State of Black New Orleans: 10 Years Post-Katrina by unknown
2State of Black New Orleans
4640 S. Carrollton Ave.
Suite 210
New Orleans, LA 70119
Phone: 504.620.2332
Website: www.urbanleagueneworleans.org
No part of this publication may be reproduced or 
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or 
mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any 
information storage or retrieval system now known or 
to be invented, without permission in writing from the 
publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote 
brief passages in connection with a review written for 
inclusion in a magazine, newspaper or broadcast.
ISBN-978-0-692-51197-8
Copyright © 2015, Urban League of Greater New Orleans
All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
STATE OF BLACK NEW ORLEANS
10 YEARS POST-KATRINA
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Erika McConduit-Diggs, Esq.
EXECUTIVE EDITORS
Rashida H. Govan, Ph.D.
Cathy Washington, MBA
COPY EDITOR
Brooke A. Burks, Ph.D
WORK GROUP MANAGER
Ethan Ashley, J.D.
PHOTOGRAPHY
Julie Dermansky
DESIGN
Dione Morgan for Morganhill, LLC
Eric Brown for Morganhill, LLC
The Data Center
National Urban League Washington  
   Bureau 
New Orleans Business Alliance 
Walton Family Foundation 
W.K. Kellogg Foundation 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
Greater New Orleans Foundation 
Baptist Community Ministries 
Foundation For Louisiana
Louisiana Public Health Institute 
Xavier University 
Dillard University 
Tulane University 
Southern University at New Orleans 
University of New Orleans 
Loyola University
   Civic Engagement Working Group
Erica Buher
Ronald Carrere
Flozell Daniels
Julius Feltus
Jacques Morial
Margo Phelps
Greg Rattler, Jr. 
Timolynn Sams Sumter
Vincent Sylvain
James Terry
Ricardo Thomas
Keith Twitchell
   Criminal Justice Working Group
Derwyn Bunton
Marjorie Esman
Michael Harrison
Norris Henderson
Susan Hutson            
Mummi Ibrahim
Calvin Johnson
Shaena Johnson
Kenneth Polite, Jr. 
Ameca Reali
Jon Wool
The Urban League of Greater New Orleans would like to extend our sincere 
thanks and gratitude to the following organizations and individuals who 
made this eort possible:
                                                  
   Economic & Workforce Development 
         Working Group
Lynnette Colin
Arnel Cosey
Cherie LaCour Duckworth
Melissa Ehlinger
Thelma French
Barbara Major
Coleman Ridley
Earl Robinson
LaTanja Silvester
Jana Sikdar
Allen Square
Tammie Washington
Patrice Williams-Smith
   Education Working Group
Toya Barnes-Teamer
Belencia Breaux
Deirdre Johnson Burel
Nancy Freeman
RaeNell Houston
Evelyn Jackson
Stacy Martin
Arielle McConduit-Longmire
Aesha Rasheed
Petrice Sams-Abiodun
   Environment Working Group
John Barry
Mark Davis
Ella Delio
Monica Farris
Monique Harden
Shirley Laska
Calvin Mackie
Telley Medina
Rachel Pickens
Beverly Wright
   Health Care
Marsha Broussard
Paulette Carter
Joia Crear-Perry
Brenda Edgerton-Webster
Mario Garner
Michael Grin
Richard Henault
Charlotte Parent
Denese Shervington
Brian Turner
Sheila Webb
   Housing Working Group
Isabel Barrios
Liza Cowan
Dawn Domengeaux
Monika Gerhart
Jerey Hebert
Fred Johnson
Martha Kegel
Ellen Lee
Andreanecia Morris
 
   
URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS
EXECUTIVE TEAM
PRESIDENT & CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Erika McConduit-Diggs
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
Cathy Washington
VICE PRESIDENT FINANCE & OPERATIONS
Gizelle Johnson–Banks
POLICY & DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANT
Rashida H. Govan
DIRECTOR 
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
Ethan Ashley
DIRECTOR 
CLARENCE L. BARNEY HEAD START CENTER
Belencia Breaux
DIRECTOR
WOMEN’S BUSINESS RESOURCE CENTER
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP CENTER
Lynnette Colin
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Cherie LaCour Duckworth
DIRECTOR
PROJECT READY
Evelyn Jackson
DIRECTOR
PARENT INFORMATION CENTER
Arielle McConduit-Longmire
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
Dorothy “Dottie” Reese
VICE CHAIRMAN
Chris D’ Amour
TREASURER
Dennis R. Mc Seveney
SECRETARY
Jade B. Russell
EX-OFFICIO
Flozell Daniels, Jr.
HONORARY MEMBER
Richard A. Henault
HONORARY MEMBER
Norman C. Francis
PRESIDENT & CEO
Erika McConduit-Diggs
MEMBERS
Ryan Banks
William T. Bostick
Mark S. Boucree
Jason Burns
Ronald Carrere
Arnel Cosey
George Chin
Peggy Grandpre
John Georges
Michael G. Grin
Maida Jones Glover
Catherine McRae
Necole Merritt
Sonia Perez
Ashton Ryan
Damon  I. Singleton
Jamie Schlottman
Keely C. Thibodeaux
Ricardo Thomas
Kimberley Treece
Beth Trotter
Kyle Wedberg
URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
State of Black New Orleans9
FOREWORD
The Fabric of New Orleans
Keith Weldon Medley
11
INTRODUCTION
The State of Black New Orleans: 10 Years Post Katrina
Erika McConduit-Diggs, Esq.
15
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
Advocate, Agitate, Activate:  
Civic Engagement trends in Post-Katrina New Orleans
Westley Bayas, III and Vincent Sylvain
17
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Over-representation in the Criminal Justice System: #BlackLivesMatter
D. Majeeda Snead and Rashida H. Govan, Ph.D.
33
ECONOMIC & WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT: 
Equity in the Economy: The Growing Wealth and Economic Divide
Richard C. Peters, Ph.D., Silas H. Lee, Ph.D. and Leroy D. Simpson, III, Psy.D., 
and Rashida H. Govan, Ph.D.
51
EDUCATION
The State of Black Education:Ten Years After the Storm of Reform
Rashida H. Govan, Ph.D.,  Andre M. Perry, Ph.D. and Debra Vaughan
65
TABLE OF CONTENTS
10
ENVIRONMENT
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
Disaster Planning and Equity:
Lessons Learned in Post-Katrina New Orleans
Robert A. Collins, Ph.D.
91
ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE
Environmental Injustice and the State of Black New Orleans
Beverly Wright, Ph.D. 
101
LIVING WITH WATER
Doubling Down: Getting to Resilience in New Orleans
John M. Barry and Mark S. Davis, J.D., M.L.T.
115
HEALTHCARE
Health Outcomes in Post-Katrina New Orleans: Place and Race Matter
Pharissa Robinson, J.D. and Lila Arnaud, M.P.H.
123
HOUSING 
The Challenges of Getting Home Quickly and Fairly: Successes and 
Failures of Housing Recovery Efforts
Kelly D. Owens, Ph.D.
139
REFLECTIONS 161
State of Black New Orleans11
IT HAS BEEN 10 YEARS SINCE 
HURRICANE KATRINA DEVASTATED NEW 
ORLEANS. SINCE THAT TIME, THERE HAVE 
BEEN UNPRECEDENTED CHANGES IN 
NEW ORLEANS AND ITS PEOPLE.
It has been 10 years since Hurricane Katrina 
devastated New Orleans. Since that time, there 
have been unprecedented changes in New 
Orleans and its people. 
The events of August 29, 2005 proved horric 
for the lives and neighborhoods of those unable 
to evacuate. At 4:30 a.m., leaks in the oodgates 
began ooding areas such as Pontchartrain Park. 
By 5:00 a.m., storm surges from the Mississippi 
River Gulf Outlet crumbled levee sections and 
the waters started seeping in toward St. Bernard 
Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward. At 6:30 a.m., 
storm surges pushed the water in the Industrial 
Canal over the levees and ooded all of New 
Orleans East, where large numbers of Black 
professionals and entrepreneurs resided. At 6:50 
a.m., the same surge began ooding the Lower 
Ninth Ward once more, as well as the mixed race 
Gentilly area and Pontchartrain Park, which had 
already ooded. Then the levee walls on the west 
side of the Industrial Canal failed, sending water 
cascading into New Orleans neighborhoods 
miles away including Treme. By the end of the 
day, 80% of the city was underwater. 
Those who study New Orleans without seeking 
its African and African-American inuences 
invariably miss what it means to know New 
Orleans. People of African descent – enslaved 
and free – willingly or unwillingly have been here 
since its earliest days. Between the years 1718 and 
1722, boatloads of Africans from the Senegambia 
region of Western Africa and outcasts from French 
FOREWORD
THE FABRIC 
OF NEW ORLEANS
Keith Weldon Medley
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society arrived in New Orleans for forced toil in 
the Louisiana marshes. They hacked and drained 
swamps, constructed buildings and levees and 
dug canals. For the French indentures, the term 
was three years. For most of the African laborers, 
it was a life sentence. 
Even with the backdrop of Katrina, 2007 marked 
a sense of resiliency and renewal and heightened 
civic involvement. In Pontchartrain Park and 
Gentilly Woods, residents signaled their return 
with bright yellow ribbons wrapped around trees 
and mailboxes even as Katrina dust still hung in 
the air. In the Lower Ninth ward, volunteers from 
around the country cleaned a ood-ravaged 
Martin Luther King School that the school system 
had virtually abandoned. Neighborhood groups 
and civic associations raised their voices and 
confronted the powers that be over the state 
and future of their beloved city. As an old Creole 
proverb stated, “Little by little, the bird built its 
nest.” 
There are always fears about the suppression of 
New Orleans Black street culture. These consist 
of the parading groups, jazz funerals, brass 
bands and oshoots that give New Orleans its 
cultural vibrancy and worldwide appeal. Those 
cultural groupings oer many young people 
the opportunity for structure and recognition. 
During the week, they may be dockworkers, 
bricklayers, or truck drivers. During the parades 
and Mardi Gras related events, they are Chiefs, 
Grand Marshalls, Kings, Bandleaders and Flag 
Boys. Similar to the sentiment expressed by the 
Houma Indians, a group of Native Americans 
who settled in Dulac, Louisiana after their land 
was appropriated, “Salvation Culture” is the same 
concept in play in New Orleans. The expressions 
that appear to be being suppressed in the city 
are beautiful and revered around the world. Louis 
Armstrong and Mahalia Jackson came from those 
traditions. 
The streets of New Orleans and its on-beat music, 
cultures, and traditions provide a cultural safety 
net.  So, even though systems and social forces 
may line up against Black youth, the cultural 
expressions provide self-esteem and purpose 
beyond what could be found in mainstream 
society. In many ways, this psychological safety 
net existed in the olden days of Congo Square 
where Africans would gather on Sundays and 
play their drums and perform ancient rituals that, 
for a few hours, shrouded every Sunday from the 
reality of their weekdays. And it still exists today 
in the traditions of the brass bands, social and 
pleasure clubs, and Mardi Gras Indians.
These cultural expressions are transmitters of 
New Orleans cultural history. The practitioners 
are cultural preservationists that hold tightly to 
the tradition set forward by those who initiated 
them. And even though the meaning behind 
some of the expressions may get lost over the 
years, the current day practitioners can still 
commune in a poetic sort of way with those who 
went before them. They walk the same streets, 
chant the same chants, and wear the same type 
of garments of those who went before them. 
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There are well-founded fears that these 
expressions—coupled with the absence of many 
of the adherents—may fall victim to those who 
prefer a more vanilla New Orleans. At a seminar 
for the 164th Anniversary of St. Augustine Church 
in the Tremé neighborhood, cultural activists 
expressed alarm at eorts by the City to suppress 
the cultural life of Black New Orleans and to expel 
Father Ledoux from the St. Augustine Church. 
He was instrumental in erecting an evocative 
sculpture garden at the church that recalled 
the anonymous slaves who built the city’s rst 
levees and buildings in old New Orleans. This 
“Tomb of the Unknown Slave” sculpture garden, 
along a wall of St. Augustine Church in the Tremé 
neighborhood, features a 1,500 pound cross 
welded from a discarded marine chain that had 
been used to anchor a buoy in the Mississippi 
River. Although people of African descent have 
been in New Orleans for nearly 300 years, the 
“Tomb of the Unknown Slave” was the only 
public monument arming their roots in New 
Orleans history.
African Americans histories were integral in 
the development of New Orleans.  There were 
philanthropists such as Thomy Lafon who 
lived in Faubourg Treme his entire life and 
funneled money to the Anti-Slavery Society and 
the Underground Railroad. Dr. Louis Charles 
Roudanez published the New Orleans Tribune in 
the middle of the Civil War. His deant newspaper 
pushed for equality and the right to vote. And 
then, there was a free man of color named 
Arnold Bertonneau who organized a petition 
drive for voting rights for people of color that 
was delivered to Abraham Lincoln and the 
United States Congress. Despite the eorts 
and successes of African Americans during 
Reconstruction, White supremacy took hold but 
not without continued opposition. 
Even in 1880, not even 20 years from 
emancipation – in the houses of the former 
slaves who had been barred from marriage or 
literacy, Black males were heads of household in 
eighty percent of those homes in New Orleans. 
Similarly, for the formerly, plantation-bound 
enslaved who were forbidden from reading, 
education became almost a lust. A Presbyterian 
minister who visited Louisiana following the Civil 
War observed that “in any direction, you meet 
Negroes on horses, Negroes with oxen, Negroes 
on foot…men, women, and children, Negroes 
in uniform, Negroes in rags; all hopeful… They 
are never out of our rooms, and their cry is for 
‘Books! Books! And ‘when will school begin?’”  
In 1890, African Americans comprised nearly 
50% of Louisiana’s voting population. There 
were 18 black members of the Louisiana 
legislature. By 1900 with the passage of White 
supremacist legislation – Blacks comprised only 
4% of the voting population and there were 
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zero Black members of the legislature. This 
all happened in 10 years. The most egregious 
policy, however, was the quashing of hopes and 
dreams of New Orleans Black school children 
seeking education.
In 1900, the Orleans Parish School Board 
stopped public education for African American 
children after the fth grade. Generations of 
Black public school students were banned from 
higher education. There would be no public high 
school for Blacks until 1917 when McDonogh 
#35 opened in New Orleans.  The 1900s were 
largely crafted by White supremacy and it is still 
a large part of Louisiana as the city’s monuments 
attest. It wasn’t that long ago we lived in a state 
where 60% of white voters voted for Nazi and 
White Supremacist David Duke. Of course, there 
are plenty of things to be angry about when 
viewing New Orleans tortured but gloriously 
redeeming history.  Still, anger, bitterness, and 
recrimination are unstable foundations from 
which to view the past or to build a future. 
The city’s African American character is not 
dened by slavery or Jim Crow or caste. Its 
character has been dened by their transcending 
the many attacks on their humanity, battling 
back against them and nding the strength to 
live another day, raise families, and shatter each 
tenet of White Supremacist thought by forming 
a sense of community, educating the next 
generation and possessing a hell of a lot of faith 
and grit. 
There are many times in a peoples’ history 
where leadership may be weak or absent and 
role models are few. But for New Orleanians and 
their allies, they can always look for inspiration 
in a remarkable and storied past. Their fore 
parents faced adversity with accomplishment. 
They stood up to segregation and fought Jim 
Crow with civil disobedience, newspapers and 
rallies, and rose to the hope of another day.  New 
Orleans will RISE from Katrina, and its people will 
have an indelible footprint on our future.  From 
the roots of our earliest ancestors to the trumpet 
blows of our youngest musicians, our culture 
will always be our strength and resilience.  
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Devastation.  Awe.  Pure and utter raw emotion 
pulled on the heartstrings of native New 
Orleanians as we watched our city drown, forced 
to gure out next steps for stabilizing our lives and 
families.  Amid government disruption, downed 
communication, mass citizen displacement, and 
crumbled infrastructure, New Orleans was a city 
in shambles with its future in question.
Ten years after the storm of the century 
devastated our beloved city, we pause to reect 
on where we have been and where we are 
going. We must honor and recognize the lives 
that have been lost and those that have been 
changed forever, as well as the countless hours 
and the enormous energy expended by people 
near and far to “bring back New Orleans.”  This 
moment of reflection allows us to count the 
lessons learned and apply them to the next ten 
years of this recovery so that we can achieve 
the goal of a stronger, sustainable and more 
equitable New Orleans. 
Over the past 10 years, tremendous progress 
has been made in New Orleans - homes, roads, 
schools, playgrounds, and hospitals have 
been rebuilt; streetcar lines expanded; airport 
remodeled; commercial development; and 
the people of this city have proven that we are 
resilient. More students are going to college 
from New Orleans public schools, our jail size 
has been reduced by more than half, and we 
are the rst major city in America to eliminate 
veteran homelessness. But on our road to 
recovery, have we reproduced some of the same 
inequities that existed prior to the storm and 
impeded people’s ability to quickly recover? The 
wealth gap continues to widen between African 
Americans and Whites, too many of us are paying 
unaordable housing costs, Black men are still 
targeted and disproportionately represented in 
the criminal justice system, and health disparities 
continue to threaten the well-being of African 
Americans in the city.  Are we seizing this 
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10 YEARS AFTER THE STORM OF THE 
CENTURY DECIMATED OUR BELOVED CITY, 
WE PAUSE TO REFLECT ON WHERE WE HAVE 
BEEN AND WHERE WE ARE GOING. 
16
opportunity to transform the city into a better 
version of itself, one in which all its residents can 
prosper and thrive? 
The State of Black New Orleans: 10 Years Post-
Katrina hopes to answer these questions (and 
more) through its analysis of the impact of 
post-Katrina recovery on the African American 
community. The publication also oers 
recommendations to address noted disparities 
impacting the African American community 
and to transform the systems that allow these 
disparities to persist.  After all, New Orleans cannot 
thrive if African Americans, who are the majority of 
the city’s residents, are not thriving as well.
Using an equity framework, the State of Black 
New Orleans: 10 Years Post-Katrina focuses on 
civic engagement, criminal justice, economic 
and workforce development, education, the 
environment, health care and housing, in 
chapters authored by some of the city’s nest 
scholars and practitioners. It is a comprehensive 
examination of the issues that impact the 
quality of life for African Americans, paying close 
attention to opportunities for improvement 
in order to chart a new course towards a more 
equitable New Orleans in 2025.  
As you delve into these chapters, consider “What 
does a successful recovery in New Orleans look 
like by 2025?” I imagine a city where every family 
has the power to access real choice in a landscape 
of quality school options; where children are 
educated in classrooms where teachers spark 
and ignite learning and creativity. I imagine a 
city where African Americans are the power base 
with a real seat at the proverbial table. I imagine a 
New Orleans where all residents can access work 
opportunities that pay a livable wage and where 
entrepreneurs are all able to take their big ideas 
and transform them into lucrative, sustainable 
businesses that create jobs and secure futures. 
I imagine a New Orleans where all residents 
can live in quality aordable homes, where life 
expectancy is not linked to zip codes, and where 
every neighborhood has access to the resources 
and experiences that promote their health and 
well-being. And, I imagine a city where better 
education and more jobs result in smaller jails 
and safer communities. How do we get to the 
New Orleans you envision in 2025? As the sun 
sets on the 10 year anniversary of Hurricane 
Katrina, blueprints like the State of Black New 
Orleans provide strategies for continued recovery 
with refocused eorts toward equity. 
Introduction
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ADV OCATE,  AG ITATE,  ACTIV ATE: 
CIV IC ENG AG EM ENT TRENDS IN 
POST- KATRINA NEW ORLEANS
BY WESTLEY BAYAS,  III &  V INCENT SYLV AIN
ON DECEMBER 10, 2 005 , 
THE STREETS OF NEW ORLEANS 
WERE FILLED WITH 5 , 000 ANG RY 
AND DETERM INED PROTESTERS. 
BOTH SURVIVORS OF HURRICANE 
KATRINA AND THEIR SUPPORTERS 
CHANTED “ WE’ RE BACK TO TAKE 
IT BACK”  AND “ NO J USTICE,  NO 
PEACE! ”
1
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Civic engagement is one pathway for 
communities of color to access much needed 
opportunities and resources to achieve equity 
with their White counterparts. This chapter 
discusses the civic engagement landscape in 
pre- and post-Katrina New Orleans and the 
ways in which it facilitates and/or hinders 
participation of communities of color in the 
areas of voter participation, volunteerism, 
youth community organizing and 
organization membership. It also provides 
a brief history of recent decades of civic 
engagement specically within the African-
American community in New Orleans, paying 
special attention to political organizing 
and African-American political organizing 
groups in the city and how they interfaced 
with a corporate structure dominated by the 
predominately White business sector.
The evacuation spread the residents of the 
city across the country months before the 
City was to hold its municipal elections. While 
local elected leadership worked to piece 
the city back together, community activists 
battled to ensure that all citizens of the city 
had an opportunity to cast a ballot. Large-
scale voter rallies led to the establishment 
of satellite voting precincts in cities across 
Louisiana, with the NAACP providing shuttle 
buses for evacuees from major Southern 
cities. While the mass organizing eorts 
helped to keep then-incumbent Mayor Ray 
Nagin in oce, the results of the election 
were a sign of the future struggles of African-
American political power.
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The Dallas Meeting and the 
“Shadow Government”
On September 8, 2005, 10 days after the 
storm, accompanied by Dan Packer, Entergy 
New Orleans' then-president & CEO, Nagin 
ew to Dallas, Texas to participate in a 
meeting arranged by Jimmy Reiss and other 
members of the Business Council (Rivlin, 
2015). That Saturday, the mayor drove 
himself to the giant Loews Anatole Hotel just 
north of downtown Dallas for what he later 
described as “my meeting with the shadow 
government” of New Orleans (Rivlin, 2015, 
p. 73).  In spite of political gains, “Uptown 
(Whites) still retained its economic clout 
despite the shifts in majority from White 
to African-American.  Its people were still 
the city’s CEOs, top lawyers, bankers, and 
real estate developers.  Whites controlled 
the business community and dominated 
philanthropic circles” (Rivlin, 2015, p. 80).  It 
was individuals from this sector who would 
largely serve as the make-up of those 
attending the ‘Dallas Meeting.’  “By Reiss’s 
count, fifty-seven members had shown 
up.  Almost everyone in the room was 
white” (Rivlin, 2015, p.86).
On December 10, 2005, the streets of New 
Orleans were filled with 5,000 angry and 
determined protesters, both survivors of 
Hurricane Katrina and their supporters, 
who chanted “We’re back to take it back” 
and “No justice, no peace!” A crowd 
estimated at 5,000 marched from the 
historic Congo Square to City Hall for a 
rally, where they demanded “Justice after 
Katrina” (Dowell, 2005).
In 2002 New Orleans elected C. Ray Nagin 
to succeed Marc Morial as mayor.  Black 
himself, Nagin would still take on the 
African-American political establishment, 
promising to eliminate the City’s living-
wage ordinance and the City’s set-aside 
program for minority- and women-owned 
businesses (Russell, 2002).  Both the city’s 
only daily newspaper at the time, The Times-
Picayune, and the city’s inuential political 
weekly, Gambit, endorsed Nagin’s candidacy 
(Russell, 2002).  That helped solidify Nagin’s 
standing in the White community, garnering 
him 86% of the White vote, enough to 
compensate for his 40% showing in the 
Black community.  He was sold as a reform-
minded, business candidate who would turn 
New Orleans around.  Plus, it did not hurt 
that Nagin’s run-o opponent, while having 
successfully served as the most recent Police 
Superintendent, was not from New Orleans. 
Nagin would preside as mayor during 
Hurricane Katrina and would get re-elected 
in 2006; Reverend Jesse Jackson and the 
Rainbow Coalition along with the National 
Coalition for Black Civic Participation and 
others would play a prominent role in 
helping to ensure that Katrina survivors, 
who had been dispersed to over 44 states 
in the country, would have their voting 
rights protected and not face massive 
disenfranchisement in the upcoming New 
Orleans election on April 22, 2006.  
In a moment captured from a page of the civil 
rights movement in the 1960s, thousands 
of disenchanted citizens marched across 
the Crescent City Connection Bridge on 
Saturday, April 8, 2006 in “The March for Our 
Right to Return, Vote and Rebuild,” seeking 
the right of displaced New Orleans citizens 
to vote in the election.  After ery speeches 
delivered on the grounds of the Ernest 
M. Morial Convention Center by leaders 
of the civil rights movement, politicians 
and celebrities, such as Rev. Jesse Jackson, 
Rev. Al Sharpton, and celebrity Judge 
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Greg Mathis, the marchers crossed the 
Crescent City Connection Bridge, spanning 
the Mississippi River, where thousands of 
New Orleans citizens were stranded after 
Hurricane Katrina and the oodwaters of 
the Gulf of Mexico caused devastation in 
the city the summer before.  Other speakers 
included former New Orleans Mayor Marc 
Morial, president of the National Urban 
League. They charged that to not meet their 
demands would result in a clear violation 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Rainbow 
PUSH, 2006).  Louisiana’s Governor Blanco 
met their demands and issued an executive 
order to put in place satellite voting places in 
cities and states where Katrina survivors were 
now residing.  Her orders also required the 
Secretary of State and Attorney General to 
make an updated voter roll. This work helped 
to spur Mayor Nagin’s reelection in 2006.
As citizen groups began to mark their 
territorial battleground, advocacy 
organizations such as Common Ground 
Collective/Relief and ACORN would lay 
claim to protecting other neighborhoods, 
the Lower Ninth Ward and additional 
underserved minority neighborhoods, 
impacted by Katrina. In March 2006, Common 
Ground commandeered Martin Luther King 
Elementary School as an act of deance and 
to stake claim on behalf of returning Katrina 
survivors (Flathery, 2010).  
ACORN focused most of its eorts towards 
rallying against Mayor Nagin’s threats 
to use his powers of eminent domain to 
seize vacant and damaged properties; 
particularly those located in the Lower Ninth 
Ward.  ACORN also brought attention to the 
double standards that were taking place 
in regards to loan repayments of damaged 
homes. While the average Lower Ninth Ward 
resident only earned an average of $16,000 
a year when Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, 
homeownership in this part of the city was 
still higher than many other parts of New 
Orleans (Etheridge, 2005).  And it would 
be the Lower Ninth Ward- a mixed-race 
community before school desegregation but 
98% African-American at the time of Katrina-
that stood as a synecdoche for anyone 
debating the rebuilding question starting to 
dominate the discussion a few weeks after 
the storm (Rivlin, 2015). 
While still in the midst of evaluating 
and developing a recovery plan from 
the devastation caused by Hurricane 
Katrina, New Orleans would experience a 
transformation of its political landscape; 
one in which it had become accustomed 
to for thirty years. Back in the 1970s as 
African-Americans began to gain a greater 
political foothold in New Orleans elective 
oces, an “unwritten rule” between African-
American political leaders and the White 
corporate and political leaders decided that 
the City’s interest was best served if it had a 
racial balance in the at-large seat, a similar 
courtesy that existed in regards to the many 
civil/criminal/municipal judicial seats.  In 
honor of that commitment, there had not 
been any organized attempts by major 
African-American political organizations to 
win the second at-large council race even as 
demographics began to favor the African-
American population.  
An unforeseen resignation only two 
years after Katrina threatened to change 
that balance. Oliver Thomas, an African 
American who held one of New Orleans’ 
two Councilman-at-Large seats, resigned his 
council seat after pleading guilty on August 
13, 2007 to bribery charges for actions taken 
prior to Hurricane Katrina (Donze, 2007). 
Thomas’ legal situation would test the will of 
Whites to honor the decades old “unwritten 
rule” which had been in place.
New Orleans had always maintained an 
African-American and a White individual in 
the two at-large positions since the Reverend 
A.L. Davis, who had been a Civil Rights 
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leader, became the rst African American to 
serve on the City Council.  Reverend Davis 
was appointed to the District “B” seat on the 
City Council in 1975 to ll the unexpired 
term of White Councilman Eddie Sapir, who 
had been elected judge of Municipal Court. 
Reverend Davis was eventually elected to 
the seat in 1976 along with Joseph DiRosa, 
a long-time political xture in the White 
community. The pattern of racial balance 
in the at-large council seats continued up 
until the 2006 municipal elections when 
then newcomer Arnie Fielkow joined 
Councilmember At-Large Thomas.  
The combination of the unexpected exit 
by Thomas from the council seat; a high 
number of African-American voters who had 
not been able to return to the city following 
Hurricane Katrina; and the challenge 
of raising necessary funds to launch a 
campaign created a new paradigm for New 
Orleans, a paradigm that would create new 
opportunities for Whites to gain a greater 
foothold in elective oce.  This would be 
the case especially during “special elections” 
where traditionally African-Americans had 
historically turned out in fewer numbers 
even under normal circumstances.
The October 2007 election to select a 
replacement for Councilman Thomas 
placed sitting District Councilwoman 
Jacquelyn Clarkson, a White Democrat from 
Algiers, a neighborhood which had largely 
escaped the ooding of Katrina, in a run-
o, against Councilwoman Cynthia Willard-
Lewis, an African American Democrat who 
represented the mostly devastated areas of 
New Orleans East and the Lower 9th Ward. 
Clarkson won the election, creating a 5-2 
majority in favor of Whites and seemingly 
began a run of White/Asian elected ocials 
on the City Council, Orleans Parish School 
Board, several judgeships, the District 
Attorney’s oce and ultimately former 
African American Congressman William 
Jeerson’s seat as well as that of the Mayor. 
Over the next few years, the African American 
political establishment would stew over the 
loss of those seats; particularly the inability to 
win at least one of the two Council-at-Large 
seats.   
A level of blame for loss of voting strength 
was also attributed to the local city  council 
members and Mayor Nagin who in 2007 
made the decision to tear down the ‘Big 
Four’ existing public housing developments 
in New Orleans; St. Bernard, C.J. Peete 
(Magnolia Projects), Latte, and  B.W. Cooper. 
Some former residents and advocates 
protested that the Housing Authority of New 
Orleans’ (HANO) plan would not provide 
enough housing for the number of people 
who formerly lived in those units prior to 
the hurricane. Another level of blame could 
be assigned to the deterioration in strength 
of the Black-led political organizations 
that rallied political support in minority 
neighborhoods. Groups like the Black 
Organization for Leadership Development 
(BOLD), the Southern Organization for 
Urban Leadership (SOUL), the Community 
Organization for Urban Politics (COUP), the 
Louisiana Independent Federation of Electors 
(LIFE), and the Progressive Democrats were 
considered critical to the election of any 
candidate in New Orleans (Mock, 2010b). 
Many of these groups split up the city by 
neighborhood, focusing on the housing 
projects in their area as a concentration of 
votes (Mock, 2010a). With the destruction 
of the housing developments, along with 
federal public corruption eorts decimating 
many leaders of the groups, the Black-led 
political organizations have suered from a 
severe loss of political power and patronage. 
Without these so-called “alphabet soup” 
(Moseley, 2012)  groups to drive voter 
education and turnout eorts, many Black 
and Black-supported candidates would begin 
to struggle with maintaining their base.
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Social activists charged that this was all 
part of a plan to create a “new New Orleans.” 
They pointed to statements such as those 
reported by the Wall Street Journal that 
then Republican Congressman Richard 
Baker of Baton Rouge (1987 to 2008) was 
overheard telling lobbyists: “We nally 
cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. 
We couldn’t do it, but God did” as evidence 
of such a plan (Babington, 2005, para. 2). Pre-
Katrina, the combination of a large African-
American middle-class and public housing 
residents had become an impenetrable 
political force for African-Americans seeking 
elective oce.  In September 2005 that 
political advantage was gone.  A sense of 
abandonment and betrayal would become 
the topic of discussion among African-
American politicians and political players in 
private gatherings.  
While African-Americans were able to hold 
on to the mayor’s seat by re-electing Mayor 
Nagin in 2006, they would lose the super-
majority control of the council when Stacy 
Head was able to parley with BOLD to garner 
their support leading to a 54% – 46%  victory 
over the Progressive Democrat-backed, and 
Congressman Jeerson-supported African 
American incumbent Councilwoman Renee 
Gill Pratt.   The predominately low-income 
neighborhoods of Central City were heavily 
impacted by the hurricane while large 
slivers of highly White-populated areas 
along the river were mostly untouched, thus 
providing White candidates a demographic 
advantage among “active voters” that did 
not exist prior to the hurricane. African-
Americans found comfort in maintaining 
control of the dual Sheri’s Oces, with 
both Civil Sheri Paul Valteau and Criminal 
Sheri Marlin Gusman winning reelection 
during the 2006 municipal election.  
Congressman Jeerson’s defeat to 
Vietnamese-American Republican Ahn 
“Joseph” Cao two years later was attributed 
to a combination of his legal issues and 
the fact that Hurricane Gustav had pushed 
the election to one month after the 2008 
presidential election in which African-
Americans turned out in record numbers in 
New Orleans to cast their vote for Senator 
Barack Obama’s run for the presidency. 
Subsequently during the Jeerson verses 
Cao run-o, African-American voter turnout 
was only 12%.  
As the number of African-Americans 
retuning to New Orleans began to grow, the 
fall elections of 2008 would begin to show 
signs of African-Americans ability to regain 
political power in oces outside of City 
Hall.  This time period also coincided with 
HUD’s ground breaking on a $138 million 
mixed-use community at the site of the old 
St. Bernard complex. Redevelopment plans 
were also announced for the replacement 
of the C.J. Peete and Latte housing 
developments (Krupa, 2008). 
While 2008 elections for seats on the Orleans 
Parish School Board resulted with a 4-2-1 
White majority school board with victories 
by African American candidates Ira Thomas 
and Cynthia Cade, and Hispanic candidate 
Lourdes Moran, the judicial elections 
produced much dierent results along racial 
terms. When Judge Nadine Ramsey stepped 
down to run for mayor in 2010, Paula Brown 
was able to chalk up another victory on the 
African American side of the ledger with her 
run for Civil District Court Judge in February 
2009.  Even though Brown won against 
overwhelming odds, many in the political 
circle still saw Judge Brown’s victory, which 
avoided a run-o against a White opponent 
and perennial candidate and former judge 
Morris Reed, merely as a political uke and not 
a true signal that African-Americans were once 
again in a political advantageous position to 
win special elections or run-os with limited 
issues on the ballot.  To become believers 
that African-American voting strength were 
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returning to pre-Katrina numbers, everyone 
would need to see more proof.
Additional evidence would soon follow. 
Monique Morial, the daughter of New 
Orleans’ rst African American mayor and 
sister of former Mayor Marc Morial was 
elected to the First City Court in July 2010 
with no opposition. Earlier that August, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court appointed Judge 
Morial to serve Pro Tempore in the First City 
Court for retired Judge Sonja Spears until 
December. In January 2011, Judge Morial 
began her term as judge of First City Court, 
Section “A”, actually succeeding retiring 
Judge Charles Imbornone.
While Mitch Landrieu won his third attempt 
at the Mayor’s Oce in 2010, additional 
signs that Black political strength continued 
to grow began to arise. In the rst election 
where Orleans Parish would have a unied 
sheri to handle civil and criminal matters, 
Criminal Sheri Marlin Gusman successfully 
won reelection and established himself as 
the foundation of Black political support in 
New Orleans. While the election of African 
American Congressman Cedric Richmond in 
2010 would provide additional redemption 
and a feeling of optimism in the African-
American community, still the lack of racial 
balance on the City Council would continue 
to burn.  In April 2012 voters would get 
another chance to restore racial balance to 
the New Orleans City Council and the White 
political and corporate establishments 
would be provided another opportunity to 
help “do the right thing.” 
However once again, the outcome 
produced results outside the boundaries 
of the old “unwritten rule” agreement.  This 
time it would be Councilmember Stacy 
Head defeating Councilmember Willard-
Lewis for the Council-at-large seat by a 
total of 281 votes, unocial returns showed 
Head receiving 27,787 votes to Willard-
Lewis’ 27,506 (WWL-TV, 2012).    Head was 
able to garner the endorsement of State 
Representative Austin Badon, an African 
American who had nished a strong third 
in the primary, while another handful 
of prominent African American leaders 
remained silent on the race.  This allowed 
Head to build momentum in pockets of the 
African-American community.  It appeared 
that a new formula for victory for White 
ocials was emerging, one that could last 
decades if African-Americans did not grow 
their ranks among the population base.  
The fall 2012 elections saw several new 
trends develop with two new African-
Americans, Nolan Marshall, Jr. and Leslie 
Ellison, winning seats on the Orleans Parish 
School Board, returning the racial majority 
to 4-3.  African American Councilwoman 
LaToya Cantrell’s victory over Dana Kaplan 
restored the District B Council seat to the 
hands of an African-American elected 
ocial for the rst time since 2006.  In fact, 
prior to 2006, the Central City seat had 
been held by an African American elected 
ocial for 31 years. An even more stunning 
development took place on the West Bank 
of Orleans Parish with unexpected victories 
by four African American candidates in 
Algiers. For the rst time since pre-Katrina 
a newer pattern emerged; White elected 
ocials were no longer able to count on 
the voter dierential being in their favor. 
Rather, if that is the case permanently, then 
White candidates would have to do as Mayor 
Mitch Landrieu did in the 2010 elections; 
show that one had a demonstrated record 
of being sensitive to the causes of the 
African American community in order to 
earn their vote.  
In the 2014 elections, for the rst time in the 
city’s history, the two seats were separated 
and council-at-large candidates now would 
have to declare in advance which of the two 
seats they are seeking.  Under the old rule all 
candidates ran under one race and the top 
State of Black New Orleans25
two vote gatherers receiving more than 25% 
of the votes were determined the winners. 
If the second place nisher failed to receive 
25% of the vote, then a runo was held 
between the second and third place nisher.
Under the new rule, each candidate would 
have to receive 50% plus one of the total 
number of votes cast in order to be declared 
the winner during the primary in each 
individual race.  If no one received the 
required 50% plus one then a runo would 
be held.  This provided for some interesting 
dynamics and created speculation that 
perhaps African-Americans would now be 
able to win both at-large seats.
The 2014 elections would result in victories 
maintaining the old racial balance, African 
American lawyer Jason Williams would win 
one seat while Councilmember Head carried 
the other at-large race.  Victories in ve of 
the seven council seats by African American 
candidates, was evidence that the African-
American voting population was returning 
to pre-Katrina levels, thus restoring a super-
majority in favor of the African American 
community.
How the Recovery Planning 
Process Spurred Community 
Civic Engagement
After Hurricane Katrina passed over New 
Orleans and the rainwaters subsided, 
hundreds of thousands of residents 
began the process of rebuilding their 
homes and lives. With almost all forms 
of communication paused due to lack of 
infrastructure, New Orleanians were at a loss 
about how they would be able to get critical 
information about the recovery.  Residents 
were also in the dark about how the city 
would be rebuilt, and which neighborhoods 
would be considered for rehabilitation. 
These conditions served as a catalyst to 
a civic engagement movement that has 
transformed how neighborhoods, NGOs, 
and government agencies interact and 
execute their missions. 
The impetus for change started in the 
immediate days following Katrina. While 
residents were still reeling from the eects of 
the storm surge that overtook homes, local 
business leaders began to plan the city’s 
future. Initial private planning meetings held 
out of state led to then-Mayor Ray Nagin’s 
September 2005 creation of the Bring Back 
New Orleans Commission, a 17-member 
mayoral appointee committee designated 
to build a master plan for the rebuilding 
of the city (CNN Wire Sta, 2005). The 
Commission’s work culminated in early 2006 
with the unveiling of a plan that shrunk the 
footprint of the city, placing many low-lying 
neighborhoods under a ubiquitous “green 
dot” that represented residential areas that 
would be converted to park space (The 
Times-Picayune Sta, 2005). Community 
uproar over the next few months lead to 
the shelving of the Commission’s plan, but 
it planted the seed for future community 
endeavors into urban planning and the 
rebuilding of New Orleans.
Shortly after the Bring Back New Orleans 
Commission unveiled their plan, a group 
of residents came together to create an 
organization that could leverage community 
power to inuence the rebuilding process. 
Known as the Neighborhood Partnership 
Network (NPN), this organization focused on 
neighborhood organizing and information 
outreach to bring groups together to 
collaborate and advocate for community 
needs. NPN also played a role in connecting 
residents to the numerous rebuilding master 
planning processes that followed.  
In the wake of the plan, the New Orleans 
City Council launched a second attempt at 
creating a rebuilding master plan. Called 
the Lambert Plan, the nal product had 
additional community input, but still 
lacked much of the needed credibility from 
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the entire city. The Louisiana Recovery 
Authority, with support from the Rockefeller 
Foundation & the Greater New Orleans 
Foundation, launched a third process. 
Known as the United New Orleans Plan 
(UNOP). This eort (which also had support 
from the Mayor’s Oce & the City Council) 
led to the rst community-accepted master 
plan (Williamson, 2007). While the ideas 
from UNOP were later expanded upon in 
the ocial City-accepted Master Plan, a 
need for expanded community voice in civic 
engagement eorts was identied. 
The Committee for a Better New Orleans 
(CBNO) picked up eorts that started with a 
1992 City Master Plan to develop a formalized 
citizen participation process (CPP) that 
would ensure residents would have voice 
in planning and zoning developments 
in their neighborhoods. CBNO launched 
a CPP campaign to inform and unite 
neighborhood leaders around a governance 
structure that would create a resident-led 
entity to facilitate conversations between 
government agencies and neighborhood 
leaders (Committee for a Better New Orleans, 
n.d.).  Concurrently, NPN began advocating 
for City Government to create an Oce 
of Neighborhoods that would formalize 
the relationship between the executive 
branch & neighborhood associations, while 
creating a conduit for dialogue between 
residents of New Orleans and city ocials. 
These ideas, among others from a variety 
of neighborhood groups, became the 
foundation for recommendations delivered 
to then Mayor-elect Mitch Landrieu from 
the Neighborhood Development Task Force 
that was commissioned by his transition 
team (Transition New Orleans, 2010).
Thanks to the eorts of NPN & neighborhood 
organizations, the City of New Orleans 
created the Oce of Neighborhood 
Engagement in response to the task force 
recommendations within the rst year of 
the Landrieu administration (Krupa, 2011). 
By the end of 2012, the City had adopted 
a formalized CPP process that ensured 
residents received notication of planning 
and zoning changes in their area and required 
developers to hold meetings with residents 
to get approval for their projects (City 
Planning Commission, 2012). Community 
groups such as Ride New Orleans, the 
Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance, and 
the New Orleans Kids Partnership have also 
taken on critical advocacy roles in the areas 
of transportation, aordable housing, and 
youth and family engagement. 
Other post-Katrina organizations that spurred 
activism and action for representative causes 
included Women of the Storm, Beacon of 
Hope, Citizens for 1 New Orleans, African 
American Women of Purpose and Power, 
Jutice and Beyond, and Puentes NOLA. 
While issue constituency and community 
groups helped to lead the planning process, 
youth organizations were beginning to 
create opportunities for young people to be 
engaged in civic endeavors.
Youth community organizing in New Orleans 
found root in the Hurricane Katrina recovery 
as residents emphasized that all voices 
needed to be heard. Prior to the storm, the 
idea of youth community organizing was 
nascent with few established outlets that 
promoted or created space for youth voice. 
In the aftermath of the storm, numerous 
organizations were established to began 
organizing various constituencies within the 
New Orleans youth community.  Using the 
rapidly changing Orleans Parish education 
system as additional leverage, youth-led 
organizing in the city has not only grown 
exponentially but has continued to stay 
nimble to meet the needs of young people 
while achieving crucial policy victories.
VAYLA, formerly known as the Vietnamese 
American Young Leaders Association, is one 
such example. Started in 2006 to mobilize 
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Vietnamese residents around environmental 
concerns in New Orleans East, VAYLA has 
grown into a multi-racial, multi -issue, youth-
led organization with signicant inuence 
in the New Orleans community. Best known 
for the “Raise Your Hand” campaign that 
used youth action participatory research on 
the conditions of local public schools, VAYLA 
has garnered national acclaim for its ability 
to organize youth around critical issues such 
as school closures, education equity, and 
language access. 
Kids Rethink New Orleans Schools is another 
example of nimble youth organizing to 
address critical needs. Started in 2006 to 
assist middle school students in having a 
meaningful voice in the city’s school reform, 
Kids Rethink has taken on issues such as 
food justice & restorative justice. The work of 
the Rethinkers has lead local school leaders 
to consider restorative justice practices 
in their disciplinary procedures, and their 
food justice program was the focus of a 
HBO documentary on school nutrition. Kids 
Rethink also used interactive projects such 
as school gardens and community theater 
to further their organizing goals and expand 
their reach. 
BreakOUT! is among the newer youth 
constituency organizing groups in the city, 
focused on ending the criminalization of 
LGBTQ youth aged 13-25 in New Orleans. 
Founded in 2011, BreakOUT! launched 
their "We Deserve Better” campaign to end 
discriminatory policing practices in New 
Orleans. BreakOUT! also co-developed a "Get 
Yr Rights" toolkit designed to equip LGBTQ 
youth with legal knowledge to protect 
themselves during police interactions. 
Their work in a short amount of time has 
increased awareness of LGBTQ youth issues, 
and has inuenced policy. 
While Hurricane Katrina forced residents to 
start over, it also allowed communities to 
dictate how development would proceed 
in their neighborhoods. Neighborhood 
associations began to demand ownership 
of their fate, issue groups ensured that 
critical policies were implemented to create 
equitable growth, and youth organizations 
have created a pathway for future 
leadership. Civic engagement has improved 
in the city, but without the continued eorts 
and support of the myriad of organizations 
that have been involved, the gains made will 
be lost.   
New Orleans Voting Engagement 
by the Numbers
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans 
was considered a bastion of Democratic 
and African-American votes. The vaunted 
voting machine of New Orleans helped 
Senator Mary Landrieu win her rst 
term in oce, and ensured that African-
American residents of New Orleans played 
an integral role in citywide and statewide 
elections (Rothenberg, 1997), Louisiana 
Secretary Of State les show that African-
Americans made up almost two-thirds 
of the registered voters in the city in the 
months preceding Katrina, and the elected 
political leadership of Orleans Parish was 
overwhelmingly African-American. After 
August 2005, African-American political and 
civic leadership in the city was in a state of 
ux for almost 10 years.
Voter registration trends have revealed 
the large drop of registered voters post-
Katrina, with African-Americans suering 
an almost 25% drop in total registered 
voters between August 2005 and 
December 2014. In comparison, the drop 
in voter registration for White voters has 
stayed under 10% and there has been very 
little drop among registered voters of other 
races (See Figure 1).
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VOTER REGISTRATION & PARTICIPATION IN NEW ORLEANS MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
Registered Voters by Race
Black White Other Total Black % of Vote
2014 Total Registered Voters 142,835 82,178 18,396 243,409 58.68%
2014 Total Voted 49,028 32,303 4,289 85,620
2014 Turnout % By Race 34.32% 39.31% 23.31% 35.18% 57.26%
2010 Total Registered Voters 168,851 84,626 19,762 273,239 61.80%
2010 Total Voted 47,549 37,184 4,622 89,355
2010 Turnout % By Race 28.16% 43.94% 23.39% 32.70% 53.21%
2006 Total Registered Voters 188,316 90,909 19,287 298,512 63.08%
2006 Total Voted 58,474 46,061 5,444 109,979
2006 Turnout % By Race 31.05% 50.67% 28.23% 36.84% 53.17%
2002 Total Registered Voters 184,798 94,087 16,165 295,050 62.63%
2002 Total Voted 83,164 47,246 4,553 134,973
2002 Turnout % By Race 45.00% 50.22% 28.17% 45.75% 61.62%
Figure 1
Voter registration by itself does not tell 
the entire story of how African-Americans 
temporarily lost political power. Participation 
played a key role, especially between 2006-
2011 as African-American New Orleanians 
focused on the Katrina recovery. For 
example, in the 2006 municipal election, 
African-American voters dropped in turnout 
by 30% from the 2002 election, while turnout 
in White and other communities stayed at. 
The 2007 gubernatorial election furthered 
the erosion, when African-American voter 
turnout in Orleans Parish dropped 48% 
from the previous gubernatorial election in 
2003, while White turnout dropped only by 
21% (See Figure 2). The 2008 presidential 
election saw turnout down across the 
board, despite the election setting national 
turnout records. (See Figure 3) Participation 
continued to lag throughout the beginning 
of the decade, and it was not until the 2012 
presidential election when African-American 
turnout percentages began to near pre-
Katrina numbers. The improvement was 
aided by the voter purge conducted by the 
Louisiana Secretary of State’s oce in early 
2011, which rid the rolls of voters who had 
not voted since 2005. 
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While the voter purge may have condensed 
the number of voters, there is still a clear trend 
line of African-American political voting power 
improving. By comparing the percentage of 
African-American voters registered among 
total registered voters to the percentage 
of African-American voters among total 
voters in an election, it can be determined if 
African-Americans are fully represented in 
a particular election (represented as Black 
or BLK % of Vote in Figures 1-3). An equal 
number represents equal representation in 
an election, with higher numbers meaning 
overrepresentation and lower numbers 
meaning underrepresentation. In the last 
major election prior to Hurricane Katrina, the 
2004 Presidential election, African-American 
voter share almost equaled African-American 
voter registration share. In comparison, the 
2006 mayoral election saw a 16-percentage 
point dierence in African-American voter 
share, and the 2007 gubernatorial election 
showed a 20-percentage point dierence. This 
trend continued through the 2010 mayoral 
election, which saw an African-American voter 
share dierence of 14 percentage points.
Starting in 2012, the previous trend lines in 
voter participation and African-American 
voter share began to shift back in favor of 
VOTER REGISTRATION & PARTICIPATION IN ORLEANS PARISH DURING GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS 
Registered Voters by Race
Black White Other Total BLK % OF VOTE
2011 Total Registered Voters 137,393 76,799 17,124 231,316 59.40%
2011 Total Voted 30,844 22,272 2,462 55,578
2011 Turnout % By Race 22.45% 29.00% 14.38% 24.03% 55.50%
2007 Total Registered Voters 176,277 83,962 18,539 278,778 63.23%
2007 Total Voted 38,738 33,937 3,879 76,554
2007 Turnout % By Race 21.98% 40.42% 20.92% 27.46% 50.60%
2003 Total Registered Voters 184,578 91,452 17,020 293,050 62.99%
2003 Total Voted 74,204 43,071 4,566 121,841
2003 Turnout % By Race 40.20% 47.10% 26.83% 41.58% 60.90%
1999 Total Registered Voters 182,807 94,846 13,802 291,455 62.72%
1999 Total Voted 76,196 39,374 3,135 118,705
1999 Turnout % By Race 41.68% 41.51% 22.71% 40.73% 64.19%
Figure 2
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African-American residents. The 2012 
Presidential election saw African-Americans 
set local turnout percentage records, and 
the African-American voter share reached 
60%. Due to the increased voter participation 
numbers from African-Americans, the 
Orleans Parish School Board returned to a 4-3 
African-American/White majority & African-
American candidates in Algiers were able to 
upset a slate of White incumbent candidates 
in local judicial races. The expansion of 
African-American elected political power 
has continued, with the New Orleans City 
Council currently holding a 5-2 African-
American/White majority & African-American 
candidates winning judicial races over more 
established White candidates. While Katrina 
has certainly aected the makeup of the New 
Orleans voting population, we are starting to 
see a return to normalcy when it comes to 
the city’s elections.
The last 10 years of voter registration and voter 
participation in New Orleans represented 
an era of ux for African-American political 
power in New Orleans, but there are three 
takeaways from the data and observations of 
that time.
VOTER REGISTRATION & PARTICIPATION IN ORLEANS PARISH DURING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
Registered Voters by Race
Black White Other Total BLK % OF VOTE
2012 Total Registered Voters 148,096 83,213 18,945 250,254 59.18%
2012 Total Voted 96,077 52,995 9,701 158,773
2012 Turnout % By Race 64.87% 63.69% 51.21% 63.44% 60.51%
2008 Total Registered Voters 177,282 86,240 20,200 283,722 62.48%
2008 Total Voted 90,380 50,082 8,986 149,448
2008 Turnout % By Race 50.98% 58.07% 44.49% 52.67% 60.48%
2004 Total Registered Voters 201,052 98,523 20,678 320,253 62.78%
2004 Total Voted 122,082 64,462 10,569 197,113
2004 Turnout % By Race 60.72% 65.43% 51.11% 61.55% 61.94%
2000 Total Registered Voters 187,691 97,713 15,998 301,402 62.27%
2000 Total Voted 112,586 61,927 7,581 182,094
2000 Turnout % By Race 59.98% 63.38% 47.39% 60.42% 61.83%
Figure 3
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1. Lower voter registration 
numbers have affected our 
statewide influence.
New Orleans lost 53,000+ registered 
voters because of Hurricane Katrina, 
86% of which were African-American. 
This loss has aected the city’s ability 
to swing statewide elections, and a 
net loss of ve seats in the legislative 
delegation. While Democratic statewide 
campaigns were built on turning out 
large numbers of African-Americans in 
New Orleans, the sheer number loss has 
turned many potential candidates o 
from taking a chance.
2. Voter participation dropped 
signicantly, but has recovered 
to almost pre-Katrina levels.
Immediately following Katrina, 
African-American voter participation 
rates tumbled. Reductions between 
20% to 50% were observed in elections 
during 2006 to 2011. Starting with the 
2012 presidential election, African-
American participation rates have 
started to rise to levels that match 
pre-Katrina numbers. 
3. African-American elected 
political power in New 
Orleans is reestablishing 
itself.
While the downturn in registration & 
participation contributed to a rapid 
shift in political power from African-
American officials to White, the last 
three years have seen a renaissance 
of leadership. With local boards 
returning under control of African-
American majorities, there seem to 
be opportunities in the future for 
the African-American community to 
advance their political presence and 
influence.
With the 2015 Gubernatorial Election 
on the horizon, we will soon see 
if African-American voters in New 
Orleans have finally reestablished 
themselves as a potent voting block 
and if New Orleans as a whole can 
swing elections again. What role will 
African American-led and focused 
organizations do to encourage 
continued civic participation within 
the African American community? 
These organizations will need to make 
African American civic engagement 
a priority in their work in order to 
strengthen African American voting 
power and advocacy efforts to bring 
about equity in the “new New Orleans.”
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OV ER- REPRESENTATION 
IN THE CRIM INAL J USTICE SYSTEM : 
# BLACKLIV ESM ATTER
BY D.  M AJ EEDA SNEAD,  ESQ  AND RASHIDA G OV AN,  PH. D.
ALTHOUGH AFRICAN AM ERICANS 
ARE ONLY 3 2 %  OF LOUISIANA’ S 
POPULATION, THEY M AKE 
UP M ORE THAN 6 7 %  OF THE 
STATE’ S PRISON POPULATION. 
NEW ORLEANS HAS THE HIGHEST 
INCARCERATION RATE PER CAPITA 
THAN ANY OTHER JURISDICTION 
AND ALMOST 9 0%  OF ITS PRISON 
POPULATION IS AFRICAN 
AM ERICAN. 2
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Hurricane Katrina unleashed its wrath on 
the city of New Orleans in 2005. The rising 
waters caused massive destruction and 
revealed systemic failures throughout the 
city.  One of the many inequities exposed 
by Hurricane Katrina was the economic and 
social disadvantages suered by many New 
Orleans residents.  Most notably, the storm 
and ood exposed the long-existing failures 
of the city’s criminal justice system. Once 
the waters receded and the lights were 
restored, the city began the daunting task of 
rebuilding.   Ten years later, these inequities 
in the criminal justice system still exist and 
continue to impact the African American 
community most signicantly. This chapter 
examines the disparities that exist in the city 
and the eects those disparities have had 
on African American communities in the 
criminal justice system.
There are more than 2.2 million people 
incarcerated in the United States, a rate 
higher than that of any other industrialized 
nation (The Sentencing Project, 2015).  That 
is a 500% increase in the number of people in 
prisons and jails in this country over the past 
thirty years (The Sentencing Project, 2015). 
Of the 50 states, Louisiana is number one in 
incarceration rates.  Regrettably, in 2005, the 
city had the highest number of incarcerated 
citizens in the State of Louisiana (See Figure1) 
(Gray, 2015). This is not a statistic that should 
illicit pride.
The high incarceration rate in this state 
clearly has a disparate impact on the African 
American community.  
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Although African Americans are only 32% of 
Louisiana’s population, they make up more 
than 67% of the state’s prison population 
(Louisiana Department of Public Safety 
and Corrections, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013a). New Orleans has the highest 
incarceration rate per capita in the world 
and almost 90% of its prison population is 
African American (Rainey, 2015). In New 
Orleans, one out of seven African American 
males in the city has either been in prison, 
on parole or on probation (See Figure 2) 
(Chang, 2012).  
The disparity existing between the 
numbers of young African American males 
incarcerated in the city and their White 
counterparts is consistent with the national 
trend of high arrest and incarceration 
rates of African American males.  The 
implementation of the “War on Drugs” in 
this country oers a clear example of this 
trend. African Americans are arrested three 
times more than Whites on drug possession 
charges and convicted 10 times more than 
Whites although they are no more likely to 
use illicit drugs than Whites (Fellner, 2013). 
These disparities in arrests and convictions 
are due in large part to drug policies 
inuenced by racially biased perspectives 
on the “drug problem” in America and on law 
enforcement decisions to concentrate their 
eorts in low-income, communities of color 
(Fellner, 2013). This disparity is even more 
disturbing considering African Americans 
are only 13.2% of the national population 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2015).
Figure 1: Ten most incarrerated US Jurisdictions, 
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Figure 2: Percentage of African Americans in Louisiana, Louisiana Prisons, New Orleans and New Orleans Prisons
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Drug oenses are not the only type of crime 
where these disparities exist. While the 
media reports of crime in the city suggest 
that crime is primarily violent and victim-
oriented, pre- Katrina reports of crime data 
reveal 86% of all arrests in the city were 
for nonviolent oenses during the period 
between 2003 and 2004 (Johnson, Laisne & 
Wool, 2015).  African Americans comprised 
67% of the city’s population pre-Katrina 
(Shrinath, Mack & Plyer, 2014).  However, 
of the 140,000 arrests that occurred in 
2004, African Americans made up an 
overwhelming majority of those arrests 
(Austin, Ware, & Rocker, 2011).      
Based on the statistical data documenting 
the disproportionate number of African 
Americans arrested and incarcerated in this 
country, anyone could infer that African 
Americans are more likely than any other 
race to commit crimes.  Of course that 
would be an inaccurate inference.  Statistics 
alone do not tell the entire story.  In order 
to explain the disparities in the number of 
African Americans arrested and imprisoned 
one must probe further to learn the root 
causes which account for their presence in 
the criminal justice system. 
Poverty
Poverty is one of the many predictors that 
may determine if someone will end up in 
the criminal justice system (Poverties.org, 
2013). A child’s future success or failure 
can be directly tied to what resources are 
available to them.  If resources are limited 
the likelihood of success is much more 
challenging. For many African Americans 
in the city, resources have been extremely 
limited.  Many in this group lack basic 
services such as quality education, health 
care, community services, playgrounds, 
social experiences and employment 
opportunities.  Currently, 59% of the 
population in New Orleans is African 
American and 35% of them live in poverty 
(Shrinath, Mack & Plyer, 2014; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013b).  The New Orleans-Metarie 
area ranked 14th in the nation for its share of 
the poor population living in concentrated 
poverty at 62.1% (Kneebone, 2014). 
While economic growth has occurred in the 
city post Katrina, economic advantage for 
African Americans has lagged behind.  In 
2011, 52% of African American men in the 
city were not in the labor force or employed 
(Sams-Abidoun & Rattler, Jr., 2013). The 
number of African American children living 
below the poverty level in the city grew by 
seven percentage points from 2007 to 2013 
to 50.5% (Mack, 2015).  More broadly, across 
all racial demographics, those living below 
the poverty level in New Orleans – unable 
to provide food, shelter and transportation 
for themselves – are 27% of the population 
(Shrinath, Mack & Plyer, 2014). These statistics 
are not encouraging for creating solutions 
that address disparities that exist for African 
Americans in all aspects of life in the city. 
Isolated by race and economic status, most 
African American residents are deprived of 
basic quality of life opportunities, which 
serve to limit their life chances.
Historically, African Americans have had 
to survive in the face of the most daunting 
challenges.  And, even though most survive 
in these depressed communities without 
succumbing to a life of crime – with many 
overcoming insurmountable obstacles – 
some who live in conditions of poverty do 
engage in and become victims of crime. 
The multigenerational existence of families 
in poverty-ridden neighborhoods has 
deleterious consequences on the physical 
and emotional health of their residents.  
The eects of poverty, as exemplied by 
blighted and substandard housing, lack 
of quality schools and recreational outlets 
and access to social services can lead to the 
disillusionment of residents.  Oftentimes 
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driven by the desire to obtain material 
possessions, which many are taught to 
believe is the ultimate symbol of success 
and measure of their worth as human 
beings, young men in these impoverished 
neighborhoods suggest they see few paths 
to achieving the American Dream other 
than becoming involved in the drug trade 
and the violence that accompanies it. 
As noted by then-U.S. Attorney Jim Letten 
in 2006, the city’s crime rate was the fault 
of poor public schools and neighborhoods 
where poverty is rampant and the 
disenfranchised are highly concentrated 
together, creating an economy where drug 
dealing is considered a step up (Filosa, 
2006).  Consequently, many poverty-stricken 
neighborhoods are plagued with drug 
abuse and violence. Community violence 
is especially harmful to children who are 
exposed to pervasive and very public 
gunre, murders, and other acts of violence 
that they all too often witness rst-hand 
(Child Trends, 2013).  This cycle of violence 
is perpetuated when children growing up 
in poverty-ridden neighborhoods live in 
fear, despair and grief due to their own 
conditions and turn to delinquent and 
criminal behavior as a means of survival 
(Child Trends, 2013).   
In 1979, U. S. Surgeon General Julius B. 
Richmond declared violence to be a public 
health crisis (Listenbee et al., 2012). Despite 
the Surgeon General calling attention to 
the dangers of violence and its deleterious 
eect on public health, New Orleans – one 
of the most violent cities in America – failed 
to invest in these economically and socially 
depressed communities to address and 
alleviate the conditions of poverty that 
would have reduced crime.  The very systems 
that should have received resources to 
address this public health crisis – education, 
employment, medical and social services – 
continued to suer defunding and decline.
Schools
At the time of the storm and the ood, 
the education system in the city was one 
of the lowest functioning systems in the 
United States (IRP, 2010). Prior to Hurricane 
Katrina, 46% of the schools in the city 
were deemed “academically unacceptable” 
(Cowan & Parker, 2008). Although there 
were a few public schools that provided 
excellent education, the majority of the 
African American population attended 
public schools in the city that were 
woefully inadequate (Sims & Rossmeier, 
2015).  Consistent with the segregated 
poverty-stricken neighborhoods, the public 
education system was also segregated 
(IRP, 2010).  Those who lived in depressed 
communities attended schools that were 
underfunded and lacked basic resources. 
A lack of quality education is a strong 
predictor of socioeconomic and criminal 
justice outcomes. It is clear that poverty 
has a direct correlation to academic 
performance: High school students living 
in poverty perform 25% lower than those 
who do not (BMBI, 2011).  
A comparison of the standardized testing 
scores by ethnicity of New Orleans Public 
School students in 2014 reveals that 95% 
of White students scored at or above basic 
on state standardized tests as compared 
to 59% of African American students, a 
36-percentage point dierence (LDOE, 
2015b).  Nearly 90% of New Orleans Public 
school students are African American, yet 
there is an alarming disparity between 
those schools attended by White students 
and those attended by African American 
students (Sims & Rossmeier, 2015). Because 
many of the schools failed to provide 
adequate education and services to 
students who had learning disabilities and 
other challenges, many African American 
males drop out of school by the 10th grade. 
Consequently, most African Americans 
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who are arrested do not have a high school 
diploma and almost a third test below a 
fth-grade level (Chang, 2012). 
Interactions with New Orleans 
Police
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) began investigating the New 
Orleans Police Department (NOPD) due 
to continued complaints of a pattern and 
practice of unlawful police misconduct and 
constitutional violations by its members 
(DOJ, 2011). The investigation involved 
extensive community engagement and 
an in-depth review of NOPD practices.  On 
March 16, 2011, the DOJ issued a written 
report of its ndings, which were startling. 
The DOJ found there were unconstitutional 
practices and violations of federal law in the 
use of excessive force against its citizens, 
unconstitutional stops, searches and arrest 
as well as biased police practices such as 
racial and ethnic proling (DOJ, 2011). 
On July 24, 2012, the City of New Orleans 
entered into a consent decree to reform 
and implement existing police policies 
and procedures in the hope of preventing 
these unconstitutional practices (City of 
New Orleans, 2015).
Historically, the African American 
community in the city has suffered from 
discriminatory and abusive practices by 
members of the NOPD.  NOPD’s reputation 
for violence long ago approached 
legendary status on a national stage 
(Keegan, 1996).  New Orleans ranked 
near the top of American cities for police 
brutality for decades. Within an 18-month 
period in the 1990s, four NOPD officers 
were charged with murder, and dozens of 
officers were arrested on felony charges 
(Herbert, 1995, 4). As noted in the New 
York Times article, “For most of the past 20 
years New Orleans has been the national 
champion in complaints of police 
brutality” (Herbert, 1995, para. 4). One of 
the most infamous cases involved NOPD 
Officer Len Davis, who ordered a hit on 
African American New Orleans resident 
Kim Groves, a mother of three (Mustian, 
2014).  Ms. Groves had filed a complaint 
against Officer Davis after she witnessed 
him pistol-whip a 17-year-old African 
American male.  Ms. Groves believed she 
had filed her complaint anonymously, but 
Davis found out about the complaint less 
than 24 hours later. At the time the hit was 
successfully executed, Officer Davis, along 
with a confederacy of nearly a dozen 
corrupt police officers, was the subject of 
a drug investigation by the FBI.  Davis was 
ultimately convicted of Ms. Groves’ murder 
and sentenced to death (Mustian, 2014).
Less than a week after Hurricane Katrina 
hit, two unarmed African American men 
were shot and killed on the Danziger 
Bridge by New Orleans Police Officers 
(Times- Picayune Staff, 2011). Five 
officers were tried and convicted of civil 
rights violations but their convictions 
were overturned in 2013 and a new trial 
ordered due to prosecutorial misconduct 
(Thompson, 2013). 
Unconstitutional police practices do not 
always take the form of brutality that 
results in death.  Pervasive discriminatory 
practices have also had an adverse eect 
on the African American community. 
While police claim that they concentrate 
their crime prevention eorts in what are 
typically referred to as “high crime areas” 
the results are that police stop and frisk 
African American males in their segregated 
communities at a higher rate than they stop 
and frisk White males in their segregated 
communities.  As the DOJ found in 
its own investigation, NOPD eected 
unconstitutional stops as well as racial and 
ethnic proling of African Americans in the 
city (DOJ, 2011).  
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The 2011 DOJ investigation found that 
almost 99% of all children arrested in the 
city were African American (LCCR, 2015). 
The report concluded that “[t]he level of 
disparity for youth in New Orleans is so 
severe and so divergent from nationally 
reported data that it cannot plausibly 
be attributed entirely to underlying 
rates at which youth commit crimes, and 
unquestionably warrants a searching 
review and a meaningful response from 
the Department” (LCCR, 2015, para. 2). 
Not much has changed since 2011: in 
2015, 99% of the children arrested in New 
Orleans are still African American (See 
Figure 3) (LCCR, 2015).  
As a result of young African American 
males being stopped more frequently, 
young African American men are arrested 
at an alarming rate for minor violations, 
while similarly situated White males are 
less likely to be stopped and frisked (LCCR, 
2015). And even when young White men 
are stopped, they are less likely to be 
arrested for the same minor violations as 
their African American peers (LCCR, 2015). 
In 2002, a Police Civilian Review Task Force 
recommended the formation of a civilian 
police oversight agency (New Orleans 
Independent Police Monitor, 2015). 
Again, in 2006, a coalition of community 
groups went before the city Council to 
express their concerns about NOPD. 
Finally, in 2008 the City Council passed a 
resolution supporting the formation of an 
independent police monitor. The Oce of 
the Independent Police Monitor (OIPM), 
along with the Oce of Inspector General, 
were voted into the city charter in 2008 
(New Orleans Independent Police Monitor, 
2015). OIPM was created in August of 2009 
and in June of 2010 Police Monitor Susan 
Hutson took oce (Hutson, 2015). 
The rst ocial recommendation of OIPM 
was to establish a new “critical incidents” 
investigation team that would be under the 
leadership of the Deputy Superintendent 
of the Public Integrity Bureau (PIB) (Hutson, 
2015). PIB is the city agency that investigates 
citizen as well as police initiated allegations 
of police misconduct.  The 2014 Annual 
Report of OIPM noted that in 2014 there 
were 17 critical incidents, the same number 
of critical incidents as in 2013 (Hutson, 
2015). OIPM found that 28 of the ocers 
involved in Ocer Involved Shooting (OIS) 
incidents had a signicant complaint and 
use of force history over the last ve years 
(Hutson, 2015). OIPM continues to focus its 
outreach not only on local reforms but also 
on national and international discussions 
about the future of policing and police 
reform (Hutson, 2015). 
Another major policy change that is focused 
on improving policing in New Orleans, is 
NOPD policy 402, a policy measure that 
informs ocers on how to interact with 
LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, 
and Queer) members of the community 
(Fernandez & Williams, 2014). The policy 
focuses on eliminating bias-based proling 
and outlines expectations for ling reports, 
for interactions between NOPD ocers 
and LGBT community members, arrest 
protocols and protocols for acquiring 
medical treatment for LGBT community 
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members should it be needed (New Orleans 
Police Department, 2013). This measure is 
a direct response to ndings from the U.S. 
Department of Justice (2011) investigation 
of the NOPD, in which it notes that NOPD 
ocers engaged in biased policing including 
LGBT discrimination, as well as a response 
to advocacy work from organizations like 
BreakOut!, a youth organization that works 
to end criminalization of LGBTQ youth of 
color and other organizations (Fernandez & 
Williams, 2014). 
In 2014, BreakOut! published the “We Deserve 
Better” report that presented ndings 
highlighting the extent of discrimination 
queer youth in New Orleans experience at the 
hands of the police. Findings from their study 
indicated that queer youth of color, especially 
transgender youth, are subjected to a range 
of abusive behavior by police including 
being called homosexual expletives, 
unconstitutional stops, assumptions that 
they are in the sex trade, and harassment 
as compared to their White and Cisgender 
counterparts (Fernandez & Williams, 2014). 
Through their “We Deserve Better”  campaign 
(launched in 2011) to end discriminatory 
policing, and their “Get YR Rights Toolkit,” a 
guide to challenging discriminatory policing 
against LGBTQTS youth, they have helped 
to educate LGBTQS youth of their rights 
and improved training of NOPD ocers 
to improve their interactions with LGBTQ 
youth of color in the city (Fernandez & 
Williams, 2014; Oaks, 2015). 
While policing remains a critical piece of 
the disparate eects of the criminal justice 
system on African American communities, 
there are indications that some within New 
Orleans’ power structure have begun to see 
the value of minimizing the risk of arrest. 
Over the past several years, the City Council 
enacted several ordinances in an attempt 
to reduce pretrial detention (Johnson, 
Laisne & Wool, 2015). NOPD ocers 
were encouraged to issue summonses 
as opposed to arresting persons charged 
with nonviolent municipal oenses such 
as disturbing the peace and possession of 
marijuana. Pre-Katrina municipal arrests for 
non-violent oenses were approximately 
70% of all those arrested.  Subsequent 
to the new ordinances, the trend has 
completely reversed itself and now 70% 
of those municipal charges are initiated 
by the issuance of a summons (Johnson, 
Laisne & Wool, 2015).
Courts
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, almost 85% of 
those criminally prosecuted in the city were 
indigent and therefore represented by the 
Orleans Parish Indigent Defender Program 
(OIDP) (Orleans Public Defenders, 2011). 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, OIDP was staed 
by approximately 40 part-time attorneys 
who represented adults in Criminal District 
Court, six part-time attorneys assigned to 
Trac and Municipal Court and six part-
time Juvenile Court attorneys.  All of the 
attorneys had extremely high caseloads and 
lacked resources to handle the volume and 
types of cases that were assigned to them. 
OIDP’s annual budget was approximately 
$2 million, with most funds primarily 
derived from local nes and fees from Trac 
Court (Orleans Public Defenders, 2011). 
The aftermath of the storm and ood left 
the city without a functioning court system 
for months.  There were no revenues to pay 
the part-time lawyers employed by OIDP 
and consequently most of those attorneys 
were left without a job and their clients 
without lawyers.
One of the many things Hurricane Katrina 
revealed was that the criminal justice 
system was broken.  It was necessary 
to reorganize the way legal services 
were provided to the city’s indigent 
population who needed representation 
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in Criminal, Trac, Municipal and Juvenile 
Courts.   In 2006, the oce of the Orleans 
Public Defenders (OPD) was created. (Lewis 
& Goyette, 2012).  The oce hired full-
time attorneys to represent its clientele. 
Previously, attorneys were assigned to 
courtrooms rather than to clients.  The 
attorneys did not meet their clients until 
charges were accepted and the clients’ 
case was allotted to the courtroom in 
which that attorney was assigned.  It was 
not uncommon for an adult charged 
with a felony punishable by death or life 
imprisonment to remain in jail and not 
meet his public defender for 60 to 120 days, 
which is the maximum amount of time an 
arrestee can be held in custody without the 
institution of prosecution (Louisiana Code 
of Criminal Procedure, Article 701). Now, 
with the restructuring of OPD, attorneys 
are assigned to represent their clients at the 
initial appearance, which occurs within 24 to 
48 hours of arrest, and continue to represent 
that client notwithstanding the courtroom 
to which the case is ultimately allotted.   
The result has been that cases are being 
investigated more promptly by their 
lawyers.  Currently, the vision for services 
provided by OPD has broadened to include 
a more holistic approach to clients.  There 
are over 51 full-time attorneys, as well as 
court support personnel, client services 
specialists, social workers and investigators 
to represent 80% of the individuals with a 
legal case in Orleans Parish. (Orleans Public 
Defenders, 2014). 
The city’s criminal court system has 
implemented pretrial services, electronic 
monitoring and other alternatives to 
detention to reduce pretrial incarceration. 
In spite of the improvements in pretrial 
detentions that focus on a risk analysis 
as well as early appointment of counsel, 
unfortunately, 85% of those detained 
while awaiting trial in 2010 were African 
Americans even though African Americans 
made up only 59% of the city’s population 
at that time due to the inability of many 
arrestees to post bond (Johnson, Laisne & 
Wool, 2015). (See Figure 2)
Juveniles arrested in New Orleans were 
previously represented by OIDP.  However, 
in 2006, Juvenile Regional Services (JRS) was 
created to ght for the rights of children in 
juvenile court  (JRS, n.d.).   That oce merged 
with Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana in 
2014 and the Louisiana Center for Children’s 
Rights was created (LCCR, n.d.).  The oce 
uses an innovative model of holistic, 
team-based, cross-disciplinary advocacy 
to win both legal and life successes for its 
vulnerable youth clientele.  Its goal is to 
ensure each child receives fairness, dignity 
and an opportunity to become a productive 
member of society. 
Orleans Parish Prison
Another feeder of dismal outcomes for 
African Americans was the Orleans Parish 
Prison (OPP).  Here also, there have been 
reforms post Katrina.  In 2005, the Parish 
Prison population was approximately 6,300 
(Johnson, Laisne & Wool, 2015). In 2015, the 
average daily population is approximately 
1,900 (See Figure 4)  (Johnson, Laisne & Wool, 
2015). 
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The Orleans Parish Sheri proposed in 2010 
to rebuild certain facilities of the jail that 
would increase the number of available beds 
to 5,832 (Johnson, Laisne, & Wool, 2015). 
Opposition from the community was erce, 
voicing the sentiment of many that the city 
could ill-aord to build and sustain such a 
large jail complex.  The idea that the city could 
incarcerate its way out of its crime problem 
was not sound.  Many believed that such a 
large jail complex would in fact continue to 
drive up the over-incarceration rate of local 
African Americans, which was already ve 
times the national average (Johnson, Laisne 
& Wool, 2015).  What the city needed was not 
an oversized jail complex but a more focused 
approach to addressing the core issues of 
crime. On February 3, 2011, the City Council 
enacted an ordinance, which allowed for only 
a 1,438 bed facility (Eggler, 2011).  The ght 
to keep the jail size small is still being waged. 
In addition to challenging the size of 
the jail, there were also challenges 
addressing the unconstitutional and 
inhumane treatment of inmates in 
OPP.  A class action lawsuit was filed on 
April 2, 2012 by the Southern Poverty 
Law Center on behalf of current and 
future inmates housed in OPP (SPLC, 
n.d.). The jail had been the subject of 
a comprehensive investigation by the 
Civil Rights Division of DOJ that began 
in 2008, pursuant to the Civil Rights 
of Institutionalized Persons Act (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2012). Following 
its investigation, DOJ informed Sheriff 
Gusman of its findings in a letter dated 
September 11, 2009, stating, 
“We nd that OPP fails to adequately 
protect inmates from harm and serious 
risk of harm from sta and other 
inmates; fails to provide inmates with 
adequate mental health care; fails to 
provide adequate suicide prevention; 
fails to provide adequate medication 
management; fails to provide safe and 
sanitary environmental conditions; 
and fails to provide adequate re safety 
precautions” (WWL Sta, 2009,  para. 4).  
In September, 2012, DOJ intervened in the 
Jones v. Gusman case, after conditions at 
the jail had not improved (U.S. Department 
of Justice, 2013). An agreement was 
reached in December 2012, and approved 
by a federal judge in June 2013. The 
federal consent decree outlined steps 
that Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusman 
must take to ensure prisoner safety and 
adequate staffing of the facility. The 
agreement required that an independent 
monitor be appointed to oversee the 
agreement and ensure compliance. Any 
new facilities built to replace the jail shall 
also be covered by the consent agreement 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). 
Juvenile Transfer 
Juveniles are transferred to adult 
court at alarming rates in New Orleans 
(Reckdahl, 2015). In Louisiana, children 
as young as 14-years-old can be tried as 
adults, transferring their cases to adult 
court. While this does not require youth 
charged as adults to be confined in adult 
facilities, juveniles transferred to adult 
courts in New Orleans have been held in 
the notoriously, dangerous Orleans Parish 
Prison (until recently). Since District 
Attorney Leon Cannizzaro took office 
in 2009, this once rarely used policy has 
now become the standard for 15 and 16 
year olds charged in the city (Reckdahl, 
2015). Cannizzaro has transferred 75% of 
all eligible juvenile cases to adult court 
and 90% of all juveniles ages 15 and 16 
charged with armed robbery (See Figure 
5). On average, the DA’s office transfers 
32 juvenile cases to adult court each year. 
Compare that to Jefferson Parish that 
transfers an average of eight juveniles per 
year and East Baton Rouge, a larger parish 
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with more armed robberies, transfers 
an average of seven juveniles per year 
(Reckdahl, 2015).
Juvenile transfer to adult court is a 
serious issue given the risks associated 
with youth transfer to adult facilities. 
Juveniles in adult facilities are more 
likely to be sexually and physically 
assaulted, are at greater risk for suicide, 
and are often deprived of education 
(Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights, 
2014). Juveniles in Orleans Parish Prison are 
also often held in isolation, sometimes in 
lockdown for 23-24 hours per day with no 
meaningful human interaction. This can lead 
to paranoia, depression and anxiety. What’s 
worse, 38% of youth transferred are found 
not guilty, have their charges dismissed 
or get probation (Louisiana Center for 
Children’s Rights). 
In June of 2015, an ordinance sponsored 
by City Councilwoman Susan Guidry to 
set aside beds at the Youth Study Center, 
the city’s juvenile detention facility, for 
some pretrial juveniles charged as adults 
was unanimously passed (White, 2015). 
This ordinance only applies to youth not 
charged with murder, aggravated rape or 
kidnapping. The Youth Study Center now 
has 12 beds set aside for these pretrial 
juveniles charged as adults. Criminal Court 
judges have the discretion to determine 
where pre-trial juveniles in their court will 
be housed. While this measure is helpful, 
it does not address the DA’s ill-advised 
practice of transferring youth to adult 
court. There is no evidence that transferring 
youth to the adult system reduces violent 
crime. In fact, transferred youth are more 
likely to commit criminal acts than those 
that remain in the juvenile justice system 
(Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). 
The practice of transferring youth to 
adult facilities subjects adolescents to 
disruptions to their development through 
increased exposure to antisocial behaviors 
in adult facilities, and denies them access to 
appropriate, youth development practices 
implemented in juvenile facilities (Mulvey & 
Schubert, 2012). This is yet another practice 
that almost exclusively impacts African 
American youth in New Orleans. In essence, 
the underlying belief that is expressed 
through this problematic practice is that 
these youth are not worth a continued 
investment in their development and 
rehabilitation. This point was conrmed by 
the DA’s statement, “As the district attorney 
for the Parish of Orleans I am not going to 
risk the safety of the law-abiding citizens 
of this community on a hope” (Reckdahl, 
2015, para. 69). This perspective ignores 
the enormous barriers of poverty, low 
quality education and mental health issues 
faced by many youth in the juvenile justice 
system and denies both the youth and the 
community the benet of their unlocked 
potential to contribute positively to the 
community. 
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Recommendations
Despite all of the reforms implemented 
post Hurricane Katrina, African Americans 
are still the vast number of those arrested 
and prosecuted in Orleans Parish.   Sixty- 
four percent of those prosecutions are for 
nonviolent oenses.   As discussed earlier, 
the causes of crime are primarily poverty 
and all its subset issues, including quality 
of life.   Unfortunately, those factors are still 
prevalent in African American communities. 
What Now?   
• Access to quality educational opportunities 
for all public students should be required 
by law.  
• Vocational job training programs should 
be made available to all students who are 
not college-bound.
• Invest in the lives of youth through active 
mentoring programs, recreational centers 
and other intervention services.
• Ensure access to quality medical care, 
including expanding drug rehabilitation 
and mental health services.
• Incentivize economic investment in 
poverty-stricken neighborhoods to 
increase the presence of private-sector 
businesses that would encourage 
employment of those residents.
• Develop job training programs for the 
unskilled labor force.
• Rebuild a police department that will 
ensure integrity in police practices, using 
best practice models such as mandatory 
body cameras, community policing, 
trainings focused on police – community 
engagement and race and gender equity.
• Work with communities to develop 
community policing programs with a focus 
on crime prevention and intervention.
• Expand the use of diversionary programs 
and specialty courts – such as mental 
health and drug courts.
• Fully fund implementation of the NOPD 
and OPP consent decrees and insist on 
constitutional practices outlined therein.
• Dedicate funding to support pre-trial 
services, the OIPM and OIG oces, 
providing the autonomy required for the 
maximum productivity of each entity.
• End the practice of charging juveniles as 
adults as standard practice rather than 
a practice for extreme cases for juveniles 
14-16 years of age. 
Although this chapter focused on the 
disparities that exist for African Americans 
that contribute to their experience with 
the criminal justice system, what must not 
be overlooked, even though not stated, are 
the many successes of African Americans 
and their contributions to the city of New 
Orleans.  This chapter focused on the 
marginalized African American citizens who 
continue to suer from socioeconomic and 
racial disparities.  These disparities manifest 
in continued poverty, inadequate schools, 
lack of employment opportunities and over 
incarceration.  Clearly, a signicant portion of 
the African American population in the city 
is still stied.   Addressing these inhumane 
disparities is essential to the future success 
of this city. 
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EQ UITY IN THE ECONOM Y: 
THE G ROWING  WEALTH 
AND ECONOM IC DIV IDE
RICHARD C.  PETERS,  PH. D. ,  SILAS H.  LEE,  PH. D.  
LEROY D.  SIM PSON,  III,  PSY. D.  AND RASHIDA H.  G OV AN,  PH. D.
THERE MUST BE CLARITY AND 
CHOREOGRAPHY BETWEEN OUR 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS.  WHERE THERE HAS 
PREVIOUSLY BEEN A TENDENCY 
TO OVERLOOK OR MARGINALIZ E 
MANY OF OUR ECONOMIC ASSETS, 
WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD 
TO HAVE THE LONG SHADOW OF 
EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC 
INEQ UALITY REMAIN THE LEGACY 
OF THIS COMMUNITY.  3
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In its immediate aftermath, Hurricane Katrina 
could count as one of its many victims, the 
economy of New Orleans. The social and 
infrastructural devastation following the 
catastrophe literally stopped New Orleans 
in its tracks. Businesses were buried, schools 
were suspended and livelihoods were lost 
as individuals and families were forced to 
ignore long-term economic success in favor 
of short-term survival.
As with many other pillars of society, the 
city’s economy slowly and resiliently rebuilt. 
While some jobs and sectors have never 
recovered (Plyer, Ortiz, Horwitz & Hobor, 
2013), they are being, to some degree, 
replaced by newer and more sustainable 
career and business opportunities. New 
Orleans’ recent drive to diversify its revenue 
streams and reduce its reliance on traditional 
hospitality and production sectors has 
led to investment and involvement in 
technological and medical innovation for 
the promise of new opportunities for recent 
and future graduates (Plyer, Ortiz, Horwitz & 
Hobor, 2013).
The hope for a progressive nancial future 
is justiable considering some of New 
Orleans’ recent economic performance. 
In fact, in 2013, New Orleans’ annual 
unemployment rate of 5.1% was below the 
national rate of 6.7% as of December that 
year (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a; U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2015b). However, the 
most recent statistics are less cheerful and 
distinctly more worrisome.  An economic 
summary published by the U.S. Bureau of 
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Labor for the period May 2014-May 2015 
indicates that the city’s economic vibrancy 
is at a state of susceptibility. While U.S. 
unemployment decreased from 6.1% 
to 5.3%, for the corresponding period 
unemployment in the New Orleans-Metarie 
area increased from 5.9% to 6.3% (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2015c). 
Despite the concerns of recent years, 
many view New Orleans as a city primed 
for economic opportunity and prosperity. 
But the question remains: “Who will be 
the winners as the city transitions to a 
knowledge-based economy?” Have the 
economic inequalities and disparities, 
particularly those based on ethnicity, 
dissipated or do they continue to make 
life dicult for those already economically 
disadvantaged? 
The crux of this chapter will be to uncover the 
present state of aairs for African Americans 
in New Orleans with respect to aspects of 
economic and workforce development, and 
will illustrate what the future may hold for 
African Americans in this ‘new’ economy of 
information and innovation. Our numbers 
and analysis suggest that the future isn’t 
bright for all in the “Big Easy” and much work 
is necessary to allow equitable access to the 
city’s entire populous, especially those that 
have been economically marginalized.
We focus on three broad aspects that all 
correlate with economic and workforce 
development for African Americans in New 
Orleans. The rst, employment, discusses the 
rate of employment and unemployment 
in the city, considers job growth rate as 
well as occupations by categories. The 
second section, education, identies the 
trends related to educational attainment, 
job training and career qualication and 
further illustrates the linkages between 
these, earnings and poverty levels. And 
nally, the third section, entrepreneurship 
and enterprise, looks at the involvement, 
or lack thereof, of African Americans in this 
new wave of innovation and small business 
development in New Orleans. Issues 
regarding opportunities and access are 
uncovered to highlight the possible future 
for African Americans in the city’s new 
economy.
Employment
“You take my life when you take the means 
whereby I live.” (William Shakespeare)
The rate of unemployment in New Orleans 
has, throughout much of the recession, 
stayed relatively comparable with the 
national gures, at times demonstrating 
better performances than the national 
average (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a). 
But dissecting the overall data reveal that job 
growth and consequential unemployment 
reduction has not been uniformly or 
equitably manifested across the races.
For example, in 2013, the unemployment 
rate for African Americans in New Orleans 
was 13%, more than twice that of the 6% 
unemployment rate for Whites (See Figure 
1) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013a; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013b). For African American 
males, aged 16-64, this number was even 
higher at 14%, substantially higher than 
the corresponding unemployment rate for 
White males in the city (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013b). Not only 
was this unemployment rate higher than 
the national unemployment rate of 6.7% 
in December 2013, but it was signicantly 
higher than the 5% unemployment rate 
for Caucasian males in New Orleans (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2013a; U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013b).  Further, in New Orleans in 2013, 
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only 54% of African American males in 
this age group were employed, compared 
to 78% for Caucasians, a 24-percentage 
point difference (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013b).  
These inequities are by no means 
idiosyncratic to New Orleans. At the 
national level, African Americans continue 
to face more challenging employment 
prospects compared to other racial 
and ethnic groups. While the national 
unemployment percentage has recently 
dipped to below 6%, unemployment rates 
for African Americans in the United States 
are approximately 10%, a discouraging 
statistic for those either unemployed 
or underemployed (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2015).
While the unemployment rate for African 
Americans in New Orleans is alarming, the 
percentage of African American males 
not in the labor force is of significant 
concern. According to a report published 
by the Lindy Boggs Center for Community 
Literacy, 52% of African American males 
in New Orleans were nonemployed 
(Sams-Abidoun & Rattler, 2011). This 
statistic represents the percentage of 
African American males who are both 
unemployed and those who are not in 
the labor force.  In 2011, 40% of African 
American males were not in the labor 
force as compared to 21% of White males 
(Sams-Abidoun & Rattler, 2011).  
The “not in labor force” category includes 
the incarcerated population, which 
might explain the 19-percentage point 
difference between African American 
males and White males. In New Orleans, 
one in 14 African American males is 
incarcerated, leaving a major gap in 
the workforce in New Orleans (Chang, 
2012).  According to Chang (2012), one 
in seven African American males in New 
Orleans are under the supervision of 
the criminal justice system. Could the 
common practice of requiring individuals 
to disclose felony convictions on 
employment applications hinder African 
American males in New Orleans from 
pursuing formal employment? “Ban the 
box” policy measures that restrict the 
use of such practices may help to open 
the door for the formerly incarcerated to 
access more employment opportunities 
in New Orleans. Other factors associated 
with a departure from the labor force 
include discouragement over job 
prospects, ill health or disability, family 
responsibilities, and other issues such as 
transportation and childcare problems 
(Desilver, 2014).  All of these issues are 
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exacerbated for African Americans and 
the poor who face greater challenges in 
each of these areas than their White and 
more affluent counterparts. 
Income disparities between African 
American and White households are 
pronounced. In 2013, African American 
households had a median income of 
$25,102 a whopping $35, 451 difference in 
the median household income for Whites 
of $60,553 (See Figure 2) (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013c; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013d). The 
income disparity has grown significantly 
since 2005, when African Americans had 
a median income of $23,394 and Whites 
hadan income of $49,262 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2005a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005b). 
A major contributor to this inequity is the 
type of occupations African Americans 
typically have access to in the city’s 
industrial sectors.
As of 2013, only 27% of African Americans 
held management and professional 
related occupations, which include 
jobs in the scientific, leal, financial, and 
business fields (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013e). Comparatively, 60% of Whites, 
held managment positions in these 
sectors, which reflects their access to 
higher wages. (See Figure 3) (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013f ). 
New, high paying jobs are expected to 
come from areas such as health care, insurance 
services, legal sectors and the burgeoning 
lm industry, a prediction corroborated 
by recent job growth reports (Plyer, Ortiz, 
& Hobor, 2013; U.S. Department of Labor, 
Figure 3
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2015c). And while New Orleans’ average wages 
continue to lag behind U.S. national averages 
in almost every occupation type category, 
the gap in wages between high paying 
professional and managerial jobs and those 
in the hospitality, retail and construction is 
substantial (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015c). 
What can be easily surmised by the gures 
and reports is that African  Americans are 
currently underrepresented in professional and 
managerial categories and are thus excluded 
from the signicantly higher wages that 
accompany this type of employment. 
One of the factors that is preventing African 
Americans from middle and high-skilled jobs in 
New Orleans is a skills gap (Sellers, Ortiz, & Plyer, 
2013). In the region, 27% of the labor force are 
low-skilled. According to a report published by 
the Data Center, 51% of the labor force is African 
American and 83% of high school dropouts 
are also African American (Sellers, Ortiz, Plyer, 
2013). Thus, low educational attainment is a 
barrier preventing African Americans from 
gaining access to higher wage employment. 
Educational pathways for adults in the labor 
force to gain additional skills and training may 
help to improve access for African Americans 
relegated to low-skilled, low-wage employment 
opportunities. One policy measure that may 
help to position African Americans and low-
income individuals for greater economic 
prosperity is an increase in the minimum wage 
to a living wage.  Low educational attainment, 
lack of work experience, minimal employment 
opportunities, and experience with the criminal 
justice system have disadvantaged African 
Americans competing in the local labor force 
(City of New Orleans, 2014a). 
In response to some of the inequities that 
permeate the city’s economic and workforce 
landscape, Mayor Mitch Landrieu announced 
the City’s Economic Opportunity Strategy, 
an comprehensive initiative to expand 
opportunities for the city’s disadvantaged 
job seekers and business (City of New 
Orleans, 2014b).  The Strategy includes 
eorts to build partnerships with some of 
the region’s largest employers and anchor 
institutions including those in industries 
like healthcare, education, government, 
engineering and aviation. The strategy 
also introduces initiatives to connect New 
Orleanians to the city’s economic growth 
opportunities through value-driven 
relationships with training providers, social 
service agencies, and community advocates. 
Furthermore, this strategy is also geared 
towards expanding outreach towards 
growth and expansion of strong small 
businesses with incentives for relocation, 
and to create collaborative projects with 
larger corporations. This eort will start 
building the bridge to create employment 
opportunities for local communities. Finally, 
the plan also invests in the creation of more 
contractual opportunities with the City 
for qualied small businesses (City of New 
Orleans, 2014b).  
A signicant part of the Mayor’s economic 
opportunity framework is an investment 
in foundational skills and job training for 
disadvantaged job seekers, a sensible 
response to the skills gap within the local 
workforce.  Educational attainment remains 
a consistent factor impacting African 
American’s economic outcomes. The next 
section will examine this issue more closely. 
Education
“The greatest good you can do for another 
is not just to share your riches, but reveal to 
them their own.”- (Benjamin Disraeli)
In 2004, a report titled A Haunted City, 
the Social and Economic Status of African 
Americans and Whites in New Orleans, 
readers were reminded that “the dominant 
theme from the 2000 census data is, New 
Orleans remains a city divided – divided 
by economics, education and opportunity. 
For a disproportionate share of this city’s 
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population, particularly African Americans, 
the hammer of inequality continues to 
pound them deeper into the grave of 
economic inequality.
The educational chasm between the “haves” 
and “have-nots” and its related impact 
on income is especially visible when one 
considers the signicant wage disparities 
between high school and college graduates. 
A 2014 report by the Pew Research Center 
reports that for millennials ages 25-32, 
employees with four-year college degrees 
earned almost $20,000 more than those with 
high school diplomas (Pew Research Center, 
2014). This data is particularly troublesome 
for African Americans in New Orleans who 
continue to lag behind Whites in this critical 
aspect. For example, in 2013, only 14% of 
African American males and 21% African 
American females in New Orleans had a 
bachelors degree or higher as compared 
to 60% of White males and 65% of White 
females (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013g; U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2013h). 
As one of the primary agents of socialization, 
education is a complex system that 
intersects and impacts the socioeconomic 
destinations of a person’s life.  In today’s 
knowledge-based economy, which 
emphasizes analytical and communication 
skills, education and occupation are still 
considered the two pathways to the middle 
class.  And, every succeeding generation 
should attain a better quality of life than the 
previous one.  However, for many African 
Americans in this city, that pathway is often 
congested with obstacles. This data reects 
more than just the disparities in education 
attainment by race in New Orleans, but the 
multiple intersecting factors contributing to 
the inertia in social mobility among African 
Americans and the long-term consequences. 
Non-involvement and non-attainment of 
tertiary education and college degrees 
can therefore help explain some of the 
worrying economic trends and inequalities 
facing African Americans in New Orleans. 
Along with the gaps in median income 
and unemployment already mentioned, 
indicators such as poverty rates and even 
housing ownership are impacted by 
disparities in education. These disparities 
also exist in homeownership, where 42% of 
African Americans in New Orleans owned 
their homes as compared to 53% of whites 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013i; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013j). Poverty levels conrm these 
disparities since 35% for African Americans 
in New Orleans live below the poverty line 
as compared to 12% of Whites (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013m; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013n).
The collateral damage and intergenerational 
impact from the gap in education attainment 
fuels inequality and contributes to a decline 
in social and economic capital for African 
American families.  Unfortunately, this leads 
to a cycle of entrenched poverty and social 
disinvestment that negatively impacts 
perceptions of residents and the outlook on 
living in New Orleans for future generations. 
This reality was reinforced in a study by 
Chetty and Hendren (2015). In this study, New 
Orleans ranked 99th out of 100 metro areas 
with respect to income mobility.  Chetty and 
Hendren (2015) noted that children from low-
income households in metro New Orleans can 
expect their household income to decline by 
nearly 15% when they reach 26 years of age. 
This decline can be attributed to low-income 
families being excluded from social and 
economic opportunities because of education 
and social isolation (Chetty and Hendren, 
2015).  Thus, inequality and poverty (rather 
than nancial assets) are transferred from one 
generation to the next.   
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Entrepreneurship
“The worst form of inequality is to try to 
make unequal things equal.” (Aristotle)
As our nation recovers from a recession, the 
gap in both entrepreneurship and workforce 
development between African-American 
entrepreneurs and their White counterparts, 
as well as other minorities, is still far and 
wide. Particularly in the city of New Orleans, 
where the population is majority African-
American, yet the presence of African 
American businesses is low with even fewer 
of these businesses being sustained for at 
least three years (Yang, 2015).  As of 2014, the 
average income of African American-owned 
businesses in the New Orleans metropolitan 
area was $56,647. This is consistent with 
data that indicates that minority-owned 
businesses represent 27% of businesses in 
New Orleans, yet only account for 2% of gross 
receipts (Plyer, Ortiz, & Hobor, 2013). Only 
16.7% of the New Orleans area businesses 
are African American-owned with 4.1% of 
those businesses having paid employees. Per 
100,000 residences, there were 8.7% African 
American-owned businesses in the area 
(Yang, 2015). Yang notes that there is realistic 
optimism regarding the growth of African 
American-owned businesses in the city, but 
this growth is gradual compared to all of the 
other racial groups. 
Disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) 
programs help minority and women-owned 
businesses access economic opportunities. 
In New Orleans, a major DBE opportunity 
that promotes inclusion of minority-owned 
businesses in economic opportunities 
related to the New Orleans recovery is 
Orleans Parish schools rebuilding projects. 
Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) and 
the Recovery School District (RSD) set a 
goal of 35% and 25% respectively for DBE 
contract participation, yet in 2012 only had 
2% combined DBE participation (Recovery 
School District, 2014). As of May 2015, OPSB 
had 32% DBE participation and RSD had 26% 
(School Construction Industry Connection, 2015).
Some of the slow growth of African American 
enterprises can be attributed to the lack of 
involvement of African Americans in funding 
opportunities and business incubators. 
The Idea Village, one of New Orleans’ 
entrepreneur incubators, reported a minority 
participation rate of 16% in the organization’s 
entrepreneurship startup program since 2009 
(A.L. Johnson, personal communication, June 
3, 2015). The local business community is 
working to address entrepreneurial inclusion 
by leveraging the achievements of existing 
African American entrepreneurs to spur 
future engagement of this demographic in 
entrepreneurship. 
PowerMoves.NOLA, is a national initiative 
based in New Orleans that uses innovative 
approaches to remove barriers to minority 
entrepreneurship. The mission of the initiative 
is to increase the number of “venture-backed, 
minority-founded companies.”  The initiative 
is currently serving ve fellows, three of 
whom are based in New Orleans, and 57 
small businesses.
PowerMoves.NOLA and Idea Village are among 
a small cadre of providers of small business 
assistance programs in New Orleans that 
can support African American enterprises. 
Organizations such as the Urban League’s 
Women’s Business Resource Center, Southern 
University at New Orleans Small Business 
Development and Management Institute, 
Goodwork Network and the Louisiana Small 
Business Development Center oer a broad 
spectrum of services that are critical to 
create the eco-system necessary for minority 
businesses to not only survive, but thrive. 
Recommendations
First and foremost, to reverse the entrenched 
eects of these disparities, the community 
must invest in the potential of its greatest 
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resource --- its people. Full civic, social and 
economic participation of its citizens is the 
key to any competitive and socially stable 
community. Schools must become more 
than just places to transmit knowledge, but 
facilitators to cultivate the personal and 
professional network.  As such, schools can 
become one of the social escalators lifting 
many out of poverty. Educated citizens are 
innovative and more adaptable to withstand 
economic disruptions.
In a hyper-competitive national and global 
economy, the ability of a community to 
nurture its human capital ensures its long-
term sustainability and the resiliency of its 
citizens.  The protracted and entrenched 
disparities expose socially and economically 
fragile residents to recurring survival 
stress and anxiety.  The psychological 
eects of trying to survive and navigate an 
environment with diminished resources 
produces a plethora of social maladies.
Finally, there must be clarity and choreography 
between our political, economic and social 
institutions.  Where there has previously 
been a tendency to overlook or marginalize 
many of our economic assets, we can no 
longer aord to have the long shadow of 
educational and economic inequality remain 
the legacy of this community.  
Ultimately, we must unlock access to 
opportunity.  Policies such as tax incentives 
should be established with direct returns 
that spur economic development in 
marginalized communities. Public projects 
should mandate equitable participation, 
with the establishment of Community 
Benefits Agreements attached.  Private 
companies must reform recruitment 
and hiring practices to not just increase 
access to jobs, but diversify at all levels 
throughout the enterprise, particularly 
manager and executive levels.  One way 
to stem the tide is to more aggressively 
connect incentives to diversity outcomes. 
Workforce development programs must 
be comprehensive in providing case 
management, workforce fundamentals 
and technical skills, and produce an actual 
pipeline to employment.  Small business 
programs must be better resourced and 
coordinated via data systems to provide 
a continuum of services and access to 
capital and investment at the various 
stages of business growth.  Accountability 
for inclusive outcomes on development 
projects should also be strengthened via 
increased monitoring and enforcement.
A practical/tactical solution is to engage 
these issues aggressively by establishing 
a strong program that is laden with 
activities promoting a concept of “the 
better opportunity”. This would involve 
promoting college education with 
practical (or real world) experience 
to prepare African Americans with a 
strategic combination of knowledge 
and skills within in their field of interest, 
particularly within the demand sectors. 
From the economic position, it would be 
essential to grow business and commerce 
from “home base” or within New Orleans 
by taking advantage of the resources 
that we have, particularly in areas such 
as real estate. Within New Orleans East 
alone, there are significant opportunities 
to build and develop, providing access 
to high wage jobs and entrepreneurial 
opportunities.
As a community, we share an inter-
locking destiny.  The continued social 
and economic displacement of a 
disproportionate share of our population 
will result in excessive under-employment 
and unemployment, producing on-
going economic stagnation.  Instead of 
families transferring economic assets to 
succeeding generations, poverty and 
economic inequality will become the 
family heirloom.
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This map highlights public investment in non-transportation capital projects across the city between 
2007-2015. City council district boundaries are labeled to highlight investments by district. Capital projects 
include libraries, police and re stations, recreation facilities, and other related projects. Total amount for 
publicly-funded capital projects is $423.7 million with $34.3 million in District A, $115.9 million in District B, 
$94.3 million in District C, $110.5 million in District D, and $69.7 million in District E.
E
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B
Legend
Capital Projects 
Development Cost
Under $1.5M
$1.5M - $3M
$3.1M - $6M
$6.1M - $10M
Over $10M
New Orleans Select* Capital Projects, 2007-2015
$423.7 Million in non-transportation 
capital investment since 2007
*Does not include transportation projects
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THE STATE OF BLACK 
EDUCATION: TEN YEARS AFTER 
THE STORM  OF REFORM
RASHIDA H. GOVAN, PH.D.  ANDRE M. PERRY, PH.D. 
AND DEBRA VAUGHAN
CROSSING  CRITICAL 
THRESHOLDS LIKE COLLEG E 
DEG REE ATTAINM ENT IS 
ULTIM ATELY IM PORTANT 
BECAUSE IT IS THE FOREM OST 
M EANS OF G AINING  SOCIAL 
M OBILITY.  THIS IS ESPECIALLY 
TRUE FOR PEOPLE IN POVERTY. 
CONSEQ UENTLY, EDUCATORS 
MUST MEASURE GROWTH 
AGAINST TRUE TO LIFE 
THRESHOLDS STUDENTS AND 
FAMILIES MUST CROSS IN ORDER 
TO CLIMB THE SOCIAL LADDER.  4
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Discussions and research on post-Katrina 
education reforms and their impacts on 
student learning, political participation and 
community cohesion most often focus on 
whether or not improvements or declines 
have occurred in those areas since the 
storm. But debates about growth do not 
plainly declare whether or not students 
are prepared for college or for a career. 
Crossing critical thresholds like college 
degree attainment is ultimately important 
because it is the foremost means of gaining 
social mobility. This is especially true for 
people in poverty. Consequently, educators 
must measure growth against true to life 
thresholds students and families must cross 
in order to climb the social ladder.  
How are schools preparing young people 
to pursue and access a better quality of life? 
What role is our system of education playing 
in improving broad economic, health and 
other outcomes for our children? How can 
school leaders leverage education systems 
to maximize the quality of life for children 
and their families?
This chapter hopes to respond to these basic 
questions by examining early childhood, 
K-12 and postsecondary educational issues. 
The chapter also examines the large number 
of young people neither working nor in 
school.
Early Childhood Care and 
Education
Today children are expected to enter 
kindergarten knowing more than they 
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did a decade ago (Curwood, 2007).  As 
expectations continue to rise, the lagging 
achievement gap between low-income, 
African American children and their high-
income, White peers still begins long before 
children enter school (Hutchison, Morrissey, 
& Burgess, 2014). Consequently, what steps 
have school leaders taken to eliminate 
this gap, facilitate healthy early childhood 
development and promote school readiness 
for low-income and African American 
children in New Orleans? 
Several key factors that promote school 
readiness during early childhood include 
access to quality childcare, health facilities, 
parks and playgrounds; health care visits, 
and home literacy activities (Karoly, Kilburn, 
Cannon, 2005a). Children in poverty often 
face barriers to these important early 
childhood development opportunities. 
At last count, 39% of children in New 
Orleans live in poverty and 50.5% of African 
American children in New Orleans live in 
poverty (Mack, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013b).  In order to assess children’s risks to 
school readiness, proxy measures are used 
such as maternal educational attainment 
(linked to home literacy activities), median 
income, female-headed households (and 
other economic indicators), and access to 
health care, insurance and other resources 
(LSU/Tulane Early Childhood Policy and 
Data Center, 2012). 
In the Early Childhood Reach and Risk in 
Louisiana report published in 2012, Orleans 
Parish received a moderate to high-risk 
rating, indicating the level of risk children 
face for gaps in school readiness (LSU/
Tulane Early Childhood Policy and Data 
Center, 2012). Orleans Parish earned a 
rating of moderate to high risk or high 
risk for all ve economic factors including 
female-headed households, maternal 
educational attainment, poverty rate, 
and unemployment (LSU/Tulane Early 
Childhood Policy and Data Center, 2012). 
As previously noted, these factors impact 
young children’s access to important early 
childhood opportunities and resources. 
According to a 2013 report by the City of 
New Orleans Department of Health, 19 out of 
72 neighborhoods lacked adequate public 
transit, 12 lacked green space, and 19 lacked 
childcare facilities within the neighborhood 
(New Orleans Health Department & Healthy 
Start New Orleans, 2013).  The deciency of 
resources limit opportunities children need 
during early childhood to stimulate healthy 
development. 
There are local programs that help to lessen 
the impact of poverty on early childhood 
outcomes. Included among them is the Early 
Steps program, which serves a relatively 
high percentage of young children with 
developmental delays (LSU/Tulane Early 
Childhood Policy and Data Center, 2012). 
Early Steps serves children from birth to 
three with developmental delays or medical 
conditions that cause delays. The program 
assists children with services such as assisted 
technology, therapy and special instruction 
within their homes to help facilitate healthy 
development (Oce for Citizens with 
Developmental Disabilities, n.d.). 
Orleans Parish also has high percentages 
of three- and four-year-olds enrolled 
in pre-school programs from high-risk 
neighborhoods such as the Desire Area, 
the Florida Area and Holy Cross, all of 
which had 100% of their three- and four-
year-olds enrolled in pre-school programs 
(New Orleans Health Department & Healthy 
Start New Orleans, 2013).  The expansion of 
community health centers in New Orleans 
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has also increased access to primary health 
care facilities in high need neighborhoods 
(New Orleans Health Department & 
Healthy Start New Orleans, 2013). The 
aforementioned assets help to expand 
opportunities for healthy early childhood 
development for children in New Orleans.  
High quality early childcare and education 
programs are related to numerous positive 
outcomes including school readiness, 
increased likelihood of graduation, 
employment, higher income, improved 
health outcomes and decreased likelihood 
of involvement with crime (Calman & Tarr-
Whelan, 2005; Karoly, Kilburn, & Cannon, 
2005).  Data is not destiny, and thus, it is 
important that programs and services aimed 
at improving early childhood development 
for vulnerable children consider the 
broad factors impacting their children’s 
development. 
A 2012 policy measure called the Early 
Childhood Education Act, or Act 3, was 
designed to address some of the challenges 
in the early childhood care and education 
system in Louisiana to better prepare 
children for kindergarten readiness (Oce 
of the Governor, 2013). In 2012, Louisiana 
Governor Bobby Jindal signed into law 
Act 3, a legislative measure that brought 
about the coordination of early childhood 
care and education services and programs 
under the auspices of the Department 
of Education. The state’s early childhood 
care and education system was previously 
described as “fragmented,” and almost 
half of the state’s young children entered 
kindergarten unprepared (Oce of the 
Governor, 2013). Act 3 established the Early 
Childhood Care and Education Network, 
a coordinated system of early childhood 
providers participating in the central 
enrollment system and quality rating 
system (LDOE, n.d.a).  Additionally, the Act 
calls for the alignment of standards in early 
childhood care and education that facilitates 
kindergarten readiness. The measure is 
intended to increase accountability and 
quality of publicly funded early childhood 
care and education programs. It introduced 
a revised rating of childcare providers and 
programs to make it easier for parents to 
select quality programs for their children. 
Other components of Act 3 focus on 
improving professional development for 
early childhood providers, introduces an 
accountability system that includes “age-
appropriate” assessments of children, and 
eliminates “red tape” that would free up 
provider resources to attract high quality 
professionals (Oce of the Governor, 2013). 
Although the Early Childhood Education 
Act intends to improve quality, coordination 
and accountability in the early childhood 
care and education system, several major 
critiques of the policy measure suggest 
that unintended consequences could 
make increased access and quality more 
challenging for the state’s most vulnerable 
children. Coordination of early childhood 
care and education system addresses 
the issue of fragmentation, however 
some believe that placing the system 
under the auspices of the Department of 
Education may lead to a developmentally 
inappropriate application of a K-12 lens 
on early childhood development. The 
implementation of standardized tests and 
a focus on numeracy and literacy do not 
meet the broad developmental needs 
of children during early childhood (e.g., 
socio-emotional development) (Bassok, 
Latham, & Rorem, 2015). Findings from a 
national study of early childhood education 
programs indicate that play-based 
learning, a popular and appropriate early 
childhood education approach is quickly 
being replaced by more traditional K-12 
teaching models that focus on academic 
skills (Bassok et al., 2015). This trend has 
resulted in a reduction in opportunities for 
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play, a more age-appropriate pedagogical 
approach to early childhood education 
(Bassok et al., 2015). This is especially true 
in districts that educate high proportions of 
low-income children and children of color. 
Consequently, Act 3 may be facilitating this 
shift without a full awareness of its impact 
on the development of Louisiana’s children. 
Another critique of Act 3 is that it 
increases standards for early childhood 
program providers but does not increase 
funding for key early childhood care and 
education programs (Gray, 2014).  That is 
a signicant shortcoming, given that the 
cost of compliance can be burdensome for 
already strained providers in low-income 
communities. Over the past ve years, 
state funding for the Child Care Assistance 
Program (CCAP) has been cut by 58% to 
$1750, while actual childcare costs are 
upwards of $6000 annually (Policy Institute 
for Children, 2015). Low-income families 
are expected to make up the dierence, 
which further serves as a barrier for 
vulnerable children to access high quality 
early childhood programs. Since these cuts 
went into eect, the number of children 
served by through CCAP has been cut in 
half (Policy Institute for Children, 2015). 
The state’s largest, publicly funded pre-K 
program LA4, is also grossly underfunded 
at $4580 per student when the actual cost 
of an LA4 classroom is $5500 per student 
(Policy Institute for Children, 2015). These 
budget shortfalls are perhaps the biggest 
threat to increased access to high quality 
early childhood care and education for 
low-income children and children of color. 
Without adequately addressing these 
issues, gaps in school readiness for low-
income children and children of color may 
continue to persist, making the goal to 
close the achievement gap in New Orleans 
continuously out of reach. 
System Reforms
New Orleans underwent a number of 
reforms post-Katrina. Broadly, some of the 
reforms we will examine are school choice, 
changes within the educator workforce, 
the Louisiana Scholarship program, school 
closures and expulsions. 
School Choice
As families returned to New Orleans and 
schools re-opened after Katrina, public 
school attendance zones were eliminated 
(Sims & Vaughan, 2014). Public schools 
instituted “open enrollment” policies 
allowing students to apply and enroll in 
schools across the city no matter where 
they lived. In New Orleans, school choice 
was born of necessity given the nature of 
destruction caused by Katrina and due to the 
fact that many schools re-opened as charter 
schools (didn’t allow for attendance zones). 
However, in many other urban areas across 
the country, public education systems have 
adopted school choice policies to diversify 
schools and allow families to “opt out” of 
failing neighborhood schools (Liu & Taylor, 
2005).
Families exercised an informal system of 
choice prior to Katrina. Schools primarily 
served families within their zoned 
neighborhood. However, magnet schools in 
New Orleans enrolled students from across 
the city regardless of where they lived.
Because there are no “default” neighborhood 
schools post Katrina, all parents must 
actively choose a school for their child. 
To encourage fairness and transparency 
in the selection process, community and 
school leaders developed a centralized 
enrollment process called the Common 
Application, which later evolved into 
OneApp (Dreilinger, 2013). OneApp is an 
application process that allows parents 
to rank in order of preference up to 
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eight schools for their child. OneApp was 
created by the Recovery School District 
(RSD) and first implemented for the 2012-
13 school year. A computer program 
matches students with available seats 
in the school based on their parents’ 
choices. Preference is given to students 
who have a sibling attending the 
school and to those transitioning from 
a failing school. In addition, geographic 
priority is given to those living within 
neighborhood boundaries of the school 
of their choice, often referred to as 
geographic catchment areas.
All RSD charter schools, OPSB direct-
run schools, and newly authorized OPSB 
charter schools are required to participate 
in OneApp. Nine OPSB charter schools and 
NOCCA do not participate; they require 
students to apply at the school and 
independently run their schools’ lotteries 
for placement (Dreilinger, 2015a). Upon 
their charter renewal, however, the nine 
OPSB charter schools will be required to 
use OneApp for student placement. Of 
the nine, six will be up for renewal and 
join OneApp in 2017-18 and three will join 
in the 2021-22 school year. But currently, 
some of the nine are the most sought 
after and competitive schools, and they 
do not participate in the OneApp process 
making it more cumbersome to fill out 
separate applications for schools. In 
addition, the most coveted schools have 
very limited seats so many parents do 
not get their first choice. For the 2015-16 
school year, 4,000 new students applied 
to schools using OneApp and 6,300 
students used OneApp  to change schools 
(Drielinger, 2015).
For the 2012-13 school year, OneApp match 
results showed that 84% of students were 
placed in one of their top 3 schools and 
75% in their number one choice. For the 
2013-14 school year, 71.5% of students 
were placed in one of their top 3 choices 
and 55% in their number one choice (Sims 
& Vaughan, 2014).
Figure1:  School Capacity by Letter Grade
Sources: Sims, P. and Vaughan, D. The State of public education in New Orleans:2014. Cowen Institute.
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How Parents Choose?
When asked about the characteristics of 
schools that are important, parents cite 
things like academic performance, teacher 
quality, extracurricular oerings (especially 
in high school), and school location. The 
Urban League of Greater New Orleans 
(ULGNO) report (2013), Parent Perspectives: 
Parental Engagement and Education Reform 
in New Orleans found that parents consider 
many factors and tend to look at a school 
holistically rather than as a set of isolated 
characteristics. While parents are interested 
in a school’s academic ranking and test 
score results, they want to be sure their own 
child’s academic needs are met and look 
for additional support such as test prep, 
tutoring, and enrichment programs. Also, 
parents recognize the importance of an 
engaging and challenging curriculum and 
value specialized programs that appeal to 
their child’s interests. 
The aforementioned ULGNO report (2013) 
and the 2013 Cowen Institute for Public 
Education Initiatives (Cowen Institute) report 
found that location or proximity to home or 
work was another factor parents consider 
when selecting a school for their child. A 
study by the Education Research Alliance for 
New Orleans at Tulane University analyzed 
enrollment patterns before and after Katrina 
and OneApp priorities (Harris & Larsen, 2015). 
Tulane researchers conrmed that distance 
from home to school was important and 
suggested that some families still view the 
nearest school or neighborhood school as 
the “default” choice. They noted that even 
when a higher performing option was only 
slightly farther away, parents ranked the 
closer school higher in priority on OneApp.
In order for school choice/open enrollment 
to adequately serve the needs of families 
and increase educational outcomes for 
all students, there must be ample quality 
options and parents must have access to 
information. An analysis of enrollment and 
capacity conducted by the Cowen Institute 
shows that elementary/middle and high 
schools with a School Performance Score 
(SPS) of “A” are at or above capacity (Sims 
& Vaughan, 2014). Of the schools earning 
an SPS of “B” nearly all are at capacity. 
Conversely most schools reporting an SPS 
letter grade of “D” and all schools reporting 
a letter grade of “F” are below capacity. (See 
Figure 1) This analysis indicates that there 
is a high demand for higher performing 
schools and that demand exceeds supply.
With so many options available to parents, 
access to information is vital in the decision 
making process. The Cowen Institute study 
in 2013 found that parents rely on family 
and friends for information about schools 
and that many parents were misinformed 
about their options and the process. 
Organizations such as the New Orleans 
Parents Guide (NOPG) and the Urban League 
of Greater New Orleans (ULGNO) are actively 
addressing the needs of families to gather 
accurate and appropriate information about 
schools and the application/enrollment 
process. New Orleans Parents Guide is a 
nonprot organization providing quality 
and transparent information to families 
through the annual New Orleans Parents’ 
Guide to Public Schools as well as a Parents 
Guide phone app.
The Urban League of Greater New Orleans, 
through the Family Resource Centers, 
provides families with information and 
support to select and navigate the 
application/enrollment process. Three 
Family Resource Centers are located 
throughout the city and are open daily to 
accommodate families as needed. Language 
assistance in Spanish and Vietnamese is also 
available at the Centers. Additionally, each 
year, ULGNO publishes the New Orleans 
Guide to High School and Beyond providing 
parents with information about both their 
State of Black New Orleans73
public and nonpublic high school options. 
ULGNO also hosts a large-scale annual 
Schools Expo where thousands of attendees 
interface with school representatives to 
learn about the full spectrum of local school 
options. 
Louisiana Scholarship Program
Families with students in public schools with 
a letter grade of  “C,” “D”, “F” or “T” (transition) 
or with children entering kindergarten can 
apply for a scholarship or voucher to send 
their child to a participating private school. In 
addition, eligible families must have a family 
income that does not exceed 250% of the 
federal poverty guidelines (Sims & Vaughan, 
2014). Parents in Orleans Parish apply using 
the OneApp and can rank up to eight schools 
in order of their preference including both 
public and participating private schools. 
For the 2015-16 school year, 1,500 students 
of 10,300 applicants included at least one 
private school as a choice on OneApp; about 
one-third of those students selected only 
private schools. (Dreilinger, 2015a.)
The voucher program was piloted in New 
Orleans in 2008 and expanded statewide 
in 2012. The state reports that 131 private 
schools are participating in the program 
statewide. There are 42 private schools 
accepting the voucher in the Greater New 
Orleans region and 29 of these schools are 
located in Orleans Parish (LDOE, n.d.c.). 
Questions remain about the quality among 
private schools in the voucher program. 
Students receiving publicly funded 
scholarships to attend private schools 
are required to take state assessments. 
Statewide, in 2013-14 40% of scholarship 
students tested in grades 3 through 8 
scored basic or above; the state average 
was 69% (Dreilinger, 2014b). Because of low 
levels of student academic achievement, 23 
schools are no longer allowed to accept new 
students through the voucher program; 10 
of these “failing schools” are in New Orleans 
(Dreilinger, 2015a).
Educator Workforce
Teacher quality is also important to parents 
and they dene it in a variety of ways. Parents 
are looking for teachers that are dedicated, 
caring, can dierentiate instruction, etc. 
Some parents value teacher certication 
and experience. In both the Urban League 
study (2013) and research conducted by 
the Cowen Institute (2013), some parents 
expressed concern about the shift in 
teacher demographics post-Katrina. In the 
wake of Katrina, approximately 7,500 public 
school employees were red. Many veteran 
teachers reapplied to teach in OPSB or 
RSD schools; however, most newly opened 
charter schools enlisted organizations such 
as Teacher For America (TFA) and The New 
Teacher Project, TeachNOLA, bringing in 
predominately younger, non-local, less 
experienced White teachers. For some 
parents, a quality teacher was described as 
someone who looked like them, grew up like 
them, and had a deep appreciation for local 
culture and traditions, in part a response to 
the vastly dierent demographic prole of 
the current NOPS educator workforce post-
Katrina (Cowen Institute, 2013). 
According to a report proered by 
EducateNOW! (2015) in the 2003-04 
academic year, 74% of teachers in public 
schools in New Orleans were African 
American. In 2012-13, 51% of teachers 
in public schools in New Orleans (OPSB 
and RSD) were African American. The 
social and economic eects of the drop 
in African American teachers remain an 
ever present, tense, but scarcely studied 
topic. An examination of the impact of this 
demographic shift within the educator 
workforce must be studied with respect to 
its impact on children and its impact on the 
shrinking, African American middle class in 
New Orleans. 
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School Closures
During the 2014-2015 school year, 26 
charter schools (30%) in New Orleans were 
up for renewal or extensions (Dreilinger, 
2014a).  The state Board of Elementary 
and Secondary Education (BESE) renewed 
or extended charters for 22 of the schools; 
charters for two schools were extended 
with some probationary stipulations 
and two schools were slated to close 
(Dreilinger, 2014d). 
Since Katrina, 19 charter schools have 
closed, surrendered their charters, changed 
management, or merged with another 
school. In addition to charter school closures, 
the RSD has closed 34 traditional direct-run 
schools and authorized charter schools to 
operate in many of the school buildings, 
and OPSB closed three alternative schools. 
(Louisiana Department of Education, n.d.b). 
Closures are usually based on the schools’ 
report card grades and performance scores, 
which are mostly made up of student test 
scores and graduation rates for high schools, 
nancial viability, and organizational 
(legal and contractual) obligations. In 
more extreme cases, schools have been 
closed because of incompliance with 
state regulations, BESE policy and charter 
contracts, special education violations, and 
other violations that compromise the safety 
and well-being of children (Jewson, 2015; 
Tidmore, 2011). 
Although school closures are a direct 
result of increased accountability in public 
education in New Orleans, the impact 
of school closures on families must be 
examined. Children of color have almost 
exclusively been impacted by this 
education reform strategy leaving families 
scrambling to nd new schools for their 
children. Empirical evidence suggests that 
student mobility has a negative impact on 
young children (Beatty, 2010). As a policy, 
school closures should be a method of last 
resort and every eort possible must be 
made to improve schools before school 
closures are enforced. 
Expulsions
The decentralization of the public school 
system following Hurricane Katrina left 
little consistency and oversight of student 
discipline and expulsions. In 2012-2013, 
the Orleans Parish School Board and the 
Recovery School District established a 
centralized expulsion hearing oce, a set 
of standard policies, and single review 
team to hear all cases for students enrolled 
in public schools located in New Orleans 
(including all RSD and state-authorized 
charter schools, OPSB charter schools, 
and OPSB direct-run schools.) The new 
expulsion handbook identies three levels 
of oenses; levels one and two include 
actions that result in expulsions while 
level three oenses lead to a “disciplinary 
conference” (Dreilinger, 2015b).  Having 
more students referred to a disciplinary 
conference has led to fewer expulsions.
A comparison of mid-year 2013 and 
2014 expulsion rates and counts shows a 
decrease. In December 2013, 114 public 
school students were expelled (.26%) and 75 
students received a conference (Dreilinger, 
2015b). By mid-year 2014, the number of 
students expelled declined to 100 (.22%) 
and 201 students received a conference. 
Overall, the RSD saw a 45% drop in the 
number of students recommended for 
expulsion by mid-year 2014-2015 and a 
citywide decrease of 25% (RSD, 2015). 
These changes to the expulsion process 
in New Orleans Public Schools are a step 
in the right direction in addressing the 
school-to-prion pipeline. School expulsions 
disproportionately impact African American 
and Hispanic students who are 10 and 
four times (respectively) more likely than 
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White students to be expelled (Louisiana 
Association of Public Charter Schools, 2012). 
In New Orleans 46% of the children that 
the Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights 
(LCCR) represents have been expelled or 
suspended, 25% have been arrested for 
something that happened in school, and 98% 
of them are African Americans (Perry, 2015). 
LCCR’s Children Defense Team represents 
1200 juvenile cases each year. These statistics 
illustrate the pervasiveness of the school-
to-prison pipeline on African Americans in 
New Orleans and should inuence schools to 
identify additional alternatives to disciplining 
African American youth.    
Secondary Education
Over the past 10 years signicant gains have 
been made in secondary education in New 
Orleans.  Public school graduation rose from 
54% in 2004 to almost 73% in 2014 (LDOE, 
2015b).  Dropout rates have almost been cut 
in half, moving from12.2% in 2004 to 6.5% 
in 2014 (LDOE, 2014c).  And 59% of the class 
of 2014 enrolled in college the fall semester 
after graduation (LDOE, 2015b). These data 
points are frequently used to highlight 
the progress that has been made in New 
Orleans schools, but what do they really tell 
us? Have gains in secondary education been 
equitable? Are students exiting high school 
ready for college and career? 
A few details must be mentioned to put 
this discussion in perspective. First, despite 
the fact that RSD-NO manages more than 
80% of public schools in New Orleans, they 
only educate about half of public high 
school students in the city (LDOE, 2015a). 
In addition, OPSB high schools include 
a few selective admissions high schools, 
two of which enroll a higher proportion 
of White students and a lower proportion 
of low-income students than most public 
high schools in the city. Benjamin Franklin 
High School and Lusher Charter School 
(upper school) graduate less than 25% of 
the OPSB senior class, but have the highest 
ACT composite scores for the district (LDOE, 
2015a; LDOE, 2014a). Finally, New Orleans 
and Louisiana have one of the highest 
private school enrollments in the nation, 
with 25% of its students attending private 
and parochial schools (Davidson, 2014). 
Thus, the state of Black education will 
include data, where possible, on private and 
parochial high school outcomes. 
The question has been posed, “How are 
high schools in New Orleans preparing their 
students to succeed in career and college?” 
We will use ACT data to examine schools’ 
success at preparing students for college, 
given that scores on the ACT are predictors 
of rst year college performance. A brief 
analysis of NOPS student performance 
over the past 10 years will be oered in this 
section. In addition, we will also present 
TOPS eligibility data available from the 
Louisiana Department of Education to 
provide a snapshot of private and parochial 
school students’ achievement in comparison 
to public school student achievement. An 
analysis of inequities within private and 
parochial schools is provided as well using 
TOPS data to provide some insight on how 
much families are benetting from the 
investment in private school education. 
Data analysis on college enrollment by 
school type for NOPS is also presented 
in this section. Very little data is available 
on career readiness initiatives in NOPS. 
However, a discussion on Jump Start, the 
statewide career readiness initiative, will be 
discussed in brief. 
ACT Performance
High school grade point average (GPA), ACT 
and SAT scores, and non-cognitive variables 
are among several valid predictors of college 
success (Richardson, Abraham, & Bond, 
2012). Although standardized tests alone 
are insucient predictors of college success, 
they are valid predictors of rst year college 
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performance and they are used nationally 
to gauge college readiness (in addition to 
other variables including high school GPA) 
(Noble, 2003).  ACT scores do not provide a 
holistic view of college readiness, but they 
are used to determine remediation and 
college entry for colleges and universities 
in Louisiana.  An ACT composite score of 
an 18 (minimum) is an indicator of college 
readiness and an ACT below an 18 is used as 
an indicator that students need remediation 
(Louisiana Connect, 2014).  
In 2014, seven out of 24 public high schools 
in New Orleans (29%) with reported ACT 
scores for seniors had an ACT composite 
score of 18 or better (LDOE, 2014a).  In the 
RSD the numbers are signicantly lower 
than OPSB with only two schools out of 
17 (12%) with a reported ACT composite 
score of 18 or better. This means that an 
overwhelming majority of schools in the RSD-
NO are graduating students who are deemed 
underprepared for college. To be exact, 33% 
of RSD-NO students had a composite score of 
18 or higher (Dreilinger, 2014c). Within OPSB, 
all but one of their high schools had an ACT 
composite score above 18 (LDOE, 2014a). 
In total, 66% of students in OPSB schools 
had an ACT composite score of 18 or better 
(Dreilinger, 2014c). Compare this to the state 
average of 59% and OPSB appears to be 
performing well. But how does this compare 
to NOPS before the state takeover?
In 2005, 19 schools had reported ACT 
composite scores for their graduating 
seniors (LDOE, 2005). Of those 19 schools, 
ve of them were selective admissions high 
schools. Yet only three schools (Franklin, 
Karr and McMain High Schools) in the entire 
district had ACT composite scores above 
18. Two of the ve selective admissions 
schools fell short of graduating students 
on average that met the benchmark for 
college readiness. However, composite ACT 
scores for both Edna Karr High School and 
Eleanor McMain High School were higher in 
2005 than they were in 2014 (LDOE, 2005; 
LDOE, 2014a).  The ACT composite score for 
Edna Karr High School in 2014 was an 18.5 
down from 19.7 in 2005 (LDOE, 2005). For 
McMain the drop was more signicant, with 
a 2014 composite score of 19.1, down from 
20.6 in 2005 (LDOE, 2005; LDOE, 2014a). 
Both of these schools have moved from 
being selective admissions schools to open 
enrollment high schools.
ACT scores give us a snapshot of student 
achievement and college readiness for 
young people in New Orleans public schools, 
but what do we know about the student 
achievement of young people graduating 
from New Orleans private and parochial 
schools? The investment that families make 
in private and parochial education ranges 
approximately $7000 to nearly $23,000 
per year (Jesuit High School, 2014). Is this 
investment paying o? Data from the Taylor 
Opportunity Program for Students, the 
state’s merit-based scholarship program for 
postsecondary education, suggests that the 
payo varies. 
TOPS Eligibility
Students at private and parochial schools 
are outperforming students in NOPS in 
TOPS eligibility (LOFSA, 2014). In 2014, 73% 
of nonpublic high school graduates in New 
Orleans were TOPS eligible as compared 
to 37% of NOPS graduates (LOFSA, 2014). 
This means that students met the grade 
point average and ACT composite score 
requirements to receive one of four of the 
state’s merit-based scholarships. That is a 
36-percentage point dierence between 
nonpublic and public schools in New Orleans 
(LOFSA, 2014). It would seem that the 
investment in private education is paying 
o for the vast majority of graduates in 
local, nonpublic schools since almost three 
quarters of nonpublic high school graduates 
are earning scholarships to state public 
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Figure 2:  Nonpublic TOPS eligibility 2014
Source: Source: LDOE, 2014 High School Graduates (including alternate eligible) eligible f
or a TOPS award by school, school district and parish TOPS eligibility report
Figure 3: TOPS eligibility district comparison 2005
Source: Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. (2005). 2005 High school graduates
 (including alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS Award by school, school district and parish
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institutions.  However, deep disparities 
exist between predominately Black and 
predominately White nonpublic schools. 
In 2014, there was a 30-point dierence in 
TOPS eligibility between predominately 
Black and White private and parochial 
schools (LOFSA, 2014). Among Black 
private schools, 47% of graduates were 
TOPS eligible as compared to 77% of White 
private school graduates (See Figure 2). This 
performance gap appears to be closing 
between predominately Black and White 
private schools, albeit slowly. In 2009 there 
was a 34-percentage point dierence in 
TOPS eligibility between predominately 
Black and predominately White nonpublic 
high schools. The dierence between these 
schools in 2005 was 38% (LOFSA, 2005; 
LOFSA, 2009; LOFSA, 2014). 
In 2005, the dierence in TOPS eligibility 
between Black private schools and New 
Orleans public schools was only ve-
percentage points  (See Figure 3) (LOSFA, 
2005). In 2005, New Orleans public schools 
were the second lowest performing school 
district in Louisiana. What do 2005 TOPS 
eligibility data suggest about the quality 
of Black nonpublic schools in New Orleans 
ten years ago? Since 2005, the gap between 
NOPS and Black nonpublic schools grew 
by 10-percentage points, with 32% TOPS 
eligibility in NOPS as compared to 47% 
for Black nonpublic schools (See Figure 4) 
(LOFS, 2014).  What does the growing gap 
in TOPS eligibility between NOPS and Black 
nonpublic schools tell us about how well 
NOPS are preparing students to compete in 
college and the workforce?  
A closer look at TOPS eligibility by school 
type reveals that OPSB TOPS eligibility was 
one percentage point higher than Black 
nonpublic schools in 2014 (LOFSA, 2014). 
That same year RSD-NO was 23- percentage 
points lower than Black nonpublic high 
schools and 24-percentage points lower 
than OPSB schools (See Figure 4). Do these 
extensive gaps suggest that there is an 
Figure 4:  TOPS eligibility by school type and scholarship level 2014
Source: Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. (2014). 2014 High School Graduates 
(including alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS award by school, school district and parish TOPS eligibility report.
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educational caste system in New Orleans? 
Have education reforms in New Orleans 
inadvertently established a more complex 
system of social stratication in local schools? 
More importantly, what can be done to 
accelerate the closing of the achievement 
gaps between RSD-NO schools and other 
school districts, as well as gaps between 
predominately Black and predominately 
White schools in New Orleans? 
Dierences in the percentage of TOPS 
Opportunity (or higher) scholarships 
between districts are better markers of 
college readiness than TOPS eligibility alone. 
These scholarships require at minimum an 
ACT score of 20, which exceeds the college 
readiness benchmark of 18, and requires a 
minimum of a 2.5 grade point average. Gaps 
between Black and White private schools 
in New Orleans are more pronounced 
when looking at TOPS eligibility type. For 
instance, there was a 37-percentage point 
dierence between predominately Black 
and predominately White nonpublic high 
schools in the percent of students eligible 
for TOPS Opportunity scholarships or higher 
(see Figure 2). This gap is down from a 
40-percentage point gap in 2005.  It is also 
worth noting that almost all TOPS eligible 
students at White nonpublic schools earned 
TOPS Opportunity scholarships or higher. 
In comparing TOPS Opportunity eligibility 
or higher amongst public and nonpublic 
high schools, NOPS schools outperformed 
Black nonpublic schools by eight 
percentage points in 2014 (LOFSA, 2014). 
OPSB outperformed Black private schools 
by 14-percentage points, and RSD-NO fell 
just three percentage points below Black 
nonpublic schools in the percentage of 
TOPS Opportunity (or higher) eligibility 
(See Figure 4). So, among students who are 
TOPS eligible in New Orleans schools, there 
is a higher percentage of TOPS Opportunity 
or better in NOPS than in Black nonpublic 
schools (LOFSA, 2014). If college readiness 
is an important factor inuencing African 
American families school choices, could 
OPSB schools be a better investment 
for African American families than Black 
nonpublic schools in New Orleans?
Despite gains in TOPS scholarship eligibility 
in public and nonpublic, predominately 
Black schools in New Orleans, the 
achievement gap between predominately 
Black and predominately White schools 
remains signicantly wide.  To what can these 
disparities be attributed? Could it be that 
the environmental barriers to development 
young children face during early childhood 
continue to disadvantage children well into 
high school? How can schools help eliminate 
disparities in student achievement and 
college and career readiness without also 
examining and addressing root causes of 
these disparities? How are these disparities 
impacting African American students’ 
capacity to compete in postsecondary 
education and in the workforce? The 
next section examines African American 
students’ college enrollment trends to shed 
light on this issue.
College Enrollment
College enrollment appears to be on the 
uptick for New Orleans public high school 
graduates. Almost 60% of the class of 2014 
is reported to have enrolled in college in 
the fall of 2014 (LDOE, 2015).  This statistic 
represents both in-state and out-of-
state college enrollment. Prior to 2012, 
the Louisiana Department of Education 
only reported on students who went to 
college in-state, thus we present in-state 
college enrollment over the past decade to 
examine college enrollment trends. 
Using current college enrollment reports, 
we were able to determine that 48% of 
public high school graduates from the class 
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of 2014 enrolled in in-state colleges and 
universities in the fall of 2014 as compared 
to 37% in 2004 (LDOE, 2014b; LDOE, 2004). 
This represents an 11-percentage point 
increase in 10 years and a one-percentage 
point increase since 2010 (LDOE, 2010). 
Figure 5 highlights changes in in-state 
college enrollment for New Orleans public 
school graduates by district from 2004-2014. 
A closer look at the postsecondary 
education enrollment trends among 
NOPS graduates reveals a series of peaks, 
valleys and plains in student outcomes 
throughout the past ten years. NOPS 
experienced its greatest gains in college 
enrollment between 2004 and 2010, 
when RSD-NO district still directly ran 
most RSD-NO high schools. (LDOE, 2004; 
LDOE, 2010). The exceptions were Algiers 
Charter Schools Association high schools 
and the Capital One UNO Charter School 
(Thurgood Marshall Early College High 
School).  RSD-NO is currently experiencing 
the most growth in the city, having 
increased college enrollment by seven 
percentage points since 2010. RSD-NO 
continues to experience growth while 
OPSB growth has slowed at almost 60% 
(LDOE, 2014b). Although OPSB contains 
a few selective admissions schools all but 
one of their high schools had college-
going rates in 2010 above the state average 
of 52% (LDOE, 2010). That suggests that 
OPSB did a fairly good job of helping their 
students access postsecondary education 
opportunities. 
Although college-going rates in 
NOPS experienced a nine percentage 
point increase between 2004-2010, 
developmental education rates for both 
OPSB and RSD-NO schools indicate that 
many NOPS students entered school 
underprepared for college coursework 
(LDOE, 2004; LDOE, 2010). In 2010, 44% 
of first time freshman from OPSB schools 
required remediation at in-state colleges, 
and 60% of students at RSD-NO schools 
required remediation (LDOE, 2010). 
Approximately 51% of NOPS students 
entering in-state schools in the fall of 
2010 required remediation. Nearly one-
third (31%) of first time freshman from 
Louisiana required remediation in 2010. 
In 2004, 53% of first time freshman from 
NOPS required remediation, as compared 
to the 29% remediation rate for the state 
(LDOE, 2004).  So, between 2004 and 2010, 
NOPS remediation rates dropped two 
percentage points. Between 2010 and 2014, 
NOPS college-going rates increased by two 
percentage points. In 2010, the state adopted 
the Louisiana GRAD Act, which phased out 
remedial courses at four-year colleges and 
increased admissions requirements across 
the state’s public institutions (Oce of the 
Governor, 2010). Since remediation data is 
no longer reported, we use ACT scores of 
18+ to gauge college readiness. 
Figure 5:   NOPS college enrollment 2004-2014
Source:  Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. 
(2004). Louisiana rst time college freshman state ; 
Report: Fall 2004;Louisiana Department of Education 
[LDOE]. (2010). Louisiana rst time college freshman 
state: Report: Fall 2010; Louisiana Department of 
Education [LDOE]. (2014b). College enrollment data for 
2013- 2014 high school graduates
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Career Readiness
At the start of this section, we asked, “How 
are high schools in New Orleans preparing 
their students to succeed in career and 
college?” We know that more than half of 
RSD-NO graduates who enrolled in college 
in 2014 attended two-year colleges (LDOE, 
2014b). Although we cannot assume that 
all students in that number attended two-
year colleges because they were not college 
ready, the RSD-NO ACT composite score of 
16.4 suggests that many RSD-NO students 
were not prepared to pursue college 
coursework without remediation (LDOE, 
2014a). Regardless, 47% of RSD-NO students 
attended college in 2014 (both in and out-
of-state) (LDOE, 2014a). What happened to 
the 53% of students who did not pursue 
postsecondary education?  In OPSB, 72% of 
students enrolled in college in 2014, with 
28% attending two-year colleges (LDOE, 
2014a). For the 28% of graduating seniors 
from OPSB that did not attend college, were 
these students prepared to pursue careers 
in elds that would provide them with a 
livable wage? Could it be that schools’ focus 
on college enrollment may be preventing 
them from serving the needs of the students 
who do not transition into postsecondary 
education institutions after high school? 
And for those that do transition to college, 
do they have the basic skills required to 
excel in the workforce?
There are currently no available data that 
capture the level of career readiness of 
students graduating from public schools in 
Louisiana. In addition, very few students in 
NOPS have access to career and technical 
education coursework according to school 
proles. Of those that do oer career and 
technical education courses, are they 
preparing students for high-wage, high 
demand industries? These are important 
questions because career pathways for 
students leaving high school may currently 
be leading to employment without a 
livable wage. This means that the school 
systems are falling short of preparing 
students for postsecondary options that 
will actually improve the quality of life 
and career trajectory of African American 
students. Could schools be reinforcing 
social stratication by graduating students 
ill-prepared for career success?
The Louisiana Department of Education 
responded to this crisis by launching 
Jump Start, the state’s career and technical 
education initiative (LDOE, 2014d). This 
initiative is meant to provide Louisiana’s 
students with access to resources, facilities 
and opportunities to prepare them for 
careers in high growth sectors in Louisiana. 
This program includes opportunities 
for students to earn industry-based 
credentials in high growth sectors before 
they graduate, positioning them for 
immediate employment in these industries 
upon graduation (LDOE, 2014d). The state 
also oers career readiness and career 
exploration courses through its Course 
Choice program and will begin using the 
Work Keys exam to evaluate students’ 
workforce readiness and literacy (LDOE, 
2014e). These initiatives will help to ensure 
all students have a pathway to success 
in college and career and will hopefully 
address existing gaps in school curriculum 
in NOPS.    
 Opportunity Youth
As mentioned, the cost of not completing 
a college degree can be devastating to 
individual and family wellbeing. The high 
school diploma simply will not secure 
job opportunities that lead to a middle-
class lifestyle. Unfortunately, many young 
people have dropped out of school and/
or not working as a result. Opportunity 
youth, also referred to as disconnected 
youth, are young adults 16 to 24 years old 
who are neither in school nor working. 
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They are called opportunity youth because 
of the opportunity their reconnection to 
school or employment could bring to their 
communities. 
Nationally, 13.8% of all youth 16 to 24 years 
old are considered opportunity youth 
(Sims, 2015). Among the four regions of the 
US, the South reports the highest rate of 
opportunity youth at 15.2%. In Louisiana, 
nearly one in ve young adults (between 
16 and 24 years) are opportunity youth. 
With a rate of 19.8, Louisiana has the 
highest percentage of opportunity youth 
in the country. Of youth in the New Orleans 
area, 18.2% (approximately 26,000 young 
people) are disconnected from school and 
work. This rate places New Orleans third 
from the highest behind Memphis (21.6%) 
and Las Vegas (19.6%) (Sims, 2015).
Nationally, 28.5% of opportunity youth 
have dropped out of high school; 23.7% 
of opportunity youth, however, have 
some college (Sims, 2015). Opportunity 
youth in the New Orleans metro area have 
similar educational attainment trends. The 
relatively high rates of opportunity youth 
with some college highlight the limited 
economic prospects for young people in 
the region. In spite of some encouraging 
improvement in the K-12 sector, many young 
people still nd it dicult to nd work or 
continue their education. The New Orleans 
job market is particularly dicult for Black 
youth. In the US, 23% of opportunity youth 
are African American. In the New Orleans 
metro area, the majority of opportunity 
youth are African American (Sims, 2015).
The issues associated with opportunity youth 
place nancial burdens on US taxpayers 
resulting from increased government 
spending (on crime, healthcare, and welfare) 
(Sims, 2015). Each opportunity youth 
represents an annual cost of $13,000. These 
costs accumulate each year and represent 
a lifetime cost of $235,680 for every young 
person who remains disconnected. If the 
26,000 opportunity youth in the New 
Orleans metro area are not re-connected 
to school or work during their lifetimes, the 
costs to taxpayers in New Orleans is $360 
million. More sobering, individuals become 
more vulnerable to a criminal justice system, 
violence, impoverished living conditions 
and unsafe neighborhoods (Sims, 2015).
There are initiatives that reconnect 
opportunity youth to jobs and schools. For 
instance, the city of New Orleans’ Job1/
YouthWork targets youth ages 14 to 21 
years old and provides participants with 
employment, tutoring, skills training, and 
counseling. The Urban League of Greater 
New Orleans’ Suits for Hire mentoring 
program provides youth ages 17 to 24 years 
with professional attire, mentoring, skills 
training, and other supports, and its Urban 
Youth Empowerment Program provides 
case management, skills development, 
education attainment, and job placement 
services. Partnership for Youth Development 
and the Cowen Institute’s EMPLOY 
(Employment and Mobility Pathways Linked 
for Opportunity Youth) is a 20 member 
collective including government, nonprot, 
and workforce development organizations 
facilitating a continuum of services that 
link and support education, employment, 
health, and well-being. The Cowen Institute 
at Tulane University oers the Earn and Learn 
Career Pathways program. For one year, 
opportunity youth work at Tulane University 
and take courses toward a career credential 
through the Accelerating Career Education 
(ACE) program at Delgado Community 
College. Upon completion, the youth will 
receive an industry-based certicate and 
long-term employment. In addition, the 
Youth Empowerment Project’s The Village 
provides out of school youth ages 16 to 
24 years with GED/HiSET preparation and 
wrap-around case management services. 
And its NOPLAY (New Orleans Providing 
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Literacy to All Youth) program provides GED/
HiSET and basic literacy instruction to youth 
between the ages of 16 and 24 years. Liberty’s 
Kitchen, Café Reconcile, and Café Hope 
provides young adults between the ages 
of 16 and 22 with workforce development 
and life skills training within the culinary 
environment to become employed and self-
sucient. 
Still these programs meet a fraction of the 
need. Quality jobs must be available so an 
education can realize its value. Unfortunately, 
the large number of opportunity youth 
reect the real life context which many Black 
students face. Educational improvement in 
New Orleans’ schools does not easily predict 
a better quality of life in New Orleans.
College Success
As schools strive for and actualize growth 
in state level achievement test scores, 
national standardized tests data as well as 
high school graduation rates are crucial 
and encouraging. However, these are 
intermediate goals – means to a bigger 
end: college access and degree attainment. 
In an increasingly global and competitive 
environment, the consequences of 
not getting a college degree can be 
devastating to individuals, communities 
and the national economy. But a high 
school diploma is worth less than in the 
past. The Pew Research Center found that 
the value of a college degree is increasing 
with time while high school diplomas are 
depreciating. Today, 22% with only a high 
school diploma from the U.S. are living in 
poverty, compared to 7% of Baby Boomers 
who had only a high school diploma in 
1979 when they were in their late 20s and 
early 30s (Pew Research Center, 2014). At an 
absolute minimum, individuals need some 
post-secondary experiences if they are to 
have any reasonable opportunities to earn 
a living wage.  
Table 1:  Fall 2014 enrollment data for Louisiana colleges & universities by race. Source: Source: Source:  National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics, U.S. Department of Education 2013; Data Note:  This data reects undergraduate enrollment; Not all institutions are 
shown in this table  due to missing data, but the averages included institutions when applicable.
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As was mentioned, more Black students 
from New Orleans are qualifying and 
enrolling in college. However, data suggest 
that serious disparities exist in the higher 
education setting. The capability to track 
New Orleans high school graduates by 
race in the Louisiana institutions of higher 
learning is limited. But we can extrapolate 
from enrollment and graduation rates that 
the journey to a higher education degree is 
dicult for Blacks in the state. 
Data from the US Census Bureau suggest 
that as of 2013 the total population ve- 
year estimate for Louisiana is approximately 
4,567,968 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013a).  Of 
this population 32% (1,463,345) are Black 
and 62.9% (2,874,235) are reported as White. 
Approximately 7.6% of Louisiana’s population 
is in the age range of 20-24, which is in line 
with the traditional age of students entering 
and attending colleges and universities. 
Institution Name Asian Black Hispanic White 
Tulane University of Louisiana 78 65 70 78
*Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College 69 59 63 67
Centenary College of Louisiana 63 54 44 60
Loyola University New Orleans 57 49 45 60
Xavier University of Louisiana 69 47 33 0
Dillard University N/R 45 N/R 0
*Louisiana Tech University 46 42 38 51
Louisiana College 50 35 25 45
*Northwestern State University of Louisiana 33 35 38 40
*University of Louisiana at Monroe 35 34 20 43
*University of Louisiana at Lafayette 60 33 31 47
*Southern University and A & M College N/R 32 N/R 29
*Grambling State University 50 31 20 13
*Nicholls State University 38 31 12 45
*Louisiana State University-Shreveport 27 30 38 34
*McNeese State University 50 30 60 38
*University of New Orleans 32 26 25 33
*Southeastern Louisiana University 30 25 47 38
University of Phoenix-Baton Rouge Campus 50 17 N/R 17
University of Phoenix-Louisiana Campus 50 17 N/R 17
*Southern University at New Orleans N/R 10 N/R N/R
Our Lady of Holy Cross College 67 7 29 23
*Louisiana State University-Alexandria 0 5 0 25
Table 2:  Six-Year graduation rate for Louisiana public colleges & universities by race Rank order by Black (highest to lowest)
Source: Source:  National Center for Education Statistics – http://nces.ed.gov
U.S. Department of Education 2013 DataN/R – None Reported
*Public, Some institutions not shown because of missing data.
due to missing data, but the averages included institutions when applicable.
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Enrollment data were collected for each 
of these institutions by race as a way of 
highlighting the racial prole of Louisiana’s 
colleges and universities.  A closer 
examination of these results revealed that 
in aggregate - that is when the institutions 
in this sample are collapsed to a single 
variable (Louisiana Colleges & Universities) 
- Black student enrollment for Fall 2013 was 
25% compared to their White counterparts 
at 59% in Louisiana Colleges and 
Universities. It can easily be discerned from 
Table 1 which institutions are traditionally 
Black and White e.g. Louisiana State 
University and A&M College (75%) White, 
Southern University and A&M College 
(94%) Black.
In further describing the prole of Louisiana 
public colleges and universities and the 
dierences in Black and White students, 
six-year graduation rates were collected 
and compared using the institutional 
comparison tool in IPEDS (NCES, 2015). 
Graduation rates reveal more than 41% of 
Whites who enrolled in Louisiana colleges 
and universities in 2007 graduated in six 
years compared to 34% of Blacks.  Both 
numbers are wanting and a gap exists 
nonetheless (See Table 2). 
These data culminate into racial dierence 
among those who have college degrees in 
New Orleans and the metro area.  The White 
subgroup is twice as likely to have at least 
an associate degree than the Black cohort 
in the metropolitan area  (See Figure 6).
Figure 6:  Population with at least an associate’s degree by race/ethnicity for the population 25 years and older
Source: Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. (2014). 2014 High School Graduates 
(including alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS award by school, school district and parish TOPS eligibility report.
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Closing
For the last 10 years, New Orleans has played 
the blame game in education. Reformers 
have shamed the past to argue for change. 
In return, reform has been charged with 
destroying traditional public education for 
future children. The aftermath of Katrina 
should incite passions. Everyone seemingly 
prots from the debate except for public 
school families – the people who need more 
than words. However, durable arguments 
have concretized into an immovable tableau 
that gets in the way of both justice and 
progress. Regardless of whose side you’re 
on, pointing ngers to say who did what to 
who doesn’t solve problems. Progress forces 
us to ask where do we go from here.
Based on this report, the authors recommend 
the following:
• Increase funding and slots for early 
childhood programming including CCAP 
and LA4 programs, while maintaining 
much-needed tax incentives.
• Increase support to early childhood care 
and education providers to improve 
quality.
• Use appropriate play-based learning 
approaches during early childhood 
education and abandon a focus on 
standardized testing of children during 
early childhood.
• Maintain a holistic focus on early childhood 
development rather than simply focusing 
on kindergarten readiness.
• Examine the impact of a Whiter 
educator workforce on academic and 
socioeconomic outcomes for African 
American children, as well as its impact 
on the African American middle class. 
• Align K-12 curriculum with college 
and career readiness standards to 
better support students in successfully 
accessing college and career 
opportunities.
• Expand career and technical education 
programs in NOPS.
• Continue to hold all schools 
accountable for exceptional outcomes 
(for all subgroups of youth), and require 
action for patterns of sub-performance. 
• Increase capacity (seats) at high-
performing and high-demand schools, 
while also strengthening all schools 
to provide high quality educational 
options in every neighborhood.
• Provide parents with meaningful and 
appropriate information that allows all 
families to select the schools that are 
the best t for their children.
• Mandate the inclusion of all NOPS in the 
centralized enrollment system. 
• Create a centralized Student Information 
System (SIS) that would hold data on all 
public school students, track mobility, 
support services, and monitor outcomes.
• Develop programs that infuse the local 
diversity into all levels of school sta, 
faculty, vendors, administration and 
governance.
• Implement restorative justice practices in 
schools to reduce the rates of suspension and 
expulsion. Produce uniform guidelines for 
school suspensions, considering appropriate 
behavior modification strategies for the 
varying age and grade levels. 
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• Expand and improve school accountability 
practices to provide schools in crisis with 
support to address areas of deciency, 
reserving complete school closure for 
emergency circumstances or as a means 
of last resort.
• Place more focus on undergraduate 
student success, with an expanded 
strategy to provide stackable 
credentials/certications to students 
while in high school and also promote 
the viability of two-year degrees for 
demand sector jobs in the region.
• Build partnerships between NOPS 
and the local business community to 
strengthen career readiness initiatives.
These and other reforms should not be 
done to communities. We should constantly 
build capacity of others so members can 
improve themselves. In the next 10 years, 
we have an opportunity to pass a test that 
has challenged our nation for decades—to 
create schools that authentically represent 
the public and compel us to learn together. 
But we will miss this opportunity if we 
reform in spite of community. It is harder, 
and it certainly takes longer, but the rewards 
and gains will be greater if we build upon 
our current reforms in an inclusive manner.
When we remove our eyes from the higher 
standard of community, we also remove our 
personal responsibilities for improving it. 
When we have faith in community, we will 
begin to understand fully that we can uplift 
communities while reforming - together.
References
Bassok, D., Latham, S., Rorem, A. (2015, May). Is 
Kindergarten the new rst grade. EdPolicy Works. 
Retrieved from http://curry.virginia.edu/uploads/
resourceLibrary/20_Bassok_Is_Kindergarten_The_
New_First_Grade.pdf 
Beatty, A. (2010). Student mobility: Exploring the impacts 
of frequent moves on achievement. Summary of a 
workshop. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 
Calman, L. J., and L. Tarr-Whelan (2005). Early 
childhood education for all—A wise investment. New 
York: Legal Momentum. Retrieved from http://web.mit.
edu/workplacecenter/docs/Full%20Report.pdf
Cowen Institute for Public Initiatives [Cowen Institute]. 
(2013). Spotlight on choice: Parent opinions on school 
selection in New Orleans. Retrieved from http://www.
coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
Choice-Focus-Groups-FINAL-small.pdf 
Curwood, J.S. (2007). What happened to kindergarten? 
Instructor, 117(1). 28-30, 32. Retrieved  from 
http://les.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ792945.pdf 
Dreilinger, D. (2013, January 11). Application period for 
most New Orleans public schools begins Wednesday. 
Nola.com/The Times-Picayune.  Retrieved from http://
www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2013/01/oneapp_
expands_to_let_parents.html 
Dreilinger, D. (2014a, September 3). 30% of New 
Orleans schools face charter renewal decisions this fall. 
Nola.com/The Times-Picayune.  Retrieved from http://
www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/09/30_of_
new_orleans_charter_scho.html
Dreilinger, D. (2014b, November 3). Louisiana voucher 
students perform poorly in 2013-14; proponents praise 
gains. Nola.com/The Times-Picayune. Retrieved from 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/11/
louisiana_voucher_students_per.html 
Dreilinger, D. (2014c, July 11). New Orleans high school 
exam results, graduation rate near state average. Nola.
com. Retrieved from http://www.nola.com/education/
index.ssf/2014/07/new_orleans_high_school_exam_r.
html 
Dreilinger, D. (2014d, December 2). One quarter 
of New Orleans public schools see their charters 
reauthorized or extended. Nola.com/The Times-
Picayune.  Retrieved from http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/12/one_quarter_of_new_
orleans_pub.htl
88Education
Dreilinger, D. (2015a, February 2). One third of 
Louisiana voucher students are enrolled at sanctioned 
schools. Nola.com/The Times-Picayune. Retrieved from 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/02/
one_third_of_louisiana_voucher.html 
Dreilinger, D. (2015b, February 11). Recovery school 
district expulsions down at mid-year, Orleans schools 
up, ocials report. Nola.com/The Times-Picayune. 
Retrieved from http://www.nola.com/education/index.
ssf/2015/02/recovery_school_district_expul.html 
Educate NOW! (2015, May 4). By the numbers: 
teacher diversity. Retrieved from http://educatenow.
net/2015/05/04/by-the-numbers-teacher-diversity/ 
Gray, D. (2014, March 20). Without funding, Act 3 may 
limit early childhood education accessibility. Louisiana 
Budget Project. Retrieved from http://www.labudget.
org/lbp/2014/03/without-funding-act-3-may-limit-
early-childhood-education-accessibility/ 
Harris, D.N. & Larsen, M.F. (2015). What schools 
do families want and why?: New Orleans families 
and their school choices before and after Katrina. 
Education Research Alliance for New Orleans. Retrieved 
from http://educationresearchalliancenola.org/les/
publications/ERA1402-Policy-Brief-What-Schools-Do-
Families-Want.pdf 
Hutchison, L., Morrissey, T. W., & Burgess, K. (2014). 
The Early Achievement and Development Gap. Research 
Brief. Oce of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services.  http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/14/
achievementgap/rb_AchievementGap.pdf
Jesuit High School. (2014). Tuition comparison. 
Retrieved from https://cdn3.jesuitnola.org/site/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/TuitionComparisons_2014-
15_20140729_B.pdf
Jewson, M. (2015, March 4). RSD superintendent 
recommends closing Lagniappe Academies charter 
school. The Lens. Retrieved from http://thelensnola.
org/2015/03/04/rsd-superintendent-recommends-
closing-lagniappe-academies-charter-school/
Karoly, Lynn A., M. Rebecca Kilburn and Jill S. Cannon 
(2005). Early Childhood Interventions: Proven Results, 
Future Promise. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2005. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG341.pdf 
Liu, G. & Taylor, W. (2005). School choice to achieve 
desegregation. 74Fordham Law Review 791. Retrieved 
from http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/School-Choice-to-Achieve-
Desegregation.pdf 
Louisiana Connect. (2014). Louisiana Board of 
Regents minimum admission standards for rst-time 
freshmen (Fall 2014). Retrieved from https://www.
louisianaconnect.org/Ext/Louisiana/Home/documents/
understand-college-and-career-options.pdf 
Louisiana Department of Education.[LDOE] (n.d.a). 
Early childhood care and education network. 
Retrieved from https://www.louisianabelieves.
com/early-childhood/early-childhood-care-and 
education-network
Louisiana Department of Education. [LDOE] (n.d.b). List 
of schools open each year since Katrina (2004-2005). 
Retrieved from http://www.louisianabelieves.com/
resources/about-us/10-years-after-hurricane-katrina   
Louisiana Department of Education. [LDOE] (n.d.c) 
Louisiana scholarship program. Retrieved from http://
www.louisianabelieves.com/schools/louisiana-
scholarship-program   
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. (2004). 
Louisiana rst time college freshman state Report: Fall 
2004. Retrieved from https://www.louisianabelieves.
com/docs/default-source/data-management/fall-
2004-college-enrollment-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. (2005). 
The Graduating class of 2005 Louisiana ACT Scores. 
Retrieved from https://www.louisianabelieves.com/
docs/data-management/act-scores---class-of-2005.
pdf?sfvrsn=2
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. (2010). 
Louisiana rst time college freshman state Report: Fall 
2010. Retrieved from https://www.louisianabelieves.
com/docs/default-source/data-management/fall-
2010-college-enrollment-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2 
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. (2014a). 
ACT best composite scores for 2013-14 seniors by 
parish. Retrieved from https://www.louisianabelieves.
com/resources/library/data-center 
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. 
(2014b). College enrollment data for 2013-2014 
high school graduates. Retrieved from https://www.
louisianabelieves.com/resources/library/college-
enrollment-reports 
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. (2014c). 
Dropout rate by site by grade in Orleans Parish and RSD 
2004 thru 2013. 
State of Black New Orleans89
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. 
(2014d). Jump Start: Expanding opportunities for 
Louisiana students. Retrieved from https://www.
louisianabelieves.com/docs/default-source/course-
choice/2014-jump-start-blueprint.pdf 
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. (2014e, 
December 9). Jump Start students pursue WorkKeys 
test, TOPS TECH Awards [Press Release].  Retrieved 
from http://www.louisianabelieves.com/newsroom/
news-releases/2014/12/09/jump-start-students-
pursue-workkeys-test-tops-tech-awards 
Louisiana Department of Education. [LDOE] (2015a). 
Enrollment counts, including students by race, 
special education status, socioeconomic status, and 
English language learner status (2004-2005, 2006-
2007 to 2013-2014). Retrieved from https://www.
louisianabelieves.com/resources/about-us/10-years-
after-hurricane-katrina 
Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. (2015b). 
High school performance. Retrieved from http://www.
louisianabelieves.com/docs/default-source/katrina/
nal-louisana-believes-v5-high-school-performance.
pdf?sfvrsn=2 
Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. 
(2005). 2005 High school graduates (including 
alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS Award by school, 
school district and parish. Retrieved from https://www.
osfa.la.gov/MainSitePDFs/Stats/TOPSEligibles2005.pdf 
Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. 
(2009). 2009 High school graduates (including 
alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS Award by school, 
school district and parish. Retrieved from https://www.
osfa.la.gov/MainSitePDFs/Stats/TOPSEligibles2009.pdf 
Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. 
(2014). 2014 High School Graduates (including 
alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS award by school, 
school district and parish TOPS eligibility report. 
Retrieved from http://www.osfa.la.gov/MainSitePDFs/
Stats/TOPSEligibles2014.pdf 
LSU/Tulane Early Childhood Policy and Data Center. 
(2012). Early childhood risk and reach in Louisiana: Fall 
2012. Author. Retrieved from http://www.brightstartla.
org/assets/les/TUL15206_2012_Risk_Report_online_
v6CBRIGHTSTART.pdf 
Mack, V. (2015, February 26). New Orleans kids, working 
parents and poverty. The Data Center. Retrieved from 
www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_ analysis/new-
orleans-kids-working-parents-and-poverty/
National Center for Education Statistics. (2015). 
Comparison Institutions – Louisiana from Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data Systems http://nces.
ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/InstitutionByName.aspx
New Orleans Health Department & Healthy Start 
New Orleans. (2013). Child and Family Health in New 
Orleans: A Life Course Perspective of Child and Family 
Health at a Neighborhood Level. Retrieved from http://
www.nola.gov/getattachment/Health/Data-and-
Publications/Child-and-Family-Health-in-New-Orleans-
December-2013.pdf/ 
Noble, J. (2003). The eects of using ACT Composite 
score and high school average on college admission 
decisions for racial/ethnic groups. (ACT Research 
Report 2003-1). Iowa City, IA: ACT 
Oce of the Governor. (2010, February 23). Governor 
Jindal announces LA GRAD Act [Press Release]. 
Retrieved from http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.
cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&article ID=1915
Oce of the Governor. (2013, March 29). 
Governor Jindal announces plan to reform 
early childhood education [Press Release]. 
Retrieved from http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.
cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=3962
Oce for Citizens with Developmental Disabilities. 
(n.d.). About early steps. http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/
index.cfm/page/139/n/139
Perry. J. (2015, February 19). Op-Ed: Expulsion and 
educational equity in New Orleans’ schools. 
Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights. Retrieved from 
http://www.laccr.org/news/op-ed-exclusion-and-
educational-equity-in-new-orleans-schools/   
Pew Research Center. (2014, February 11). The Rising 
Cost of Not Going to College. Retrieved from http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/02/11/the-rising-cost-
of-not-going-to-college/
Policy Institute for Children. (2015). The New world 
of early learning in Louisiana: Early childhood 
funding. Retrieved from http://www.policyinstitutela.
org/#!educationfunding/c1r2t 
Recovery School District [RSD]. (2015, February 9). 
Recovery School District sees 39 percent decrease in 
expulsions for rst half of 2014=15 school year.[Press 
Release]. Retrieved from http://rsdla.net/apps/news/
show_news.jsp?REC_ID=342306&id=0
90Education
Richardson, M., Abraham, C. & Bond, R. (2012). 
Psychological correlates of university students’ 
academic performance: A systematic review and meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 138, 353–387. 
Samuels, D. (2014, August 14). New Orleans has 
highest percentage of private school students, Baton 
Rouge is 4th.Nola.com. Retrieved from http://www.
nola.com/education/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2014/08/
new_orleans_has_highest_percen.html  
Sims, P. (2015, March). Reconnecting opportunity 
youth: Data reference guide. Cowen Institute for Public 
Initiatives. Retrieved from http://www.coweninstitute.
com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Cowen_OY_Data_
Guide_2015.pdf
Sims, P. & Vaughan, D. (2015, July). The State of public 
education in New Orleans. Cowen Institute. Retrieved 
from http://www.speno2014.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/08/SPENO-HQ.pdf 
Tidmore, C. (2011, August 8). State orders closure 
of Abramson Charter School. The Louisiana Weekly. 
Retrieved from http://www.louisianaweekly.com/
state-orders-closure-of-abramson-charter-school/ 
Urban League of Greater New Orleans. (2013). 
Parent perspectives: Parental engagement and 
education reform in New Orleans. Retrieved from 
http://ulgno.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/
ParentPerspectives_UL_1013.pdf
U.S. Census Bureau. (2013a). Louisiana, DP_05, ACS 
demographic and housing estimates, 2009-2013 
American Community Survey 5-year estimates [Table]. 
Retrieved from http://factnder.census.gov/faces/
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF 
U.S. Census Bureau. (2013b). New Orleans city, 
Louisiana, B17001B, Poverty status in the past 12 
months by sex by age (Black or African American 
alone) [Table]. 2013 American Community Survey 1-Year 
Estimates. Retrieved from http://factnder.census.
gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.
xhtml?pid=ACS_13_1YR_B17001B&prodType=table
Vaughan, D., Mogg, L., Zimmerman, J. & O’Neill, T. 
(2012). Transforming public education in New Orleans: 
the Recovery School District: 2003-2011. Cowen 
Institute. Retrieved from http://www.coweninstitute.
com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/History-of-the-
RSD-Report-2011.pdf 
State of Black New Orleans91
92Disaster Preparedness
DISASTER PLANNING  
AND EQ UITY:LESSONS LEARNED 
IN POST- KATRINA NEW ORLEANS
ROBERT A.  COLLINS
WHILE THE KATRINA 
DISASTER RESPONSE 
HAS BEEN EX TREMELY 
WELL DOCUMENTED AND 
ANALYZ ED MANY TIMES, 
MOST ANALYSES DO NOT 
LOOK SPECIFICALLY AT 
ISSUES OF EQ UITY.
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Hurricane Katrina did more than expose the 
weaknesses in the ood control structures 
around New Orleans. It also exposed the 
weaknesses in the social fabric of the city 
by demonstrating how the impacts of 
disasters are not shared equally among all 
social groups. This essay will examine this 
issue by rst describing the history of the 
challenge. It will then look at the Katrina 
disaster response through the lens of 
equity. After looking at the Katrina disaster 
response, it will examine improvements 
in disaster planning implemented since 
Katrina. Finally, the essay will conclude by 
making recommendations on how disaster 
planning can be improved in the future.
The History of the Challenge
The city of New Orleans is, by nature and by 
design, a vulnerable geographic location. 
It was already vulnerable to ooding at the 
time it was founded by the French in 1718, 
due to its location in the natural oodplain 
of the Mississippi River (Colten 2005). 
Generations of settlers and governments 
have attempted to make the city more 
livable by draining the soils and building 
levees and oodwalls higher with each 
passing generation. Paradoxically, while 
these structures make the city habitable to 
humans, they also increase human exposure 
to catastrophic ooding during a hurricane. 
The levees intended to protect the city 
also locked out the sediment and nutrients 
that built the land up over millions of years 
of natural Mississippi River ooding. The 
locking out of sediment and nutrients 
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began a process of subsidence, or sinking 
land. The vast majority of modern soil 
subsidence, however, was caused by the 
installation of drainage systems, originally 
designed to drain swamp water, and 
then designed to drain rainwater. These 
modern drainage structures built to pump 
rainwater out of the city have the eect 
of denying the land of natural hydration 
and lowering the water table, which soils 
need to maintain organic character and 
shape. The result of pumping out rainwater 
is constantly sinking land (Campanella, 
2015a). This process of constantly sinking 
land has turned areas of the city that were 
at or slightly below sea level a century ago, 
to currently being several feet below sea 
level in some parts of the city – enough to 
drown a human being.
No levee system is perfect, and levees are 
occasionally breached. Subsidence makes 
recovery from a catastrophic ood more 
dicult because when levees are breached 
a “bowl eect” is created, containing the 
standing water in the low-lying areas of the 
city and making draining oodwater from 
the city much more dicult. While much of 
the land mass of New Orleans is below sea 
level, there is a great deal of variation in the 
number of feet below sea level, and about 
one half of the city is actually at or above 
sea level due to natural geologic ridges. 
The beginning of inequity in disaster 
planning began with the earliest 
settlement of the city. The early wealthy 
settlers had access to the surveyors’ maps 
and knew the location of the geologic 
ridges that were above sea level. Once the 
early wealthy settlers bought up the land 
above sea level, the lower income residents 
had to settle on what was left. This began 
the process of the upper classes being 
settled on the higher land and the lower 
income residents settling in the lower 
elevations (Colten, 2005). This pattern was 
repeated over many generations and as a 
result there is a direct correlation between 
income level and ood level. This  is not 
simply caused by the upper income citizens 
buying up all the available land. There was, 
and is, land available for purchase at the 
higher elevations. However, because of the 
economic principle of scarcity, that land is 
also the most expensive, pricing it out of 
range for many working class families.
In general, the phenomenon of the highest 
elevation land being the most expensive 
in the city has continued until the present 
day. There are a few exceptions to this rule. 
The primary one being that land bordering 
Lake Pontchartrain is more valuable since 
land close to a lake tends to demand 
a higher price in any city. However, in 
general, the land aordable to poor and 
working class families will tend to be at 
the lower elevations, meaning poor and 
working class families will have the greatest 
exposure to ooding.
The issue of racial discrimination amplied 
the inequities in the land and housing 
market. After World War II, when the VA 
Housing Loans in the GI bill allowed many 
veterans to purchase their rst home, many 
Black veterans found their benets either 
delayed or denied. By the time many Black 
veterans received their housing benets, 
the safest neighborhoods in the city had 
already been lled up. Add to this the 
well-documented processes of “Redlining:” 
Banks rejecting mortgage applications 
to Black applicants in certain desirable 
neighborhoods; real estate agents steering 
Black homeowners into low elevation areas; 
blatant racial discrimination in the sale of 
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homes, and a historic pattern developed 
whereby Black homeowners ended up 
living, by and large, in the lowest and most 
ood prone areas of the city.  
Insurance is another area where inequities 
of income and race are exposed. While 
mortgage holders require ood insurance 
in lower elevation areas, acquiring ood 
insurance adequate enough to insure a 
home against a total ood loss is beyond 
the nancial means of most working class 
families, making them unable to replace a 
home lost to a catastrophic ood. 
All of the above factors formed a nexus of 
historical circumstances whereby poor and 
working class Black families were steered 
into the most vulnerable areas of the city 
with the highest probability of catastrophic 
ooding, then left without sucient 
resources to rebuild when that catastrophic 
ooding took place.     
The Katrina Disaster Response
While the Katrina disaster response has 
been extremely well documented and 
analyzed many times, most analyses do 
not look specically at issues of equity. All 
residents of New Orleans suered during 
Katrina, however some residents suered 
more because they were in more vulnerable 
conditions prior to the storm (Tierney, 
2006). The rst inequitable condition was 
the greater geographic vulnerability of 
Black and low-income residents, discussed 
above. Black and low-income residents 
were hit hardest by the ooding because 
they tended to live in the lowest elevations. 
Perhaps the most striking inequities from a 
disaster planning perspective are those of 
transportation and shelter. When the mayor 
calls for a mandatory evacuation of the city, 
middle and upper-income residents simply 
get in their cars and drive out of the city. 
Upon reaching their destination city, they 
rent a hotel room, or stay with relatives, 
and monitor the news media for word as 
to when they can return to the city. These 
options are simply not available to the poor 
and many working class families. 
The poverty rate in New Orleans is 27%, 
considerably higher than the national 
rate of 16%; and 19% of New Orleans 
households do not have access to a car, 
compared to 9% nationwide (Shrinath, 
Mack, & Plyer, 2014). If working class 
families do own a car, quite often the car 
is old and not in good enough condition 
to make a long evacuation trip. Even 
among those citizens who own reliable 
cars, evacuation is not an option for many 
because they simply have nowhere to go. 
They may not have relatives or friends 
outside of the city. And a hotel room for 
these families is out of the question due to 
high cost. Evacuating before a hurricane 
can cost hundreds or even thousands of 
dollars, resources that poor and working 
class families do not have. 
In some cases, the inequity of transportation 
and shelter access had a lethal eect, 
causing some residents to stay and drown in 
the oodwaters. Also, many of the residents 
who stayed found themselves trapped in 
a city with no access to fresh water, food, 
or sanitary living conditions. The plight of 
the citizens trapped in the Superdome and 
Convention Center is well documented, 
and those conditions were replicated all 
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over the city at many other locations. The 
fact that none of the government agencies 
charged with protecting the city had a 
comprehensive plan in place to evacuate 
and shelter the most vulnerable citizens 
was an egregious disaster planning failure. 
Basically, there was no truly comprehensive 
plan. The response was made up on site. 
This resulted in citizens being scattered all 
over the US after they nally were rescued 
and evacuated from New Orleans. The 
rental assistance funding oered by the 
federal government for evacuees to rent 
housing was slow in coming and dicult 
to access, unless, of course, one had a 
computer, internet access, and a bank 
account ready to receive an electronic 
direct deposit, all markers of the middle 
class and not available to the poor. 
Once citizens were able to return to the 
city, the disaster recovery process was also 
not equitable. The poor and working class 
areas were likely to have the most damage 
to housing stock from ooding, due to the 
fact that they were in lower elevations. 
Also, these houses were likely to be the 
oldest, and the weakest in terms of ability 
to withstand a ood (wood instead of brick 
construction.) 
In terms of insurance coverage, many of 
these homeowners did not even know 
that they were in a oodplain due to old, 
outdated maps being used by the mortgage 
banks and insurance industry. As a result, 
they had never been required to buy ood 
insurance. So, when the ooding occurred, 
many found themselves with no ood 
insurance to cover the loss. Those working 
class families who did have ood insurance 
tended to have very little, due to the high 
cost. Very few had insurance sucient to 
cover a total loss. 
The disaster recovery process was much 
quicker for middle class families who either 
had minimal ooding due to neighborhood 
location and ood elevation, or, even if 
they did experience catastrophic ooding, 
they were more likely to be fully insured 
and were able to recover most of the value 
of the house from the ood policy. Flood 
insurance rates are predicted to continue to 
go up, further straining the resources of the 
low-income residents (Campanella, 2015b).  
The federally-funded, state-administered 
“Road Home” program, intended to assist 
homeowners with nancial reconstruction 
assistance, was slow to deliver funds, and 
had a tedious and complicated application 
process. Once again, favoring the middle 
class with access to computers, lawyers, 
and accountants. 
Improvements to Disaster 
Planning since Katrina
Although New Orleans remains a vulnerable 
city, there have been key improvements 
since Katrina. First, the US Army Corps 
of Engineers made billions of dollars in 
improvements to the levee, oodwall, and 
drainage systems protecting the city. Most 
of the ooding in the city was caused by the 
breach of oodwalls connected to rainwater 
drainage canals. The oodwall breaches 
were caused by storm surge that came in 
from the Gulf of Mexico, passed through 
Lake Borgne, then into Lake Pontchartrain. 
Once in Lake Pontchartrain, the storm surge 
travelled into the drainage canals (their 
function is normally carrying rainwater 
out to Lake Pontchartrain). Due to awed 
engineering and shoddy construction, the 
canal oodwalls breached in several areas, 
ooding the city. 
The Army Corps of Engineers has installed 
“Lock and Dam” systems at the mouth of 
every drainage canal. These locks will be 
closed before a hurricane threatens the 
city, protecting the drainage canals from 
storm surge. Although levees can still be 
over-topped by a large storm surge, the 
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most vulnerable aspect of the ood control 
system has been repaired. The city is much 
better protected than pre-Katrina, and 
should be able to withstand a Category 
3 Hurricane (111-129 mph wind speed); 
however, a storm with higher wind speeds 
will still overtop the levees and ood large 
sections of the city, so there is more work 
to be done.
In the area of urban planning, the city 
recently completed a 10 process of 
post-Katrina city planning that included 
a master plan and comprehensive 
zoning ordinance. Although the current 
comprehensive zoning ordinance passed 
in May of 2015 does not include all of the 
recommendations written into the master 
plan passed in 2010, it is a work in progress. 
The post-Katrina master plan began the 
work of designing a more sustainable ood 
control plan for the city (Collins, 2011). 
Disaster planners contracted by the city 
have designed a comprehensive ood 
control system based on the globally 
respected “Dutch Model” of ood control, 
rst used by the Government of the 
Netherlands to protect that country from 
the North Sea. The Dutch Model does 
not simply rely on levees. Instead, it relies 
on a system of inundation canals, which 
essentially carry storm surge through a 
city and move it along within the canals, 
pushing it out the other end of the system. 
It would pass in, through, and out of the city 
without ooding. Also, the ood control 
plan included in the city’s master plan, 
called the “Urban Water Plan,” proposes to 
ght subsidence by absorbing as much 
rainwater runo as possible through 
porous surfaces, retention ponds, and 
open drainage canals built into the natural 
landscape. (In terms of city topography, 
think: A version of the Venice canal 
system). This plan to “live with water” is 
popular with city planners, but there is no 
implementation funding at the moment.   
In the area of assisted-evacuation, there 
is now a comprehensive plan in place 
to evacuate residents who do not have 
access to transportation: The City-Assisted 
Evacuation Plan or CAEP (City of New 
Orleans, 2015). It is assisted by a non-prot 
organization that provides volunteers to 
the city as part of a cooperative agreement 
(Evacuteer, 2015). Once the mayor calls an 
evacuation, residents in need of evacuation 
assistance will report to a large number of 
designated pick-up points around the city, 
called “evacuspots.” Buses provided by the 
city will pick citizens up and transport them 
to Union Passenger Terminal, at which time 
they will be transported out of town. This 
plan was eective during Hurricane Gustav 
in 2008, however that was only a short-term 
evacuation, as Gustav was not a direct hit. 
The most recent hurricane to threaten the 
city, Isaac in 2012, was not large enough to 
call a mass evacuation. 
The plan has not yet been tested with a 
large-scale, long-term evacuation event 
the size of Katrina. Also, it is unclear 
whether or not comprehensive long-
term shelter plans have been improved 
since Katrina, since the city evacuation 
plan simply states that residents will be 
transported to “State and Federal shelters” 
(City of New Orleans, 2015). 
Recommendations for future 
Disaster Planning
Based on lessons learned from Katrina, the 
following recommendations should be 
considered in making preparations for the 
next hurricane more equitable:
1.  Aordable housing at higher elevations: 
Although current market forces will 
conspire with a history of race and class 
discrimination to keep most poor and 
working class families in the most ood 
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prone neighborhoods, inclusionary 
zoning can be used to require that 
any new multi-family residential 
development on land above sea level 
include some aordable housing, 
thereby improving access to higher 
elevations for low-income residents.
2.  Funding to complete ood protection: 
Congress should approve the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ full funding request 
to complete the upgrade of the city’s 
ood control network, and provide 
funding to begin work on the Dutch 
Model of ood control in the “Urban 
Water Plan” by installing inundation 
canals to handle storm surge, and 
building drainage canals into the 
natural landscape to return rainwater 
to the ground, re-hydrating the soils, 
which is the only plan that will ght 
subsidence in the long run and stop 
the city from sinking even further 
below sea level.
3.  Assisted Evacuation: Although the 
city now has a robust city-assisted 
evacuation plan, it is unclear whether 
or not residents will avoid the problems 
with long-term evacuation shelter that 
occurred during Katrina once they are 
outside of the city and delivered to state 
shelters. The state government should 
publish a specic plan for long-term 
evacuation shelter so that each resident 
knows what to expect when evacuated. 
4.  City Planning: The city can mitigate 
ood risk by zoning for higher 
population density at higher elevations, 
with inclusion of aordable housing 
as mentioned in recommendation 
number one. Also, the City’s most recent 
master plan calls for “Comprehensive 
stormwater management systems that 
include natural drainage methods and 
potential use of Dutch-style canals 
as amenities” to allow residents to 
“live with water” (City of New Orleans, 
2010). A high priority should be 
given to eorts to directly ght soil 
subsidence by absorbing or retaining 
as much stormwater runo as possible 
through retention ponds and open 
drainage canals built directly into the 
natural landscape. The next round 
of amendments to the city’s new 
comprehensive zoning ordinance will 
need to begin specically implementing 
and enforcing designs to allow the 
city to live in harmony with the water, 
so that regardless of race, income, 
geographic location, or elevation, 
residents can avoid the damage of 
ood inundation.  Only then will the 
New Orleans landscape become a truly 
equitable environment.  
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ENV IRONM ENTAL INJ USTICE 
AND THE STATE OF BLACK 
NEW ORLEANS
BEV ERLY WRIG HT,  PH. D.  
HURRICANE KATRINA MADE CLEAR 
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN RACE, 
PLACE, AND VULNERABILITY. WHAT 
PEOPLE OFTEN TERM “ NATURAL”  
DISASTERS OR “ ACTS OF G OD”  
ARE OFTEN ACTS OF SOCIAL 
INJ USTICE PERPETUATED BY 
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS ON 
THE POOR, PEOPLE OF COLOR, 
THE MOST VULNERABLE OF OUR 
SOCIETY— GROUPS LEAST ABLE TO 
WITHSTAND SUCH DISASTERS.6
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A rising concern in recent years for societies 
across the globe is the impact of extreme 
weather on coastal areas, natural habitats 
and the species that inhabit them.  Extreme 
weather events have impacted agriculture 
and natural resources with devastating 
and long lasting eects. While managing 
weather impacts has always been dicult 
for societies, survival before, during and after 
these impacts has always been more dicult 
for some than others.  Disadvantaged 
populations around the world already bear 
inequitable environmental burdens, and 
that fact rings true, even in today’s society.
While United States citizens have not 
experienced the devastating impacts of 
climate change on the same scale as the 
citizens of Haiti after the earthquake in 
2010, or the people of Asia after the tsunami 
of 2004, the footprint for recovery is quite 
similar in content. In all of these examples 
the issue of equity in recovery is central, 
especially to marginalized communities.
Katrina Left Behind
In its wake, Katrina left behind toxic 
contamination and health threats as well 
as debris and hazardous waste. Six storm-
caused oil spills released 7.4 million gallons 
of oil, or 61% as much as the 11 million 
gallons that leaked into Alaska’s Prince 
William Sound from the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in 1989 (The New York Times, 
2010).  Waters from the storm surge hit 60 
underground storage tanks, ve Superfund 
sites and 466 industrial facilities that stored 
highly dangerous chemicals. More than 
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1,000 drinking-water systems were disabled, 
leaving the dreaded e. coli in oodwaters at 
levels far exceeding EPA’s safe standards. 
Twelve million of 21 million tons of debris 
from Hurricane Katrina was left in Orleans 
Parish. Sixty thousand boats, 300,000 
underground fuel tanks, and 42,000 tons of 
hazardous waste were left for collection and 
proper disposal at licensed facilities (Bullard 
& Wright, 2009).  Katrina left behind 350,000 
automobiles to be drained of oil and 
gasoline and then recycled, with 145,000 
left in New Orleans alone (Bullard & Wright, 
2009).  But that is not all Katrina left behind.
One of the remnants of Hurricane Katrina 
was the question of who would survive 
the storm, and who would be rescued and 
protected by society and government. The 
storm illustrated how pointed a political 
question that was. Katrina exposed the 
hard truth that groups within society are 
valued dierently as is evidenced by the 
consistent, dierential eects of natural 
disasters on low-income and minority 
communities.  Vulnerable populations by 
denition already suer from both higher 
socio-economic stress and greater exposure 
to environmental toxins, hazardous wastes 
and experience other environmental 
burdens (Boyce, 2000).
Such is the case for the city of New Orleans, 
Louisiana.  The incomes of the poor did 
not aord many citizens the luxury of 
evacuating, so they remained in peril of 
a killer storm.  Those left behind were 
people already living in low-lying areas 
with less than adequate levee protection, 
and in proximity to landlls and Toxic 
Release Inventory reporting facilities, thus 
compounding their exposure to toxins 
released in the air and oodwaters after the 
hurricane. It was largely African-American, 
Vietnamese and poor populations who 
lived in the areas most vulnerable to the 
collapse of the levees, who were unable to 
secure transportation for evacuation, and 
who scrambled in frightening conditions 
to secure scarce resources and aid for their 
families and themselves.
As the city began to recover, the question 
became, “How equitable was the plan 
and who would recover?”  Ten years after 
Katrina, New Orleans has become more 
separate and less equal than before the 
storm.  There are huge disparities emerging 
in income, housing, jobs and education. 
The city today is undeniably Whiter and 
richer in terms of individually-earned 
income than before the storm.
An examination of data shows that the 
impact of this recovery on the Black middle 
class has been devastating.  These data 
indicate that only 5% of African American 
compared to 29% of White households 
fall within the highest income categories 
(Plyer, Ortiz, Horowitz, & Hobor, 2013). 
The gap is widening.  African Americans 
of all income groups were hit hardest by 
Hurricane Katrina. These data seem to 
indicate that they have also beneted least 
from its recovery.
Ten years after Katrina laid waste to this 
historic and culturally diverse city, what 
we have learned is that race still matters. 
What we have yet to learn is how the city 
will be transformed and to what extent 
African Americans will benet from this 
transformation.  History does not paint 
a positive picture of how the African 
American community, particularly its poor, 
survive large-scale changes made towards 
“progress” in the city.  History records a 
culture of metropolitan progress resulting in 
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the displacement of African American New 
Orleanians (Long, 2007).
There is an adverse relationship between 
city progress, as dened by developers and 
city leaders, and the displacement of Black, 
urban neighborhoods in New Orleans. 
After Hurricane Katrina, many traditionally 
African American neighborhoods were 
decimated (Long, 2007). When this result 
is coupled with the tear down of public 
housing, we now nd that New Orleans 
is a city where gentrication is running 
rampant in traditionally African American 
neighborhoods. (Long, 2007)
Disaster Capitalism
Immediately after the ood, billions of no-
bid contracts were awarded to a handful of 
politically connected national contractors; 
the federal Davis-Bacon Act, which 
mandates workers be paid the prevailing 
wage, was suspended; and a host of 
environmental waivers were granted 
(Bullard & Wright, 2009).  Some policy 
analysts and elected ocials presented 
the plight of the city’s displaced citizens as 
a “silver lining” in dispersing New Orleans’ 
poor in Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, 
Memphis, and Jackson. They spin it as an 
unintended positive eect of the storm 
- breaking   up concentrated poverty—
something that government ocials 
had been trying to achieve for decades 
(Bullard & Wright, 2009). However, the best 
way to break up concentrated poverty 
is not displacement, but concentrated 
employment at a livable wage.
Disaster capitalism, or the embracing of 
Milton Friedman’s free market policy as a 
deliberate strategy for political leaders, is 
argued as being a prominent strategy in 
some developed countries (Klein, 2007). 
Disaster capitalism is the exploitation 
of crises by leaders to push through 
controversial exploitive policies while 
citizens are too emotionally and physically 
distracted by disasters or upheavals to 
mount an eective resistance (Klein, 2007).
The situation is described as synonymous 
with the process by which prisoners are 
softened up for interrogation by the shock 
of their captivity (Klein, 2007). Massive 
disasters could serve to soften up citizens 
for radical free market crusades.  Politicians 
are advised that they should immediately 
after a crisis push through all the painful 
policies at once before people could regain 
their footing.  Such practices are akin to an 
economic shock treatment.  The state of 
shock is, by denition, a temporary state; 
shock wears o.  The best way to stay 
oriented to resist shock is to know what is 
happening to you and why.  Klein calls it the 
“shock doctrine” (Klein, 2007).
Hurricane Katrina made clear the linkages 
between race, place, and vulnerability. What 
people often term “natural” disasters or “acts 
of God” are often acts of social injustice 
perpetuated by government and business 
on the poor, people of color, the most 
vulnerable of our society—groups least 
able to withstand such disasters (Squires & 
Hartman, 2006).  Decades of government 
neglect, denial, and old-fashioned greed 
created a nightmare in the aftermath of 
the storm, and Katrina allowed “disaster 
capitalism” to shift into high gear.
Perilous Consequences of Policy 
Decisions: A Plan for the Future of 
New Orleans
As the pumping stations in the city were 
restored, and the massive breaches in the 
levees were nally plugged with tons of sand 
bags, the gravity of the situation became 
real for New Orleans residents and for the 
rest of the world.  The sobering newscasts 
elicited quite dierent responses as a matter 
of perspective for those who remained in 
the city, those who left the city and people 
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watching the disaster play out around the 
globe.  While New Orleans natives grieved 
and were obsessed with the complicated 
nature of how to return home, or how to 
rebuild their lives living in a devastated city; 
urban planners around the world saw this 
tragedy as an opportunity to plan and build 
their version of the perfect city.  It was almost 
as if the hurricane waters that had washed 
away the lives of New Orleans citizens had 
also washed away the knowledge that 
this city, with a settlement history that is 
older than the United States, was home 
to thousands of people. Developers and 
planners approached the crippled city as an 
artist would a new canvas, ready to display 
his latest artistic strokes of genius for the 
world to admire.  Katrina presented them 
with an opportunity of a lifetime; the ability 
to start anew and build their dream city.
New plans for the city abounded and 
planners and developers from all over 
descended on the city wrangling for their 
piece of the rebuilding pie.  Ultimately, the 
plan selected, entitled “Plan for the Future,” 
was put forth by the Bring New Orleans Back 
Commission (Times-Picayune Sta, 2006). 
Despite the attempt to engage community 
representatives in the planning process, the 
completed plan was not well received by 
the community (Warner, 2006).
The Plan for the Future proposed to 
signicantly reduce the “footprint” or size 
of the city of New Orleans, reasoning that 
a signicantly resource-constrained city 
would not be able to eciently serve all 
neighborhoods when only a fraction of 
the pre-storm population and tax base had 
returned (Times-Picayune Sta, 2006). The 
citizens of New Orleans largely rejected 
this plan and spoke against it at numerous 
city council and town hall meetings 
following its introduction to the public 
(Randall, 2006; Krupa, 2010). The plan was 
rejected by citizens for many reasons, but 
the most signicant was the perception 
of inappropriate and heavy-handed 
government intrusion into the private 
lives of citizens eectively denying their 
individual right of self-determination and 
the right to return to the city in which they 
lived (Warner, 2006).
Ironically, most areas slated for immediate 
rebuilding and redevelopment were 
predominantly White and auent, while 
areas identied for conversion into green 
space and parks and areas required to 
prove their viability were predominantly 
African-American and less auent (Mohai 
& Lee, 2010). The plan also appeared to 
ignore the fact that New Orleans started 
losing population in the 1960s, resulting in 
signicant blight and an insucient tax base 
decades before Hurricane Katrina (Plyer, 
2011).  This only fueled the feeling among 
residents that the storm was being used as 
an excuse to prevent certain neighborhoods 
from returning (Warner, 2006).  The citizens 
of New Orleans were actively engaged in 
a process to determine the direction, size, 
and scope of the rebuilding, including the 
allocation of recovery funding. A preliminary 
equity analysis reveals a key feature of New 
Orleans’ recovery. Principles for ensuring 
equitable distribution of recovery funds 
were not in eect. To this day, parts of the city 
are “back” while others are still languishing.
It is dicult to identify any action taken by 
government as a response to the enormous 
devastation that befell New Orleans than 
the Bring New Orleans Back Commission 
(2006) unveiling its plan for rebuilding New 
Orleans.  Mayor Ray Nagin’s commission 
presented the city with a $17 billion plan 
that would signicantly change the city’s 
neighborhood and housing patterns. 
The plan presented specic directions on 
who could rebuild and where building 
was allowed (Bring New Orleans Back 
Commission, 2006).
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The hot button prescriptive, however, was 
that all renovation was to be stopped in 
the ooded areas.  Persons most aected 
by this moratorium on rebuilding were 
African Americans.  In New Orleans alone, 
61% of the population (484,674) lived in 
areas that were ooded (Campanella, 2007; 
Plyer, 2014).  African Americans resided in 
these areas with numbers far greater than 
Whites by nearly 4 to 1 (220,970 to 57,469) 
(Campanella, 2007).  African Americans also 
outnumbered Whites even before the storm 
by nearly 2.5 to 1 (323,868 to 134,120).  Asian 
and Hispanic residents citywide totaled 
10,751 and 14,663 respectively (Plyer, Ortiz, 
Horowitz, & Hobor, 2013).
The Bring New Orleans Back Commission 
plan  (2006) had four levels of specicity 
relative to rebuilding, They included  (1) 
areas where rebuilding was allowed,  (2) 
areas where a building moratorium would 
exist until neighborhoods proved viability, 
(3) approximate areas expected to become 
parks and green space; and (4) areas to 
be redeveloped, some with new housing 
for relocated home owners. The map, 
infamously known as the green dot map, 
became a bone of contention for African 
Americans and Vietnamese in particular, 
but clearly, the largest number of persons 
to be aected were African Americans 
(Krupa, 2010).
In response to the panic and fury of the 
community, by many neighborhoods that 
were overlaid with green dots, the plan 
was dismissed (Krupa, 2010).  And, while it 
was suggested that the city deny citizens 
permits to rebuild over a large area of the 
city, residents nalized their rebuilding 
plans, and the city granted permits to all 
who applied (Krupa, 2010). Today, most 
areas earmarked for green space, by the 
infamous green dots, have rebounded to 
at least 60% of their pre-Katrina population 
(Krupa, 2010).  There has even been 
improvement in two green zones in New 
Orleans East that were zoned commercial.
After nearly 10 years of recovery since 
Hurricane Katrina, the city of New Orleans 
is showing strong resilience in eorts to 
rebuild damaged and ooded housing. 
According to a University of New Orleans 
survey, 81% of both single and double 
family residents have begun or completed 
rebuilding or renovating their homes 
(University of New Orleans, 2015).  Fifteen 
percent of homes have been demolished 
and four percent are gutted or derelict 
(Louisiana Weekly Sta , 2015).
The dreaded green dots seem to have little 
consequence for community resettlement. 
But, in light of the slow recovery in some 
areas versus speedy progress in others, 
many wonder if the Plan for the Future is 
still the plan. A real test of this hypothesis 
could be to embrace the old adage “Follow 
the Money.”
The Unwritten Plan 
– Following the Money
In a preliminary study conducted by the 
Deep South Center for Environmental 
Justice, the planned distribution of 
hurricane recovery funds was analyzed for 
New Orleans’ thirteen planning districts 
(Mohai & Lee, 2010). The analysis was based 
on publicly-available information provided 
in the Unied New Orleans Plan (City of New 
Orleans, 2007), a planning document that 
oers only a snapshot of an ongoing process, 
yet served as one of several post-disaster 
recovery plans with widespread community 
involvement (City of New Orleans, 2007). 
The plan presented 95 recovery projects 
at a total cost of over $1.55 billion. Thirty-
three percent of this amount was planned 
for recovery projects located in Planning 
Districts 1, 2, and 3 (i.e., the French Quarter/
Central Business District, Garden District, 
and Uptown), which were among the least 
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storm-damaged neighborhoods in New 
Orleans. The remaining 67% of recovery 
expenditures were planned for Planning 
Districts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13; 
districts that include the greater proportion 
of the city’s population and the hardest 
hit neighborhoods of Lakeview, Lower 9th 
Ward, and New Orleans East (City of New 
Orleans, 2007). 
To put these facts into context, there are 13 
planning districts in New Orleans, four of 
which are predominantly White (Planning 
Districts 1, 5, 11, and 13) (Mohai & Lee, 2010). 
Eight planning districts are majority Black 
(Planning Districts 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 
12).  The four predominantly White planning 
districts were allocated a combined total 
of $208 million for redevelopment, which 
exceeds the $204 million allocated to a 
total of eight predominantly Black planning 
districts (Mohai & Lee, 2010). These ndings, 
while disturbing, are not surprising to 
researchers, activists, and scholars who 
routinely illuminate environmental 
injustices and who regularly monitor 
governmental disaster response actions. 
Hurricane Katrina placed a magnifying lens 
on the environmental injustices suered 
by the people of New Orleans immediately 
prior to, during and after the storm (Pastor, 
et al., 2006).
Place Matters
Place matters. In fact, where one lives is 
the best determinant of one’s health and 
how long one will live (Policy Link, 2007). 
A community’s physical, social, economic 
and service environment are important 
factors in the quality of life for its residents 
(Policy Link, 2007).  Poor communities and 
communities of color are often home to 
dangerously polluting facilities in addition 
to other maladies that accompany poverty. 
High crime rates, inadequate housing, 
poor transportation and under-funded 
schools are commonplace to many poor 
communities.  Citizens are locked into a 
life of poverty by segregation, which is 
often due to their race or skin color, and are 
excluded from the decision-making process.
Hurricane Katrina revealed to the nation 
(and developers in particular) that the area 
in New Orleans known as the “sliver by the 
river,” (i.e., an area of the city that did not 
ood after the levee failures that resulted in 
the ooding of most of the rest of the city). 
This area is replete with the quintessential 
architecture of New Orleans on display in 
neighborhoods lined with grand mansions 
and modest shotgun houses shaded by 
old-growth trees.  Real estate values have 
skyrocketed as the market of buyers and 
renters for these houses has swelled to 
include thousands of people relocating 
from other states (White, 2015).
Since Hurricane Katrina, African American 
residents have demanded that the New 
Orleans City Council, Mayor, and legislative 
representatives establish rent controls and 
high-rise development zoning restrictions; 
stop the closure of public housing; ensure 
adequate funding through an equitable 
process for repairing Katrina-damaged 
homes; make property taxes aordable; 
as well as other measures to prevent 
their displacement from homes and 
neighborhoods.  More recently, a growing 
number of White residents are now 
demanding high-rise developing zoning 
restrictions and property tax relief.  However, 
none of these demands have resulted in 
legislation, regulation, or even a policy.  As a 
result, developers are setting the standards 
in New Orleans and targeting the streets 
and neighborhoods for gentrication 
(Goodyear, 2014).
For example, the Walter L. Cohen High 
School building is located two blocks 
from mansion-lined St. Charles Avenue in 
New Orleans’ famed Garden District.  The 
value of properties that share the same 
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zip code (70115) with the school has on 
average increased by more than 40% since 
Hurricane Katrina (White, 2015). Before 
Katrina, properties were sold at $173/sq. ft. 
However, in 2013 those values rose to $233/
sq. ft. and by 2014, it had reached $240/sq. 
ft. (White, 2015).
The Recovery School District (“RSD”), a 
special school district in Louisiana that 
assumed control of the majority of New 
Orleans public schools in the weeks after 
Hurricane Katrina, as prescribed in the 
School Facilities Master Plan and ultimately 
ratied by the Orleans Parish School Board 
(OPSB) and the La. Board of Elementary 
and Secondary Education (BESE), decided 
to land bank or close this school building 
that was assessed to be in fair condition 
(Lawton, 2014).  The RSD has not convened 
a process for informing the public of its 
rationale for closing the school building 
and inviting public input on this rationale 
(Lawton, 2014).  The school is currently 
attended by nearly 500 African American 
students (Lawton, 2014).
The proposed plan for Cohen College Prep, 
currently operating out of the Walter L. Cohen 
High School site, is to build a school for those 
students on the site of the former Booker T. 
Washington school, which was constructed 
on the site of the former Silver City Dump. 
While the RSD has asserted that its plan met 
or exceeded the remediation requirements 
for environmental standards of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality (LaDEQ), ongoing tension ensues. 
Children are one of the most vulnerable 
segments of the population when it comes to 
being harmed by exposure to toxic chemicals. 
Because they spend so much of their time at 
schools, these environments must be as toxin 
free as possible. Not surprisingly, schools 
that serve low-income students of color 
are more frequently built on contaminated 
sites (Cohen, 2010).  School siting has thus 
become a serious problem not only in New 
Orleans, but across this nation as advocates 
for children’s environmental health and 
environmental justice galvanize around this 
issue.  It has also become abundantly clear 
that this ght is a continuing one in New 
Orleans as the practice of siting schools 
serving low-income children of color on toxic 
landlls is repeated.
The City of New Orleans operated the 
Agriculture Street Landll from 1909 
until the late 1950s and reopened it to 
burn debris from Hurricane Betsy in 1965 
(Webster, 2015). During the 1970s and 
1980s, residential neighborhoods and 
Moton Elementary School were built over 
more than 40 acres of the site.  In 1984, 
Robert Moton Elementary School opened 
for kindergarten through sixth grade. There 
were about 900 children enrolled in the 
school. The Orleans Parish School Board did 
not tell its employees or parents that the 
school had been built on a part of the City’s 
landll or that environmental testing had 
identied the presence of toxic chemicals on 
the school site. The EPA added the site to its 
national list of Superfund sites in 1994, after 
arsenic, lead and other hazardous materials 
were found on the property (Webster, 2015).
We are now more knowledgeable of the 
consequences of building schools on 
municipal landlls, and have a better 
scientic knowledge of what harm could 
occur to our children if schools are built on 
these sites.  What lessons have we actually 
learned from our past behaviors if we are 
willing to continue to build our schools on 
contaminated sites?
The RSD proposes to build a new school 
for the students on a former city waste 
dump, where the land remains highly 
contaminated with lead, arsenic, mercury, 
and cancer-causing chemicals (Jacobs 
CSRS Program Management, 2015; Dall, 
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2015).  According to the RSD’s plan, at least 
12 feet of the contaminated soil would 
remain on the school site with lead levels 
24 times above the standard for residential 
land use (Leaaf Environmental, 2012; Leaaf 
Environmental, 2013).  Several parents, 
school alumni, public education advocates, 
environmental justice organizations, and 
other New Orleanians have condemned the 
RSD’s plan (Dall, 2015). State legislation was 
introduced by Representative Joseph Bouie 
to prohibit the RSD from building the school 
on the waste dump.  The legislation passed 
unanimously by the Louisiana House of 
Representatives, but died in the Louisiana 
Senate after school ocials and building 
contractors testied in opposition to the bill 
(Campbell-Rock, 2015).  The RSD publicly 
announced that it will proceed with its plan 
to build the  school for students whose 
current school is now “hot” property in post-
Katrina New Orleans (White, 2015).
Disaster Increased Vulnerability
Research is replete with data supporting 
the disproportionate exposure of minority 
and poor communities to hazardous waste 
facilities and the disparities in clustering 
waste facilities within three kilometers 
of these communities (Bullard, Mohai, 
Saha, & Wright, 2007).  After Katrina, New 
Orleans East, a largely African American and 
Vietnamese community was chosen for the 
disposal of debris from the storm.  There 
were four landlls in the community with 
River Birch Landll taking on the lion’s share 
of the waste along with the Old Gentilly 
Landll being reopened for that purpose 
after Katrina (Russell, 2012).
Additionally, vulnerable communities have 
become increasingly more endangered by 
the threat of new and risky technologies 
for waste disposal. An Eastern New Orleans 
community was targeted for the location 
of a risky technology waste disposal 
facility in 2009.  Over the past ten years, 
plasma arc technology has emerged as a 
potential trend for renewable energy in 
waste management (Solena Group, n.d.). 
It is a waste disposal technology with 
critical environmental health implications 
in the waste management industry.  Such 
a gasication facility was proposed by the 
Sun Energy Group, LLC, for development 
at the site of the Regional Business Park on 
Jourdan Road (Elie, 2009; Buchanan, 2010). 
It would be the rst facility of its size to be 
built in the United States and the largest of 
any existing facility in the world.
“Sun Energy (Sun Energy Group, LLC), in 
partnership with Air Products, through 
a joint venture company, Louisiana 
Gasication Facility, LLC (LGF), proposed 
to build, own and operate what they 
call an ‘energy from waste . . . facility’ in 
New Orleans East (Deep South Center for 
Environmental Justice, 2011). The LGF would 
use ‘Plasma Arc Gasication” (Deep South 
Center for Environmental Justice, 2011). Sun 
Energy claims that the technology is not 
incineration, per se (Sun Energy Group, LLC., 
n.d.). However, though company websites, 
diagrams, and process descriptions claim 
the technology is a renewable energy 
facility, the proposed technology would in 
fact have the same polluting eect as a two-
stage incinerator (Deep South Center for 
Environmental Justice, 2011; Greenaction 
for Health and Environmental Justice, 2011). 
While there are dierences between 
traditional incineration technologies and 
plasma arc technology, the system proposed 
by Sun Energy involves incineration/
combustion as an essential component 
(Greenaction for Health & Environmental 
Justice, 2011). One dierence is that while 
traditional incinerators burn the waste 
directly, plasma arc heats the waste in the 
gasication stage, creating a synthetic 
gas (or “syngas”). Key to the technology 
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proposed by Sun Energy is the burning 
of the syngas in a turbine or boiler. This 
combustion process is the incineration 
that results in emissions of toxic and 
criteria air pollutants into a neighborhood 
already overloaded with air pollution. 
These emissions would include dioxins and 
furans, highly toxic chemicals linked to a 
wide range of profound illnesses including 
cancer, reproductive, developmental, and 
immunological diseases. Plasma arc facilities 
around the country have been plagued with 
failed equipment and no merit of energy 
production from the syngas technology 
has been shown (Greenaction for Health & 
Environmental Safety, 2011). This new and 
risky technology represents the latest threat 
to New Orleans’ vulnerable communities.
The selected site for the project is the 
neighborhood of New Orleans East, the 
largest African-American community in the 
city located in Planning District 9 (Bennett, et 
al., 2011).  New Orleans East has an industrial 
park that is zoned as heavy industrial, and 
for a long time, the neighborhood has 
served as a garbage-dumping site for the 
city and surrounding parishes (Bennett, 
et al., 2011). The neighborhood currently 
has 23 illegal dumpsites and numerous 
inactive and active landlls (Bennett, et al., 
2011). The city of New Orleans does not 
have a comprehensive waste management 
plan to eectively manage this problem. 
African American and Vietnamese residents 
living near the site opposed the location 
of the facility there (Elie, 2009). To date, 
the community has been able to stop the 
development of the project.
Collateral Damage in the Melia 
Community
Policies and projects implemented to mitigate 
the damages of climate change impacts 
sometimes  come with consequences as was 
the case with a New Orleans community, 
Melia, that was negatively impacted by the 
Southeast Louisiana (SELA) Dwyer Road 
Drainage Project (Deep South Center for 
Environmental Justice, 2012). The purpose 
of the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood 
Damage Reduction Project (SELA) is to 
reduce the risk of ood damage due to 
rainfall ooding in Orleans, Jeerson and 
St. Tammany Parishes.  The Army Corps of 
Engineers led the implementation of the 
project with the Sewerage and Water Board 
of New Orleans as the local sponsor.  Homes, 
some newly constructed and renovated 
after Katrina, were severely damaged in this 
predominantly African American community 
of mostly elderly and retired residents.   The 
damage was extensive, including structural 
property damage, cracked slabs, shifted 
windows and doors, sewer ies, and broken 
plumbing pipes. Since May 2011, residents 
of the Melia community have complained 
of structural damage to their property. In an 
eort to resolve their problems, residents 
solicited assistance from Dillard University’s 
Deep South Center for Environmental Justice 
(Deep South Center for Environmental 
Justice, 2012).
For nearly four years, the DSCEJ assisted 
the Melia community in navigating the 
complicated terrain required for redress of 
damages caused by the drainage project. 
A class action lawsuit was led to further 
progress in the resolution of their claims 
(Rainey, 2015). On  May 15, 2015,  10 Melia 
residents along with assistance from the 
DSCEJ and Advocates for Environmental 
Human Rights sta attended a meeting with 
the Federal District Court judge assigned 
to this case to address issues blocking the 
SWBNO processing of damage claims.  After 
four years of living in substandard conditions 
due to property damage caused by the SELA 
project, SWBNO was given the green light to 
continue their claims process with the Melia 
residents. It is important to note that while 
it took four years for the Melia community 
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to get redress, the Uptown community 
complaining of similar damages to their 
property due to another SELA project in the 
mostly White auent community, received 
front page coverage in the Times-Picayune 
of their plight (Rainey, 2015).
Conclusions
There are perilous consequences that stem 
from policy decisions that do not have 
equity as a foundational principle.   All of the 
policy decisions in response to Hurricane 
Katrina discussed herein to some degree 
are stimulating changes and movement 
towards the total transformation of the city 
of New Orleans.  Sadly, this transformation 
has largely lacked inclusion and equity for 
the poor and middle class African American 
citizens of this city.
While New Orleans is being applauded for a 
remarkable comeback, a close look reveals 
some deeply troubling facts. While showing 
improvements in many quality of life index 
areas (New Orleans Recovery Index), its 
lowest scores come in the areas of equity 
and inclusion (Plyer, Ortiz, Horowitz, & 
Hobor, 2013; Rainey, 2013). This inequitable 
legacy of Katrina must be addressed.
Asking dierent questions will generate 
dierent answers. Comparing the city of 
New Orleans to other cities suering from 
the same structural and systemic problems 
due to race and income does not get us 
on the road to equitable recovery.   New 
Orleans has been touted as a model for city 
recovery after a major disaster. The question 
is whether this model should be replicated 
in other communities suering post-
disaster recovery challenges.  Is the New 
Orleans model inclusive and equitable for all 
citizens?  Or is it a model of dispossession and 
forewarning for indigenous communities 
whose very survival is threatened not only 
by the disaster, but by post-disaster policies 
favoring exclusion and gentrication?
The city of New Orleans’ progress towards 
prosperity should have at its foundation 
an examination of the lack of inclusion of 
African Americans in this new prosperity.  We 
would then have a truer picture of where we 
should be and plan to prioritize eorts in 
needed areas. The city has made progress 
in some areas, but it is those areas where 
we have not made progress that need the 
most attention in order to better plan for the 
future. If issues of equity in recovery as well 
as emergency preparedness and response 
are not adequately addressed, there will be 
an ongoing disaster that will result in the 
permanent, systematic depopulation of 
New Orleans’ African American communities 
and neighborhoods (Wright, 2006).
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DOUBLING  DOWN: 
G ETTING  TO RESILIENCE 
IN NEW ORLEANS
J OHN M .  BARRY AND M ARK S.  DAV IS,  J . D. ,  M . L. T.
WE REMAIN DEEPLY 
V ULNERABLE TO HURRICANES, 
RISING SEAS, SINKING SOILS, A 
VANISHING COAST, AND JUST 
PLAIN HEAVY RAINS.  THOSE ARE 
HARD THINGS TO DEAL WITH AND 
NEW ORLEANS IS BY NO MEANS 
ALONE IN FACING THEM. 
7
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There is something about anniversaries that 
focuses our thinking and makes us reect 
on, mourn, and celebrate those people and 
events that shape our lives.  It is tting that we 
do that.  And if ever there was an occasion 
worth marking it is the 10th anniversary of 
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall along the coasts 
of Louisiana and Mississippi.  But amid all 
the speeches, vigils, and memorials some 
space needs to be made to ask ourselves 
just what we learned from that largely 
induced tragedy—and whether we are 
applying those lessons.
Since we have all chosen to make our 
homes in New Orleans, we clearly have a 
stake in this being a smarter, safer place. 
We deeply hope it is and there is evidence 
that says it.  But being safer and smarter 
is not the same thing as being safe and 
smart enough.  By almost every measure 
we have a long way to go before our levels 
of protection and resilience are where they 
need to be.  Most of the vulnerabilities 
and the consequences thereof fall 
disproportionately on the disadvantaged. 
We remain deeply vulnerable to hurricanes, 
rising seas, sinking soils, a vanishing coast, 
and just plain heavy rains.  Those are hard 
things to deal with and New Orleans is by 
no means alone in facing them.  But there 
is a positive:  Plans and options exist that 
give New Orleans and coastal Louisiana a 
better chance at a decent future than many 
other places.  
But plans and technically feasible actions 
don’t implement themselves to create vibrant 
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resilient communities and ecosystems.   That 
takes community, a community able and 
willing to honestly invest in itself and to face 
the fact that, when you are working at this 
scale, a community’s prospects for survival 
and prosperity are measured not by how 
prepared and engaged its most auent and 
privileged members are, but how well its least 
are.  Katrina revealed that in spades.  Those 
most likely to die, lose their jobs or homes, 
and to miss out on the post storm recovery 
work were African Americans, the elderly, 
the poor and the civically estranged.   This is 
what makes Katrina an event of global and 
enduring importance.  It was not just a storm, 
it was an unraveling of society in a way that 
few have seen and fewer expected, especially 
in the richest nation on Earth.
So, how are things?  What lessons have 
been learned?  The truth is, it depends on 
who you ask.  The city has been hailed as a 
successful comeback story with a surging 
economy, housing market and a bold 
approach to reforming public education.  But 
there is still entrenched poverty, racism, and 
unemployment and a persistent trust-gap 
between those making it and those who are 
not (and who historically were not allowed 
to).   The region struggles to remain insurable 
and attractive to investors in the face of 
advancing seas and a pervasive disinvestment 
in the public sector.  In short, New Orleans 
remains a fascinating but troubled place and 
one that grapples daily with its own identity 
and sustainability.  Considering that the City 
and its surrounding coast were decidedly 
unsustainable 10 years ago, perhaps this is 
progress but without much more it will not 
be enough.
Whether New Orleans can make it or not 
is probably not a question most people 
outside of Louisiana ask.  After all, after 
Hurricane Sandy, western droughts, eastern 
blizzards, and urban unrest, there are 
other places to think about, not the least 
of which are those thousands of places 
where everybody else lives and that New 
Orleanians surely don’t spend much time 
thinking about. But New Orleanians should 
always keep these issues in mind, and 
others should keep their nger on the 
pulse of New Orleans.  Because if one thing 
is now clear it is this:  New Orleans is one of 
the handful of places on the planet that are 
bellwethers of our ability to manage our 
way out of the mess we are in. 
For all the talk of resilience, sustainability, 
inclusion, and no more “business as usual,” 
no place that we know of has marshaled 
the options, resources and civic and 
political will to squarely face the future. 
Maybe that is because you cannot face 
the future if you do not honestly own up 
to the past, for the keys to crafting a future 
lie in learning about and from the past. 
The disasters of Fukashima, Hurricanes 
Katrina and Sandy, the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill, and earthquakes in Haiti, Mexico 
City, Christ Church New Zealand, and 
most recently Nepal teach one relentless 
lesson.  And that is that too many people 
in too many places are living at profound 
and well-understood risk, and that it is 
policy to trust more to luck than any sense 
of real management to reduce or alleviate 
those risks.  
There is a brief window following a disaster 
when systemic change may be possible 
but it passes quickly, replaced by excuses, 
platitudes and plans that have little chance 
of being implemented.  That is particularly 
true where solutions depend more on 
social change than engineering.  It is easy 
to call for change but when change means 
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things really being dierent, or costing too 
much in terms of money or how we see and 
treat our neighbors, things get dicey.
The problem is not just people’s attitudes. 
In fact, people’s attitudes may be the most 
straightforward piece of the puzzle.   People 
are teachable and capable of caring and 
learning.   You can move them to thought, 
action or tears with a message or experience. 
Not so long ago, when our communities 
were smaller and more compact, this was 
where the action was.  This is no longer the 
case , at least not in some very important 
ways. The more intractable part of getting 
more sustainable societies lies in the fact 
that our communities are less and less the 
masters of their destinies.  There has been 
a pronounced shift from the personal and 
local sphere to the institutional and global 
realm.  The issue is not whether that is good 
or bad. This is simply a fact.  New Orleans 
oers a good example. 
When Hurricane Betsy hit New Orleans in 
1965 many neighborhoods ooded in ways 
that Katrina repeated in 2005.  At that time 
hurricane protection was a local, mostly 
personal, thing.  There were no federal 
hurricane defenses to protect the City, 
much less to fail.  The decision to return 
and rebuild was assisted from Washington 
DC, but mostly shaped by locals.  Most 
of the drug and grocery stores, retailers, 
banks were locally-owned.  The decision for 
them to reopen was inseparable from the 
recovery of the neighbors they served. 
By 2010, that had changed dramatically. 
Flood protection was heavily the province 
of the Army Corps of Engineers.  Federal 
government had a commitment to protect 
the region from the worst storm it was 
likely to see, a once in 200 to 300 year storm 
to use the current terminology.  That made 
people feel safe but it turns out to have been 
illusory.  The hurricane science the Army 
Corp of Engineers relied on in designing 
that system had evolved and by 1972 it 
was clear even to the Corps that the worst 
likely storm would be worse than the one 
they had planned for (St. Bernard Parish et 
al. v United States, 2015).  New information 
like that tends to make a sensible person 
reect, learn and adapt their plans.  That is 
not what the Corps, which is full of sensible 
people, did.  No, the Corps felt absolutely 
bound to build the system they pitched to 
Congress in 1965 and no new information 
about the real storm risk was going to 
change what they saw as their legal 
mission.  Unfortunately for the people 
in New Orleans that meant the Corps’ 
legal mission had become defending an 
outdated metric instead of a city.  That is 
hardly an aberration.   In addition, their 
engineering designs were in critical places 
so deeply flawed it could not perform 
even to the Corps’s old standards.
The truth of the matter is that for every law 
empowering someone or some agency 
to promote greater public safety and 
environmental resilience, there are passels 
of other laws and policies that run counter 
to it.  Not intentionally, of course, and not 
without some justification, but the result 
is the same.  Immunity laws intended to 
protect the public purse also can inoculate 
government against accountability, as 
can laws intended to encourage (and 
then shield) private investment.  Narrow 
agency and organization missions can 
be useful to focus expertise and limit 
overreaching, but they also can defy 
comprehensive planning and action.  And 
lending, housing and education policies 
that can elevate communities, can also be 
used to trap people in poverty and high-
risk locations.
By the time Katrina hit, many of the 
banks, grocers, and retailers had been 
bought out or replaced by national 
chains, organizations with no ties to the 
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community.  For them the decision to 
return, rebuild and reopen was a business 
decision driven by metrics and policies set 
in cities far away.  They needed customers 
first, customers who often could not return 
until they had a place to shop, bank and 
worship. Their duty was to their shareholders 
and business models, duties that did not 
reward compassion or local roots.  
One of the most compelling lessons from 
New Orleans and Katrina is that the very 
nature of our communities has changed. 
The notion that community is dened by 
who lives nearby must now be expanded 
to include persons and institutions at 
a distance whose decisions can control 
the fate of places and their residents. 
When those persons and institutions are 
unknown or faceless to locals, and when 
the locals are mere abstractions or metrics 
to those out-of-towners, the challenges 
of building any sense of real community 
should be obvious.  But nobody said this 
was going to be easy.
Which brings us to the second lesson from 
New Orleans.  The enemy is also us.  New 
Orleans has made tremendous strides and 
by almost every measure, is well ahead of 
any post-storm projections of where the 
region would be 10 years after the storm. 
People in every segment of the metro 
region have worked hard and accomplished 
far more than expected by almost anyone. 
Yet, to an unfortunate extent, our very 
success has made us complacent about the 
greatest threat:  The all too real risk that we 
can ood again.   
Too many people believe that so-called 
“100-year protection” is something with 
which we should be content. But that term 
just means is that we are protected against 
a storm with a 1% chance of striking any 
particular year. This is the lowest standard 
in the civilized world for densely populated 
areas. In fact, that standard was set by and 
for ood insurance. It may make perfect 
sense to insure a single building to that 
standard. Unfortunately, when oods hit 
entire cities not just a few buildings it’s 
comparable to designing medical care to 
handle a single person sick with inuenza, 
when the threat is actually an inuenza 
pandemic. In the rst case, a single doctor 
can handle it. In the second case, an entire 
society can be knocked out or even all but 
wiped out. 
The real chances over the next 100 years of 
escaping a hurricane that could overwhelm 
the 100-year standard are not good. Facts 
communicate more than probability 
statistics. The Mississippi River levees 
were built to protect against what was 
perceived to be the worst probable ood, 
and not to protect against some arbitrary 
mathematical projection.  And that is a 
good thing: in the last 88 years there have 
been at least four and possibly more oods 
that broke the standard for a 100-year ood 
on the river, most recently during the 2011 
Mississippi River Floods. 
Much better protection is closer than it 
might seem. The existing protection system 
can keep the city dry against the “still-
water” storm surge of a “500-year storm,” i.e., 
the surge if waves can be knocked o the 
top of it. How can that be accomplished? 
Greater protection can be accomplished 
by restoring areas outside the levees and 
by honestly partnering with the people 
and communities who live and work on the 
“wet” side of the levees.  This strategy can 
raise the standard of protection to “500-
year.” That standard is achievable, at least 
for much of the metro area.
But it cannot be accomplished unless we 
face a number of truths, some of them 
uncomfortable.   Our window of opportunity 
is shrinking and the temptation to delay or 
compromise to avoid making hard decisions 
will be immense.  But we must keep after it, 
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keep the faith and be honest with ourselves. 
We must make it our business to not let our 
community be divorced from those who 
have the power to make decisions that 
will determine its future.  We must make it 
our business to empower every resident in 
civic life.  And we must make sure that we 
do not ever assume that the institutions 
that now dominate our governments and 
economies have our best interests at heart. 
None of this will be easy or cheap. There will 
be friction. There has to be if you are doing 
anything worthwhile. But if it is friction that 
is fueled by a true sense of purpose and that 
produces traction and not just heat, then 
there is indeed hope. 
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HEALTH OUTCOM ES IN 
POST- KATRINA NEW ORLEANS: 
PLACE AND RACE M ATTER
PHARISSA ROBINSON,  J . D.  AND LILA ARNAUD,  M . P. H.  
IN NEW ORLEANS PLACE 
AND RACE ARE CLOSELY 
LINKED, BECAUSE STRUCTURAL 
BARRIERS SUCH AS HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION, HISTORICALLY 
HAVE RELEGATED AFRICAN 
AMERICANS TO NEIGHBORHOODS 
THAT ARE POORLY RESOURCED, 
WHILE RESIDENTS IN MAJORITY-
WHITE NEIG HBORHOODS ENJ OY 
BETTER RESOURCES AND HEALTH 
OUTCOM ES.  8
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The neighborhoods in which people live 
have a profound impact on their health 
behaviors and health outcomes (World 
Health Organization, n.d.). In New Orleans, 
the concept that place matters is literally 
life and death. People residing in high 
poverty, high crime communities where 
the educational attainment of residents 
is low and unemployment is high, have a 
much lower life expectancy rate than their 
counterparts in communities where the 
reverse is true (Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies, 2012). In New 
Orleans place and race are closely linked, 
because structural barriers such as housing 
discrimination, historically have relegated 
African Americans to neighborhoods that 
are poorly resourced, while residents in 
majority-White neighborhoods enjoy 
better resources and health outcomes.  For 
instance, individuals living in zip code 70112 
(predominately Black) have a life expectancy 
25 years lower than those in zip code 70124 
(predominately White) (Joint Center for 
Political and Economic Studies, 2012).
This chapter will examine the social and 
structural forces that impact health equity 
for African Americans in New Orleans. 
These social determinants of health, or 
the conditions in which people live, work 
and age and the systems in which they 
interact, are examined in this chapter using 
neighborhood comparisons of health 
outcomes. More specically, the health 
disparities between African American and 
White New Orleanians are highlighted with 
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neighborhood-level analysis of the rates of 
chronic illness. Included in this chapter are 
discussions on the natural and manmade 
forces that impacted the health care 
infrastructure in New Orleans and its eect 
on African Americans. Finally, an analysis of 
structural and social issues in health care is 
provided that includes recommendations 
to improve health and wellness for African 
Americans in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
Health Care Infrastructure
Hurricane Katrina severely damaged the 
health care infrastructure in New Orleans 
and exposed the vast vulnerabilities in 
the system at the expense of low-income, 
African Americans. Charity Hospital, a 
state-run hospital that primarily served the 
city’s indigent, lay vacant after the storm, 
leaving a major gap in health care access 
for low-income African Americans in the 
city (Gratz, 2011). The closure of Charity 
Hospital had severe consequences for 
African Americans in the city as 75% of the 
hospital’s patients were African American 
before the storm (Save Charity Hospital, 
n.d.). In the absence of Charity Hospital, 
African Americans’ access to health care in 
New Orleans diminished signicantly, and 
the city saw a 50% increase in its death rate 
following the hospital’s closure (Save Charity 
Hospital, n.d.). To highlight the importance 
of Charity Hospital in the New Orleans 
landscape, 51% of uninsured individuals in 
New Orleans reported their usual source 
of care was the emergency room (New 
Orleans Health Department, 2012). Without 
Charity Hospital, more than half of the city’s 
uninsured, lacked access to their usual 
source of care. 
In 2012, at a time when the city was 
still recovering from the devastation of 
Hurricane Katrina, Governor Jindal made $34 
million dollars in cuts to the public hospital 
system (Deslatte, 2012). LSU Public Hospital 
prisoner services and the city’s already 
crippled mental health infrastructure were 
hit hardest, representing half the nancial 
cuts. The hospital’s chemical detoxication 
unit and nine out of 38 psychiatric inpatient 
beds at the DePaul campus were also 
closed (Maldonado, 2012). The Jindal 
administration had already closed the New 
Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH) in 
2009, which had provided psychiatric care 
to indigent children (Barrow, 2009). These 
cuts dealt a serious blow to the already 
fractured health care infrastructure in the 
region and impacted some of the most 
vulnerable populations in the city, most of 
whom are African American. 
Despite these severe cuts to the hospital 
system in Louisiana, several post-Katrina 
recovery projects are expected to help 
improve access to medical care for residents 
of the city. These projects include the 
University Medical Center New Orleans 
(opened August 2015), the VA Hospital 
downtown medical complex (opening 
in 2016) and New Orleans East Hospital 
(opened July 2014). These projects cost 
over $2 billion dollars much of which came 
from hefty allocations from the federal 
government (Adelson, 2015; Buchanan, 
2012; Jacobson, 2013).  The federal 
government also awarded a $10 million 
grant to the City of New Orleans Health 
Department for its Healthy Start New 
Orleans Initiative to improve birth outcomes 
in communities with the high rates of low 
weight babies (City of New Orleans, 2014). 
Federal support has been essential to the 
recovery and rebuilding of the health care 
infrastructure in the city. 
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The rebuilding of these hospital projects 
are important steps in the recovery of the 
health care infrastructure of the city. Not 
only do they expand access to health care 
for New Orleans residents, but they also 
have a positive impact on the economic 
and workforce development in the city.  The 
completion of the New Orleans medical 
complex and Biodistrict are projected to 
create over 17,000 jobs and generate $630 
million in personal earnings by 2030 (Hollier, 
2011).  This underscores the importance of 
the health care system to the local economy 
in New Orleans. While these key projects 
are coming online, federal policies and local 
eorts are helping to address health care 
access issues that may help address health 
care disparities for African Americans. 
Access
Access to health care is an important factor 
inuencing health disparities across the 
nation. This is particularly true for African 
Americans who are more likely than Whites 
to be uninsured in New Orleans, are more 
likely than Whites to not see a doctor 
because of cost in Louisiana, and are less 
likely than Whites in Louisiana to have a 
primary care physician (The Kaiser Family 
Foundation State Health Facts, n.d.; New 
Orleans Health Department, 2013). It follows 
then that Blacks die from diseases at a higher 
rate than other racial groups, thus widening 
racial disparities (Culp-Ressler, 2013). 
Like many other southern states, Louisiana 
opted out of the Aordable Care Act’s 
Medicaid expansion provisions, denying 
coverage to otherwise ineligible residents 
who earn up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level (Schuler, 2015). Notwithstanding this, 
the Aordable Care Act has the potential 
to reduce racial disparities throughout New 
Orleans.  In particular, the city’s African 
American community is already signicantly 
benetting from some of its reforms 
through insurance coverage for more than 
60,000 in the New Orleans Metropolitan Area 
(Advocate Sta, 2015).  Many of the city’s 
African Americans who were ineligible for 
Medicaid now have coverage and access to 
treatment that was once only available to 
them in the city’s hospital emergency rooms. 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, 21% of New Orleans 
residents were uninsured, giving the city one 
of the highest uninsured rates in the country 
(Rudowitz, Rowland & Shartzer, 2006).  As 
previously mentioned African Americans 
have higher uninsured rates than Whites, 
with uninsured rates of 32.3% as compared to 
16.6% for nonelderly adults from 2009-2011 
African-American Unisured Rate in New Orleans from  2009 - 2011 and 2013-2014
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(New Orleans Health Department, 2013a). The 
Aordable Care Act has made a noticeable 
impact in reducing this disparity, by helping 
reduce the number of uninsured in the city. 
Between 2013 and 2014, the percent of 
uninsured African Americans dropped from 
25% to 16%, while the percent of uninsured 
Whites dropped from 14% to 11% (Number 
of uninsured, 2015). That’s a dierence of 
just ve percentage points between African 
Americans and Whites in the percent of 
uninsured in 2014, down from an almost 16 
percentage point dierence in 2009- 2011 
(See Figure 1) (Number of uninsured, 2015; 
New Orleans Health Department, 2013a). The 
impact of the Aordable Care Act is expected 
to play a continual role in decreasing the 
number of uninsured African Americans in 
New Orleans.   
While uninsured rates are dropping in New 
Orleans, the city faces the dicult challenge 
of addressing the shortages in mental 
health care providers.  Pre-Katrina, the 
mental health care provider shortage was an 
issue that was exacerbated by inadequate 
funding to address mental health and 
substance abuse needs (Reckdahl, 2012). 
Before the storm, the city’s shortage of 
psychiatric inpatient beds was at a rate of 
46.5 per 100,000 population or 364 total 
inpatient psychiatric beds for the entire city 
(City of New Orleans, 2010). Of those beds, 
100 were at Charity Hospital. The hospital 
that served the needs of the city’s low-
income African Americans, no longer served 
as a primary source of both inpatient and 
outpatient mental health care (The Kaiser 
Family Foundation State Health Facts, n.d.). 
African Americans in New Orleans were 
hardest hit because they are most likely to 
be misdiagnosed or not diagnosed at all, 
thus ending up in jail or avoiding treatment 
altogether (Simpson, 2015).  
By 2010, the number of available mental 
health and substance abuse hospital 
beds remained critically low at about 
17.5 adult beds per 100,000 (The Kaiser 
Family Foundation State Health Facts, 
n.d.). Although the number of available 
emergency room beds increased to 159 
in 2010, a shortage in psychiatric beds 
still remains a challenge in the city (City of 
New Orleans, 2010). While the outpatient 
infrastructure has beneted from the inux 
of federal funding, inpatient psychiatric 
facilities still face a shortage of inpatient 
beds. The new University Medical Center, 
provides 80 inpatient psychiatric beds 
today (Hays, 2015). One of the unfortunate 
results of this mental health care shortage 
crisis in the city is the criminalization of 
mental illness.  The combination of poverty, 
the unaordable housing and a edgling 
psychiatric healthcare system led to a 
disproportionate number of mentally ill 
African Americans falling through the cracks 
and ultimately showing up in city jails, 
morgues and emergency rooms (Simpson, 
2015). But the New Orleans East Behavioral 
Health Center opened their doors June 2015 
brining a much-needed mental health care 
service to the metropolitan area (Barbarin, 
2015). A continued increase of mental health 
care providers is crucial to increasing access 
to mental health care in New Orleans, but 
other options may also help to address the 
needs of residents in New Orleans.  Another 
strategy to address the mental health 
needs of New Orleanians is to follow the 
national trend of increasing the provision 
of home-based psychiatric care to stabilized 
patients as an alternative where psychiatric 
admissions are not feasible. 
An important improvement to health care 
access in New Orleans is the expansion of 
community health centers. Community 
health centers provide much needed 
primary care and mental health care to low-
income residents, including those that are 
uninsured (504HealthNet.org, 2015). Today, 
over 70 neighborhood-based, community 
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health centers serve 59,000 working class 
individuals throughout the Greater New 
Orleans area (City of New Orleans, n.d.). 
The Aordable Care Act has accelerated 
the growth of these centers encouraging 
the development of patient-centered 
medical homes that are well-coordinated 
systems in which clinicians and patients 
work together to provide patients with 
appropriate care (Freundlich, 2013). These 
Centers are designed to reduce emergency 
room visits and avoidable hospitalizations, 
reduce health disparities and improve 
health outcomes for its patients. In July of 
2014, two community health centers in New 
Orleans were awarded federal funds made 
available by the Aordable Care Act to 
expand or establish mental health services 
(Catalanello, 2014). In May 2015, the City 
of New Orleans was awarded a $175,000 
grant to help community health centers 
encourage residents to use the centers 
(McClendon, 2015). The Aordable Care 
Act and the health care delivery reforms in 
New Orleans are helping to rebuild a health 
care system that may help change health 
care decisions and behaviors of residents 
by increasing their access to primary care. 
Community health centers in New Orleans 
are serving many of the low-income African 
American residents who previously would 
be served by Charity Hospital, and providing 
much needed primary care and mental 
health care that can help turn the tide on 
health disparities for African Americans in 
New Orleans. 
In New Orleans East, the city also opened 
New Orleans East Hospital in July 2014, an 
80-bed facility that serves nearly 80,000 
residents (Catalanello & Myers, 2014). 
The facility is located on the former old 
Methodist Hospital site. Neighborhood 
clinic initiatives and the reopening of 
a hospital in New Orleans East may be 
contributing to improved health outcomes 
that have been experienced across the city 
for the past three consecutive years (City 
of New Orleans, 2015).  Today, the services 
the City oers through New Orleans East 
Hospital and its community health centers 
play a crucial role in increased health care 
access for African Americans and other New 
Orleans residents. 
Social Determinants of Health & 
Chronic Diseases
The conditions in which people live, work 
and age and the systems at play that 
shape their daily lives are referred to as 
the “social determinants of health” (World 
Health Organization, n.d.). Conditions like 
neighborhood income, crime rates, access to 
supermarkets and educational attainment 
are social determinants that can each create 
disparity in the health outcomes observed 
in a neighborhood.  Income, for example, 
directly aects health outcomes as families 
living below the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) 
become almost four times more likely to 
report poor health than families living at 
least two times above the FPL (Joint Center 
for Political and Economic Studies, 2014). 
The disparity in health outcomes is most 
dramatically observed across zip code 70112 
(a predominantly Black area) and 70124 (a 
Today, over 70 
neighborhood-based, 
Community  Health Centers 
serve 59,000 working class 
individuals throughout the 
Greater New Orleans area.
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predominantly White area) and leads to a 
drastic dierence in life expectancy (over 
25 years), with residents in 70112 living an 
average of 54 years and residents in 70124 
living an average of 85 years (Joint Center 
for Political and Economic Studies, 2014). 
Residents in zip code 70112, for example, 
are ve times more likely to die from heart 
disease than are those living in zip codes 
like 70124, with 1,945.2 people/100,000 in 
70112 dying from cardiovascular disease as 
compared to the 190/100000 people in zip 
code 70124 (Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies, 2014). Residents living 
within zip code 70112 also experience the 
highest rates of mortality due to stroke and 
diabetes. Between 2008 and 2010, African 
Americans were also three times more 
likely than white New Orleans residents 
to die of diabetes and twice as likely to 
die of kidney disease (New Orleans Health 
Department, 2013b). Risk factors like 
obesity, hypertension and diabetes all of 
which are driven by the cycle of poverty, also 
persist at the highest disparity levels in the 
neighborhoods represented under 70112 
(Joint Center for Political and Economic 
Studies, 2014). 
Obesity
Social determinants like the concentration 
of corner stores and fast food restaurants 
coupled with the lack of supermarkets 
and fresh food options, all can impact a 
person’s decision making around their food 
options and can lead to obesity. In spite of a 
growing number of supermarkets and fresh 
food venues in the city since the storm, 
access to these venues for African American 
residents has decreased. Pre-Katrina census 
tracts showed that African Americans were 
40% less likely to have access to more than 
one supermarket in their neighborhood 
as compared to residents of other 
neighborhoods. By 2009, lack of access 
increased to 71% (New Orleans Health 
Department, 2015). 
Crime and neighborhood safety are 
intrinsically linked to obesity. Unsafe 
neighborhood spaces deter people from 
becoming physically active. Exposure to 
stress also signals the body to release 
hormones like cortisol and adrenaline in 
the bloodstream, which have been linked 
with obesity and metabolic disease (Bose, 
Laferrere & Olivan, 2009). Obesity is a major 
risk factor of increased risk of diabetes, 
heart disease, stroke and certain kinds of 
cancer. A report by the New Orleans Health 
Department (2012) indicates that New 
Orleans has a 30% adult obesity rate. More 
recent numbers show that 42% of African 
Americans reported living with obesity as 
compared to 30% of Whites in Louisiana, 
giving Louisiana the sixth highest rates 
of adult obesity in the nation (Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2013; 
Levi, Segal, St. Lauren, & Rayburn, 2014). 
Diabetes
Disparities in health outcomes due to 
diabetes can be observed across race, 
income lines, and educational backgrounds 
(Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals [DHH], 2004b). The disease 
can be prevented and managed with 
healthful eating, regular physical activity 
and management of other risk factors 
such as high blood pressure, high levels 
of body fat and tobacco use (CDC, 2014). 
With decreased access to healthy food 
options, safe, walkable neighborhoods, 
and continuous health care access, African 
Americans are at a social disadvantage for 
preventing and managing diabetes. On a 
national level, 13.2% of Blacks live with the 
disease as compared to almost 8% of Whites 
(CDC, 2014). In New Orleans, Blacks are 
three times more likely to die from diabetes 
related complications than their White 
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counterparts (United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2012).
Due to limited local data, this section 
extrapolates state data to talk about trends 
in health disparity of diabetes across time. 
In 2004, the prevalence of diabetes in 
Louisiana had increased steadily from 5% of 
the adult population in 1994 to 80% (DHH, 
2004a). In pre-Katrina Louisiana, 10.9% 
of African Americans lived with diabetes 
as compared to 7% of White Americans 
(DHH, 2004a).  Residents who reported an 
annual household income less than $13,000 
were at higher risk of developing diabetes 
than residents who reported an annual 
household income of over $50,000 (14% 
versus 9%). Residents who had not attained 
a high school diploma were also twice as 
likely to develop diabetes than residents 
who had graduated from college (14% 
versus 7%) (DHH, 2004).
By 2010, the prevalence of diabetes had 
increased to 10% of the adult population in 
Louisiana as compared to almost 7% in 2000 
(CDC, 2010). African Americans still had the 
highest prevalence of diabetes with a 13% 
diagnosis rate compared to approximately 
9% diagnosis rate among White Americans. 
Residents who reported an annual income of 
less than $15,000 were still at higher risk than 
residents who reported an annual income 
of over $50,000 (a prevalence of 20% versus 
approximately 6%). Residents who had not 
attained a high school diploma experienced 
higher prevalence of diabetes than residents 
who attained a college degree at 16% and 
8% respectively (CDC, 2010).
Maternal Health Indicators  
Unfortunately not all pregnancies in the 
US today result in a live or healthy birth. 
Infant mortality rates (IMR) and rates of 
low birth weight (LBW) are maternal health 
indicators used to gauge the overall health 
of mothers and their babies. Some will 
argue that accessing prenatal care within 
the rst trimester of pregnancy is the 
greatest indicator of low infant mortality rate, 
premature births, neonatal mortality, infant 
mortality and maternal mortality (Funke, 
Tran, Mather & Kieltyka, 2006). 
Black communities throughout the US, 
including Orleans parish, report more adverse 
birth outcomes, than any other group (DHH, 
2006). This is due in part to much higher 
rates of low birth weight and higher rates of 
infant mortality before the rst year of life. 
Black communities also report less utilization 
of prenatal care early in pregnancy (rst 
trimester), which has been linked to healthy 
pregnancy (DHH, 2006).
From 2004-2006, the Department of Health 
and Hospitals (2006) estimated that in 
Orleans Parish, 16% of live Black births 
compared to 8% of live White births resulted 
in babies with low birth weight. The infant 
mortality rate in Black communities was 
11.5 deaths/1,000 live births compared 
to 4.8 deaths/1,000 live births in White 
communities. There was a wide disparity 
in utilization of prenatal care, with 72% 
of Black women reporting they received 
prenatal care in the rst trimester compared 
to 92% of White women (DHH, 2006).
Immediately after the storm, from 2005-
2007, the disparity in rates of low birth 
weight widened slightly from 16% of Black 
live births compared to 8% of live White 
births (DHH, 2007).  Infant mortality rate in 
Black communities was 11 deaths /1,000 
live births compared to 4.3 deaths/1,000 
live births in White communities; and 76.5% 
of Black women reported accessing rst 
trimester care, compared to 92.2% White 
women (DHH 2007).
 Most recent numbers show that the disparity 
in maternal health outcomes continues to 
widen across racial groups in New Orleans. 
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Fourteen percent of live Black births result 
in low birth weight and 7% of live White 
births result in low birth weight (DHH, 
2011). While infant mortality rates between 
both Black and White communities each 
decreased, the disparity observed across 
groups increased with 10.7 deaths/1,000 
Black births compared to 1.9 deaths/1,000 
White births (DHH, 2011).
HIV/AIDS
The dierences in rates of HIV transmission 
are the most extreme health disparity for 
African Americans in New Orleans given 
that African American residents are twice 
as likely to be diagnosed with HIV than 
their White counterparts (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2012). The 
Louisiana Public Health Institute identies 
high-risk heterosexual sexual activity and 
injection drug use as major modes of HIV 
transmission for women and same sex 
sexual activities followed by high-risk 
heterosexual activity as major modes of 
HIV transmission for men (Louisiana Public 
Health Institute, 2010). 
In 2004, 1,113 new HIV/AIDS cases were 
diagnosed in the state of Louisiana, 32% 
(353) of which were in New Orleans. Of the 
1,113 new HIV/AIDS cases diagnosed in the 
state, 872 were new AIDS cases, indicating 
late diagnosis (DHH, 2004b). New Orleans 
had the highest number of new HIV/AIDS 
cases diagnosed in 2004 and 76% of the new 
HIV/AIDS diagnoses were AIDS diagnoses. In 
2004, 5,148 people were living with AIDS 
in New Orleans (DHH, 2004b). Although 
African Americans made up 33% of the 
Louisiana population, they represented 76% 
of new HIV cases diagnosed and 79% of new 
AIDS cases diagnosed in the state. African 
Americans’ HIV rates were seven times 
higher than Whites in Louisiana in 2004 
(DHH, 2004b). 
In 2004, there were 15,068 people living with 
HIV/AIDS in Louisiana, 50% of whom were 
living with AIDS (DHH, 2004b). By December 
2014, there were a total of 20,013 people 
living with HIV/AIDS in Louisiana, 53% of 
whom were living with AIDS (DHH, 2014). 
In New Orleans, 4,901 people were living 
with HIV/AIDS in 2014. Of those living with 
HIV/AIDS, 2,596 had AIDS (53%). Across the 
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state, disparities in HIV/AIDS rates were 
extreme in 2014. In Louisiana, 68% of 
people living with HIV/AIDS were African 
American as compared to Whites who 
made up 23% of people living with AIDS 
(DHH, 2014). In 2014, African Americans 
represented 32% of the population in 
Louisiana. Those disparities held up in 
the New Orleans Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, where 62% of people living with 
HIV/AIDS were African American and 
31% of those living with HIV/AIDS were 
White (See Figure 2) (DHH, 2014). The 
New Orleans metropolitan area includes 
Jefferson, Orleans, St. Tammany, St. John 
the Baptist, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. 
James and St. Charles parishes. 
Cancer
Louisiana’s rates of cancer are close to the 
national average or higher. From 2008-
2012, per 100,000 people, the incidence 
of breast cancer rates averaged 121.9 
compared to the national average of 123; 
lung cancer rates averaged 73 compared 
to the national average of 63.7; and rates 
of kidney cancer averaged 20.9 compared 
to national average of 16.0 (National 
Cancer Institute, 2012). Overall, cancer 
disproportionately affects people of color 
in Louisiana, with age-adjusted incidence 
rates for Whites at 486.7/100,000 
compared to 508.8/100,000 for people of 
color including Latinos living in the state 
(National Cancer Institute, 2012). With 
less access and utilization of health care, 
African Americans are at an increased 
risk of morbidity caused by cancer. Black 
women, for example, are less likely to 
survive cancer following a diagnosis, 
compared to White women (Susan G. 
Komen Breast Cancer Foundation, 2013). 
In New Orleans, African Americans are 
also disproportionately affected by 
cancer, with rates of death caused by 
cancer averaging 245/100,000 among 
African American communities compared 
to the death rate average of 150/100,000 
seen among White New Orleanians. 
African Americans are 1.55 times more 
likely to die from cancer than their White 
counterparts (See Figure 3) (New Orleans 
Department of Health, 2013). 
Social Determinants of Health and 
Smoking
One of the most egregious examples of 
structural and social forces that promote 
poor health outcomes for African Americans 
is the tobacco industries’ targeting of young 
people and low-income communities 
of color. An unpublished report by the 
Louisiana Public Health Institute (LPHI) 
found that the tobacco industry spends 
$215 million annually to market their 
products to these populations, resulting in 
tobacco-related disparities. LPHI conducted 
a study of the product, placement, pricing 
and promotion (4Ps) of tobacco, alcohol 
and food in New Orleans, surveying 
465 stores throughout the city. They 
found a significant relationship between 
socioeconomic status and access. 
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Specific findings of the unpublished LPHI 
study suggest that the 4Ps are major social 
determinants that impact health choices 
and influence health outcomes. Findings 
of the study indicate that tobacco and 
alcohol products were cheaper and 
health foods were more expensive 
in African American neighborhoods. 
The reverse was true in more affluent, 
White neighborhoods. Study findings 
also indicate that African American 
neighborhoods had 2.5 times more 
tobacco advertising than more affluent, 
White neighborhoods where they had 
almost no tobacco ads in stores. These 
findings highlight the disparate strategies 
implemented by the tobacco industry in 
African American neighborhoods and 
illuminate some of the structural forces 
that promote poor health outcomes and 
health disparities for African Americans. 
For added clarity, smoking is linked to 
20% to 30% of low birth rates in the 
United States and public smoking and 
lack of access to fresh foods are risk 
factors for obesity and chronic disease 
(New Orleans Health Department, 2013b). 
It is safe to say that product, placement, 
pricing and promotion of tobacco, 
alcohol and healthy foods in African 
American neighborhoods in New Orleans 
is contributing to higher rates of low 
birth rates, obesity and chronic diseases 
among African American New Orleanians. 
While the aforementioned structural and 
social forces continue to facilitate poor 
health outcomes for African Americans, 
the New Orleans City Council passed a 
smoke-free ordinance banning smoking 
in bars, restaurants and casinos in the 
city that appears to be yielding positive 
health results (Berenson, 2015; City of 
New Orleans, 2015). A new study found a 
96% decrease in fine particle air pollution 
in the 100 days since the ordinance 
passed (Travers &Vogl, 2015).
Disaster Preparedness 
How much mayhem and loss of life 
could the city have avoided during the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina had 
officials at all three levels of government 
executed an effective communication or 
disaster preparedness plan is unknown. 
Hindsight is 20/20. However, there are 
lessons learned regarding where the city 
stands today in its disaster preparedness 
and readiness plan should another storm 
or disaster strike. The government has 
infused billions of dollars into the city 
to shore up its levees, and has since 
made several repairs to address constant 
sinkage problems. However, some still 
worry the levees may not hold up if 
another storm makes a direct hit. Local 
providers and hospitals are still tasked 
with the challenge of caring for its sickest 
ventilator dependent patients during 
power outages. Lessons learned from 
Katrina include moving critical equipment 
like generators to higher floors and 
revamping hospital communication lists. 
No plan is ever exhaustive, which is why 
the greatest lesson learned from Hurricane 
Katrina is eradicating complacency such 
that residents heed evacuation warnings 
and alerts in a timely and orderly fashion 
and that disaster plans are regularly 
checked and updated for maximum 
preparedness. This is particularly critical 
for the city’s most ill and vulnerable 
populations who will more likely rely on 
public transportation and other mass 
transit for evacuation purposes. 
Conclusion
Like other major cities in America, 
where you live in New Orleans strongly 
correlates with the condition of your 
health and life expectancy. Thus, despite 
having a greater number of providers, 
residents in some of the most income and 
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resource poor areas of the city experience 
more persistent, frequent & severe health 
problems than those living in zip codes 
that are predominantly White and have 
higher income rates. Large disparities in 
diseases in only certain areas of the city 
are too disproportionate to ascribe it only 
to poor decision-making, particularly 
when considering how high the deck is 
stacked against residents living in some 
of the most violent areas of the city, like 
Treme and Central City. 
Neighborhoods with low crime rates, 
quality schools, libraries, nutritious food 
outlets, safe workout facilities, parks 
and community centers, as well as, 
trusted relationships, and equal access 
to resources, strongly influence healthier 
lives just as much as access to quality 
healthcare. In applying this to New 
Orleans as a solution for addressing health 
disparities, we should take a different 
approach by looking more closely at the 
city’s neighborhood infrastructure, land 
use and housing policies and not just the 
African Americans who live in them. The 
density of liquor stores and commercial 
to residential space, as well as the 
number of banks versus check-cashing 
places are as much drivers of health 
outcomes as is access to healthcare and 
neighborhood clinics. 
Although riddled and beleaguered by 
epidemic, systemic failures, the city 
has nonetheless undergone a major 
transformation since Hurricane Katrina. 
But too many struggling areas of the 
city still sit bruised and battered not just 
from the waters of Katrina, but also from 
an almost daily spray of bullets and gun 
violence that remind us of the plight of New 
Orleans. If ever there was an opportunity 
to rectify substandard neighborhood 
conditions known to perpetuate the 
cycle of violence, desperation and health 
disparity in New Orleans, the recovery 
period in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina was it. Yet, 10 years after one of 
the worst disasters ever unleashed onto 
the banks of the Mississippi, the health 
of many African American residents is no 
better off than it was before Hurricane 
Katrina, as compared to White residents. 
These disparities are sometimes seen 
as aggravating problems that are near 
impossible to fix. When the city honestly 
addresses its issues with neighborhood 
diversity and inclusion, and couples that 
with healthcare access interventions, it will 
have a more realistic and comprehensive 
picture on which to base decisions and 
an equitable strategy. Until New Orleans 
applies lessons learned from Katrina by 
addressing the relationship between zip 
code and morbidity, no amount of beds 
or providers alone will eliminate the 
health disparities between its African 
American and White residents. Closing 
the disparity gap between predominantly 
White communities like 70124 and 
predominately Black communities like 
70112 requires an equitable practice of 
prioritizing Black health and healing in 
the city, which includes neighborhood 
diversity. The strategies employed 
throughout Columbia Parc represent one 
such approach the city can adopt in truly 
desegregating its communities as a step 
towards closing the health outcomes 
disparity gap.  
Recommendations 
Adopt strategies that diversify resources and 
funding streams and make them available 
to historically marginalized New Orleans 
communities to improve health equity.
Review the city’s neighborhood infrastructure, 
and not just the African Americans who live in 
them, for land use and housing policies that 
promote a cycle of poverty, i.e., density of 
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liquor stores, commercial to residential space, 
number of banks versus check-cashing places, 
food deserts and limited service restaurants.   
Advocate for increased funding and access 
to primary care and mental health services, 
exploring alternatives such as the national 
trend of increasing the provision of home-
based psychiatric care to stabilized patients.
Regularly check disaster plans and update 
for maximum protection.
In hurricane preparedness plans, ensure 
critical equipment like generators are 
moved to higher oors.
Ensure hospital communication lists are 
periodically updated and alerts, educational 
outreach programs and warnings are 
regularly tested.
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THE CHALLENG ES OF G ETTING  
HOM E Q UICKLY AND FAIRLY: 
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
OF POST- KATRINA 
HOUSING  RECOV ERY EFFORTS
KELLY D. OWENS, PHD.
THE Q UESTION OFTEN ASKED 
BY THOSE OUTSIDE OF NEW 
ORLEANS IS, “ IS NEW ORLEANS 
BACK? ”  ALTHOUGH THIS INQ UIRY 
IS SEEMINGLY STRAIGHTFORWARD, A 
NUMBER OF COMPLEX ITIES PRECLUDE 
THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE A SIMPLE 
ANSWER. IN GENERAL, 7 8 %  OF 
THE PRE- KATRINA NEW ORLEANS 
POPULATION COUNT IS BACK WITH 
8 8 %  OF HOUSING  INV ENTORY 
RESTORED. 9I V E TORY 
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The question often asked by those 
outside of New Orleans is, “Is New Orleans 
back?”  Although this inquiry is seemingly 
straightforward, a number of complexities 
preclude the ability to provide a simple 
answer. In general, 78% of the pre-Katrina 
New Orleans population count is back 
with 88% of housing inventory restored 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). On the surface, 
the numbers suggest that the immediate 
post-Katrina concern around housing New 
Orleanians has been resolved. However, 
digging deeper unveils that while the 
quantity of housing units is not an issue, 
the aordability and quality of housing in 
New Orleans is a major concern, particularly 
to individuals and organizations vying 
for fairness, equality, and the provision 
of decent places to live for all citizens. 
Further, if “being back” is dened as the 
return of New Orleanians to their pre-Katrina 
neighborhoods, a thorough response has 
to be qualied with reference to race 
because of the disparate recovery of 
predominantly white versus predominantly 
Black neighborhoods. The fact that the 
answer to “Is New Orleans back?” elicits 
responses that have to be qualied based 
on aordability, housing quality, and race 
suggests that an analysis about equity and 
the fair distribution of disaster recovery 
resources for the rebuilding of New Orleans 
neighborhoods is warranted.
Bringing families back to New Orleans 
necessitated swift action to restore housing 
to pre-Katrina levels in order to stabilize 
neighborhoods. However, housing recovery 
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became an arduous task, complicated by 
the limitations of insurance companies, pre-
Katrina poverty rates at 28%, and challenges 
such as neighborhood blight associated 
with a steadily declining population. 
Moreover, the city/state had to equally 
prioritize several needs: housing its labor 
force; safeguarding tax-based revenue from 
higher income households; preserving its 
tourist economy; and forestalling increased 
homelessness. These considerations meant 
that a comprehensive housing recovery plan 
would have to be developed and executed 
quickly. Under a national spotlight, the city 
of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana 
with support from the federal government 
had the opportunity to demonstrate how 
disaster recovery should be conducted. 
However, many lessons can still be gleaned 
from the mistakes made during the housing 
recovery. However, once the dust settled, 
housing recovery in New Orleans would 
become a case-study complete with lessons 
on what could and should have been done 
dierently.
Housing and Race
Hurricane Katrina did not discriminate. 
Homes belonging to families of all 
racial backgrounds were aected by the 
devastating eects of the storm.  Thousands 
of families were displaced and given that 
New Orleans had a majority African American 
population, when looking at raw numbers, 
more African American households were 
aected than any other racial group. Yet, 
when analyzing devastation and housing 
recovery percentage-wise, while disaster 
did not discriminate, disaster did expose 
major inequities. Of New Orleans’ 14 
planning districts, ve areas experienced 
less than 13% severe housing damage 
as a result of Katrina while eight districts 
encountered severe damage to at least 40% 
of their homes. In the Uptown/Carrollton 
area, one of the larger districts, 27% of 
homes were severely damaged (see Table 
1). Of those eight, New Orleans East, the 
Lower Ninth Ward, Mid-City, Gentilly, and 
Village De l’est were the hardest hit, with 
64% to 69% of homes severely damaged. 
All of these areas were predominantly 
occupied by African American families (see 
Table 1). Related to this observation is the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) nding 
that Blacks were less likely to return than 
were individuals in other racial groups. 
According to BLS, only 54% of Black 
evacuees returned to their pre-Katrina 
communities, compared with 82% of White 
evacuees. BLS concluded that Black net 
out-migration was tied to geographical 
patterns of storm damage, income, and 
educational attainment rather than race 
(Groen & Polivka, 2008). While it is apparent 
that geography determined which 
communities were more damaged and 
socioeconomic status dictated the capacity 
for residents to return, BLS’s suggestion 
that race did not factor into which 
residents were able to return ignores the 
vestiges of racially discriminatory practices 
(e,g., redlining, steering, blockbusting, 
and exclusionary zoning)  that established 
racially segregated communities. The 
suggestion also ignores that life chances 
are tied to geography.
It is because of residential segregation 
that predominantly Black communities 
in New Orleans were more susceptible 
to destruction caused by Katrina, which 
can be correlated to the rate of return of 
African Americans to New Orleans. New 
Orleans’ population count dropped by 
197,792 people from the 2000 census 
count to 2006, the period immediately 
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following Katrina, and estimates are that 
64% of this population loss was African 
American (Shrinath, Mack, & Plyer, 2014; 
U.S. Census, 2000). As anticipated, the 
hardest hit neighborhoods suered the 
most population loss. In 2010, ve years 
after Katrina, the Lower Ninth Ward and the 
Little Woods neighborhood in New Orleans 
East were still experiencing population 
declines of more than 10,000 people (see 
Table 2). 
These ndings make it hard to circumvent 
race as a unit of analysis with respect 
to housing recovery. Since the onset 
of recovery eorts, policy analysts and 
academicians have been grappling 
with the nding that African American 
neighborhoods have been recovering at 
slower rates than white neighborhoods 
despite the inux of state and federal 
funding earmarked for recovery (Gotham, 
2014; Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2011; Rose, 
Clark, & Duval-Diop, 2008; Rivera & Miller, 
2007; Quigley, 2007a).
While these results may not have been 
intentional, it is important to bring such 
critiques and analyses forward if we are to 
inform and shape future practices that are 
equitable and fair for all groups.
Damage by Neighborhoods
New Orleans’ City Planning Commission 
divides New Orleans into 14 planning 
districts comprised of neighborhoods. 
 HOUSING UNITS
% UNITS 
SEVERELY 
DAMAGED
PERCENT OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN SPECIFIED NEIGHBORHOOD 
POPULATION COUNT PRE- AND POST-KATRINA
Neighborhood 2000 2010
French Quarter/CBD (1a) 2,896 0% French Quarter 4.3% 4.4%
Warehouse/CBD (1b) 1,552 2% Warehouse DNA DNA
Central City/Garden District 
(2)
19,737 12% Central City 87.1% 72.4%
Uptown/Carrollton (3) 28,213 27% Audubon 5.1% 4.8%
Mid-City (4) 24,247 64% Mid City 64.3% 55%
Lakeview (5) 12,666 57% Lakeview .7% 3.4%
Gentilly (6) 16,902 67% Gentilly Terrace 69.7% 77.8%
Bywater (7) 15,416 42% St. Roch 91.5% 86.8%
Lower Ninth Ward (8) 6,802 69% Lower Ninth Ward 98.3% 95.5%
Eastern New Orleans (9) 28,865 68% Little Woods 86.1% 92.6%
Village d L’est (10) 3,820 67% Village De l’est 55.4% 43.4%
Lake Catherine/Venetian 
Isles(11)
829 62% Venetian Isles 76.5% 61.4%
Algiers (12) 18,973 1% Old Aurora 30.9% 54.9%
English Turn (13) 1,712 12% New Aurora/English Turn 68.1% 63.4%
Table 1: Damage by Neighborhoods 
Source: The Data Center, Neighborhood Statistical Area Data Proles
144Success and Failures of Housing Recovery Eorts
Table 1 indicates the amount of severe 
damage in each planning district and 
indicates the percentage of African 
Americans represented in the most 
populated neighborhoods of the planning 
districts. 
Pre and Post-Katrina Housing 
Landscape
At the time of the last census (2000) before 
Katrina, housing inventory accommodated 
New Orleans’ population of 484,674 
residents with a total of 215,091 units. 
Of these units, 188,251 were occupied 
and renters inhabited 53.5% of them. 
The median home value was $87,300 
and median gross rent was $488.  The 
U.S. Census found that 26.7% of Orleans 
Parish homeowners and 42.7% of renters 
were paying 30% or more of their 
income toward housing costs (housing 
cost burden). Racial demographics 
before Katrina showed a majority Black/
African American population of 66.6%. 
White residents represented 26.6% and 
the Asian population 2.3%. Hispanics of 
any race numbered 3.1% while American 
Indian and others were at 1.4% (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2000). 
By 2013, the population of New Orleans 
was estimated at 378,715-- indicating 
that New Orleans had lost 105,959 
residents since 2000. The 2013 American 
Community Survey counted 190,127 
housing units in the city of New Orleans, 
24,964 fewer units than in 2000.1
Additionally, by 2013, the median gross 
rent had increased by 89% and home 
 
Sample Neighborhoods
POPULATION
Change 
Number
Change 
Percent
2000 2010
French Quarter            4,176            3,813          (363) -8.69%
Central City          19,072          11,257      (7,815) -40.98%
Audubon          14,898          15,865            967 6.49%
Mid City          19,909          14,633      (5,276) -26.50%
Lakeview            9,875            6,394      (3,481) -35.25%
Gentilly Terrace          10,542            8,210      (2,332) -22.12%
St. Roch          11,975            6,632      (5,343) -44.62%
Lower Ninth Ward          14,008            2,842    (11,166) -79.71%
Little Woods (New Orleans 
East)
         44,311          31,698    (12,613) -28.46%
Village De l'est          12,912            8,008      (4,904) -37.98%
Venetian Isles            1,883                840      (1,043) -55.39%
Old Aurora          15,807          16,781            974 6.16%
New Aurora/English Turn            5,672            5,769               97 1.71%
Table 2: Population Count in Select Neighborhoods in 2000 and 2010
 Source: The Data Center, Neighborhood Statistical Area Data Proles
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median values increased by more than 
$95,000 compared to 2000 values. Median 
gross rent at $926 explains the significant 
increase—from 42.7% to 61.3%--in 
number of renters experiencing housing 
cost burden of 30% or more. Another 
notable difference is the African American 
population, which in 2000 measured at 
323,392, and was estimated at 213,632 
in 2013 – a significant boost after having 
experienced a low of 125,600 in 2005. 
2013 numbers show a decrease of 6.8% 
in Black residents since 2000 while White 
and Hispanic representation has increased 
by 7% and 2.2%, respectively (see Table 3). 
Housing Recovery: Slow but 
Steady
Ten years post-Katrina, 99.9% of the 46,922 
households that applied for nancial 
assistance through Road Home, the state’s 
housing disaster recovery program, have 
been granted funding (State of Louisiana, 
2015a). While this is an encouraging nding, 
the pace by which the program operated 
substantially slowed down the rate by 
which neighborhoods recovered. It was not 
until August 2006, one year after Hurricane 
Katrina, that the Road Home program was 
ocially launched. 
2000 2010 2013
POPULATION 484,674 343,829 378,715
Black/African American 66.6% 60% 59.8%
White 26.6% 30% 33.6%
Asian American 2.3% 3% 3%
Hispanics (any race) 3.1% 5% 5.3%
HOUSING
Housing Units 215,091 189,896 190,127
Occupied Units 87.5% 74.9% 78.1%
Renter-occupied Units 53.5% 52.2% 52.7%
Vacant Units 26,840 47,738 41,729
Median Home Value $87,300 $184,100 $183,700
Median gross rent $488 $899 $926
Homeowners paying ≥ 30% of income 
toward housing costs
26.7% 46.2% 43.9%
Renters paying ≥ 30% of income toward 
gross rent
42.7% 61.6% 61.3%
Table 3: Demographic and Housing Characteristics of New Orleans in 2000, 2010, and 2013
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census & American Community Survey 2013, 2006-2010 American 
Community Survey 5 Year Estimates, 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
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Road Home, the state’s response to damage 
caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita2, has 
been a major component of the disaster 
housing programs that garnered $11.5 
billion of the $13.3 billion in Community 
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery 
(CDBG-DR) funding from HUD3 (State of 
Louisiana, 2015b). According to Governor 
Blanco, Road Home was established to 
“help Louisiana residents get back into their 
homes or apartments as quickly and fairly 
as possible” (Louisiana Recovery Authority, 
2006). With grants of up to $150,000 to 
homeowners, New Orleanians would nally 
receive the assistance needed to rebuild 
their damaged homes. In partnership with 
the newly created Louisiana Recovery 
Authority, HUD signed o on the Road 
Home program as the mechanism to 
deliver much needed funding to distressed 
homeowners. The reliance on federal 
assistance was necessitated by the 
tremendous gaps created by the refusal 
of insurance companies to cover damage 
that was deemed to have been caused by 
ooding rather than wind. In other cases, 
homeowners were under- or uninsured 
(King, 2007; Buckley, Doroshow, Hamdan, & 
Hunter, 2006).
Unfortunately, Road Home was riddled with 
a number of challenges. Administrative 
execution of the program was slow and 
haphazard, eventually leading to the ring 
and replacement of the lead subcontractor 
of the program. Disbursement of funds was 
hindered by bureaucratic ineciencies 
creating nancial hardship for families 
waiting to rebuild (Finger, 2008). One 
troubling nding was that most Road 
Home grants were insucient. Even 
after receiving nancial assistance, many 
homeowners were still faced with major 
funding gaps making it impossible to 
complete work on their homes. By 2008, 
the average Road Home grant of $60,000 
meant a shortfall of nearly $50,000 for 
46.7% of applicants rebuilding in place 
(Rose, Clark, & Duval-Diop, 2008).
The shortfall of funding was a direct result 
of Road Home’s policy in determining 
how much funding homeowners could 
receive. The formula was based on the 
pre-Katrina assessed value of the home 
or the actual cost to repair the home – 
whichever amount was less. For example, 
a home valued at $70,000 with $90,000 
of home rebuilding costs would only 
receive $70,000 thus creating a $20,000 
shortage. This policy created an even more 
deleterious eect for African American 
communities dealing with the nationwide 
trend of depressed market value attributed 
Neighborhood Impact of the 
Road Home Program
New Orleans East, a 
predominantly African American, 
middle-class neighborhood 
is about eight miles east of 
Lakeview, a neighborhood with 
a majority of White households. 
In New Orleans East and 
Lakeview, pre-storm home values 
averaged $146,216 and $336,064, 
respectively. Average home 
damage estimates were $224,303 
in New Orleans East and $281,537 
in Lakeview. In 2008, the average 
Road Home grant for the 13,908 
applicants in New Orleans East 
was $69,196 while 4,735 Lakeview 
applicants received an average of 
$109,777. This created an average 
funding gap of $69,196 for New 
Orleans East applicants compared 
to a $44,405 gap for Lakeview 
applicants. (Rose, Clark, & Duval-
Diop, 2008).
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to homes located in predominantly Black 
neighborhoods. PolicyLink (2007) found that 
African American households had an almost 
35% higher shortfall than White households. 
A neighborhood-by-neighborhood analysis 
showed that in predominantly Black areas 
such as New Orleans East and the Lower 
9th ward, 60% of homeowners ended up 
with average gaps of $65,000 and $68,000 
respectively (Duval-Diop, 2009).
It could be argued that housing inequities 
were being further exacerbated by Road 
Home’s policies and racial preferences. 
In 2008, HUD and LRA were sued for the 
disparate outcomes of Road Home in a 
class action lawsuit led by several African 
American homeowners, the Greater 
New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, 
the  NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, and the National Fair Housing Alliance. 
The suit was settled six years after the 
storm in 2011 with remedies that included 
amending grant formulas to provide 
full relief to over 13,000 homeowners. 
Over 45,000 low and moderate-income 
homeowners across the state received 
supplemental grants based on damage 
costs rather than home values and one 
year extensions to occupy the homes were 
granted to homeowners whose original 
grants were based on pre-storm market 
value (NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 2011). 
To date, over $2 billion has been provided 
through Additional Compensation Grants 
(State of Louisiana, Oce of Community 
Development, 2015).
LRA’s failure to apply principles of equity 
and utilize actual renovation costs as a 
basis for funding from the start resulted in a 
delayed recovery process. In the meantime, 
lower- and middle-income families were 
indenitely displaced or were forced to 
sell rather than rebuild due to delayed 
and insucient funding. Slowly getting 
the program on par came at the expense 
of tax dollars being spent on building and 
maintaining temporary housing units 
(“FEMA trailers”) or completely losing 
families—mostly Black families—to other 
cities and states. In addition to African 
American neighborhoods being disparately 
impacted by the government’s policies 
and processes, government ineciencies 
led to millions of wasted federal tax dollars 
and lost tax revenue for the city. As recent 
as 2014, LRA was continuing to implement 
new measures to deal with issues related 
to applicant compliance and recovery of 
grant dollars from homeowners due to non-
compliance (Road Home, 2014).
Aordable Housing 
High poverty rates, low wages, a 
preponderance of single-parent households, 
and high unemployment in New Orleans 
created the need for substantial aordable 
housing units in the city prior to Katrina 
where 42% of tenant households and over 
25% of homeowners were excessively 
burdened (according to HUD standards) 
by paying 30% or more of their income 
towards gross rent and/or housing costs 
(U.S Census, 2000).  This amount of burden 
demonstrated that aordable housing was 
extremely insucient before Katrina. 
Hurricane Katrina worsened the aordable 
housing situation for the city of New Orleans 
with severe damage to over 51,000 units 
(PolicyLink, 2007). The shortage of rental 
housing—market-rate or aordable—
placed a premium on livable units resulting 
in median gross rents soaring from $488 right 
before Katrina to the current median gross 
rent of $926. Of the housing units damaged 
or lost due to the hurricane, 37,790 of these 
units fell in a price range ocially considered 
aordable for low-income residents (less 
than 30% of household income). 
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Expediency and strategy were required in 
order to bring residents, including lower-
income New Orleanians, back to the city. The 
primary aordable housing providers—the 
Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), 
the Louisiana Housing Corporation (which 
had been preceded by the Louisiana Housing 
Finance Authority), state and city-sponsored 
aordable homeownership programs, state 
and city-based tax incentives for private 
developers, and non-prot community 
development corporations—would have 
to thoughtfully address aordable housing 
gaps that were now deeper than before 
Katrina.
Rehabilitation Aid for Small 
Rental Properties  
One of the state’s responses to the aordable 
rental housing crisis was the Small Rental 
program launched in January 2007 and 
administered through the Louisiana 
Recovery Authority’s Road Home program. 
To date, LRA has allocated $649 million of 
the $11.5 billion Community Development 
Block Grant (for housing programs) towards 
rental housing for extremely low- and very-
low-income people (State of Louisiana, 
2015b). The intent of the program was to 
provide forgivable loans to landlords of 
one to four-unit properties in the hardest 
hit neighborhoods. Landlords had to agree 
that rents would be capped for the next 10 
years. In doing so, aordable rental units 
would be made available to residents. 
However, policy became a barrier for 
substantial progress being made during the 
initial phases. The program operated on a 
reimbursement basis with the expectation 
that landlords would front the money 
for repairs and then get compensated for 
expenditures up to $72,000 per unit. This 
policy initially delayed the replenishment 
of aordable units because many landlords 
did not have the resources to obtain 
upfront capital. Revisiting the policy, LRA 
decided to provide gap nancing to eligible 
landlords. As of 2015, incentives for 6,169 
small rental loans have been committed 
including 5,407 aordable rental units 
available in New Orleans. Just over $295 
million of Community Development Block 
Grant Disaster Recovery Funds have been 
committed specically in New Orleans 
(Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2015). 
Public Housing
Prior to August 2005, HANO reported 
5,146 households living in public housing 
apartments. Currently, the city has a total 
count of 1,976 public housing units (HANO 
Fact sheet, 2015). The reduction in available 
units may have been more related to the 
timing of the storm rather than the storm 
itself. Katrina hit New Orleans during an 
era of nationwide redevelopment via the 
HUD-sponsored HOPE VI program launched 
in 1992. By 2005, HOPE VI had already 
transformed over 200 major housing 
developments in cities across the nation, 
including Chicago and Washington, DC as 
well as the Desire, St. Thomas, and Fischer 
housing developments in New Orleans.4 
HOPE VI was the federal government’s 
solution to deconcentrate poverty whereby 
public-private partnerships leveraged 
funding to physically and socially alter 
public housing sites into mixed-income 
developments. Housing middle-class 
residents along with a substantially 
smaller subsidized tenant population in 
newly redeveloped sites was intended 
for new, higher-income individuals to 
model behavior that would encourage 
government-subsidized residents to adopt 
mainstream values such as self-suciency 
(Owens, 2012). However, HOPE VI bore with 
it some controversy, namely the failure to 
replace units on a one-on-one basis and 
allow all former residents to return upon 
completion of the new developments. This 
created the permanent displacement of 
State of Black New Orleans149
poor, Black residents with what appeared 
to be government-sanctioned gentrication 
(Lees, 2008; Hackworth & Smith, 2001). 
The four housing developments—C.J. Peete, 
St. Bernard, Latte and B.W. Cooper—that 
were slated for redevelopment (using the 
HOPE VI mixed-income model)5 survived 
the storm. This fueled protest against HUD 
and HANO’s plan to demolish the buildings.6 
Redevelopment opponents pointed to the 
increased demand for aordable housing 
sparked by Katrina as rationale to merely 
renovate the developments, which could 
have housed more low-income households 
more quickly and more aordably than if they 
were razed and redeveloped. Protesters also 
made accusations of racism as the buildings 
had been occupied by Black families who 
faced permanent displacement.7 The 
city cited unlivable conditions and an 
estimated $1 billion renovation cost as 
major impediments to renovate rather than 
redevelop (HANO, 2015). The New Orleans 
City Council unanimously voted in favor of 
demolition, resulting in 3,170 fewer public 
housing units in New Orleans. Mitigation 
for residents displaced by redevelopment 
included HANO’s issuance of 2,987 tenant-
protection vouchers.
Under President Obama’s Administration, 
HOPE VI was modied into the HUD Choice 
Neighborhood Initiative, which requires 
one-to-one replacement of public housing 
units along with comprehensive services for 
subsidized residents. HANO was awarded 
a HUD Choice grant and is currently 
transforming the Iberville public housing 
site into a mixed-income community, which 
upon completion will bring the city’s total 
to 2,748 public housing units. However, 
completion is not expected until 2017 and 
HANO’s leadership has raised questions 
about the agency’s capacity to deliver as 
originally planned. 8
Since Katrina, the displacement of poorer 
households by redevelopment eorts and 
Hurricane Katrina more than doubled the 
demand for the Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher Program, which provides housing 
assistance to enable low-income families 
to rent from private landlords. HANO 
has responded to demand via scattered 
site public housing and the inclusion of 
aordable units (in addition to public 
housing units) in a number of housing 
developments.9  As an indication of the 
compelling need for aordable housing, 
consider that 17,800 families receive Section 
8 vouchers and 20,000 families are currently 
on the waiting list (HANO, 2015).
Aordable Rentals Via Tax Credits
In addition to mixed-income developments 
resulting from the redevelopment of 
public housing, mixed-income housing is 
also made possible by private developers 
incentivized by public support in the form 
of tax credits. Investors have been building 
and rehabilitating multi-unit developments 
in areas such as the Tulane Avenue corridor, 
where aordable units funded by Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) funds 
comprise at least 30% of these newer 
developments. LIHTC is an indirect federal 
subsidy administered through the state-
run Louisiana Housing Corporation (LHC). 
Aordable units are delivered through 
partnerships with private developers, non-
prot organizations and public agencies. 
As enforced by the IRS, LIHTC units in these 
developments must remain aordable for 
15 years. This timeframe can extend to a 
total of 30 years dependent upon continued 
enforcement by the city and state. 
Despite a slow start, the production of 
aordable units made possible through 
LIHTC’s did increase in response to 
Katrina, resulting in a total of 10,187 
aordable tax credit units.10  LIHTC units 
could have been made available sooner, 
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but several issues delayed or disrupted 
development. A number of neighborhood 
coalitions, driven by NIMBY-ism,11 made 
it dicult for developers to come into 
their communities. Another barrier was 
the rising cost of insurance for apartment 
buildings, particularly right after Katrina. 
With higher insurance costs, opportunities 
to build equity and ensure profitability 
were diminished. Furthermore, the Great 
Recession12 further hampered progress 
as stricter underwriting laws came into 
effect. LIHTC production was eventually 
aided by an allocation of $595 million 
in CDBG/Piggyback funds, which saved 
a number of developments under 
construction facing additional loan 
restrictions and scrutiny. As of May 2015, 
all but $272,000 of the CDBG/Piggyback 
fund had been obligated to the LIHTC 
program (State of Louisiana, 2015; Rose, 
Clark, & Duval-Diop, 2008; Schrayer, 2007). 
The Impact of Mixed-Income 
Housing
To date, the combined eorts of public-
private partnerships have created a modest 
dent when considering the overall housing 
aordability needs of low-income residents. 
Even with eorts such as the Greater 
New Orleans Foundation’s Community 
Revitalization Fund that supported the 
development of 9,500 aordable housing 
units, aordable housing continues to be in 
great need.
While the aordable housing situation 
continues to be addressed, there is 
concern about where poorer families are 
being housed and for how long. Under 
certain conditions, developers are able 
to opt out of the LIHTC program in 15 
years. This means that aordable housing 
units put in service beginning in 2010 
could be drastically reduced by 2025 with 
subsequent conversions from aordable 
to market-rate units in the years thereafter, 
thus creating waves of aordable housing 
unit shortages. Moreover, the eects of 
NIMBYism and housing discrimination by 
Section 8 landlords are pushing lower-
income residents into certain pockets 
of neighborhoods, reinforcing racial 
segregation and creating new areas of 
concentrated poverty.13
Aordable Homeownership
As an indication of housing cost burden, 26% 
of homeowners were paying 30% or more 
of their income towards home ownership 
costs in 2000. In 2013, 43.9% were paying 
more than 30% towards owner costs (e.g., 
mortgage, insurance, taxes, utilities, etc.), 
however, in 2013, there were 17,414 fewer 
owner occupied units than in 2000. In 
raw numbers, the number of “burdened” 
households has increased by over 600 
families when compared to 2000 rates 
despite lower population numbers.  One 
explanation for the increase in burdened 
households is the rising cost to buy homes. 
The average purchase price in May 2015 
was $347,212 compared to $253,502 in 
May 2005 based on information from 
the Gulf South Real Estate Information 
Network. Other explanations are tied to 
institutionalized trends and market forces 
(discussed in next section).
While the rate of owner-occupied units has 
remained steady when comparing 2000 
to 2013 (46.5% vs 47.3%), there were over 
17,000 fewer owner occupied units by 2013. 
Still, the fact that owner occupancy is on par 
with previous rates despite the substantial 
displacement of previous homeowners is 
commendable and largely attributed to the 
collective eorts of government agencies, 
funders, volunteers, and organizations 
that have supported aordable housing 
programs and clean-up campaigns. Their 
eorts have helped neighborhoods recover 
and have made homeownership possible 
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for lower- and middle-income families. 
Eorts include the Crescent City Community 
Land Trust, which committed to providing 
1,000 aordable housing units by 2024; 
Make it Right has built 150 homes averaging 
$150,000; NORA’s administration of the HUD 
Neighborhood Stabilization program has 
delivered 236 aordable homes; the New 
Orleans Area Habitat for Humanity helped 
over 3,200 families since 2006 by building 
500 homes and gutting 2,400 buildings; 
HANO has placed 340 rst-time buyers into 
homes; and the City of New Orleans and 
the Louisiana Housing Corporation have 
administered funds for homeownership 
programs including rst time buyer and soft 
second programs, which received $120.9 
million of CDBG-DR funds (Greater New 
Orleans Foundation, 2015; HANO, 2015; Make 
it Right, 2015; New Orleans Area Habitat for 
Humanity, 2015; State of Louisiana, 2015; 
NORA, 2013).  Although these eorts are 
laudable, there is still much work to be done 
if New Orleans’ homeownership rates are to 
compete with those of Louisiana and the 
U.S.—which are 19.7 and 17.6 percentage 
points higher, respectively— and  with 
a majority African American population, 
increasing homeownership may prove to be 
a challenge.
Challenges to Homeownership
Current homeownership rates in New 
Orleans are consistent with Pre-Katrina 
rates at about 46%, which is 17% lower 
than national homeownership rates. 
African American homeownership in 
New Orleans is more consistent with the 
national African American homeownership 
rate of 43.2%, however, New Orleans 
falls short in comparison to other 
predominantly Black cities such as Mobile, 
AL; Memphis, TN; and Virginia Beach, VA 
where Black homeownership is at least 
48%. When examining predominantly 
Black neighborhoods in New Orleans prior 
to Katrina, higher than average African 
American homeownership rates were 
found in The Lower Ninth Ward (54%), 
New Orleans East (55%) and Gentilly 
(72% homeownership rate). Post-Katrina 
homeownership for African Americans 
have fallen in these neighborhoods mostly 
due to lack of ood and hazard insurance, 
compounded by delays, ineciencies, and 
inequitable distribution of Road Home 
funding (Washington, Smedley, Alvarez, & 
Reese, 2006). 
The African American homeownership rate 
is largely attributable to discriminatory 
practices that have always existed in the real 
estate and mortgage industries, and recent 
market forces have added complications. 
The Great Recession brought with it 
foreclosures and tighter loan restrictions 
that have thwarted homeownership rates 
for families of all racial backgrounds. Upon 
factoring in predatory lending and other 
discriminatory loan practices in minority 
communities, the disparate impact on 
families of color is signicant. Still today, 
the threat of foreclosure looms over many 
African American households in New 
Orleans and FHA foreclosed properties 
in Black neighborhoods are more likely 
to be neglected than those in white 
neighborhoods, consequently bringing 
down home values in African American 
neighborhoods. According to the Greater 
New Orleans Fair Housing Center, between 
2008 and 2010, African Americans held 
more high-yearly-percentage-rate home 
loans than whites, meaning that because 
they were paying o interest rather than 
principal, building equity was occurring at a 
much slower pace (Buchanan, 2015). 
Additional ndings that explain challenges 
to homeownership for African American 
households include the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition’s 2008 reporting 
that African Americans were 2.59 times 
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more likely to receive high cost home loans 
when compared to whites immediately 
following Katrina in 2006. Forty-one percent 
of all home loans received by African 
Americans were high cost, compared to 
just 16% of loans received by whites. Also, 
African Americans were nearly twice more 
likely to be denied loans than whites. In 
2010, the Louisiana Oce of Community 
Development conveyed that the home 
loan denial rate for Whites was 20.7%, for 
African Americans 37.9%, and for Hispanics 
26.8% (Buchanan, 2015; Louisiana Oce of 
Community Development, 2010).
Herein lies one of the major equity issues 
further compromised by the hurricane, levee 
failures, and government recovery eorts. 
Threats to homeownership, particularly 
for racial minorities, means delaying the 
building of equity and generational wealth. 
The associated implications are far-reaching 
when considering how home equity can be 
leveraged to handle nancial emergencies 
or nance education, small business 
development, and other investments with 
potentially positive returns. In 2011, the 
median white household had $111,146 
in wealth holdings, compared to just 
$7,113 for the median Black household. 
Homeownership is key to addressing the 
racial wealth gap (Sullivan et al., 2015).
Progress toward Eliminating 
Residual Eects of Katrina
Blight reduction. Another major issue 
confronting New Orleans recovery has 
been urban decay— also known as blight. 
Already a problem that precipitated Katrina 
due to population decline, blight became 
a barrier to neighborhood recovery in 
that many homeowners were reluctant to 
rebuild in neighborhoods experiencing 
higher percentages of blighted properties 
such as in the Lower 9th ward. While pre-
storm blight gures are not available, it 
has been estimated that in 2010, the rate 
of blighted homes in New Orleans was 
25%, with approximately 43,755 blighted 
homes and empty lots coupled with 9,356 
vacant but habitable housing units (one 
of the highest rates of abandonment in 
the country) (Plyer et al., 2011). In many 
instances, blight resulted from Road Home 
funding shortages, denied insurance claims, 
and contractor fraud. In essence, blight 
disparately impacted African American 
neighborhoods where there was the most 
damage and the widest funding gaps 
(Southern United Neighborhoods, 2013).
Peter Yaukey, geography professor at UNO, 
estimates blight reduction at a range of 
10,328 to 14,591 units between 2010 and 
2013 –an indication that Mayor Landrieu’s 
blight reduction goal of 10,000 units was 
met. The city credits blight reduction to 
code enforcement, aggressive demolition 
policies, and a soft second nance program 
that tacked both blight and the aordable 
housing issue. Another blight reduction 
strategy has been the Lot Next Door program 
(LND) administered by the New Orleans 
Redevelopment Authority (NORA). Through 
this program, homeowners were able to 
purchase adjacent vacant properties that 
were part of the 5,000 properties acquired 
by the state through the Road Home 
program 14. At least 1,300 homeowners have 
participated in LND and NORA is continuing 
to oer properties through this program 
(City of New Orleans, 2014a; NORA, 2014; 
Yaukey, Knaggs, & Wise, 2013).
Housing for homeless individuals and 
families. Homelessness in New Orleans was 
certainly worsened by Hurricane Katrina. 
Before Katrina, only 2,051 people lived in 
literal homelessness on any given night. In 
2007, the homeless population surged to 
11,619 homeless people. UNITY of Greater 
New Orleans—a nonprot organization that 
leads a collaborative eort of 60 agencies 
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helping individuals who are homeless or at 
risk of being homeless—determined the 
2014 homeless population to be at 1,981 
people, 3% less than pre-Katrina.15 This 
count is 15% less than the previous year and 
83% less than 2007 (City of New Orleans, 
2014b). Steady declines in the homeless 
population from 2007 to 2014 have been 
attributed to the combined eorts of 
the city’s Homelessness Prevention and 
Rapid Rehousing Program funded with 
federal dollars and the UNITY homeless 
collaborative. UNITY doubled the amount of 
clients initially served in 2004, leased private 
rentals, and reunited homeless individuals 
with their families. UNITY also surpassed 
HUD’s national requirement to permanently 
house at least 65% of transitional clients 
by nding permanent homes for 90% of 
clients in transitional housing programs. 
Even more recent developments include the 
abolishment of homelessness for veterans 
(National Alliance to End Homelessness, 
2015; Unity of Greater New Orleans, 2012; 
City of New Orleans, 2015).
Did Katrina Spur Gentrication?
Anxiety around the idea of New Orleans 
becoming more and more gentried has 
been expressed by long-time residents 
since the beginning of initial planning talks. 
Apprehension may have been well founded 
given commentary from city ocials and 
scholars. For example, Jimmy Reiss, the chair 
of the Regional Transit Authority for New 
Orleans, asserted that Katrina had changed 
New Orleans for the better if low income 
African Americans were not able to return; 
conclusions by over 200 social scientists 
indicated that the displacement of low-
income residents presented the opportunity 
to deconcentrate poverty (Ehrenfeucht & 
Nelson, 2011). 
While housing practitioners debate 
whether gentrication is an issue, an 
observation of redevelopment activity 
and soaring housing costs suggest that 
conditions for gentrication exist. Using 
the denition provided by Neil Smith, a 
preeminent geographer and scholar on 
the topic of gentrication, conditions for 
gentrication include the inux of private 
capital, homeowners, and renters as a 
means to refurbish poor neighborhoods 
(Smith, 1996). In the instance of post-
Katrina recovery, it can be argued that 
both private and public capital has been 
poured into the redevelopment of lower-
income neighborhoods, particularly in 
areas where public housing developments 
have been replaced with mixed-income 
developments, bringing in higher-
income individuals as new renters and 
homeowners (Owens, 2012). Private 
and public redevelopment dollars have 
also contributed to improvements in 
several corridors bringing about more 
restaurants, retail hubs, and mixed-use 
developments. CDBG-DR dollars have 
contributed to redevelopment efforts 
with funding coming from an economic 
development allocation of over $317 
million and/or from the nearly $1.4 billion 
dedicated to infrastructure programs 
(State of Louisiana, 2015b). 
What is obvious to long-time residents 
is the influx of White transplants 
(Campanella, 2013), particularly into 
neighborhoods that are becoming less 
black, such as Central City, Mid City, and 
St. Roch. Neighborhood change is also 
prevalent along the Mississippi River 
where Bywater, Marigny, the Lower 
Garden District, St. Thomas, the Irish 
Channel, and East Riverside have all 
statistically become Whiter (see Table 2). 
Displacement in favor of mixed income 
development, neighborhood composition 
changing from one race to another, and 
huge capital investment clearly point to 
neighborhoods in the process of being 
gentrified.
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Conclusion: Equity in the 
Rebuilding Process
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, African 
Americans comprised 67% of the 
population with one-third of those 
individuals living under the poverty line 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Blacks were 
overrepresented as residents of public 
housing and affordable housing units. The 
economic status and housing patterns 
of New Orleanian Blacks is what made 
them more vulnerable to Hurricane 
Katrina, thus making their post-disaster 
experience quite different from more 
affluent populations (Fothergill & Peek, 
2004; Bolin, 1998). Similar to policy-
backed housing patterns in other urban 
areas across the U.S., African American 
New Orleanians resided in multi-
family dwellings, in homes with weak 
infrastructures, in racially segregated 
sections of town, and in poor land-use 
areas (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004). 
These conditions made it possible for 
Katrina to uproot a disproportionate 
number of Black people, causing the 
involuntary displacement of mostlyBlack 
communities (Rivera & Miller, 2007). In 
essence, Katrina intensified the racial 
inequities that had predicated her arrival. 
A number of scholars (Biles, 2000; Hirsch, 
2000; Radford, 2000; Wilson, 1987) make it 
clear that residential segregation patterns 
are deliberate outcomes of housing policies 
and programs, including government 
subsidies for White ight to suburbs, 
redlining, and restrictive covenants. African 
Americans were further disadvantaged by 
sections of the Federal Housing Acts of 1949 
and 1954 that “cleared slums” to embark 
upon urban renewal projects that, more 
often than not, were private development 
projects that resulted in the displacement 
of Blacks and rehousing of Blacks into public 
housing developments and neighborhoods 
plagued with concentrated poverty (Biles, 
2000; Hirsch, 2000). In total, these policies 
helped to crystallize racially segregated 
ghettos (Hirsch, 1998), subjecting African 
Americans to substandard land such as the 
case in New Orleans.
With respect to post-Katrina recovery, the 
state employed a number of tactics that 
placed African American neighborhoods 
at a disadvantage to recover as quickly 
as other neighborhoods. The demolition 
of four public housing developments 
and displacement of poor residents, the 
establishment of uninformed policies to 
govern distribution of government recovery 
dollars, and slow decision-making were 
crucial deterrents to recovery for all New 
Orleanians and particularly for African 
Americans. While unintended, the policy 
implications of initial recovery eorts have 
been reminiscent of slum clearance, urban 
renewal, and institutionalized racism. 
Essentially, when new policies are created 
without regard to preexisting disparate 
conditions, they are ineective for intended 
minority groups, create more advantages 
for Whites, or create further harm to non-
Whites. In the case of post-Katrina New 
Orleans, leveling the playing eld for African 
American households may have been an 
unrealistic goal, however, the dire housing 
situation in New Orleans presented the 
city with the opportunity to design and 
build stronger communities, ensuring less 
exposure to future natural disaster. Ideally, 
housing recovery would also present an 
opportunity to ensure equity while restoring 
both Black and White neighborhoods. 
Future housing recovery plans are 
encouraging. A group of concerned citizens 
and housing advocates are currently 
positioning New Orleanians for long-term 
development including plans for recovery 
should the city face another catastrophic 
disaster. HousingNola was launched in 2014 
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as a result of the Foundation for Louisiana’s 
convening of a working group of 
community residents, housing advocates, 
for-profit and non-profit developers, and 
representatives of elected officials and 
city agencies. The Greater New Orleans 
Housing Alliance (GNOHA) serves as 
the lead agency of the coalition, which 
also includes the Urban League of 
Greater New Orleans and the Greater 
New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center. 
Collaborative efforts will produce a 
10-year comprehensive housing plan, 
funded by the Foundation for Louisiana 
and a number of partners including the 
City of New Orleans and the Greater New 
Orleans Foundation.  Of most importance 
is HousingNola’s commitment towards 
equitable results undergirded by goals 
that include preventing displacement, 
promoting fair housing, encouraging 
sustainable design, improving quality 
of life in neighborhoods, and increasing 
accessibility for all residents, including 
special needs residents (HousingNola, 
2015). The HousingNola plan intends to 
address permanent affordable housing, 
which is not fully addressed in the city’s 
current master plan. The impact of 
HousingNola is dependent upon city 
leadership and is sure to be an important 
resource as housing recovery continues 
to be evaluated.
Data-based evaluation will continue to 
play a critical role in Katrina recovery 
efforts. Policy analysts, academicians, 
think tanks such as PolicyLink and the 
Brookings Institution, in addition to The 
Data Center (formerly the Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center) have 
been instrumental in providing statistics, 
highlighting progress, exposing inequity, 
demonstrating the impact of policies 
and programs, and reporting important 
findings through data analyses. The level 
of transparency that these individuals 
and organizations have created ensures 
that agencies remain accountable and 
provide a clear picture of what still needs 
to be done. 
Consistent with the saying that “hindsight 
is 20-20,” it is recognized that Hurricane 
Katrina and its aftermath presented 
numerous unforeseen challenges, and 
many responses resulted from creating a 
recovery playbook in the process of trying 
to recover. The incapacity to administer 
recovery programs using fair and equitable 
practices may speak to a larger issue, not 
just in New Orleans but across the nation. 
Allowing policies and programs to be 
developed without considering historical 
and institutional biases has and will 
continue to place traditionally marginalized 
groups in vulnerable positions. Post-Katrina 
recovery eorts provide many lessons for 
cities and states that will have to respond 
to disaster-related neighborhood damage. 
In the same manner that environmental 
impact assessments are utilized to predict 
program and policy outcomes, cities and 
states will need to consider the social and 
racial implications of policy decisions and 
recovery processes. Taking the time to 
gauge overall equity and eectiveness 
prior to implementation not only ensures 
fairness but also saves long-term costs 
associated with lost wages, lost tax revenue, 
mismanagement, litigation, duplication of 
eorts, etc.
Having had this experience means that the 
city of New Orleans now has the playbook 
to ensure that in the event of future 
catastrophes, every eort will be made to 
make sure that the city fully and equitably 
recovers, and we will all be able to provide a 
resounding “Yes!” if ever asked the question, 
“Is New Orleans back?”
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Endnotes
1Count does not take into consideration the number 
of housing units that were still uninhabitable. Because 
the Census Bureau denes housing units as long 
as they are not open means that many boarded up 
houses are in the census count. Examining the number 
of vacant units is therefore important in determining 
available housing stock.
 2Hurricane Rita hit coastal Louisiana three weeks after 
Hurricane Katrina.
 3CDBG-DR funding also supported infrastructure 
programs, economic development initiatives, planning 
and technical assistance, and administrative costs.
 4HOPE VI awards to the Housing Authority of New 
Orleans occurred in 1994, 1996, and 2003
 5HANO received a $20 million HOPE VI grant for 
redevelopment of C.J. Peete.
 6HANO was under HUD receivership at the time due 
to operational challenges, mismanagement, and poor 
housing conditions.
 7See http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2007/12/
city_hall_girds_for_public_hou.html
 8See http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/
blog/2015/02/16/top-construction-projects-8-
iberville-redevelopment-2/ and http://nextcity.org/
features/view/10-years-after-katrina-new-orleans-
public-housing-still-in-limbo-iberville
 9These are aordable units in addition to public 
housing units. The LIHTC program, which provides 
tax-based incentives to developers, is one of the 
mechanisms used to create aordable rental housing.
 10Number includes units in service and units in 
development. Veried by LHC administrator via email, 
July 2015.
 11NIMBY is the acronym for Not In My Backyard 
and describes the rationale for protest of proposed 
development that existing residents believe will create 
undesired eects
 12 The economic downturn between the years 
2007-2009 precipitated by disproportionately high 
foreclosure rates
 13 See http://www.gnofairhousing.org/2009/09/16/
housing-choice-in-crisis/
 14 5,221 homeowners opted not to rebuild and sold 
their properties to the state via the Road Home 
program. 
  15According to UNITY’s point-in-time count 
conducted March 31, 2014 for Orleans and Jeerson 
parishes.
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We all thought New Orleans would never be 
the same after Hurricane Katrina ravaged it 
beyond one’s imagination.  Nor would the 
lives of thousands ever be the same. Homes 
were destroyed by wind and floodwaters. 
Jobs disappeared, medical services and 
schools were crippled and in some areas non-
existent.  Family and neighborhood networks 
and churches, the bedrock in many areas, 
were gone as people fled to safe ground, 
some to cities all over the United States.  The 
homes of three of my children and I were 
uninhabitable.  Ten years later, we have 
recovered.
My family’s losses were devastating to us, but 
they cannot be compared with the financial 
loss and emotional trauma that thousands 
of New Orleanians had to live through. 
Everyone who was affected by Katrina 
has their own story.  However at this 10 
anniversary of the disaster, I have chosen to 
recall the thousands of people who came to 
our aid, unsolicited, to help in so many ways 
that seemed miniscule in the whole scheme 
of the tragedy but meant a lot to the victims 
they helped.   Aid came from good people 
from around the globe, from individuals and 
diverse organizations, from church groups, 
and  college students in the months and 
years after Katrina to lend their time, their 
hands and talents and their treasure.
I cite just two examples of the help that 
came.  A group of college students from 
the northeast came during their Christmas 
vacation, secured free paint, and painted 
every room from ceiling to floor in a public 
school.  
Katrina victims who had no place to go 
nor the means to get away from their 
flooded homes and neighborhoods went 
to inadequate public shelters. They suffered 
pain and humiliation beyond description, 
and from which they were transported to 
cities all over the country.  Families in some 
of the cities opened their homes to the 
victims who were virtual strangers to them 
and allowed them to live there until they 
could figure out a plan of recovery.
Many opened their wallets over and over. 
Some made the journey over and over to 
help in ways that not only assisted in victim 
recovery, but lifted their spirits when their 
faith was at its lowest.  I am sure there are 
more stories that should be recorded about 
the generosity of others during this horrific 
disaster.  It is this generosity of care and 
giving that has sustained my faith in the 
goodness of human beings.
Sybil H. Morial
Educator and wife of the late 
New Orleans mayor, Dutch Morial
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I continue to see our beloved city like many 
other natives as we deem it the “Tale of Two 
or maybe Three Cities.” A recent local news 
article (Times Picayune) on August 2, 2015 
describes New Orleans economic expansion 
and job growth as strong, but wages and 
education funding lagging. New Orleans is a 
very different place  10  years post the storms. 
Because I was born, raised and educated 
here, I can really feel and see the difference. 
I believe we are even more segregated than 
before as a community in spite of all the 
great efforts to bring about a so-called “one 
voice.”  There are many Black churches still 
trying their best to be restored. Many Black 
pastors and leaders along with many Black 
citizens never returned and there is very 
little discussion or strategic efforts to aid in 
their return that I am aware of since August 
2005.  In my humble opinion, I believe the 
biggest crisis in the Black community (and 
maybe the White community) is one of 
effective, credible leadership at many tiers 
(religiously, politically, civically, socially etc). 
It’s one of the reasons I offered myself to run 
for the mayor’s seat in 2006. I thought and 
still believe that the profile of an effective 
city leader should be (but not limited to) a 
very spiritually grounded, governmentally 
experienced and militarily and culturally 
conscious individual considering the “times” 
in which we live.  
In the midst of all of the basic challenges 
to return to New Orleans after hurricane 
Katrina, our church doors reopened with 
worship services on the first Sunday in 
November 2005 with full participation from 
so many worshippers who had no place to 
have church services. This reopening was 
under the leadership of Rev. Pat Watson, 
who now serves as the Executive Pastor of 
Watson Memorial Teaching Ministries and 
CEO of the Family Center of Hope Social 
and Educational agency. I returned to our 
city on the first Sunday in January 2006 and 
we have been non stop since that time with 
rebuilding, restoring and making ongoing 
contributions to our beloved community. 
I hope and pray that our city will move 
forward over the next ten years with some 
since of “equity” so that we don’t leave so 
many others behind.  Our goal for the next 
10 years is to hold hands with partners 
throughout this region and beyond as 
we train and pave the way for the “next 
generation.” We want to ensure to the best 
of our ability that the next generation is a 
lot better off than this one. Last but certainly 
not least, I hope that the people of God 
in this city and nation would continue to 
seek His divine direction as we march on ‘til 
victory is won!
Pastor Tom Watson
Senior Pastor 
Watson Memorial Teaching Ministries
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2015 New Orleans is much more affluent, 
much more white, much more brown and far 
less black.   Traditional black neighborhoods 
such as Central City, the Lower Ninth Ward 
and many other parts of uptown are being 
gentrified at a rocket pace.  While the 
population numbers have risen to those 
similar to pre-Katrina, those numbers reflect 
new residents and the number of displaced 
natives who are unable to return home is 
alarming.  Housing prices and escalating 
rent are forcing native residents out of 
neighborhoods that their families have 
populated for generations.
The one glaring fact about New Orleans that 
has not changed is the economic disparity 
between Blacks and Whites.  Billions of 
dollars have been spent in rebuilding and 
reconstruction but very few Black New 
Orleanians have participated in capacities 
other than laborers.  Atlanta created a 
black middle class with the construction 
of its airport and we had a much bigger 
opportunity to create black wealth here. 
Unfortunately, to-date, we have failed 
miserably.  
The population will most certainly benefit 
from the construction of the new schools, 
drainage, infrastructure systems, hospitals 
and transportation systems, but those 
benefits would have still been realized 
if there had been significant minority 
participation in making some of the billions 
spent.
Our people, food, culture and way of life 
make New Orleans a wonderful place to 
live, but erasing the economic disparity 
would only make it better.  I would never 
want another Katrina, but I sure would like 
another chance to fix this and truly build 
back stronger and more equitably for all 
New Orleanians
Jay H. Banks
King-elect 2016 and Recording Secretary, 
Zulu Social Aid & Pleasure Club; and 
Director of the School of Commerce, 
Dryades YMCA
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Whenever I think about post Katrina 
New Orleans, I reect on how racism 
was woven into the very fabric of Road 
Home  - Homeowner Assistance  Program 
distributions and how that negatively 
impacted the ability of too many black 
homeowners to restore their lives and 
property. 
The inclusion of pre-Katrina property values 
into the calculations for claims rather than 
the more equitable cost to rebuild meant that 
the more Black and poor the neighborhood 
was, the less money Road Home provided for 
a home’s repair, whereas similar size homes 
in more White and auent neighborhoods 
received the maximum... because real estate 
values in New Orleans are heavily weighed 
by race. Even middle class, recently turned 
Black neighborhoods like New Orleans East 
felt the discrimination as their pre-Katrina 
property values were a fraction of the value 
before the collapse of the oil business and 
White ight from what was a primarily White 
homeowner community before 1986.
Now, 10 years later, in the name of blight 
removal, land is being taken from people 
as a result of their inability to recover, as 
many are disgustingly self-righteous about 
people who didn’t renovate their property... 
since many have to remain away with no 
resources to keep up land that has lost 
almost all its value.
So once again, those that have are those 
that got and can now grab land that is 
a bargain because those who didn’t get 
couldn’t aord to keep it.
What bothers me is there are no media 
stories, no acknowledgment, no reparation 
for this inclusion of an easily identiable 
racial and demographic factor into a disaster 
relief program. Why property values? There 
were no loans, no need for collateral, no 
federal requirement, just an assumption that 
some homes deserved to be rebuilt more 
than others and the inclusion of property 
values insured that race and demographics 
would determine which. But actually we 
are talking about rebuilding lives and in the 
Road Home program it seems rebuilding 
Black lives just didn’t matter as much.
Lloyd Dennis
Executive Director
The Silverback Society
KATRINA REFLECTIONS
REBUILDING : BLACK LIV ES DIDN’ T M ATTER AS M UCH
LLOYD DENNIS
State of Black New Orleans165
During this decade of rebirth following 
Hurricane Katrina, one of the more 
remarkable transformations has been New 
Orleans’ K-12 education landscape. Prior 
to Hurricane Katrina, public education in 
New Orleans was experiencing its own 
mini-disaster. We had a school board that 
was completely dysfunctional, the system’s 
finances were a mess and worst of all 
children were not learning.
While significant education reforms were 
enacted just prior to Hurricane Katrina, it 
took this tragedy that claimed the lives of 
more than 1,000 Louisianans to force us to 
make changes that we all knew needed to 
be made. The things that held us back for 
so many years – politics, turf wars, and the 
desire by many to maintain the status quo 
– were washed away by Katrina. The disaster 
thrust upon stakeholders – parents, school 
boards, lawmakers, unions, and reform 
advocates – the urgency to come together 
to create an educational environment that 
would put children and families at the 
forefront.
What’s ahead in the next 10 years for 
education in New Orleans? We must look 
to parents, who are now more informed, 
empowered and engaged in the education 
of their children. They are saying loudly 
and unequivocally, “Don’t go back!” This 
is a window of opportunity, opened by 
Hurricane Katrina, that cannot be closed. 
During the recent NOLA PARENTS 
PERSPECTIVE: A Conversation About New 
Orleans Public Education 10 Years Post-
Katrina, I listened as parents demanded that 
our schools continue to improve. They all 
agreed that the we won’t reach the finish 
line until all choices are good choices; where 
every school is an excellent school, in every 
New Orleans neighborhood.
Ann Duplessis is president of the Louisiana 
Federation for Children and former state 
senator.
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My look back at Hurricane Katrina is one of 
death and dying, grieving and goodbyes as 
exemplified by the funeral of my mentor 
and the former Urban League of Greater 
New Orleans CEO, Clarence Lyle Barney. It 
was Saturday, August 27, 2005-- just two 
days before Katrina made landfall and the 
levees broke--when the Black community 
gathered at Dillard University Chapel to lay 
Barney to rest.
Ten years after ”the” cataclysmic storm 
ripped our community asunder, forever 
changing the city, the defining event which, 
to me, symbolizes the mournful leave-
taking of a people and their  way of life is the 
funeral of our good friend and leader.
For 30 years, he had been the stalwart 
president of the local affiliate of the Urban 
League. He was determined and committed, 
a daring trailblazer. With his feet planted 
firmly on the ground, Barney understood 
the challenges of the everyday New 
Orleanian. He was at ease in every sector of 
our community. Whether conferring with 
the well-heeled uptown establishment or 
with the regular men and women whose 
culture, hard work and spirit are woven 
together to create the very fabric of the city, 
he was comfortable; he was unapologetic 
and authentic. 
At this time— the 10th anniversary of 
Hurricane Katrina and 10 years after Barney’s 
death, I find myself asking over and again, 
“What would Clarence Barney think; what 
would he say about the state of our city 
now?” Interestingly enough, I need only 
to turn pages in The New Orleans Tribune 
to find the answers. You see, Barney had 
been a frequent Tribune contributor—
writing one of his last commentaries in 
the August 2002 edition of the paper, an 
issue emblazoned with the headline “Yell 
Fire”—a headline that he had animatedly 
suggested for that issue.
Facing the daunting reality that there was 
an effort afoot to take New Orleans back, 
to wrestle influence and political muscle 
from the Black leadership that had steered 
its course during the previous 24 years, in 
that article he contemplated what he saw, 
an African American community in dire 
trouble.
And as usual, Barney was right. In fact, 
anxiety and angst envelope me as I reread 
his column. With uncanny prescience, he 
laid out the steps the establishment would 
employ to take New Orleans back.
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He warned of the consequences Black 
New Orleans would face if it waited or 
did nothing or even worse—aided the 
establishment in their mission that he 
forewarned would:
“Proclaim that a certain group of citizens is 
morally, socially, culturally and intellectually 
superior and deserves to control New 
Orleans.”
Is this not exactly what happened when the 
“shadow government” met in the days and 
weeks after Katrina with their plans for green 
space in New Orleans East and the Ninth Ward 
and their plans for redeveloping public housing 
into mixed income dwellings that provide fewer 
options for the city’s poorest residents? 
“Organize a network of private, quasi-public 
and volunteer institutions and supply them 
with a core ideology and message.”
How long after Katrina were our public 
education system and neighborhood schools 
seized and subsequently turned over to 
outside management organizations? How 
long after Katrina before talk of privatizing 
our public recreation system began? 
“Identify Blacks to carry that message and 
put them in positions of power.”
 To be sure, sadness washes over me when I 
consider the number of our leaders who have 
either co-signed these disastrous ideologies 
and messages or those who have sat silently 
saying and doing nothing as our communities, 
our schools, and our neighborhoods are placed 
on a modern-day auction block and sold to the 
highest bidders.
I know Clarence Barney would be troubled 
by this New Orleans. It may be new and 
different…revitalized. But it isn’t right. With 
too many poor, mostly Black people still left 
out, left behind, locked out and stranded—
just as they were in those haunting days after 
Katrina—it could never be right. 
In the 30 years that The New Orleans Tribune 
has been in existence and particularly 
since Katrina, we at McKenna Publishing 
have taken seriously our mission to be an 
unfettered voice for the community. We 
remain undeterred in that mission. In so 
doing, we will strive to honor the legacy of 
our friend Clarence Barney. And personally, 
I, who served a term as vice chairman of 
the local Urban League board during his 
tenure, will challenge those who celebrate 
now to genuinely reimagine New Orleans as 
a city that refuses to leave anyone behind. 
Ours should be a richer city—not because 
we priced out and locked out the poor, but 
because we did everything in our power to 
eliminate the conditions that create poverty. 
Our city cannot be made stronger—truly 
stronger—by turning its back on the weak.
Yes, certain areas of the city have made 
progress since those precarious weeks and 
months immediately following the storm. And 
as we commemorate the 10th anniversary of 
Hurricane Katrina, those strides should be 
observed. But let’s not confuse progress for 
certain areas with success. 
As I look back to the 10 years since Katrina 
and then look to the future, I want a better 
New Orleans for all of our citizens—not just 
a different one.
Beverly Stanton McKenna
Publisher, The New Orleans Tribune
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IT HAS BEEN 10 YEARS SINCE 
HURRICANE KATRINA DEVASTATED NEW 
ORLEANS. SINCE THAT TIME, THERE HAVE 
BEEN UNPRECEDENTED CHANGES IN 
NEW ORLEANS AND ITS PEOPLE.
It has been 10 years since Hurricane Katrina 
devastated New Orleans. Since that time, there 
have been unprecedented changes in New 
Orleans and its people. 
The events of August 29, 2005 proved horric 
for the lives and neighborhoods of those unable 
to evacuate. At 4:30 a.m., leaks in the oodgates 
began ooding areas such as Pontchartrain Park. 
By 5:00 a.m., storm surges from the Mississippi 
River Gulf Outlet crumbled levee sections and 
the waters started seeping in toward St. Bernard 
Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward. At 6:30 a.m., 
storm surges pushed the water in the Industrial 
Canal over the levees and ooded all of New 
Orleans East, where large numbers of Black 
professionals and entrepreneurs resided. At 6:50 
a.m., the same surge began ooding the Lower 
Ninth Ward once more, as well as the mixed race 
Gentilly area and Pontchartrain Park, which had 
already ooded. Then the levee walls on the west 
side of the Industrial Canal failed, sending water 
cascading into New Orleans neighborhoods 
miles away including Treme. By the end of the 
day, 80% of the city was underwater. 
Those who study New Orleans without seeking 
its African and African-American inuences 
invariably miss what it means to know New 
Orleans. People of African descent – enslaved 
and free – willingly or unwillingly have been here 
since its earliest days. Between the years 1718 and 
1722, boatloads of Africans from the Senegambia 
region of Western Africa and outcasts from French 
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society arrived in New Orleans for forced toil in 
the Louisiana marshes. They hacked and drained 
swamps, constructed buildings and levees and 
dug canals. For the French indentures, the term 
was three years. For most of the African laborers, 
it was a life sentence. 
Even with the backdrop of Katrina, 2007 marked 
a sense of resiliency and renewal and heightened 
civic involvement. In Pontchartrain Park and 
Gentilly Woods, residents signaled their return 
with bright yellow ribbons wrapped around trees 
and mailboxes even as Katrina dust still hung in 
the air. In the Lower Ninth ward, volunteers from 
around the country cleaned a ood-ravaged 
Martin Luther King School that the school system 
had virtually abandoned. Neighborhood groups 
and civic associations raised their voices and 
confronted the powers that be over the state 
and future of their beloved city. As an old Creole 
proverb stated, “Little by little, the bird built its 
nest.” 
There are always fears about the suppression of 
New Orleans Black street culture. These consist 
of the parading groups, jazz funerals, brass 
bands and oshoots that give New Orleans its 
cultural vibrancy and worldwide appeal. Those 
cultural groupings oer many young people 
the opportunity for structure and recognition. 
During the week, they may be dockworkers, 
bricklayers, or truck drivers. During the parades 
and Mardi Gras related events, they are Chiefs, 
Grand Marshalls, Kings, Bandleaders and Flag 
Boys. Similar to the sentiment expressed by the 
Houma Indians, a group of Native Americans 
who settled in Dulac, Louisiana after their land 
was appropriated, “Salvation Culture” is the same 
concept in play in New Orleans. The expressions 
that appear to be being suppressed in the city 
are beautiful and revered around the world. Louis 
Armstrong and Mahalia Jackson came from those 
traditions. 
The streets of New Orleans and its on-beat music, 
cultures, and traditions provide a cultural safety 
net.  So, even though systems and social forces 
may line up against Black youth, the cultural 
expressions provide self-esteem and purpose 
beyond what could be found in mainstream 
society. In many ways, this psychological safety 
net existed in the olden days of Congo Square 
where Africans would gather on Sundays and 
play their drums and perform ancient rituals that, 
for a few hours, shrouded every Sunday from the 
reality of their weekdays. And it still exists today 
in the traditions of the brass bands, social and 
pleasure clubs, and Mardi Gras Indians.
These cultural expressions are transmitters of 
New Orleans cultural history. The practitioners 
are cultural preservationists that hold tightly to 
the tradition set forward by those who initiated 
them. And even though the meaning behind 
some of the expressions may get lost over the 
years, the current day practitioners can still 
commune in a poetic sort of way with those who 
went before them. They walk the same streets, 
chant the same chants, and wear the same type 
of garments of those who went before them. 
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There are well-founded fears that these 
expressions—coupled with the absence of many 
of the adherents—may fall victim to those who 
prefer a more vanilla New Orleans. At a seminar 
for the 164th Anniversary of St. Augustine Church 
in the Tremé neighborhood, cultural activists 
expressed alarm at eorts by the City to suppress 
the cultural life of Black New Orleans and to expel 
Father Ledoux from the St. Augustine Church. 
He was instrumental in erecting an evocative 
sculpture garden at the church that recalled 
the anonymous slaves who built the city’s rst 
levees and buildings in old New Orleans. This 
“Tomb of the Unknown Slave” sculpture garden, 
along a wall of St. Augustine Church in the Tremé 
neighborhood, features a 1,500 pound cross 
welded from a discarded marine chain that had 
been used to anchor a buoy in the Mississippi 
River. Although people of African descent have 
been in New Orleans for nearly 300 years, the 
“Tomb of the Unknown Slave” was the only 
public monument arming their roots in New 
Orleans history.
African Americans histories were integral in 
the development of New Orleans.  There were 
philanthropists such as Thomy Lafon who 
lived in Faubourg Treme his entire life and 
funneled money to the Anti-Slavery Society and 
the Underground Railroad. Dr. Louis Charles 
Roudanez published the New Orleans Tribune in 
the middle of the Civil War. His deant newspaper 
pushed for equality and the right to vote. And 
then, there was a free man of color named 
Arnold Bertonneau who organized a petition 
drive for voting rights for people of color that 
was delivered to Abraham Lincoln and the 
United States Congress. Despite the eorts 
and successes of African Americans during 
Reconstruction, White supremacy took hold but 
not without continued opposition. 
Even in 1880, not even 20 years from 
emancipation – in the houses of the former 
slaves who had been barred from marriage or 
literacy, Black males were heads of household in 
eighty percent of those homes in New Orleans. 
Similarly, for the formerly, plantation-bound 
enslaved who were forbidden from reading, 
education became almost a lust. A Presbyterian 
minister who visited Louisiana following the Civil 
War observed that “in any direction, you meet 
Negroes on horses, Negroes with oxen, Negroes 
on foot…men, women, and children, Negroes 
in uniform, Negroes in rags; all hopeful… They 
are never out of our rooms, and their cry is for 
‘Books! Books! And ‘when will school begin?’”  
In 1890, African Americans comprised nearly 
50% of Louisiana’s voting population. There 
were 18 black members of the Louisiana 
legislature. By 1900 with the passage of White 
supremacist legislation – Blacks comprised only 
4% of the voting population and there were 
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zero Black members of the legislature. This 
all happened in 10 years. The most egregious 
policy, however, was the quashing of hopes and 
dreams of New Orleans Black school children 
seeking education.
In 1900, the Orleans Parish School Board 
stopped public education for African American 
children after the fth grade. Generations of 
Black public school students were banned from 
higher education. There would be no public high 
school for Blacks until 1917 when McDonogh 
#35 opened in New Orleans.  The 1900s were 
largely crafted by White supremacy and it is still 
a large part of Louisiana as the city’s monuments 
attest. It wasn’t that long ago we lived in a state 
where 60% of white voters voted for Nazi and 
White Supremacist David Duke. Of course, there 
are plenty of things to be angry about when 
viewing New Orleans tortured but gloriously 
redeeming history.  Still, anger, bitterness, and 
recrimination are unstable foundations from 
which to view the past or to build a future. 
The city’s African American character is not 
dened by slavery or Jim Crow or caste. Its 
character has been dened by their transcending 
the many attacks on their humanity, battling 
back against them and nding the strength to 
live another day, raise families, and shatter each 
tenet of White Supremacist thought by forming 
a sense of community, educating the next 
generation and possessing a hell of a lot of faith 
and grit. 
There are many times in a peoples’ history 
where leadership may be weak or absent and 
role models are few. But for New Orleanians and 
their allies, they can always look for inspiration 
in a remarkable and storied past. Their fore 
parents faced adversity with accomplishment. 
They stood up to segregation and fought Jim 
Crow with civil disobedience, newspapers and 
rallies, and rose to the hope of another day.  New 
Orleans will RISE from Katrina, and its people will 
have an indelible footprint on our future.  From 
the roots of our earliest ancestors to the trumpet 
blows of our youngest musicians, our culture 
will always be our strength and resilience.  
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Devastation.  Awe.  Pure and utter raw emotion 
pulled on the heartstrings of native New 
Orleanians as we watched our city drown, forced 
to gure out next steps for stabilizing our lives and 
families.  Amid government disruption, downed 
communication, mass citizen displacement, and 
crumbled infrastructure, New Orleans was a city 
in shambles with its future in question.
Ten years after the storm of the century 
devastated our beloved city, we pause to reect 
on where we have been and where we are 
going. We must honor and recognize the lives 
that have been lost and those that have been 
changed forever, as well as the countless hours 
and the enormous energy expended by people 
near and far to “bring back New Orleans.”  This 
moment of reflection allows us to count the 
lessons learned and apply them to the next ten 
years of this recovery so that we can achieve 
the goal of a stronger, sustainable and more 
equitable New Orleans. 
Over the past 10 years, tremendous progress 
has been made in New Orleans - homes, roads, 
schools, playgrounds, and hospitals have 
been rebuilt; streetcar lines expanded; airport 
remodeled; commercial development; and 
the people of this city have proven that we are 
resilient. More students are going to college 
from New Orleans public schools, our jail size 
has been reduced by more than half, and we 
are the rst major city in America to eliminate 
veteran homelessness. But on our road to 
recovery, have we reproduced some of the same 
inequities that existed prior to the storm and 
impeded people’s ability to quickly recover? The 
wealth gap continues to widen between African 
Americans and Whites, too many of us are paying 
unaordable housing costs, Black men are still 
targeted and disproportionately represented in 
the criminal justice system, and health disparities 
continue to threaten the well-being of African 
Americans in the city.  Are we seizing this 
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opportunity to transform the city into a better 
version of itself, one in which all its residents can 
prosper and thrive? 
The State of Black New Orleans: 10 Years Post-
Katrina hopes to answer these questions (and 
more) through its analysis of the impact of 
post-Katrina recovery on the African American 
community. The publication also oers 
recommendations to address noted disparities 
impacting the African American community 
and to transform the systems that allow these 
disparities to persist.  After all, New Orleans cannot 
thrive if African Americans, who are the majority of 
the city’s residents, are not thriving as well.
Using an equity framework, the State of Black 
New Orleans: 10 Years Post-Katrina focuses on 
civic engagement, criminal justice, economic 
and workforce development, education, the 
environment, health care and housing, in 
chapters authored by some of the city’s nest 
scholars and practitioners. It is a comprehensive 
examination of the issues that impact the 
quality of life for African Americans, paying close 
attention to opportunities for improvement 
in order to chart a new course towards a more 
equitable New Orleans in 2025.  
As you delve into these chapters, consider “What 
does a successful recovery in New Orleans look 
like by 2025?” I imagine a city where every family 
has the power to access real choice in a landscape 
of quality school options; where children are 
educated in classrooms where teachers spark 
and ignite learning and creativity. I imagine a 
city where African Americans are the power base 
with a real seat at the proverbial table. I imagine a 
New Orleans where all residents can access work 
opportunities that pay a livable wage and where 
entrepreneurs are all able to take their big ideas 
and transform them into lucrative, sustainable 
businesses that create jobs and secure futures. 
I imagine a New Orleans where all residents 
can live in quality aordable homes, where life 
expectancy is not linked to zip codes, and where 
every neighborhood has access to the resources 
and experiences that promote their health and 
well-being. And, I imagine a city where better 
education and more jobs result in smaller jails 
and safer communities. How do we get to the 
New Orleans you envision in 2025? As the sun 
sets on the 10 year anniversary of Hurricane 
Katrina, blueprints like the State of Black New 
Orleans provide strategies for continued recovery 
with refocused eorts toward equity. 
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ADV OCATE,  AG ITATE,  ACTIV ATE: 
CIV IC ENG AG EM ENT TRENDS IN 
POST- KATRINA NEW ORLEANS
BY WESTLEY BAYAS,  III &  V INCENT SYLV AIN
ON DECEMBER 10, 2 005 , 
THE STREETS OF NEW ORLEANS 
WERE FILLED WITH 5 , 000 ANG RY 
AND DETERM INED PROTESTERS. 
BOTH SURVIVORS OF HURRICANE 
KATRINA AND THEIR SUPPORTERS 
CHANTED “ WE’ RE BACK TO TAKE 
IT BACK”  AND “ NO J USTICE,  NO 
PEACE! ”
1
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Civic engagement is one pathway for 
communities of color to access much needed 
opportunities and resources to achieve equity 
with their White counterparts. This chapter 
discusses the civic engagement landscape in 
pre- and post-Katrina New Orleans and the 
ways in which it facilitates and/or hinders 
participation of communities of color in the 
areas of voter participation, volunteerism, 
youth community organizing and 
organization membership. It also provides 
a brief history of recent decades of civic 
engagement specically within the African-
American community in New Orleans, paying 
special attention to political organizing 
and African-American political organizing 
groups in the city and how they interfaced 
with a corporate structure dominated by the 
predominately White business sector.
The evacuation spread the residents of the 
city across the country months before the 
City was to hold its municipal elections. While 
local elected leadership worked to piece 
the city back together, community activists 
battled to ensure that all citizens of the city 
had an opportunity to cast a ballot. Large-
scale voter rallies led to the establishment 
of satellite voting precincts in cities across 
Louisiana, with the NAACP providing shuttle 
buses for evacuees from major Southern 
cities. While the mass organizing eorts 
helped to keep then-incumbent Mayor Ray 
Nagin in oce, the results of the election 
were a sign of the future struggles of African-
American political power.
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The Dallas Meeting and the 
“Shadow Government”
On September 8, 2005, 10 days after the 
storm, accompanied by Dan Packer, Entergy 
New Orleans' then-president & CEO, Nagin 
ew to Dallas, Texas to participate in a 
meeting arranged by Jimmy Reiss and other 
members of the Business Council (Rivlin, 
2015). That Saturday, the mayor drove 
himself to the giant Loews Anatole Hotel just 
north of downtown Dallas for what he later 
described as “my meeting with the shadow 
government” of New Orleans (Rivlin, 2015, 
p. 73).  In spite of political gains, “Uptown 
(Whites) still retained its economic clout 
despite the shifts in majority from White 
to African-American.  Its people were still 
the city’s CEOs, top lawyers, bankers, and 
real estate developers.  Whites controlled 
the business community and dominated 
philanthropic circles” (Rivlin, 2015, p. 80).  It 
was individuals from this sector who would 
largely serve as the make-up of those 
attending the ‘Dallas Meeting.’  “By Reiss’s 
count, fifty-seven members had shown 
up.  Almost everyone in the room was 
white” (Rivlin, 2015, p.86).
On December 10, 2005, the streets of New 
Orleans were filled with 5,000 angry and 
determined protesters, both survivors of 
Hurricane Katrina and their supporters, 
who chanted “We’re back to take it back” 
and “No justice, no peace!” A crowd 
estimated at 5,000 marched from the 
historic Congo Square to City Hall for a 
rally, where they demanded “Justice after 
Katrina” (Dowell, 2005).
In 2002 New Orleans elected C. Ray Nagin 
to succeed Marc Morial as mayor.  Black 
himself, Nagin would still take on the 
African-American political establishment, 
promising to eliminate the City’s living-
wage ordinance and the City’s set-aside 
program for minority- and women-owned 
businesses (Russell, 2002).  Both the city’s 
only daily newspaper at the time, The Times-
Picayune, and the city’s inuential political 
weekly, Gambit, endorsed Nagin’s candidacy 
(Russell, 2002).  That helped solidify Nagin’s 
standing in the White community, garnering 
him 86% of the White vote, enough to 
compensate for his 40% showing in the 
Black community.  He was sold as a reform-
minded, business candidate who would turn 
New Orleans around.  Plus, it did not hurt 
that Nagin’s run-o opponent, while having 
successfully served as the most recent Police 
Superintendent, was not from New Orleans. 
Nagin would preside as mayor during 
Hurricane Katrina and would get re-elected 
in 2006; Reverend Jesse Jackson and the 
Rainbow Coalition along with the National 
Coalition for Black Civic Participation and 
others would play a prominent role in 
helping to ensure that Katrina survivors, 
who had been dispersed to over 44 states 
in the country, would have their voting 
rights protected and not face massive 
disenfranchisement in the upcoming New 
Orleans election on April 22, 2006.  
In a moment captured from a page of the civil 
rights movement in the 1960s, thousands 
of disenchanted citizens marched across 
the Crescent City Connection Bridge on 
Saturday, April 8, 2006 in “The March for Our 
Right to Return, Vote and Rebuild,” seeking 
the right of displaced New Orleans citizens 
to vote in the election.  After ery speeches 
delivered on the grounds of the Ernest 
M. Morial Convention Center by leaders 
of the civil rights movement, politicians 
and celebrities, such as Rev. Jesse Jackson, 
Rev. Al Sharpton, and celebrity Judge 
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Greg Mathis, the marchers crossed the 
Crescent City Connection Bridge, spanning 
the Mississippi River, where thousands of 
New Orleans citizens were stranded after 
Hurricane Katrina and the oodwaters of 
the Gulf of Mexico caused devastation in 
the city the summer before.  Other speakers 
included former New Orleans Mayor Marc 
Morial, president of the National Urban 
League. They charged that to not meet their 
demands would result in a clear violation 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Rainbow 
PUSH, 2006).  Louisiana’s Governor Blanco 
met their demands and issued an executive 
order to put in place satellite voting places in 
cities and states where Katrina survivors were 
now residing.  Her orders also required the 
Secretary of State and Attorney General to 
make an updated voter roll. This work helped 
to spur Mayor Nagin’s reelection in 2006.
As citizen groups began to mark their 
territorial battleground, advocacy 
organizations such as Common Ground 
Collective/Relief and ACORN would lay 
claim to protecting other neighborhoods, 
the Lower Ninth Ward and additional 
underserved minority neighborhoods, 
impacted by Katrina. In March 2006, Common 
Ground commandeered Martin Luther King 
Elementary School as an act of deance and 
to stake claim on behalf of returning Katrina 
survivors (Flathery, 2010).  
ACORN focused most of its eorts towards 
rallying against Mayor Nagin’s threats 
to use his powers of eminent domain to 
seize vacant and damaged properties; 
particularly those located in the Lower Ninth 
Ward.  ACORN also brought attention to the 
double standards that were taking place 
in regards to loan repayments of damaged 
homes. While the average Lower Ninth Ward 
resident only earned an average of $16,000 
a year when Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, 
homeownership in this part of the city was 
still higher than many other parts of New 
Orleans (Etheridge, 2005).  And it would 
be the Lower Ninth Ward- a mixed-race 
community before school desegregation but 
98% African-American at the time of Katrina-
that stood as a synecdoche for anyone 
debating the rebuilding question starting to 
dominate the discussion a few weeks after 
the storm (Rivlin, 2015). 
While still in the midst of evaluating 
and developing a recovery plan from 
the devastation caused by Hurricane 
Katrina, New Orleans would experience a 
transformation of its political landscape; 
one in which it had become accustomed 
to for thirty years. Back in the 1970s as 
African-Americans began to gain a greater 
political foothold in New Orleans elective 
oces, an “unwritten rule” between African-
American political leaders and the White 
corporate and political leaders decided that 
the City’s interest was best served if it had a 
racial balance in the at-large seat, a similar 
courtesy that existed in regards to the many 
civil/criminal/municipal judicial seats.  In 
honor of that commitment, there had not 
been any organized attempts by major 
African-American political organizations to 
win the second at-large council race even as 
demographics began to favor the African-
American population.  
An unforeseen resignation only two 
years after Katrina threatened to change 
that balance. Oliver Thomas, an African 
American who held one of New Orleans’ 
two Councilman-at-Large seats, resigned his 
council seat after pleading guilty on August 
13, 2007 to bribery charges for actions taken 
prior to Hurricane Katrina (Donze, 2007). 
Thomas’ legal situation would test the will of 
Whites to honor the decades old “unwritten 
rule” which had been in place.
New Orleans had always maintained an 
African-American and a White individual in 
the two at-large positions since the Reverend 
A.L. Davis, who had been a Civil Rights 
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leader, became the rst African American to 
serve on the City Council.  Reverend Davis 
was appointed to the District “B” seat on the 
City Council in 1975 to ll the unexpired 
term of White Councilman Eddie Sapir, who 
had been elected judge of Municipal Court. 
Reverend Davis was eventually elected to 
the seat in 1976 along with Joseph DiRosa, 
a long-time political xture in the White 
community. The pattern of racial balance 
in the at-large council seats continued up 
until the 2006 municipal elections when 
then newcomer Arnie Fielkow joined 
Councilmember At-Large Thomas.  
The combination of the unexpected exit 
by Thomas from the council seat; a high 
number of African-American voters who had 
not been able to return to the city following 
Hurricane Katrina; and the challenge 
of raising necessary funds to launch a 
campaign created a new paradigm for New 
Orleans, a paradigm that would create new 
opportunities for Whites to gain a greater 
foothold in elective oce.  This would be 
the case especially during “special elections” 
where traditionally African-Americans had 
historically turned out in fewer numbers 
even under normal circumstances.
The October 2007 election to select a 
replacement for Councilman Thomas 
placed sitting District Councilwoman 
Jacquelyn Clarkson, a White Democrat from 
Algiers, a neighborhood which had largely 
escaped the ooding of Katrina, in a run-
o, against Councilwoman Cynthia Willard-
Lewis, an African American Democrat who 
represented the mostly devastated areas of 
New Orleans East and the Lower 9th Ward. 
Clarkson won the election, creating a 5-2 
majority in favor of Whites and seemingly 
began a run of White/Asian elected ocials 
on the City Council, Orleans Parish School 
Board, several judgeships, the District 
Attorney’s oce and ultimately former 
African American Congressman William 
Jeerson’s seat as well as that of the Mayor. 
Over the next few years, the African American 
political establishment would stew over the 
loss of those seats; particularly the inability to 
win at least one of the two Council-at-Large 
seats.   
A level of blame for loss of voting strength 
was also attributed to the local city  council 
members and Mayor Nagin who in 2007 
made the decision to tear down the ‘Big 
Four’ existing public housing developments 
in New Orleans; St. Bernard, C.J. Peete 
(Magnolia Projects), Latte, and  B.W. Cooper. 
Some former residents and advocates 
protested that the Housing Authority of New 
Orleans’ (HANO) plan would not provide 
enough housing for the number of people 
who formerly lived in those units prior to 
the hurricane. Another level of blame could 
be assigned to the deterioration in strength 
of the Black-led political organizations 
that rallied political support in minority 
neighborhoods. Groups like the Black 
Organization for Leadership Development 
(BOLD), the Southern Organization for 
Urban Leadership (SOUL), the Community 
Organization for Urban Politics (COUP), the 
Louisiana Independent Federation of Electors 
(LIFE), and the Progressive Democrats were 
considered critical to the election of any 
candidate in New Orleans (Mock, 2010b). 
Many of these groups split up the city by 
neighborhood, focusing on the housing 
projects in their area as a concentration of 
votes (Mock, 2010a). With the destruction 
of the housing developments, along with 
federal public corruption eorts decimating 
many leaders of the groups, the Black-led 
political organizations have suered from a 
severe loss of political power and patronage. 
Without these so-called “alphabet soup” 
(Moseley, 2012)  groups to drive voter 
education and turnout eorts, many Black 
and Black-supported candidates would begin 
to struggle with maintaining their base.
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Social activists charged that this was all 
part of a plan to create a “new New Orleans.” 
They pointed to statements such as those 
reported by the Wall Street Journal that 
then Republican Congressman Richard 
Baker of Baton Rouge (1987 to 2008) was 
overheard telling lobbyists: “We nally 
cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. 
We couldn’t do it, but God did” as evidence 
of such a plan (Babington, 2005, para. 2). Pre-
Katrina, the combination of a large African-
American middle-class and public housing 
residents had become an impenetrable 
political force for African-Americans seeking 
elective oce.  In September 2005 that 
political advantage was gone.  A sense of 
abandonment and betrayal would become 
the topic of discussion among African-
American politicians and political players in 
private gatherings.  
While African-Americans were able to hold 
on to the mayor’s seat by re-electing Mayor 
Nagin in 2006, they would lose the super-
majority control of the council when Stacy 
Head was able to parley with BOLD to garner 
their support leading to a 54% – 46%  victory 
over the Progressive Democrat-backed, and 
Congressman Jeerson-supported African 
American incumbent Councilwoman Renee 
Gill Pratt.   The predominately low-income 
neighborhoods of Central City were heavily 
impacted by the hurricane while large 
slivers of highly White-populated areas 
along the river were mostly untouched, thus 
providing White candidates a demographic 
advantage among “active voters” that did 
not exist prior to the hurricane. African-
Americans found comfort in maintaining 
control of the dual Sheri’s Oces, with 
both Civil Sheri Paul Valteau and Criminal 
Sheri Marlin Gusman winning reelection 
during the 2006 municipal election.  
Congressman Jeerson’s defeat to 
Vietnamese-American Republican Ahn 
“Joseph” Cao two years later was attributed 
to a combination of his legal issues and 
the fact that Hurricane Gustav had pushed 
the election to one month after the 2008 
presidential election in which African-
Americans turned out in record numbers in 
New Orleans to cast their vote for Senator 
Barack Obama’s run for the presidency. 
Subsequently during the Jeerson verses 
Cao run-o, African-American voter turnout 
was only 12%.  
As the number of African-Americans 
retuning to New Orleans began to grow, the 
fall elections of 2008 would begin to show 
signs of African-Americans ability to regain 
political power in oces outside of City 
Hall.  This time period also coincided with 
HUD’s ground breaking on a $138 million 
mixed-use community at the site of the old 
St. Bernard complex. Redevelopment plans 
were also announced for the replacement 
of the C.J. Peete and Latte housing 
developments (Krupa, 2008). 
While 2008 elections for seats on the Orleans 
Parish School Board resulted with a 4-2-1 
White majority school board with victories 
by African American candidates Ira Thomas 
and Cynthia Cade, and Hispanic candidate 
Lourdes Moran, the judicial elections 
produced much dierent results along racial 
terms. When Judge Nadine Ramsey stepped 
down to run for mayor in 2010, Paula Brown 
was able to chalk up another victory on the 
African American side of the ledger with her 
run for Civil District Court Judge in February 
2009.  Even though Brown won against 
overwhelming odds, many in the political 
circle still saw Judge Brown’s victory, which 
avoided a run-o against a White opponent 
and perennial candidate and former judge 
Morris Reed, merely as a political uke and not 
a true signal that African-Americans were once 
again in a political advantageous position to 
win special elections or run-os with limited 
issues on the ballot.  To become believers 
that African-American voting strength were 
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returning to pre-Katrina numbers, everyone 
would need to see more proof.
Additional evidence would soon follow. 
Monique Morial, the daughter of New 
Orleans’ rst African American mayor and 
sister of former Mayor Marc Morial was 
elected to the First City Court in July 2010 
with no opposition. Earlier that August, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court appointed Judge 
Morial to serve Pro Tempore in the First City 
Court for retired Judge Sonja Spears until 
December. In January 2011, Judge Morial 
began her term as judge of First City Court, 
Section “A”, actually succeeding retiring 
Judge Charles Imbornone.
While Mitch Landrieu won his third attempt 
at the Mayor’s Oce in 2010, additional 
signs that Black political strength continued 
to grow began to arise. In the rst election 
where Orleans Parish would have a unied 
sheri to handle civil and criminal matters, 
Criminal Sheri Marlin Gusman successfully 
won reelection and established himself as 
the foundation of Black political support in 
New Orleans. While the election of African 
American Congressman Cedric Richmond in 
2010 would provide additional redemption 
and a feeling of optimism in the African-
American community, still the lack of racial 
balance on the City Council would continue 
to burn.  In April 2012 voters would get 
another chance to restore racial balance to 
the New Orleans City Council and the White 
political and corporate establishments 
would be provided another opportunity to 
help “do the right thing.” 
However once again, the outcome 
produced results outside the boundaries 
of the old “unwritten rule” agreement.  This 
time it would be Councilmember Stacy 
Head defeating Councilmember Willard-
Lewis for the Council-at-large seat by a 
total of 281 votes, unocial returns showed 
Head receiving 27,787 votes to Willard-
Lewis’ 27,506 (WWL-TV, 2012).    Head was 
able to garner the endorsement of State 
Representative Austin Badon, an African 
American who had nished a strong third 
in the primary, while another handful 
of prominent African American leaders 
remained silent on the race.  This allowed 
Head to build momentum in pockets of the 
African-American community.  It appeared 
that a new formula for victory for White 
ocials was emerging, one that could last 
decades if African-Americans did not grow 
their ranks among the population base.  
The fall 2012 elections saw several new 
trends develop with two new African-
Americans, Nolan Marshall, Jr. and Leslie 
Ellison, winning seats on the Orleans Parish 
School Board, returning the racial majority 
to 4-3.  African American Councilwoman 
LaToya Cantrell’s victory over Dana Kaplan 
restored the District B Council seat to the 
hands of an African-American elected 
ocial for the rst time since 2006.  In fact, 
prior to 2006, the Central City seat had 
been held by an African American elected 
ocial for 31 years. An even more stunning 
development took place on the West Bank 
of Orleans Parish with unexpected victories 
by four African American candidates in 
Algiers. For the rst time since pre-Katrina 
a newer pattern emerged; White elected 
ocials were no longer able to count on 
the voter dierential being in their favor. 
Rather, if that is the case permanently, then 
White candidates would have to do as Mayor 
Mitch Landrieu did in the 2010 elections; 
show that one had a demonstrated record 
of being sensitive to the causes of the 
African American community in order to 
earn their vote.  
In the 2014 elections, for the rst time in the 
city’s history, the two seats were separated 
and council-at-large candidates now would 
have to declare in advance which of the two 
seats they are seeking.  Under the old rule all 
candidates ran under one race and the top 
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two vote gatherers receiving more than 25% 
of the votes were determined the winners. 
If the second place nisher failed to receive 
25% of the vote, then a runo was held 
between the second and third place nisher.
Under the new rule, each candidate would 
have to receive 50% plus one of the total 
number of votes cast in order to be declared 
the winner during the primary in each 
individual race.  If no one received the 
required 50% plus one then a runo would 
be held.  This provided for some interesting 
dynamics and created speculation that 
perhaps African-Americans would now be 
able to win both at-large seats.
The 2014 elections would result in victories 
maintaining the old racial balance, African 
American lawyer Jason Williams would win 
one seat while Councilmember Head carried 
the other at-large race.  Victories in ve of 
the seven council seats by African American 
candidates, was evidence that the African-
American voting population was returning 
to pre-Katrina levels, thus restoring a super-
majority in favor of the African American 
community.
How the Recovery Planning 
Process Spurred Community 
Civic Engagement
After Hurricane Katrina passed over New 
Orleans and the rainwaters subsided, 
hundreds of thousands of residents 
began the process of rebuilding their 
homes and lives. With almost all forms 
of communication paused due to lack of 
infrastructure, New Orleanians were at a loss 
about how they would be able to get critical 
information about the recovery.  Residents 
were also in the dark about how the city 
would be rebuilt, and which neighborhoods 
would be considered for rehabilitation. 
These conditions served as a catalyst to 
a civic engagement movement that has 
transformed how neighborhoods, NGOs, 
and government agencies interact and 
execute their missions. 
The impetus for change started in the 
immediate days following Katrina. While 
residents were still reeling from the eects of 
the storm surge that overtook homes, local 
business leaders began to plan the city’s 
future. Initial private planning meetings held 
out of state led to then-Mayor Ray Nagin’s 
September 2005 creation of the Bring Back 
New Orleans Commission, a 17-member 
mayoral appointee committee designated 
to build a master plan for the rebuilding 
of the city (CNN Wire Sta, 2005). The 
Commission’s work culminated in early 2006 
with the unveiling of a plan that shrunk the 
footprint of the city, placing many low-lying 
neighborhoods under a ubiquitous “green 
dot” that represented residential areas that 
would be converted to park space (The 
Times-Picayune Sta, 2005). Community 
uproar over the next few months lead to 
the shelving of the Commission’s plan, but 
it planted the seed for future community 
endeavors into urban planning and the 
rebuilding of New Orleans.
Shortly after the Bring Back New Orleans 
Commission unveiled their plan, a group 
of residents came together to create an 
organization that could leverage community 
power to inuence the rebuilding process. 
Known as the Neighborhood Partnership 
Network (NPN), this organization focused on 
neighborhood organizing and information 
outreach to bring groups together to 
collaborate and advocate for community 
needs. NPN also played a role in connecting 
residents to the numerous rebuilding master 
planning processes that followed.  
In the wake of the plan, the New Orleans 
City Council launched a second attempt at 
creating a rebuilding master plan. Called 
the Lambert Plan, the nal product had 
additional community input, but still 
lacked much of the needed credibility from 
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the entire city. The Louisiana Recovery 
Authority, with support from the Rockefeller 
Foundation & the Greater New Orleans 
Foundation, launched a third process. 
Known as the United New Orleans Plan 
(UNOP). This eort (which also had support 
from the Mayor’s Oce & the City Council) 
led to the rst community-accepted master 
plan (Williamson, 2007). While the ideas 
from UNOP were later expanded upon in 
the ocial City-accepted Master Plan, a 
need for expanded community voice in civic 
engagement eorts was identied. 
The Committee for a Better New Orleans 
(CBNO) picked up eorts that started with a 
1992 City Master Plan to develop a formalized 
citizen participation process (CPP) that 
would ensure residents would have voice 
in planning and zoning developments 
in their neighborhoods. CBNO launched 
a CPP campaign to inform and unite 
neighborhood leaders around a governance 
structure that would create a resident-led 
entity to facilitate conversations between 
government agencies and neighborhood 
leaders (Committee for a Better New Orleans, 
n.d.).  Concurrently, NPN began advocating 
for City Government to create an Oce 
of Neighborhoods that would formalize 
the relationship between the executive 
branch & neighborhood associations, while 
creating a conduit for dialogue between 
residents of New Orleans and city ocials. 
These ideas, among others from a variety 
of neighborhood groups, became the 
foundation for recommendations delivered 
to then Mayor-elect Mitch Landrieu from 
the Neighborhood Development Task Force 
that was commissioned by his transition 
team (Transition New Orleans, 2010).
Thanks to the eorts of NPN & neighborhood 
organizations, the City of New Orleans 
created the Oce of Neighborhood 
Engagement in response to the task force 
recommendations within the rst year of 
the Landrieu administration (Krupa, 2011). 
By the end of 2012, the City had adopted 
a formalized CPP process that ensured 
residents received notication of planning 
and zoning changes in their area and required 
developers to hold meetings with residents 
to get approval for their projects (City 
Planning Commission, 2012). Community 
groups such as Ride New Orleans, the 
Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance, and 
the New Orleans Kids Partnership have also 
taken on critical advocacy roles in the areas 
of transportation, aordable housing, and 
youth and family engagement. 
Other post-Katrina organizations that spurred 
activism and action for representative causes 
included Women of the Storm, Beacon of 
Hope, Citizens for 1 New Orleans, African 
American Women of Purpose and Power, 
Jutice and Beyond, and Puentes NOLA. 
While issue constituency and community 
groups helped to lead the planning process, 
youth organizations were beginning to 
create opportunities for young people to be 
engaged in civic endeavors.
Youth community organizing in New Orleans 
found root in the Hurricane Katrina recovery 
as residents emphasized that all voices 
needed to be heard. Prior to the storm, the 
idea of youth community organizing was 
nascent with few established outlets that 
promoted or created space for youth voice. 
In the aftermath of the storm, numerous 
organizations were established to began 
organizing various constituencies within the 
New Orleans youth community.  Using the 
rapidly changing Orleans Parish education 
system as additional leverage, youth-led 
organizing in the city has not only grown 
exponentially but has continued to stay 
nimble to meet the needs of young people 
while achieving crucial policy victories.
VAYLA, formerly known as the Vietnamese 
American Young Leaders Association, is one 
such example. Started in 2006 to mobilize 
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Vietnamese residents around environmental 
concerns in New Orleans East, VAYLA has 
grown into a multi-racial, multi -issue, youth-
led organization with signicant inuence 
in the New Orleans community. Best known 
for the “Raise Your Hand” campaign that 
used youth action participatory research on 
the conditions of local public schools, VAYLA 
has garnered national acclaim for its ability 
to organize youth around critical issues such 
as school closures, education equity, and 
language access. 
Kids Rethink New Orleans Schools is another 
example of nimble youth organizing to 
address critical needs. Started in 2006 to 
assist middle school students in having a 
meaningful voice in the city’s school reform, 
Kids Rethink has taken on issues such as 
food justice & restorative justice. The work of 
the Rethinkers has lead local school leaders 
to consider restorative justice practices 
in their disciplinary procedures, and their 
food justice program was the focus of a 
HBO documentary on school nutrition. Kids 
Rethink also used interactive projects such 
as school gardens and community theater 
to further their organizing goals and expand 
their reach. 
BreakOUT! is among the newer youth 
constituency organizing groups in the city, 
focused on ending the criminalization of 
LGBTQ youth aged 13-25 in New Orleans. 
Founded in 2011, BreakOUT! launched 
their "We Deserve Better” campaign to end 
discriminatory policing practices in New 
Orleans. BreakOUT! also co-developed a "Get 
Yr Rights" toolkit designed to equip LGBTQ 
youth with legal knowledge to protect 
themselves during police interactions. 
Their work in a short amount of time has 
increased awareness of LGBTQ youth issues, 
and has inuenced policy. 
While Hurricane Katrina forced residents to 
start over, it also allowed communities to 
dictate how development would proceed 
in their neighborhoods. Neighborhood 
associations began to demand ownership 
of their fate, issue groups ensured that 
critical policies were implemented to create 
equitable growth, and youth organizations 
have created a pathway for future 
leadership. Civic engagement has improved 
in the city, but without the continued eorts 
and support of the myriad of organizations 
that have been involved, the gains made will 
be lost.   
New Orleans Voting Engagement 
by the Numbers
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans 
was considered a bastion of Democratic 
and African-American votes. The vaunted 
voting machine of New Orleans helped 
Senator Mary Landrieu win her rst 
term in oce, and ensured that African-
American residents of New Orleans played 
an integral role in citywide and statewide 
elections (Rothenberg, 1997), Louisiana 
Secretary Of State les show that African-
Americans made up almost two-thirds 
of the registered voters in the city in the 
months preceding Katrina, and the elected 
political leadership of Orleans Parish was 
overwhelmingly African-American. After 
August 2005, African-American political and 
civic leadership in the city was in a state of 
ux for almost 10 years.
Voter registration trends have revealed 
the large drop of registered voters post-
Katrina, with African-Americans suering 
an almost 25% drop in total registered 
voters between August 2005 and 
December 2014. In comparison, the drop 
in voter registration for White voters has 
stayed under 10% and there has been very 
little drop among registered voters of other 
races (See Figure 1).
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VOTER REGISTRATION & PARTICIPATION IN NEW ORLEANS MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
Registered Voters by Race
Black White Other Total Black % of Vote
2014 Total Registered Voters 142,835 82,178 18,396 243,409 58.68%
2014 Total Voted 49,028 32,303 4,289 85,620
2014 Turnout % By Race 34.32% 39.31% 23.31% 35.18% 57.26%
2010 Total Registered Voters 168,851 84,626 19,762 273,239 61.80%
2010 Total Voted 47,549 37,184 4,622 89,355
2010 Turnout % By Race 28.16% 43.94% 23.39% 32.70% 53.21%
2006 Total Registered Voters 188,316 90,909 19,287 298,512 63.08%
2006 Total Voted 58,474 46,061 5,444 109,979
2006 Turnout % By Race 31.05% 50.67% 28.23% 36.84% 53.17%
2002 Total Registered Voters 184,798 94,087 16,165 295,050 62.63%
2002 Total Voted 83,164 47,246 4,553 134,973
2002 Turnout % By Race 45.00% 50.22% 28.17% 45.75% 61.62%
Figure 1
Voter registration by itself does not tell 
the entire story of how African-Americans 
temporarily lost political power. Participation 
played a key role, especially between 2006-
2011 as African-American New Orleanians 
focused on the Katrina recovery. For 
example, in the 2006 municipal election, 
African-American voters dropped in turnout 
by 30% from the 2002 election, while turnout 
in White and other communities stayed at. 
The 2007 gubernatorial election furthered 
the erosion, when African-American voter 
turnout in Orleans Parish dropped 48% 
from the previous gubernatorial election in 
2003, while White turnout dropped only by 
21% (See Figure 2). The 2008 presidential 
election saw turnout down across the 
board, despite the election setting national 
turnout records. (See Figure 3) Participation 
continued to lag throughout the beginning 
of the decade, and it was not until the 2012 
presidential election when African-American 
turnout percentages began to near pre-
Katrina numbers. The improvement was 
aided by the voter purge conducted by the 
Louisiana Secretary of State’s oce in early 
2011, which rid the rolls of voters who had 
not voted since 2005. 
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While the voter purge may have condensed 
the number of voters, there is still a clear trend 
line of African-American political voting power 
improving. By comparing the percentage of 
African-American voters registered among 
total registered voters to the percentage 
of African-American voters among total 
voters in an election, it can be determined if 
African-Americans are fully represented in 
a particular election (represented as Black 
or BLK % of Vote in Figures 1-3). An equal 
number represents equal representation in 
an election, with higher numbers meaning 
overrepresentation and lower numbers 
meaning underrepresentation. In the last 
major election prior to Hurricane Katrina, the 
2004 Presidential election, African-American 
voter share almost equaled African-American 
voter registration share. In comparison, the 
2006 mayoral election saw a 16-percentage 
point dierence in African-American voter 
share, and the 2007 gubernatorial election 
showed a 20-percentage point dierence. This 
trend continued through the 2010 mayoral 
election, which saw an African-American voter 
share dierence of 14 percentage points.
Starting in 2012, the previous trend lines in 
voter participation and African-American 
voter share began to shift back in favor of 
VOTER REGISTRATION & PARTICIPATION IN ORLEANS PARISH DURING GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS 
Registered Voters by Race
Black White Other Total BLK % OF VOTE
2011 Total Registered Voters 137,393 76,799 17,124 231,316 59.40%
2011 Total Voted 30,844 22,272 2,462 55,578
2011 Turnout % By Race 22.45% 29.00% 14.38% 24.03% 55.50%
2007 Total Registered Voters 176,277 83,962 18,539 278,778 63.23%
2007 Total Voted 38,738 33,937 3,879 76,554
2007 Turnout % By Race 21.98% 40.42% 20.92% 27.46% 50.60%
2003 Total Registered Voters 184,578 91,452 17,020 293,050 62.99%
2003 Total Voted 74,204 43,071 4,566 121,841
2003 Turnout % By Race 40.20% 47.10% 26.83% 41.58% 60.90%
1999 Total Registered Voters 182,807 94,846 13,802 291,455 62.72%
1999 Total Voted 76,196 39,374 3,135 118,705
1999 Turnout % By Race 41.68% 41.51% 22.71% 40.73% 64.19%
Figure 2
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African-American residents. The 2012 
Presidential election saw African-Americans 
set local turnout percentage records, and 
the African-American voter share reached 
60%. Due to the increased voter participation 
numbers from African-Americans, the 
Orleans Parish School Board returned to a 4-3 
African-American/White majority & African-
American candidates in Algiers were able to 
upset a slate of White incumbent candidates 
in local judicial races. The expansion of 
African-American elected political power 
has continued, with the New Orleans City 
Council currently holding a 5-2 African-
American/White majority & African-American 
candidates winning judicial races over more 
established White candidates. While Katrina 
has certainly aected the makeup of the New 
Orleans voting population, we are starting to 
see a return to normalcy when it comes to 
the city’s elections.
The last 10 years of voter registration and voter 
participation in New Orleans represented 
an era of ux for African-American political 
power in New Orleans, but there are three 
takeaways from the data and observations of 
that time.
VOTER REGISTRATION & PARTICIPATION IN ORLEANS PARISH DURING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
Registered Voters by Race
Black White Other Total BLK % OF VOTE
2012 Total Registered Voters 148,096 83,213 18,945 250,254 59.18%
2012 Total Voted 96,077 52,995 9,701 158,773
2012 Turnout % By Race 64.87% 63.69% 51.21% 63.44% 60.51%
2008 Total Registered Voters 177,282 86,240 20,200 283,722 62.48%
2008 Total Voted 90,380 50,082 8,986 149,448
2008 Turnout % By Race 50.98% 58.07% 44.49% 52.67% 60.48%
2004 Total Registered Voters 201,052 98,523 20,678 320,253 62.78%
2004 Total Voted 122,082 64,462 10,569 197,113
2004 Turnout % By Race 60.72% 65.43% 51.11% 61.55% 61.94%
2000 Total Registered Voters 187,691 97,713 15,998 301,402 62.27%
2000 Total Voted 112,586 61,927 7,581 182,094
2000 Turnout % By Race 59.98% 63.38% 47.39% 60.42% 61.83%
Figure 3
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1. Lower voter registration 
numbers have affected our 
statewide influence.
New Orleans lost 53,000+ registered 
voters because of Hurricane Katrina, 
86% of which were African-American. 
This loss has aected the city’s ability 
to swing statewide elections, and a 
net loss of ve seats in the legislative 
delegation. While Democratic statewide 
campaigns were built on turning out 
large numbers of African-Americans in 
New Orleans, the sheer number loss has 
turned many potential candidates o 
from taking a chance.
2. Voter participation dropped 
signicantly, but has recovered 
to almost pre-Katrina levels.
Immediately following Katrina, 
African-American voter participation 
rates tumbled. Reductions between 
20% to 50% were observed in elections 
during 2006 to 2011. Starting with the 
2012 presidential election, African-
American participation rates have 
started to rise to levels that match 
pre-Katrina numbers. 
3. African-American elected 
political power in New 
Orleans is reestablishing 
itself.
While the downturn in registration & 
participation contributed to a rapid 
shift in political power from African-
American officials to White, the last 
three years have seen a renaissance 
of leadership. With local boards 
returning under control of African-
American majorities, there seem to 
be opportunities in the future for 
the African-American community to 
advance their political presence and 
influence.
With the 2015 Gubernatorial Election 
on the horizon, we will soon see 
if African-American voters in New 
Orleans have finally reestablished 
themselves as a potent voting block 
and if New Orleans as a whole can 
swing elections again. What role will 
African American-led and focused 
organizations do to encourage 
continued civic participation within 
the African American community? 
These organizations will need to make 
African American civic engagement 
a priority in their work in order to 
strengthen African American voting 
power and advocacy efforts to bring 
about equity in the “new New Orleans.”
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OV ER- REPRESENTATION 
IN THE CRIM INAL J USTICE SYSTEM : 
# BLACKLIV ESM ATTER
BY D.  M AJ EEDA SNEAD,  ESQ  AND RASHIDA G OV AN,  PH. D.
ALTHOUGH AFRICAN AM ERICANS 
ARE ONLY 3 2 %  OF LOUISIANA’ S 
POPULATION, THEY M AKE 
UP M ORE THAN 6 7 %  OF THE 
STATE’ S PRISON POPULATION. 
NEW ORLEANS HAS THE HIGHEST 
INCARCERATION RATE PER CAPITA 
THAN ANY OTHER JURISDICTION 
AND ALMOST 9 0%  OF ITS PRISON 
POPULATION IS AFRICAN 
AM ERICAN. 2
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Hurricane Katrina unleashed its wrath on 
the city of New Orleans in 2005. The rising 
waters caused massive destruction and 
revealed systemic failures throughout the 
city.  One of the many inequities exposed 
by Hurricane Katrina was the economic and 
social disadvantages suered by many New 
Orleans residents.  Most notably, the storm 
and ood exposed the long-existing failures 
of the city’s criminal justice system. Once 
the waters receded and the lights were 
restored, the city began the daunting task of 
rebuilding.   Ten years later, these inequities 
in the criminal justice system still exist and 
continue to impact the African American 
community most signicantly. This chapter 
examines the disparities that exist in the city 
and the eects those disparities have had 
on African American communities in the 
criminal justice system.
There are more than 2.2 million people 
incarcerated in the United States, a rate 
higher than that of any other industrialized 
nation (The Sentencing Project, 2015).  That 
is a 500% increase in the number of people in 
prisons and jails in this country over the past 
thirty years (The Sentencing Project, 2015). 
Of the 50 states, Louisiana is number one in 
incarceration rates.  Regrettably, in 2005, the 
city had the highest number of incarcerated 
citizens in the State of Louisiana (See Figure1) 
(Gray, 2015). This is not a statistic that should 
illicit pride.
The high incarceration rate in this state 
clearly has a disparate impact on the African 
American community.  
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Although African Americans are only 32% of 
Louisiana’s population, they make up more 
than 67% of the state’s prison population 
(Louisiana Department of Public Safety 
and Corrections, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013a). New Orleans has the highest 
incarceration rate per capita in the world 
and almost 90% of its prison population is 
African American (Rainey, 2015). In New 
Orleans, one out of seven African American 
males in the city has either been in prison, 
on parole or on probation (See Figure 2) 
(Chang, 2012).  
The disparity existing between the 
numbers of young African American males 
incarcerated in the city and their White 
counterparts is consistent with the national 
trend of high arrest and incarceration 
rates of African American males.  The 
implementation of the “War on Drugs” in 
this country oers a clear example of this 
trend. African Americans are arrested three 
times more than Whites on drug possession 
charges and convicted 10 times more than 
Whites although they are no more likely to 
use illicit drugs than Whites (Fellner, 2013). 
These disparities in arrests and convictions 
are due in large part to drug policies 
inuenced by racially biased perspectives 
on the “drug problem” in America and on law 
enforcement decisions to concentrate their 
eorts in low-income, communities of color 
(Fellner, 2013). This disparity is even more 
disturbing considering African Americans 
are only 13.2% of the national population 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2015).
Figure 1: Ten most incarrerated US Jurisdictions, 
2005 Jail Incarceration Rate Per 1,000 Residents
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59% 90%
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City Prison
Percentage of 
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Figure 2: Percentage of African Americans in Louisiana, Louisiana Prisons, New Orleans and New Orleans Prisons
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Drug oenses are not the only type of crime 
where these disparities exist. While the 
media reports of crime in the city suggest 
that crime is primarily violent and victim-
oriented, pre- Katrina reports of crime data 
reveal 86% of all arrests in the city were 
for nonviolent oenses during the period 
between 2003 and 2004 (Johnson, Laisne & 
Wool, 2015).  African Americans comprised 
67% of the city’s population pre-Katrina 
(Shrinath, Mack & Plyer, 2014).  However, 
of the 140,000 arrests that occurred in 
2004, African Americans made up an 
overwhelming majority of those arrests 
(Austin, Ware, & Rocker, 2011).      
Based on the statistical data documenting 
the disproportionate number of African 
Americans arrested and incarcerated in this 
country, anyone could infer that African 
Americans are more likely than any other 
race to commit crimes.  Of course that 
would be an inaccurate inference.  Statistics 
alone do not tell the entire story.  In order 
to explain the disparities in the number of 
African Americans arrested and imprisoned 
one must probe further to learn the root 
causes which account for their presence in 
the criminal justice system. 
Poverty
Poverty is one of the many predictors that 
may determine if someone will end up in 
the criminal justice system (Poverties.org, 
2013). A child’s future success or failure 
can be directly tied to what resources are 
available to them.  If resources are limited 
the likelihood of success is much more 
challenging. For many African Americans 
in the city, resources have been extremely 
limited.  Many in this group lack basic 
services such as quality education, health 
care, community services, playgrounds, 
social experiences and employment 
opportunities.  Currently, 59% of the 
population in New Orleans is African 
American and 35% of them live in poverty 
(Shrinath, Mack & Plyer, 2014; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013b).  The New Orleans-Metarie 
area ranked 14th in the nation for its share of 
the poor population living in concentrated 
poverty at 62.1% (Kneebone, 2014). 
While economic growth has occurred in the 
city post Katrina, economic advantage for 
African Americans has lagged behind.  In 
2011, 52% of African American men in the 
city were not in the labor force or employed 
(Sams-Abidoun & Rattler, Jr., 2013). The 
number of African American children living 
below the poverty level in the city grew by 
seven percentage points from 2007 to 2013 
to 50.5% (Mack, 2015).  More broadly, across 
all racial demographics, those living below 
the poverty level in New Orleans – unable 
to provide food, shelter and transportation 
for themselves – are 27% of the population 
(Shrinath, Mack & Plyer, 2014). These statistics 
are not encouraging for creating solutions 
that address disparities that exist for African 
Americans in all aspects of life in the city. 
Isolated by race and economic status, most 
African American residents are deprived of 
basic quality of life opportunities, which 
serve to limit their life chances.
Historically, African Americans have had 
to survive in the face of the most daunting 
challenges.  And, even though most survive 
in these depressed communities without 
succumbing to a life of crime – with many 
overcoming insurmountable obstacles – 
some who live in conditions of poverty do 
engage in and become victims of crime. 
The multigenerational existence of families 
in poverty-ridden neighborhoods has 
deleterious consequences on the physical 
and emotional health of their residents.  
The eects of poverty, as exemplied by 
blighted and substandard housing, lack 
of quality schools and recreational outlets 
and access to social services can lead to the 
disillusionment of residents.  Oftentimes 
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driven by the desire to obtain material 
possessions, which many are taught to 
believe is the ultimate symbol of success 
and measure of their worth as human 
beings, young men in these impoverished 
neighborhoods suggest they see few paths 
to achieving the American Dream other 
than becoming involved in the drug trade 
and the violence that accompanies it. 
As noted by then-U.S. Attorney Jim Letten 
in 2006, the city’s crime rate was the fault 
of poor public schools and neighborhoods 
where poverty is rampant and the 
disenfranchised are highly concentrated 
together, creating an economy where drug 
dealing is considered a step up (Filosa, 
2006).  Consequently, many poverty-stricken 
neighborhoods are plagued with drug 
abuse and violence. Community violence 
is especially harmful to children who are 
exposed to pervasive and very public 
gunre, murders, and other acts of violence 
that they all too often witness rst-hand 
(Child Trends, 2013).  This cycle of violence 
is perpetuated when children growing up 
in poverty-ridden neighborhoods live in 
fear, despair and grief due to their own 
conditions and turn to delinquent and 
criminal behavior as a means of survival 
(Child Trends, 2013).   
In 1979, U. S. Surgeon General Julius B. 
Richmond declared violence to be a public 
health crisis (Listenbee et al., 2012). Despite 
the Surgeon General calling attention to 
the dangers of violence and its deleterious 
eect on public health, New Orleans – one 
of the most violent cities in America – failed 
to invest in these economically and socially 
depressed communities to address and 
alleviate the conditions of poverty that 
would have reduced crime.  The very systems 
that should have received resources to 
address this public health crisis – education, 
employment, medical and social services – 
continued to suer defunding and decline.
Schools
At the time of the storm and the ood, 
the education system in the city was one 
of the lowest functioning systems in the 
United States (IRP, 2010). Prior to Hurricane 
Katrina, 46% of the schools in the city 
were deemed “academically unacceptable” 
(Cowan & Parker, 2008). Although there 
were a few public schools that provided 
excellent education, the majority of the 
African American population attended 
public schools in the city that were 
woefully inadequate (Sims & Rossmeier, 
2015).  Consistent with the segregated 
poverty-stricken neighborhoods, the public 
education system was also segregated 
(IRP, 2010).  Those who lived in depressed 
communities attended schools that were 
underfunded and lacked basic resources. 
A lack of quality education is a strong 
predictor of socioeconomic and criminal 
justice outcomes. It is clear that poverty 
has a direct correlation to academic 
performance: High school students living 
in poverty perform 25% lower than those 
who do not (BMBI, 2011).  
A comparison of the standardized testing 
scores by ethnicity of New Orleans Public 
School students in 2014 reveals that 95% 
of White students scored at or above basic 
on state standardized tests as compared 
to 59% of African American students, a 
36-percentage point dierence (LDOE, 
2015b).  Nearly 90% of New Orleans Public 
school students are African American, yet 
there is an alarming disparity between 
those schools attended by White students 
and those attended by African American 
students (Sims & Rossmeier, 2015). Because 
many of the schools failed to provide 
adequate education and services to 
students who had learning disabilities and 
other challenges, many African American 
males drop out of school by the 10th grade. 
Consequently, most African Americans 
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who are arrested do not have a high school 
diploma and almost a third test below a 
fth-grade level (Chang, 2012). 
Interactions with New Orleans 
Police
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) began investigating the New 
Orleans Police Department (NOPD) due 
to continued complaints of a pattern and 
practice of unlawful police misconduct and 
constitutional violations by its members 
(DOJ, 2011). The investigation involved 
extensive community engagement and 
an in-depth review of NOPD practices.  On 
March 16, 2011, the DOJ issued a written 
report of its ndings, which were startling. 
The DOJ found there were unconstitutional 
practices and violations of federal law in the 
use of excessive force against its citizens, 
unconstitutional stops, searches and arrest 
as well as biased police practices such as 
racial and ethnic proling (DOJ, 2011). 
On July 24, 2012, the City of New Orleans 
entered into a consent decree to reform 
and implement existing police policies 
and procedures in the hope of preventing 
these unconstitutional practices (City of 
New Orleans, 2015).
Historically, the African American 
community in the city has suffered from 
discriminatory and abusive practices by 
members of the NOPD.  NOPD’s reputation 
for violence long ago approached 
legendary status on a national stage 
(Keegan, 1996).  New Orleans ranked 
near the top of American cities for police 
brutality for decades. Within an 18-month 
period in the 1990s, four NOPD officers 
were charged with murder, and dozens of 
officers were arrested on felony charges 
(Herbert, 1995, 4). As noted in the New 
York Times article, “For most of the past 20 
years New Orleans has been the national 
champion in complaints of police 
brutality” (Herbert, 1995, para. 4). One of 
the most infamous cases involved NOPD 
Officer Len Davis, who ordered a hit on 
African American New Orleans resident 
Kim Groves, a mother of three (Mustian, 
2014).  Ms. Groves had filed a complaint 
against Officer Davis after she witnessed 
him pistol-whip a 17-year-old African 
American male.  Ms. Groves believed she 
had filed her complaint anonymously, but 
Davis found out about the complaint less 
than 24 hours later. At the time the hit was 
successfully executed, Officer Davis, along 
with a confederacy of nearly a dozen 
corrupt police officers, was the subject of 
a drug investigation by the FBI.  Davis was 
ultimately convicted of Ms. Groves’ murder 
and sentenced to death (Mustian, 2014).
Less than a week after Hurricane Katrina 
hit, two unarmed African American men 
were shot and killed on the Danziger 
Bridge by New Orleans Police Officers 
(Times- Picayune Staff, 2011). Five 
officers were tried and convicted of civil 
rights violations but their convictions 
were overturned in 2013 and a new trial 
ordered due to prosecutorial misconduct 
(Thompson, 2013). 
Unconstitutional police practices do not 
always take the form of brutality that 
results in death.  Pervasive discriminatory 
practices have also had an adverse eect 
on the African American community. 
While police claim that they concentrate 
their crime prevention eorts in what are 
typically referred to as “high crime areas” 
the results are that police stop and frisk 
African American males in their segregated 
communities at a higher rate than they stop 
and frisk White males in their segregated 
communities.  As the DOJ found in 
its own investigation, NOPD eected 
unconstitutional stops as well as racial and 
ethnic proling of African Americans in the 
city (DOJ, 2011).  
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The 2011 DOJ investigation found that 
almost 99% of all children arrested in the 
city were African American (LCCR, 2015). 
The report concluded that “[t]he level of 
disparity for youth in New Orleans is so 
severe and so divergent from nationally 
reported data that it cannot plausibly 
be attributed entirely to underlying 
rates at which youth commit crimes, and 
unquestionably warrants a searching 
review and a meaningful response from 
the Department” (LCCR, 2015, para. 2). 
Not much has changed since 2011: in 
2015, 99% of the children arrested in New 
Orleans are still African American (See 
Figure 3) (LCCR, 2015).  
As a result of young African American 
males being stopped more frequently, 
young African American men are arrested 
at an alarming rate for minor violations, 
while similarly situated White males are 
less likely to be stopped and frisked (LCCR, 
2015). And even when young White men 
are stopped, they are less likely to be 
arrested for the same minor violations as 
their African American peers (LCCR, 2015). 
In 2002, a Police Civilian Review Task Force 
recommended the formation of a civilian 
police oversight agency (New Orleans 
Independent Police Monitor, 2015). 
Again, in 2006, a coalition of community 
groups went before the city Council to 
express their concerns about NOPD. 
Finally, in 2008 the City Council passed a 
resolution supporting the formation of an 
independent police monitor. The Oce of 
the Independent Police Monitor (OIPM), 
along with the Oce of Inspector General, 
were voted into the city charter in 2008 
(New Orleans Independent Police Monitor, 
2015). OIPM was created in August of 2009 
and in June of 2010 Police Monitor Susan 
Hutson took oce (Hutson, 2015). 
The rst ocial recommendation of OIPM 
was to establish a new “critical incidents” 
investigation team that would be under the 
leadership of the Deputy Superintendent 
of the Public Integrity Bureau (PIB) (Hutson, 
2015). PIB is the city agency that investigates 
citizen as well as police initiated allegations 
of police misconduct.  The 2014 Annual 
Report of OIPM noted that in 2014 there 
were 17 critical incidents, the same number 
of critical incidents as in 2013 (Hutson, 
2015). OIPM found that 28 of the ocers 
involved in Ocer Involved Shooting (OIS) 
incidents had a signicant complaint and 
use of force history over the last ve years 
(Hutson, 2015). OIPM continues to focus its 
outreach not only on local reforms but also 
on national and international discussions 
about the future of policing and police 
reform (Hutson, 2015). 
Another major policy change that is focused 
on improving policing in New Orleans, is 
NOPD policy 402, a policy measure that 
informs ocers on how to interact with 
LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, 
and Queer) members of the community 
(Fernandez & Williams, 2014). The policy 
focuses on eliminating bias-based proling 
and outlines expectations for ling reports, 
for interactions between NOPD ocers 
and LGBT community members, arrest 
protocols and protocols for acquiring 
medical treatment for LGBT community 
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members should it be needed (New Orleans 
Police Department, 2013). This measure is 
a direct response to ndings from the U.S. 
Department of Justice (2011) investigation 
of the NOPD, in which it notes that NOPD 
ocers engaged in biased policing including 
LGBT discrimination, as well as a response 
to advocacy work from organizations like 
BreakOut!, a youth organization that works 
to end criminalization of LGBTQ youth of 
color and other organizations (Fernandez & 
Williams, 2014). 
In 2014, BreakOut! published the “We Deserve 
Better” report that presented ndings 
highlighting the extent of discrimination 
queer youth in New Orleans experience at the 
hands of the police. Findings from their study 
indicated that queer youth of color, especially 
transgender youth, are subjected to a range 
of abusive behavior by police including 
being called homosexual expletives, 
unconstitutional stops, assumptions that 
they are in the sex trade, and harassment 
as compared to their White and Cisgender 
counterparts (Fernandez & Williams, 2014). 
Through their “We Deserve Better”  campaign 
(launched in 2011) to end discriminatory 
policing, and their “Get YR Rights Toolkit,” a 
guide to challenging discriminatory policing 
against LGBTQTS youth, they have helped 
to educate LGBTQS youth of their rights 
and improved training of NOPD ocers 
to improve their interactions with LGBTQ 
youth of color in the city (Fernandez & 
Williams, 2014; Oaks, 2015). 
While policing remains a critical piece of 
the disparate eects of the criminal justice 
system on African American communities, 
there are indications that some within New 
Orleans’ power structure have begun to see 
the value of minimizing the risk of arrest. 
Over the past several years, the City Council 
enacted several ordinances in an attempt 
to reduce pretrial detention (Johnson, 
Laisne & Wool, 2015). NOPD ocers 
were encouraged to issue summonses 
as opposed to arresting persons charged 
with nonviolent municipal oenses such 
as disturbing the peace and possession of 
marijuana. Pre-Katrina municipal arrests for 
non-violent oenses were approximately 
70% of all those arrested.  Subsequent 
to the new ordinances, the trend has 
completely reversed itself and now 70% 
of those municipal charges are initiated 
by the issuance of a summons (Johnson, 
Laisne & Wool, 2015).
Courts
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, almost 85% of 
those criminally prosecuted in the city were 
indigent and therefore represented by the 
Orleans Parish Indigent Defender Program 
(OIDP) (Orleans Public Defenders, 2011). 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, OIDP was staed 
by approximately 40 part-time attorneys 
who represented adults in Criminal District 
Court, six part-time attorneys assigned to 
Trac and Municipal Court and six part-
time Juvenile Court attorneys.  All of the 
attorneys had extremely high caseloads and 
lacked resources to handle the volume and 
types of cases that were assigned to them. 
OIDP’s annual budget was approximately 
$2 million, with most funds primarily 
derived from local nes and fees from Trac 
Court (Orleans Public Defenders, 2011). 
The aftermath of the storm and ood left 
the city without a functioning court system 
for months.  There were no revenues to pay 
the part-time lawyers employed by OIDP 
and consequently most of those attorneys 
were left without a job and their clients 
without lawyers.
One of the many things Hurricane Katrina 
revealed was that the criminal justice 
system was broken.  It was necessary 
to reorganize the way legal services 
were provided to the city’s indigent 
population who needed representation 
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in Criminal, Trac, Municipal and Juvenile 
Courts.   In 2006, the oce of the Orleans 
Public Defenders (OPD) was created. (Lewis 
& Goyette, 2012).  The oce hired full-
time attorneys to represent its clientele. 
Previously, attorneys were assigned to 
courtrooms rather than to clients.  The 
attorneys did not meet their clients until 
charges were accepted and the clients’ 
case was allotted to the courtroom in 
which that attorney was assigned.  It was 
not uncommon for an adult charged 
with a felony punishable by death or life 
imprisonment to remain in jail and not 
meet his public defender for 60 to 120 days, 
which is the maximum amount of time an 
arrestee can be held in custody without the 
institution of prosecution (Louisiana Code 
of Criminal Procedure, Article 701). Now, 
with the restructuring of OPD, attorneys 
are assigned to represent their clients at the 
initial appearance, which occurs within 24 to 
48 hours of arrest, and continue to represent 
that client notwithstanding the courtroom 
to which the case is ultimately allotted.   
The result has been that cases are being 
investigated more promptly by their 
lawyers.  Currently, the vision for services 
provided by OPD has broadened to include 
a more holistic approach to clients.  There 
are over 51 full-time attorneys, as well as 
court support personnel, client services 
specialists, social workers and investigators 
to represent 80% of the individuals with a 
legal case in Orleans Parish. (Orleans Public 
Defenders, 2014). 
The city’s criminal court system has 
implemented pretrial services, electronic 
monitoring and other alternatives to 
detention to reduce pretrial incarceration. 
In spite of the improvements in pretrial 
detentions that focus on a risk analysis 
as well as early appointment of counsel, 
unfortunately, 85% of those detained 
while awaiting trial in 2010 were African 
Americans even though African Americans 
made up only 59% of the city’s population 
at that time due to the inability of many 
arrestees to post bond (Johnson, Laisne & 
Wool, 2015). (See Figure 2)
Juveniles arrested in New Orleans were 
previously represented by OIDP.  However, 
in 2006, Juvenile Regional Services (JRS) was 
created to ght for the rights of children in 
juvenile court  (JRS, n.d.).   That oce merged 
with Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana in 
2014 and the Louisiana Center for Children’s 
Rights was created (LCCR, n.d.).  The oce 
uses an innovative model of holistic, 
team-based, cross-disciplinary advocacy 
to win both legal and life successes for its 
vulnerable youth clientele.  Its goal is to 
ensure each child receives fairness, dignity 
and an opportunity to become a productive 
member of society. 
Orleans Parish Prison
Another feeder of dismal outcomes for 
African Americans was the Orleans Parish 
Prison (OPP).  Here also, there have been 
reforms post Katrina.  In 2005, the Parish 
Prison population was approximately 6,300 
(Johnson, Laisne & Wool, 2015). In 2015, the 
average daily population is approximately 
1,900 (See Figure 4)  (Johnson, Laisne & Wool, 
2015). 
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The Orleans Parish Sheri proposed in 2010 
to rebuild certain facilities of the jail that 
would increase the number of available beds 
to 5,832 (Johnson, Laisne, & Wool, 2015). 
Opposition from the community was erce, 
voicing the sentiment of many that the city 
could ill-aord to build and sustain such a 
large jail complex.  The idea that the city could 
incarcerate its way out of its crime problem 
was not sound.  Many believed that such a 
large jail complex would in fact continue to 
drive up the over-incarceration rate of local 
African Americans, which was already ve 
times the national average (Johnson, Laisne 
& Wool, 2015).  What the city needed was not 
an oversized jail complex but a more focused 
approach to addressing the core issues of 
crime. On February 3, 2011, the City Council 
enacted an ordinance, which allowed for only 
a 1,438 bed facility (Eggler, 2011).  The ght 
to keep the jail size small is still being waged. 
In addition to challenging the size of 
the jail, there were also challenges 
addressing the unconstitutional and 
inhumane treatment of inmates in 
OPP.  A class action lawsuit was filed on 
April 2, 2012 by the Southern Poverty 
Law Center on behalf of current and 
future inmates housed in OPP (SPLC, 
n.d.). The jail had been the subject of 
a comprehensive investigation by the 
Civil Rights Division of DOJ that began 
in 2008, pursuant to the Civil Rights 
of Institutionalized Persons Act (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2012). Following 
its investigation, DOJ informed Sheriff 
Gusman of its findings in a letter dated 
September 11, 2009, stating, 
“We nd that OPP fails to adequately 
protect inmates from harm and serious 
risk of harm from sta and other 
inmates; fails to provide inmates with 
adequate mental health care; fails to 
provide adequate suicide prevention; 
fails to provide adequate medication 
management; fails to provide safe and 
sanitary environmental conditions; 
and fails to provide adequate re safety 
precautions” (WWL Sta, 2009,  para. 4).  
In September, 2012, DOJ intervened in the 
Jones v. Gusman case, after conditions at 
the jail had not improved (U.S. Department 
of Justice, 2013). An agreement was 
reached in December 2012, and approved 
by a federal judge in June 2013. The 
federal consent decree outlined steps 
that Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusman 
must take to ensure prisoner safety and 
adequate staffing of the facility. The 
agreement required that an independent 
monitor be appointed to oversee the 
agreement and ensure compliance. Any 
new facilities built to replace the jail shall 
also be covered by the consent agreement 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). 
Juvenile Transfer 
Juveniles are transferred to adult 
court at alarming rates in New Orleans 
(Reckdahl, 2015). In Louisiana, children 
as young as 14-years-old can be tried as 
adults, transferring their cases to adult 
court. While this does not require youth 
charged as adults to be confined in adult 
facilities, juveniles transferred to adult 
courts in New Orleans have been held in 
the notoriously, dangerous Orleans Parish 
Prison (until recently). Since District 
Attorney Leon Cannizzaro took office 
in 2009, this once rarely used policy has 
now become the standard for 15 and 16 
year olds charged in the city (Reckdahl, 
2015). Cannizzaro has transferred 75% of 
all eligible juvenile cases to adult court 
and 90% of all juveniles ages 15 and 16 
charged with armed robbery (See Figure 
5). On average, the DA’s office transfers 
32 juvenile cases to adult court each year. 
Compare that to Jefferson Parish that 
transfers an average of eight juveniles per 
year and East Baton Rouge, a larger parish 
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with more armed robberies, transfers 
an average of seven juveniles per year 
(Reckdahl, 2015).
Juvenile transfer to adult court is a 
serious issue given the risks associated 
with youth transfer to adult facilities. 
Juveniles in adult facilities are more 
likely to be sexually and physically 
assaulted, are at greater risk for suicide, 
and are often deprived of education 
(Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights, 
2014). Juveniles in Orleans Parish Prison are 
also often held in isolation, sometimes in 
lockdown for 23-24 hours per day with no 
meaningful human interaction. This can lead 
to paranoia, depression and anxiety. What’s 
worse, 38% of youth transferred are found 
not guilty, have their charges dismissed 
or get probation (Louisiana Center for 
Children’s Rights). 
In June of 2015, an ordinance sponsored 
by City Councilwoman Susan Guidry to 
set aside beds at the Youth Study Center, 
the city’s juvenile detention facility, for 
some pretrial juveniles charged as adults 
was unanimously passed (White, 2015). 
This ordinance only applies to youth not 
charged with murder, aggravated rape or 
kidnapping. The Youth Study Center now 
has 12 beds set aside for these pretrial 
juveniles charged as adults. Criminal Court 
judges have the discretion to determine 
where pre-trial juveniles in their court will 
be housed. While this measure is helpful, 
it does not address the DA’s ill-advised 
practice of transferring youth to adult 
court. There is no evidence that transferring 
youth to the adult system reduces violent 
crime. In fact, transferred youth are more 
likely to commit criminal acts than those 
that remain in the juvenile justice system 
(Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). 
The practice of transferring youth to 
adult facilities subjects adolescents to 
disruptions to their development through 
increased exposure to antisocial behaviors 
in adult facilities, and denies them access to 
appropriate, youth development practices 
implemented in juvenile facilities (Mulvey & 
Schubert, 2012). This is yet another practice 
that almost exclusively impacts African 
American youth in New Orleans. In essence, 
the underlying belief that is expressed 
through this problematic practice is that 
these youth are not worth a continued 
investment in their development and 
rehabilitation. This point was conrmed by 
the DA’s statement, “As the district attorney 
for the Parish of Orleans I am not going to 
risk the safety of the law-abiding citizens 
of this community on a hope” (Reckdahl, 
2015, para. 69). This perspective ignores 
the enormous barriers of poverty, low 
quality education and mental health issues 
faced by many youth in the juvenile justice 
system and denies both the youth and the 
community the benet of their unlocked 
potential to contribute positively to the 
community. 
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Recommendations
Despite all of the reforms implemented 
post Hurricane Katrina, African Americans 
are still the vast number of those arrested 
and prosecuted in Orleans Parish.   Sixty- 
four percent of those prosecutions are for 
nonviolent oenses.   As discussed earlier, 
the causes of crime are primarily poverty 
and all its subset issues, including quality 
of life.   Unfortunately, those factors are still 
prevalent in African American communities. 
What Now?   
• Access to quality educational opportunities 
for all public students should be required 
by law.  
• Vocational job training programs should 
be made available to all students who are 
not college-bound.
• Invest in the lives of youth through active 
mentoring programs, recreational centers 
and other intervention services.
• Ensure access to quality medical care, 
including expanding drug rehabilitation 
and mental health services.
• Incentivize economic investment in 
poverty-stricken neighborhoods to 
increase the presence of private-sector 
businesses that would encourage 
employment of those residents.
• Develop job training programs for the 
unskilled labor force.
• Rebuild a police department that will 
ensure integrity in police practices, using 
best practice models such as mandatory 
body cameras, community policing, 
trainings focused on police – community 
engagement and race and gender equity.
• Work with communities to develop 
community policing programs with a focus 
on crime prevention and intervention.
• Expand the use of diversionary programs 
and specialty courts – such as mental 
health and drug courts.
• Fully fund implementation of the NOPD 
and OPP consent decrees and insist on 
constitutional practices outlined therein.
• Dedicate funding to support pre-trial 
services, the OIPM and OIG oces, 
providing the autonomy required for the 
maximum productivity of each entity.
• End the practice of charging juveniles as 
adults as standard practice rather than 
a practice for extreme cases for juveniles 
14-16 years of age. 
Although this chapter focused on the 
disparities that exist for African Americans 
that contribute to their experience with 
the criminal justice system, what must not 
be overlooked, even though not stated, are 
the many successes of African Americans 
and their contributions to the city of New 
Orleans.  This chapter focused on the 
marginalized African American citizens who 
continue to suer from socioeconomic and 
racial disparities.  These disparities manifest 
in continued poverty, inadequate schools, 
lack of employment opportunities and over 
incarceration.  Clearly, a signicant portion of 
the African American population in the city 
is still stied.   Addressing these inhumane 
disparities is essential to the future success 
of this city. 
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EQ UITY IN THE ECONOM Y: 
THE G ROWING  WEALTH 
AND ECONOM IC DIV IDE
RICHARD C.  PETERS,  PH. D. ,  SILAS H.  LEE,  PH. D.  
LEROY D.  SIM PSON,  III,  PSY. D.  AND RASHIDA H.  G OV AN,  PH. D.
THERE MUST BE CLARITY AND 
CHOREOGRAPHY BETWEEN OUR 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS.  WHERE THERE HAS 
PREVIOUSLY BEEN A TENDENCY 
TO OVERLOOK OR MARGINALIZ E 
MANY OF OUR ECONOMIC ASSETS, 
WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD 
TO HAVE THE LONG SHADOW OF 
EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC 
INEQ UALITY REMAIN THE LEGACY 
OF THIS COMMUNITY.  3
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In its immediate aftermath, Hurricane Katrina 
could count as one of its many victims, the 
economy of New Orleans. The social and 
infrastructural devastation following the 
catastrophe literally stopped New Orleans 
in its tracks. Businesses were buried, schools 
were suspended and livelihoods were lost 
as individuals and families were forced to 
ignore long-term economic success in favor 
of short-term survival.
As with many other pillars of society, the 
city’s economy slowly and resiliently rebuilt. 
While some jobs and sectors have never 
recovered (Plyer, Ortiz, Horwitz & Hobor, 
2013), they are being, to some degree, 
replaced by newer and more sustainable 
career and business opportunities. New 
Orleans’ recent drive to diversify its revenue 
streams and reduce its reliance on traditional 
hospitality and production sectors has 
led to investment and involvement in 
technological and medical innovation for 
the promise of new opportunities for recent 
and future graduates (Plyer, Ortiz, Horwitz & 
Hobor, 2013).
The hope for a progressive nancial future 
is justiable considering some of New 
Orleans’ recent economic performance. 
In fact, in 2013, New Orleans’ annual 
unemployment rate of 5.1% was below the 
national rate of 6.7% as of December that 
year (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a; U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2015b). However, the 
most recent statistics are less cheerful and 
distinctly more worrisome.  An economic 
summary published by the U.S. Bureau of 
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Labor for the period May 2014-May 2015 
indicates that the city’s economic vibrancy 
is at a state of susceptibility. While U.S. 
unemployment decreased from 6.1% 
to 5.3%, for the corresponding period 
unemployment in the New Orleans-Metarie 
area increased from 5.9% to 6.3% (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2015c). 
Despite the concerns of recent years, 
many view New Orleans as a city primed 
for economic opportunity and prosperity. 
But the question remains: “Who will be 
the winners as the city transitions to a 
knowledge-based economy?” Have the 
economic inequalities and disparities, 
particularly those based on ethnicity, 
dissipated or do they continue to make 
life dicult for those already economically 
disadvantaged? 
The crux of this chapter will be to uncover the 
present state of aairs for African Americans 
in New Orleans with respect to aspects of 
economic and workforce development, and 
will illustrate what the future may hold for 
African Americans in this ‘new’ economy of 
information and innovation. Our numbers 
and analysis suggest that the future isn’t 
bright for all in the “Big Easy” and much work 
is necessary to allow equitable access to the 
city’s entire populous, especially those that 
have been economically marginalized.
We focus on three broad aspects that all 
correlate with economic and workforce 
development for African Americans in New 
Orleans. The rst, employment, discusses the 
rate of employment and unemployment 
in the city, considers job growth rate as 
well as occupations by categories. The 
second section, education, identies the 
trends related to educational attainment, 
job training and career qualication and 
further illustrates the linkages between 
these, earnings and poverty levels. And 
nally, the third section, entrepreneurship 
and enterprise, looks at the involvement, 
or lack thereof, of African Americans in this 
new wave of innovation and small business 
development in New Orleans. Issues 
regarding opportunities and access are 
uncovered to highlight the possible future 
for African Americans in the city’s new 
economy.
Employment
“You take my life when you take the means 
whereby I live.” (William Shakespeare)
The rate of unemployment in New Orleans 
has, throughout much of the recession, 
stayed relatively comparable with the 
national gures, at times demonstrating 
better performances than the national 
average (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a). 
But dissecting the overall data reveal that job 
growth and consequential unemployment 
reduction has not been uniformly or 
equitably manifested across the races.
For example, in 2013, the unemployment 
rate for African Americans in New Orleans 
was 13%, more than twice that of the 6% 
unemployment rate for Whites (See Figure 
1) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013a; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013b). For African American 
males, aged 16-64, this number was even 
higher at 14%, substantially higher than 
the corresponding unemployment rate for 
White males in the city (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013b). Not only 
was this unemployment rate higher than 
the national unemployment rate of 6.7% 
in December 2013, but it was signicantly 
higher than the 5% unemployment rate 
for Caucasian males in New Orleans (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2013a; U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013b).  Further, in New Orleans in 2013, 
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only 54% of African American males in 
this age group were employed, compared 
to 78% for Caucasians, a 24-percentage 
point difference (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013b).  
These inequities are by no means 
idiosyncratic to New Orleans. At the 
national level, African Americans continue 
to face more challenging employment 
prospects compared to other racial 
and ethnic groups. While the national 
unemployment percentage has recently 
dipped to below 6%, unemployment rates 
for African Americans in the United States 
are approximately 10%, a discouraging 
statistic for those either unemployed 
or underemployed (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2015).
While the unemployment rate for African 
Americans in New Orleans is alarming, the 
percentage of African American males 
not in the labor force is of significant 
concern. According to a report published 
by the Lindy Boggs Center for Community 
Literacy, 52% of African American males 
in New Orleans were nonemployed 
(Sams-Abidoun & Rattler, 2011). This 
statistic represents the percentage of 
African American males who are both 
unemployed and those who are not in 
the labor force.  In 2011, 40% of African 
American males were not in the labor 
force as compared to 21% of White males 
(Sams-Abidoun & Rattler, 2011).  
The “not in labor force” category includes 
the incarcerated population, which 
might explain the 19-percentage point 
difference between African American 
males and White males. In New Orleans, 
one in 14 African American males is 
incarcerated, leaving a major gap in 
the workforce in New Orleans (Chang, 
2012).  According to Chang (2012), one 
in seven African American males in New 
Orleans are under the supervision of 
the criminal justice system. Could the 
common practice of requiring individuals 
to disclose felony convictions on 
employment applications hinder African 
American males in New Orleans from 
pursuing formal employment? “Ban the 
box” policy measures that restrict the 
use of such practices may help to open 
the door for the formerly incarcerated to 
access more employment opportunities 
in New Orleans. Other factors associated 
with a departure from the labor force 
include discouragement over job 
prospects, ill health or disability, family 
responsibilities, and other issues such as 
transportation and childcare problems 
(Desilver, 2014).  All of these issues are 
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exacerbated for African Americans and 
the poor who face greater challenges in 
each of these areas than their White and 
more affluent counterparts. 
Income disparities between African 
American and White households are 
pronounced. In 2013, African American 
households had a median income of 
$25,102 a whopping $35, 451 difference in 
the median household income for Whites 
of $60,553 (See Figure 2) (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013c; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013d). The 
income disparity has grown significantly 
since 2005, when African Americans had 
a median income of $23,394 and Whites 
hadan income of $49,262 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2005a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005b). 
A major contributor to this inequity is the 
type of occupations African Americans 
typically have access to in the city’s 
industrial sectors.
As of 2013, only 27% of African Americans 
held management and professional 
related occupations, which include 
jobs in the scientific, leal, financial, and 
business fields (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013e). Comparatively, 60% of Whites, 
held managment positions in these 
sectors, which reflects their access to 
higher wages. (See Figure 3) (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013f ). 
New, high paying jobs are expected to 
come from areas such as health care, insurance 
services, legal sectors and the burgeoning 
lm industry, a prediction corroborated 
by recent job growth reports (Plyer, Ortiz, 
& Hobor, 2013; U.S. Department of Labor, 
Figure 3
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2015c). And while New Orleans’ average wages 
continue to lag behind U.S. national averages 
in almost every occupation type category, 
the gap in wages between high paying 
professional and managerial jobs and those 
in the hospitality, retail and construction is 
substantial (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015c). 
What can be easily surmised by the gures 
and reports is that African  Americans are 
currently underrepresented in professional and 
managerial categories and are thus excluded 
from the signicantly higher wages that 
accompany this type of employment. 
One of the factors that is preventing African 
Americans from middle and high-skilled jobs in 
New Orleans is a skills gap (Sellers, Ortiz, & Plyer, 
2013). In the region, 27% of the labor force are 
low-skilled. According to a report published by 
the Data Center, 51% of the labor force is African 
American and 83% of high school dropouts 
are also African American (Sellers, Ortiz, Plyer, 
2013). Thus, low educational attainment is a 
barrier preventing African Americans from 
gaining access to higher wage employment. 
Educational pathways for adults in the labor 
force to gain additional skills and training may 
help to improve access for African Americans 
relegated to low-skilled, low-wage employment 
opportunities. One policy measure that may 
help to position African Americans and low-
income individuals for greater economic 
prosperity is an increase in the minimum wage 
to a living wage.  Low educational attainment, 
lack of work experience, minimal employment 
opportunities, and experience with the criminal 
justice system have disadvantaged African 
Americans competing in the local labor force 
(City of New Orleans, 2014a). 
In response to some of the inequities that 
permeate the city’s economic and workforce 
landscape, Mayor Mitch Landrieu announced 
the City’s Economic Opportunity Strategy, 
an comprehensive initiative to expand 
opportunities for the city’s disadvantaged 
job seekers and business (City of New 
Orleans, 2014b).  The Strategy includes 
eorts to build partnerships with some of 
the region’s largest employers and anchor 
institutions including those in industries 
like healthcare, education, government, 
engineering and aviation. The strategy 
also introduces initiatives to connect New 
Orleanians to the city’s economic growth 
opportunities through value-driven 
relationships with training providers, social 
service agencies, and community advocates. 
Furthermore, this strategy is also geared 
towards expanding outreach towards 
growth and expansion of strong small 
businesses with incentives for relocation, 
and to create collaborative projects with 
larger corporations. This eort will start 
building the bridge to create employment 
opportunities for local communities. Finally, 
the plan also invests in the creation of more 
contractual opportunities with the City 
for qualied small businesses (City of New 
Orleans, 2014b).  
A signicant part of the Mayor’s economic 
opportunity framework is an investment 
in foundational skills and job training for 
disadvantaged job seekers, a sensible 
response to the skills gap within the local 
workforce.  Educational attainment remains 
a consistent factor impacting African 
American’s economic outcomes. The next 
section will examine this issue more closely. 
Education
“The greatest good you can do for another 
is not just to share your riches, but reveal to 
them their own.”- (Benjamin Disraeli)
In 2004, a report titled A Haunted City, 
the Social and Economic Status of African 
Americans and Whites in New Orleans, 
readers were reminded that “the dominant 
theme from the 2000 census data is, New 
Orleans remains a city divided – divided 
by economics, education and opportunity. 
For a disproportionate share of this city’s 
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population, particularly African Americans, 
the hammer of inequality continues to 
pound them deeper into the grave of 
economic inequality.
The educational chasm between the “haves” 
and “have-nots” and its related impact 
on income is especially visible when one 
considers the signicant wage disparities 
between high school and college graduates. 
A 2014 report by the Pew Research Center 
reports that for millennials ages 25-32, 
employees with four-year college degrees 
earned almost $20,000 more than those with 
high school diplomas (Pew Research Center, 
2014). This data is particularly troublesome 
for African Americans in New Orleans who 
continue to lag behind Whites in this critical 
aspect. For example, in 2013, only 14% of 
African American males and 21% African 
American females in New Orleans had a 
bachelors degree or higher as compared 
to 60% of White males and 65% of White 
females (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013g; U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2013h). 
As one of the primary agents of socialization, 
education is a complex system that 
intersects and impacts the socioeconomic 
destinations of a person’s life.  In today’s 
knowledge-based economy, which 
emphasizes analytical and communication 
skills, education and occupation are still 
considered the two pathways to the middle 
class.  And, every succeeding generation 
should attain a better quality of life than the 
previous one.  However, for many African 
Americans in this city, that pathway is often 
congested with obstacles. This data reects 
more than just the disparities in education 
attainment by race in New Orleans, but the 
multiple intersecting factors contributing to 
the inertia in social mobility among African 
Americans and the long-term consequences. 
Non-involvement and non-attainment of 
tertiary education and college degrees 
can therefore help explain some of the 
worrying economic trends and inequalities 
facing African Americans in New Orleans. 
Along with the gaps in median income 
and unemployment already mentioned, 
indicators such as poverty rates and even 
housing ownership are impacted by 
disparities in education. These disparities 
also exist in homeownership, where 42% of 
African Americans in New Orleans owned 
their homes as compared to 53% of whites 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013i; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013j). Poverty levels conrm these 
disparities since 35% for African Americans 
in New Orleans live below the poverty line 
as compared to 12% of Whites (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013m; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013n).
The collateral damage and intergenerational 
impact from the gap in education attainment 
fuels inequality and contributes to a decline 
in social and economic capital for African 
American families.  Unfortunately, this leads 
to a cycle of entrenched poverty and social 
disinvestment that negatively impacts 
perceptions of residents and the outlook on 
living in New Orleans for future generations. 
This reality was reinforced in a study by 
Chetty and Hendren (2015). In this study, New 
Orleans ranked 99th out of 100 metro areas 
with respect to income mobility.  Chetty and 
Hendren (2015) noted that children from low-
income households in metro New Orleans can 
expect their household income to decline by 
nearly 15% when they reach 26 years of age. 
This decline can be attributed to low-income 
families being excluded from social and 
economic opportunities because of education 
and social isolation (Chetty and Hendren, 
2015).  Thus, inequality and poverty (rather 
than nancial assets) are transferred from one 
generation to the next.   
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Entrepreneurship
“The worst form of inequality is to try to 
make unequal things equal.” (Aristotle)
As our nation recovers from a recession, the 
gap in both entrepreneurship and workforce 
development between African-American 
entrepreneurs and their White counterparts, 
as well as other minorities, is still far and 
wide. Particularly in the city of New Orleans, 
where the population is majority African-
American, yet the presence of African 
American businesses is low with even fewer 
of these businesses being sustained for at 
least three years (Yang, 2015).  As of 2014, the 
average income of African American-owned 
businesses in the New Orleans metropolitan 
area was $56,647. This is consistent with 
data that indicates that minority-owned 
businesses represent 27% of businesses in 
New Orleans, yet only account for 2% of gross 
receipts (Plyer, Ortiz, & Hobor, 2013). Only 
16.7% of the New Orleans area businesses 
are African American-owned with 4.1% of 
those businesses having paid employees. Per 
100,000 residences, there were 8.7% African 
American-owned businesses in the area 
(Yang, 2015). Yang notes that there is realistic 
optimism regarding the growth of African 
American-owned businesses in the city, but 
this growth is gradual compared to all of the 
other racial groups. 
Disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) 
programs help minority and women-owned 
businesses access economic opportunities. 
In New Orleans, a major DBE opportunity 
that promotes inclusion of minority-owned 
businesses in economic opportunities 
related to the New Orleans recovery is 
Orleans Parish schools rebuilding projects. 
Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) and 
the Recovery School District (RSD) set a 
goal of 35% and 25% respectively for DBE 
contract participation, yet in 2012 only had 
2% combined DBE participation (Recovery 
School District, 2014). As of May 2015, OPSB 
had 32% DBE participation and RSD had 26% 
(School Construction Industry Connection, 2015).
Some of the slow growth of African American 
enterprises can be attributed to the lack of 
involvement of African Americans in funding 
opportunities and business incubators. 
The Idea Village, one of New Orleans’ 
entrepreneur incubators, reported a minority 
participation rate of 16% in the organization’s 
entrepreneurship startup program since 2009 
(A.L. Johnson, personal communication, June 
3, 2015). The local business community is 
working to address entrepreneurial inclusion 
by leveraging the achievements of existing 
African American entrepreneurs to spur 
future engagement of this demographic in 
entrepreneurship. 
PowerMoves.NOLA, is a national initiative 
based in New Orleans that uses innovative 
approaches to remove barriers to minority 
entrepreneurship. The mission of the initiative 
is to increase the number of “venture-backed, 
minority-founded companies.”  The initiative 
is currently serving ve fellows, three of 
whom are based in New Orleans, and 57 
small businesses.
PowerMoves.NOLA and Idea Village are among 
a small cadre of providers of small business 
assistance programs in New Orleans that 
can support African American enterprises. 
Organizations such as the Urban League’s 
Women’s Business Resource Center, Southern 
University at New Orleans Small Business 
Development and Management Institute, 
Goodwork Network and the Louisiana Small 
Business Development Center oer a broad 
spectrum of services that are critical to 
create the eco-system necessary for minority 
businesses to not only survive, but thrive. 
Recommendations
First and foremost, to reverse the entrenched 
eects of these disparities, the community 
must invest in the potential of its greatest 
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resource --- its people. Full civic, social and 
economic participation of its citizens is the 
key to any competitive and socially stable 
community. Schools must become more 
than just places to transmit knowledge, but 
facilitators to cultivate the personal and 
professional network.  As such, schools can 
become one of the social escalators lifting 
many out of poverty. Educated citizens are 
innovative and more adaptable to withstand 
economic disruptions.
In a hyper-competitive national and global 
economy, the ability of a community to 
nurture its human capital ensures its long-
term sustainability and the resiliency of its 
citizens.  The protracted and entrenched 
disparities expose socially and economically 
fragile residents to recurring survival 
stress and anxiety.  The psychological 
eects of trying to survive and navigate an 
environment with diminished resources 
produces a plethora of social maladies.
Finally, there must be clarity and choreography 
between our political, economic and social 
institutions.  Where there has previously 
been a tendency to overlook or marginalize 
many of our economic assets, we can no 
longer aord to have the long shadow of 
educational and economic inequality remain 
the legacy of this community.  
Ultimately, we must unlock access to 
opportunity.  Policies such as tax incentives 
should be established with direct returns 
that spur economic development in 
marginalized communities. Public projects 
should mandate equitable participation, 
with the establishment of Community 
Benefits Agreements attached.  Private 
companies must reform recruitment 
and hiring practices to not just increase 
access to jobs, but diversify at all levels 
throughout the enterprise, particularly 
manager and executive levels.  One way 
to stem the tide is to more aggressively 
connect incentives to diversity outcomes. 
Workforce development programs must 
be comprehensive in providing case 
management, workforce fundamentals 
and technical skills, and produce an actual 
pipeline to employment.  Small business 
programs must be better resourced and 
coordinated via data systems to provide 
a continuum of services and access to 
capital and investment at the various 
stages of business growth.  Accountability 
for inclusive outcomes on development 
projects should also be strengthened via 
increased monitoring and enforcement.
A practical/tactical solution is to engage 
these issues aggressively by establishing 
a strong program that is laden with 
activities promoting a concept of “the 
better opportunity”. This would involve 
promoting college education with 
practical (or real world) experience 
to prepare African Americans with a 
strategic combination of knowledge 
and skills within in their field of interest, 
particularly within the demand sectors. 
From the economic position, it would be 
essential to grow business and commerce 
from “home base” or within New Orleans 
by taking advantage of the resources 
that we have, particularly in areas such 
as real estate. Within New Orleans East 
alone, there are significant opportunities 
to build and develop, providing access 
to high wage jobs and entrepreneurial 
opportunities.
As a community, we share an inter-
locking destiny.  The continued social 
and economic displacement of a 
disproportionate share of our population 
will result in excessive under-employment 
and unemployment, producing on-
going economic stagnation.  Instead of 
families transferring economic assets to 
succeeding generations, poverty and 
economic inequality will become the 
family heirloom.
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This map highlights public investment in non-transportation capital projects across the city between 
2007-2015. City council district boundaries are labeled to highlight investments by district. Capital projects 
include libraries, police and re stations, recreation facilities, and other related projects. Total amount for 
publicly-funded capital projects is $423.7 million with $34.3 million in District A, $115.9 million in District B, 
$94.3 million in District C, $110.5 million in District D, and $69.7 million in District E.
E
C
D
A
B
Legend
Capital Projects 
Development Cost
Under $1.5M
$1.5M - $3M
$3.1M - $6M
$6.1M - $10M
Over $10M
New Orleans Select* Capital Projects, 2007-2015
$423.7 Million in non-transportation 
capital investment since 2007
*Does not include transportation projects
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THE STATE OF BLACK 
EDUCATION: TEN YEARS AFTER 
THE STORM  OF REFORM
RASHIDA H. GOVAN, PH.D.  ANDRE M. PERRY, PH.D. 
AND DEBRA VAUGHAN
CROSSING  CRITICAL 
THRESHOLDS LIKE COLLEG E 
DEG REE ATTAINM ENT IS 
ULTIM ATELY IM PORTANT 
BECAUSE IT IS THE FOREM OST 
M EANS OF G AINING  SOCIAL 
M OBILITY.  THIS IS ESPECIALLY 
TRUE FOR PEOPLE IN POVERTY. 
CONSEQ UENTLY, EDUCATORS 
MUST MEASURE GROWTH 
AGAINST TRUE TO LIFE 
THRESHOLDS STUDENTS AND 
FAMILIES MUST CROSS IN ORDER 
TO CLIMB THE SOCIAL LADDER.  4
State of Black New Orleans67
Discussions and research on post-Katrina 
education reforms and their impacts on 
student learning, political participation and 
community cohesion most often focus on 
whether or not improvements or declines 
have occurred in those areas since the 
storm. But debates about growth do not 
plainly declare whether or not students 
are prepared for college or for a career. 
Crossing critical thresholds like college 
degree attainment is ultimately important 
because it is the foremost means of gaining 
social mobility. This is especially true for 
people in poverty. Consequently, educators 
must measure growth against true to life 
thresholds students and families must cross 
in order to climb the social ladder.  
How are schools preparing young people 
to pursue and access a better quality of life? 
What role is our system of education playing 
in improving broad economic, health and 
other outcomes for our children? How can 
school leaders leverage education systems 
to maximize the quality of life for children 
and their families?
This chapter hopes to respond to these basic 
questions by examining early childhood, 
K-12 and postsecondary educational issues. 
The chapter also examines the large number 
of young people neither working nor in 
school.
Early Childhood Care and 
Education
Today children are expected to enter 
kindergarten knowing more than they 
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did a decade ago (Curwood, 2007).  As 
expectations continue to rise, the lagging 
achievement gap between low-income, 
African American children and their high-
income, White peers still begins long before 
children enter school (Hutchison, Morrissey, 
& Burgess, 2014). Consequently, what steps 
have school leaders taken to eliminate 
this gap, facilitate healthy early childhood 
development and promote school readiness 
for low-income and African American 
children in New Orleans? 
Several key factors that promote school 
readiness during early childhood include 
access to quality childcare, health facilities, 
parks and playgrounds; health care visits, 
and home literacy activities (Karoly, Kilburn, 
Cannon, 2005a). Children in poverty often 
face barriers to these important early 
childhood development opportunities. 
At last count, 39% of children in New 
Orleans live in poverty and 50.5% of African 
American children in New Orleans live in 
poverty (Mack, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 
2013b).  In order to assess children’s risks to 
school readiness, proxy measures are used 
such as maternal educational attainment 
(linked to home literacy activities), median 
income, female-headed households (and 
other economic indicators), and access to 
health care, insurance and other resources 
(LSU/Tulane Early Childhood Policy and 
Data Center, 2012). 
In the Early Childhood Reach and Risk in 
Louisiana report published in 2012, Orleans 
Parish received a moderate to high-risk 
rating, indicating the level of risk children 
face for gaps in school readiness (LSU/
Tulane Early Childhood Policy and Data 
Center, 2012). Orleans Parish earned a 
rating of moderate to high risk or high 
risk for all ve economic factors including 
female-headed households, maternal 
educational attainment, poverty rate, 
and unemployment (LSU/Tulane Early 
Childhood Policy and Data Center, 2012). 
As previously noted, these factors impact 
young children’s access to important early 
childhood opportunities and resources. 
According to a 2013 report by the City of 
New Orleans Department of Health, 19 out of 
72 neighborhoods lacked adequate public 
transit, 12 lacked green space, and 19 lacked 
childcare facilities within the neighborhood 
(New Orleans Health Department & Healthy 
Start New Orleans, 2013).  The deciency of 
resources limit opportunities children need 
during early childhood to stimulate healthy 
development. 
There are local programs that help to lessen 
the impact of poverty on early childhood 
outcomes. Included among them is the Early 
Steps program, which serves a relatively 
high percentage of young children with 
developmental delays (LSU/Tulane Early 
Childhood Policy and Data Center, 2012). 
Early Steps serves children from birth to 
three with developmental delays or medical 
conditions that cause delays. The program 
assists children with services such as assisted 
technology, therapy and special instruction 
within their homes to help facilitate healthy 
development (Oce for Citizens with 
Developmental Disabilities, n.d.). 
Orleans Parish also has high percentages 
of three- and four-year-olds enrolled 
in pre-school programs from high-risk 
neighborhoods such as the Desire Area, 
the Florida Area and Holy Cross, all of 
which had 100% of their three- and four-
year-olds enrolled in pre-school programs 
(New Orleans Health Department & Healthy 
Start New Orleans, 2013).  The expansion of 
community health centers in New Orleans 
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has also increased access to primary health 
care facilities in high need neighborhoods 
(New Orleans Health Department & 
Healthy Start New Orleans, 2013). The 
aforementioned assets help to expand 
opportunities for healthy early childhood 
development for children in New Orleans.  
High quality early childcare and education 
programs are related to numerous positive 
outcomes including school readiness, 
increased likelihood of graduation, 
employment, higher income, improved 
health outcomes and decreased likelihood 
of involvement with crime (Calman & Tarr-
Whelan, 2005; Karoly, Kilburn, & Cannon, 
2005).  Data is not destiny, and thus, it is 
important that programs and services aimed 
at improving early childhood development 
for vulnerable children consider the 
broad factors impacting their children’s 
development. 
A 2012 policy measure called the Early 
Childhood Education Act, or Act 3, was 
designed to address some of the challenges 
in the early childhood care and education 
system in Louisiana to better prepare 
children for kindergarten readiness (Oce 
of the Governor, 2013). In 2012, Louisiana 
Governor Bobby Jindal signed into law 
Act 3, a legislative measure that brought 
about the coordination of early childhood 
care and education services and programs 
under the auspices of the Department 
of Education. The state’s early childhood 
care and education system was previously 
described as “fragmented,” and almost 
half of the state’s young children entered 
kindergarten unprepared (Oce of the 
Governor, 2013). Act 3 established the Early 
Childhood Care and Education Network, 
a coordinated system of early childhood 
providers participating in the central 
enrollment system and quality rating 
system (LDOE, n.d.a).  Additionally, the Act 
calls for the alignment of standards in early 
childhood care and education that facilitates 
kindergarten readiness. The measure is 
intended to increase accountability and 
quality of publicly funded early childhood 
care and education programs. It introduced 
a revised rating of childcare providers and 
programs to make it easier for parents to 
select quality programs for their children. 
Other components of Act 3 focus on 
improving professional development for 
early childhood providers, introduces an 
accountability system that includes “age-
appropriate” assessments of children, and 
eliminates “red tape” that would free up 
provider resources to attract high quality 
professionals (Oce of the Governor, 2013). 
Although the Early Childhood Education 
Act intends to improve quality, coordination 
and accountability in the early childhood 
care and education system, several major 
critiques of the policy measure suggest 
that unintended consequences could 
make increased access and quality more 
challenging for the state’s most vulnerable 
children. Coordination of early childhood 
care and education system addresses 
the issue of fragmentation, however 
some believe that placing the system 
under the auspices of the Department of 
Education may lead to a developmentally 
inappropriate application of a K-12 lens 
on early childhood development. The 
implementation of standardized tests and 
a focus on numeracy and literacy do not 
meet the broad developmental needs 
of children during early childhood (e.g., 
socio-emotional development) (Bassok, 
Latham, & Rorem, 2015). Findings from a 
national study of early childhood education 
programs indicate that play-based 
learning, a popular and appropriate early 
childhood education approach is quickly 
being replaced by more traditional K-12 
teaching models that focus on academic 
skills (Bassok et al., 2015). This trend has 
resulted in a reduction in opportunities for 
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play, a more age-appropriate pedagogical 
approach to early childhood education 
(Bassok et al., 2015). This is especially true 
in districts that educate high proportions of 
low-income children and children of color. 
Consequently, Act 3 may be facilitating this 
shift without a full awareness of its impact 
on the development of Louisiana’s children. 
Another critique of Act 3 is that it 
increases standards for early childhood 
program providers but does not increase 
funding for key early childhood care and 
education programs (Gray, 2014).  That is 
a signicant shortcoming, given that the 
cost of compliance can be burdensome for 
already strained providers in low-income 
communities. Over the past ve years, 
state funding for the Child Care Assistance 
Program (CCAP) has been cut by 58% to 
$1750, while actual childcare costs are 
upwards of $6000 annually (Policy Institute 
for Children, 2015). Low-income families 
are expected to make up the dierence, 
which further serves as a barrier for 
vulnerable children to access high quality 
early childhood programs. Since these cuts 
went into eect, the number of children 
served by through CCAP has been cut in 
half (Policy Institute for Children, 2015). 
The state’s largest, publicly funded pre-K 
program LA4, is also grossly underfunded 
at $4580 per student when the actual cost 
of an LA4 classroom is $5500 per student 
(Policy Institute for Children, 2015). These 
budget shortfalls are perhaps the biggest 
threat to increased access to high quality 
early childhood care and education for 
low-income children and children of color. 
Without adequately addressing these 
issues, gaps in school readiness for low-
income children and children of color may 
continue to persist, making the goal to 
close the achievement gap in New Orleans 
continuously out of reach. 
System Reforms
New Orleans underwent a number of 
reforms post-Katrina. Broadly, some of the 
reforms we will examine are school choice, 
changes within the educator workforce, 
the Louisiana Scholarship program, school 
closures and expulsions. 
School Choice
As families returned to New Orleans and 
schools re-opened after Katrina, public 
school attendance zones were eliminated 
(Sims & Vaughan, 2014). Public schools 
instituted “open enrollment” policies 
allowing students to apply and enroll in 
schools across the city no matter where 
they lived. In New Orleans, school choice 
was born of necessity given the nature of 
destruction caused by Katrina and due to the 
fact that many schools re-opened as charter 
schools (didn’t allow for attendance zones). 
However, in many other urban areas across 
the country, public education systems have 
adopted school choice policies to diversify 
schools and allow families to “opt out” of 
failing neighborhood schools (Liu & Taylor, 
2005).
Families exercised an informal system of 
choice prior to Katrina. Schools primarily 
served families within their zoned 
neighborhood. However, magnet schools in 
New Orleans enrolled students from across 
the city regardless of where they lived.
Because there are no “default” neighborhood 
schools post Katrina, all parents must 
actively choose a school for their child. 
To encourage fairness and transparency 
in the selection process, community and 
school leaders developed a centralized 
enrollment process called the Common 
Application, which later evolved into 
OneApp (Dreilinger, 2013). OneApp is an 
application process that allows parents 
to rank in order of preference up to 
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eight schools for their child. OneApp was 
created by the Recovery School District 
(RSD) and first implemented for the 2012-
13 school year. A computer program 
matches students with available seats 
in the school based on their parents’ 
choices. Preference is given to students 
who have a sibling attending the 
school and to those transitioning from 
a failing school. In addition, geographic 
priority is given to those living within 
neighborhood boundaries of the school 
of their choice, often referred to as 
geographic catchment areas.
All RSD charter schools, OPSB direct-
run schools, and newly authorized OPSB 
charter schools are required to participate 
in OneApp. Nine OPSB charter schools and 
NOCCA do not participate; they require 
students to apply at the school and 
independently run their schools’ lotteries 
for placement (Dreilinger, 2015a). Upon 
their charter renewal, however, the nine 
OPSB charter schools will be required to 
use OneApp for student placement. Of 
the nine, six will be up for renewal and 
join OneApp in 2017-18 and three will join 
in the 2021-22 school year. But currently, 
some of the nine are the most sought 
after and competitive schools, and they 
do not participate in the OneApp process 
making it more cumbersome to fill out 
separate applications for schools. In 
addition, the most coveted schools have 
very limited seats so many parents do 
not get their first choice. For the 2015-16 
school year, 4,000 new students applied 
to schools using OneApp and 6,300 
students used OneApp  to change schools 
(Drielinger, 2015).
For the 2012-13 school year, OneApp match 
results showed that 84% of students were 
placed in one of their top 3 schools and 
75% in their number one choice. For the 
2013-14 school year, 71.5% of students 
were placed in one of their top 3 choices 
and 55% in their number one choice (Sims 
& Vaughan, 2014).
Figure1:  School Capacity by Letter Grade
Sources: Sims, P. and Vaughan, D. The State of public education in New Orleans:2014. Cowen Institute.
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How Parents Choose?
When asked about the characteristics of 
schools that are important, parents cite 
things like academic performance, teacher 
quality, extracurricular oerings (especially 
in high school), and school location. The 
Urban League of Greater New Orleans 
(ULGNO) report (2013), Parent Perspectives: 
Parental Engagement and Education Reform 
in New Orleans found that parents consider 
many factors and tend to look at a school 
holistically rather than as a set of isolated 
characteristics. While parents are interested 
in a school’s academic ranking and test 
score results, they want to be sure their own 
child’s academic needs are met and look 
for additional support such as test prep, 
tutoring, and enrichment programs. Also, 
parents recognize the importance of an 
engaging and challenging curriculum and 
value specialized programs that appeal to 
their child’s interests. 
The aforementioned ULGNO report (2013) 
and the 2013 Cowen Institute for Public 
Education Initiatives (Cowen Institute) report 
found that location or proximity to home or 
work was another factor parents consider 
when selecting a school for their child. A 
study by the Education Research Alliance for 
New Orleans at Tulane University analyzed 
enrollment patterns before and after Katrina 
and OneApp priorities (Harris & Larsen, 2015). 
Tulane researchers conrmed that distance 
from home to school was important and 
suggested that some families still view the 
nearest school or neighborhood school as 
the “default” choice. They noted that even 
when a higher performing option was only 
slightly farther away, parents ranked the 
closer school higher in priority on OneApp.
In order for school choice/open enrollment 
to adequately serve the needs of families 
and increase educational outcomes for 
all students, there must be ample quality 
options and parents must have access to 
information. An analysis of enrollment and 
capacity conducted by the Cowen Institute 
shows that elementary/middle and high 
schools with a School Performance Score 
(SPS) of “A” are at or above capacity (Sims 
& Vaughan, 2014). Of the schools earning 
an SPS of “B” nearly all are at capacity. 
Conversely most schools reporting an SPS 
letter grade of “D” and all schools reporting 
a letter grade of “F” are below capacity. (See 
Figure 1) This analysis indicates that there 
is a high demand for higher performing 
schools and that demand exceeds supply.
With so many options available to parents, 
access to information is vital in the decision 
making process. The Cowen Institute study 
in 2013 found that parents rely on family 
and friends for information about schools 
and that many parents were misinformed 
about their options and the process. 
Organizations such as the New Orleans 
Parents Guide (NOPG) and the Urban League 
of Greater New Orleans (ULGNO) are actively 
addressing the needs of families to gather 
accurate and appropriate information about 
schools and the application/enrollment 
process. New Orleans Parents Guide is a 
nonprot organization providing quality 
and transparent information to families 
through the annual New Orleans Parents’ 
Guide to Public Schools as well as a Parents 
Guide phone app.
The Urban League of Greater New Orleans, 
through the Family Resource Centers, 
provides families with information and 
support to select and navigate the 
application/enrollment process. Three 
Family Resource Centers are located 
throughout the city and are open daily to 
accommodate families as needed. Language 
assistance in Spanish and Vietnamese is also 
available at the Centers. Additionally, each 
year, ULGNO publishes the New Orleans 
Guide to High School and Beyond providing 
parents with information about both their 
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public and nonpublic high school options. 
ULGNO also hosts a large-scale annual 
Schools Expo where thousands of attendees 
interface with school representatives to 
learn about the full spectrum of local school 
options. 
Louisiana Scholarship Program
Families with students in public schools with 
a letter grade of  “C,” “D”, “F” or “T” (transition) 
or with children entering kindergarten can 
apply for a scholarship or voucher to send 
their child to a participating private school. In 
addition, eligible families must have a family 
income that does not exceed 250% of the 
federal poverty guidelines (Sims & Vaughan, 
2014). Parents in Orleans Parish apply using 
the OneApp and can rank up to eight schools 
in order of their preference including both 
public and participating private schools. 
For the 2015-16 school year, 1,500 students 
of 10,300 applicants included at least one 
private school as a choice on OneApp; about 
one-third of those students selected only 
private schools. (Dreilinger, 2015a.)
The voucher program was piloted in New 
Orleans in 2008 and expanded statewide 
in 2012. The state reports that 131 private 
schools are participating in the program 
statewide. There are 42 private schools 
accepting the voucher in the Greater New 
Orleans region and 29 of these schools are 
located in Orleans Parish (LDOE, n.d.c.). 
Questions remain about the quality among 
private schools in the voucher program. 
Students receiving publicly funded 
scholarships to attend private schools 
are required to take state assessments. 
Statewide, in 2013-14 40% of scholarship 
students tested in grades 3 through 8 
scored basic or above; the state average 
was 69% (Dreilinger, 2014b). Because of low 
levels of student academic achievement, 23 
schools are no longer allowed to accept new 
students through the voucher program; 10 
of these “failing schools” are in New Orleans 
(Dreilinger, 2015a).
Educator Workforce
Teacher quality is also important to parents 
and they dene it in a variety of ways. Parents 
are looking for teachers that are dedicated, 
caring, can dierentiate instruction, etc. 
Some parents value teacher certication 
and experience. In both the Urban League 
study (2013) and research conducted by 
the Cowen Institute (2013), some parents 
expressed concern about the shift in 
teacher demographics post-Katrina. In the 
wake of Katrina, approximately 7,500 public 
school employees were red. Many veteran 
teachers reapplied to teach in OPSB or 
RSD schools; however, most newly opened 
charter schools enlisted organizations such 
as Teacher For America (TFA) and The New 
Teacher Project, TeachNOLA, bringing in 
predominately younger, non-local, less 
experienced White teachers. For some 
parents, a quality teacher was described as 
someone who looked like them, grew up like 
them, and had a deep appreciation for local 
culture and traditions, in part a response to 
the vastly dierent demographic prole of 
the current NOPS educator workforce post-
Katrina (Cowen Institute, 2013). 
According to a report proered by 
EducateNOW! (2015) in the 2003-04 
academic year, 74% of teachers in public 
schools in New Orleans were African 
American. In 2012-13, 51% of teachers 
in public schools in New Orleans (OPSB 
and RSD) were African American. The 
social and economic eects of the drop 
in African American teachers remain an 
ever present, tense, but scarcely studied 
topic. An examination of the impact of this 
demographic shift within the educator 
workforce must be studied with respect to 
its impact on children and its impact on the 
shrinking, African American middle class in 
New Orleans. 
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School Closures
During the 2014-2015 school year, 26 
charter schools (30%) in New Orleans were 
up for renewal or extensions (Dreilinger, 
2014a).  The state Board of Elementary 
and Secondary Education (BESE) renewed 
or extended charters for 22 of the schools; 
charters for two schools were extended 
with some probationary stipulations 
and two schools were slated to close 
(Dreilinger, 2014d). 
Since Katrina, 19 charter schools have 
closed, surrendered their charters, changed 
management, or merged with another 
school. In addition to charter school closures, 
the RSD has closed 34 traditional direct-run 
schools and authorized charter schools to 
operate in many of the school buildings, 
and OPSB closed three alternative schools. 
(Louisiana Department of Education, n.d.b). 
Closures are usually based on the schools’ 
report card grades and performance scores, 
which are mostly made up of student test 
scores and graduation rates for high schools, 
nancial viability, and organizational 
(legal and contractual) obligations. In 
more extreme cases, schools have been 
closed because of incompliance with 
state regulations, BESE policy and charter 
contracts, special education violations, and 
other violations that compromise the safety 
and well-being of children (Jewson, 2015; 
Tidmore, 2011). 
Although school closures are a direct 
result of increased accountability in public 
education in New Orleans, the impact 
of school closures on families must be 
examined. Children of color have almost 
exclusively been impacted by this 
education reform strategy leaving families 
scrambling to nd new schools for their 
children. Empirical evidence suggests that 
student mobility has a negative impact on 
young children (Beatty, 2010). As a policy, 
school closures should be a method of last 
resort and every eort possible must be 
made to improve schools before school 
closures are enforced. 
Expulsions
The decentralization of the public school 
system following Hurricane Katrina left 
little consistency and oversight of student 
discipline and expulsions. In 2012-2013, 
the Orleans Parish School Board and the 
Recovery School District established a 
centralized expulsion hearing oce, a set 
of standard policies, and single review 
team to hear all cases for students enrolled 
in public schools located in New Orleans 
(including all RSD and state-authorized 
charter schools, OPSB charter schools, 
and OPSB direct-run schools.) The new 
expulsion handbook identies three levels 
of oenses; levels one and two include 
actions that result in expulsions while 
level three oenses lead to a “disciplinary 
conference” (Dreilinger, 2015b).  Having 
more students referred to a disciplinary 
conference has led to fewer expulsions.
A comparison of mid-year 2013 and 
2014 expulsion rates and counts shows a 
decrease. In December 2013, 114 public 
school students were expelled (.26%) and 75 
students received a conference (Dreilinger, 
2015b). By mid-year 2014, the number of 
students expelled declined to 100 (.22%) 
and 201 students received a conference. 
Overall, the RSD saw a 45% drop in the 
number of students recommended for 
expulsion by mid-year 2014-2015 and a 
citywide decrease of 25% (RSD, 2015). 
These changes to the expulsion process 
in New Orleans Public Schools are a step 
in the right direction in addressing the 
school-to-prion pipeline. School expulsions 
disproportionately impact African American 
and Hispanic students who are 10 and 
four times (respectively) more likely than 
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White students to be expelled (Louisiana 
Association of Public Charter Schools, 2012). 
In New Orleans 46% of the children that 
the Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights 
(LCCR) represents have been expelled or 
suspended, 25% have been arrested for 
something that happened in school, and 98% 
of them are African Americans (Perry, 2015). 
LCCR’s Children Defense Team represents 
1200 juvenile cases each year. These statistics 
illustrate the pervasiveness of the school-
to-prison pipeline on African Americans in 
New Orleans and should inuence schools to 
identify additional alternatives to disciplining 
African American youth.    
Secondary Education
Over the past 10 years signicant gains have 
been made in secondary education in New 
Orleans.  Public school graduation rose from 
54% in 2004 to almost 73% in 2014 (LDOE, 
2015b).  Dropout rates have almost been cut 
in half, moving from12.2% in 2004 to 6.5% 
in 2014 (LDOE, 2014c).  And 59% of the class 
of 2014 enrolled in college the fall semester 
after graduation (LDOE, 2015b). These data 
points are frequently used to highlight 
the progress that has been made in New 
Orleans schools, but what do they really tell 
us? Have gains in secondary education been 
equitable? Are students exiting high school 
ready for college and career? 
A few details must be mentioned to put 
this discussion in perspective. First, despite 
the fact that RSD-NO manages more than 
80% of public schools in New Orleans, they 
only educate about half of public high 
school students in the city (LDOE, 2015a). 
In addition, OPSB high schools include 
a few selective admissions high schools, 
two of which enroll a higher proportion 
of White students and a lower proportion 
of low-income students than most public 
high schools in the city. Benjamin Franklin 
High School and Lusher Charter School 
(upper school) graduate less than 25% of 
the OPSB senior class, but have the highest 
ACT composite scores for the district (LDOE, 
2015a; LDOE, 2014a). Finally, New Orleans 
and Louisiana have one of the highest 
private school enrollments in the nation, 
with 25% of its students attending private 
and parochial schools (Davidson, 2014). 
Thus, the state of Black education will 
include data, where possible, on private and 
parochial high school outcomes. 
The question has been posed, “How are 
high schools in New Orleans preparing their 
students to succeed in career and college?” 
We will use ACT data to examine schools’ 
success at preparing students for college, 
given that scores on the ACT are predictors 
of rst year college performance. A brief 
analysis of NOPS student performance 
over the past 10 years will be oered in this 
section. In addition, we will also present 
TOPS eligibility data available from the 
Louisiana Department of Education to 
provide a snapshot of private and parochial 
school students’ achievement in comparison 
to public school student achievement. An 
analysis of inequities within private and 
parochial schools is provided as well using 
TOPS data to provide some insight on how 
much families are benetting from the 
investment in private school education. 
Data analysis on college enrollment by 
school type for NOPS is also presented 
in this section. Very little data is available 
on career readiness initiatives in NOPS. 
However, a discussion on Jump Start, the 
statewide career readiness initiative, will be 
discussed in brief. 
ACT Performance
High school grade point average (GPA), ACT 
and SAT scores, and non-cognitive variables 
are among several valid predictors of college 
success (Richardson, Abraham, & Bond, 
2012). Although standardized tests alone 
are insucient predictors of college success, 
they are valid predictors of rst year college 
76Education
performance and they are used nationally 
to gauge college readiness (in addition to 
other variables including high school GPA) 
(Noble, 2003).  ACT scores do not provide a 
holistic view of college readiness, but they 
are used to determine remediation and 
college entry for colleges and universities 
in Louisiana.  An ACT composite score of 
an 18 (minimum) is an indicator of college 
readiness and an ACT below an 18 is used as 
an indicator that students need remediation 
(Louisiana Connect, 2014).  
In 2014, seven out of 24 public high schools 
in New Orleans (29%) with reported ACT 
scores for seniors had an ACT composite 
score of 18 or better (LDOE, 2014a).  In the 
RSD the numbers are signicantly lower 
than OPSB with only two schools out of 
17 (12%) with a reported ACT composite 
score of 18 or better. This means that an 
overwhelming majority of schools in the RSD-
NO are graduating students who are deemed 
underprepared for college. To be exact, 33% 
of RSD-NO students had a composite score of 
18 or higher (Dreilinger, 2014c). Within OPSB, 
all but one of their high schools had an ACT 
composite score above 18 (LDOE, 2014a). 
In total, 66% of students in OPSB schools 
had an ACT composite score of 18 or better 
(Dreilinger, 2014c). Compare this to the state 
average of 59% and OPSB appears to be 
performing well. But how does this compare 
to NOPS before the state takeover?
In 2005, 19 schools had reported ACT 
composite scores for their graduating 
seniors (LDOE, 2005). Of those 19 schools, 
ve of them were selective admissions high 
schools. Yet only three schools (Franklin, 
Karr and McMain High Schools) in the entire 
district had ACT composite scores above 
18. Two of the ve selective admissions 
schools fell short of graduating students 
on average that met the benchmark for 
college readiness. However, composite ACT 
scores for both Edna Karr High School and 
Eleanor McMain High School were higher in 
2005 than they were in 2014 (LDOE, 2005; 
LDOE, 2014a).  The ACT composite score for 
Edna Karr High School in 2014 was an 18.5 
down from 19.7 in 2005 (LDOE, 2005). For 
McMain the drop was more signicant, with 
a 2014 composite score of 19.1, down from 
20.6 in 2005 (LDOE, 2005; LDOE, 2014a). 
Both of these schools have moved from 
being selective admissions schools to open 
enrollment high schools.
ACT scores give us a snapshot of student 
achievement and college readiness for 
young people in New Orleans public schools, 
but what do we know about the student 
achievement of young people graduating 
from New Orleans private and parochial 
schools? The investment that families make 
in private and parochial education ranges 
approximately $7000 to nearly $23,000 
per year (Jesuit High School, 2014). Is this 
investment paying o? Data from the Taylor 
Opportunity Program for Students, the 
state’s merit-based scholarship program for 
postsecondary education, suggests that the 
payo varies. 
TOPS Eligibility
Students at private and parochial schools 
are outperforming students in NOPS in 
TOPS eligibility (LOFSA, 2014). In 2014, 73% 
of nonpublic high school graduates in New 
Orleans were TOPS eligible as compared 
to 37% of NOPS graduates (LOFSA, 2014). 
This means that students met the grade 
point average and ACT composite score 
requirements to receive one of four of the 
state’s merit-based scholarships. That is a 
36-percentage point dierence between 
nonpublic and public schools in New Orleans 
(LOFSA, 2014). It would seem that the 
investment in private education is paying 
o for the vast majority of graduates in 
local, nonpublic schools since almost three 
quarters of nonpublic high school graduates 
are earning scholarships to state public 
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Figure 2:  Nonpublic TOPS eligibility 2014
Source: Source: LDOE, 2014 High School Graduates (including alternate eligible) eligible f
or a TOPS award by school, school district and parish TOPS eligibility report
Figure 3: TOPS eligibility district comparison 2005
Source: Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. (2005). 2005 High school graduates
 (including alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS Award by school, school district and parish
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institutions.  However, deep disparities 
exist between predominately Black and 
predominately White nonpublic schools. 
In 2014, there was a 30-point dierence in 
TOPS eligibility between predominately 
Black and White private and parochial 
schools (LOFSA, 2014). Among Black 
private schools, 47% of graduates were 
TOPS eligible as compared to 77% of White 
private school graduates (See Figure 2). This 
performance gap appears to be closing 
between predominately Black and White 
private schools, albeit slowly. In 2009 there 
was a 34-percentage point dierence in 
TOPS eligibility between predominately 
Black and predominately White nonpublic 
high schools. The dierence between these 
schools in 2005 was 38% (LOFSA, 2005; 
LOFSA, 2009; LOFSA, 2014). 
In 2005, the dierence in TOPS eligibility 
between Black private schools and New 
Orleans public schools was only ve-
percentage points  (See Figure 3) (LOSFA, 
2005). In 2005, New Orleans public schools 
were the second lowest performing school 
district in Louisiana. What do 2005 TOPS 
eligibility data suggest about the quality 
of Black nonpublic schools in New Orleans 
ten years ago? Since 2005, the gap between 
NOPS and Black nonpublic schools grew 
by 10-percentage points, with 32% TOPS 
eligibility in NOPS as compared to 47% 
for Black nonpublic schools (See Figure 4) 
(LOFS, 2014).  What does the growing gap 
in TOPS eligibility between NOPS and Black 
nonpublic schools tell us about how well 
NOPS are preparing students to compete in 
college and the workforce?  
A closer look at TOPS eligibility by school 
type reveals that OPSB TOPS eligibility was 
one percentage point higher than Black 
nonpublic schools in 2014 (LOFSA, 2014). 
That same year RSD-NO was 23- percentage 
points lower than Black nonpublic high 
schools and 24-percentage points lower 
than OPSB schools (See Figure 4). Do these 
extensive gaps suggest that there is an 
Figure 4:  TOPS eligibility by school type and scholarship level 2014
Source: Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. (2014). 2014 High School Graduates 
(including alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS award by school, school district and parish TOPS eligibility report.
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educational caste system in New Orleans? 
Have education reforms in New Orleans 
inadvertently established a more complex 
system of social stratication in local schools? 
More importantly, what can be done to 
accelerate the closing of the achievement 
gaps between RSD-NO schools and other 
school districts, as well as gaps between 
predominately Black and predominately 
White schools in New Orleans? 
Dierences in the percentage of TOPS 
Opportunity (or higher) scholarships 
between districts are better markers of 
college readiness than TOPS eligibility alone. 
These scholarships require at minimum an 
ACT score of 20, which exceeds the college 
readiness benchmark of 18, and requires a 
minimum of a 2.5 grade point average. Gaps 
between Black and White private schools 
in New Orleans are more pronounced 
when looking at TOPS eligibility type. For 
instance, there was a 37-percentage point 
dierence between predominately Black 
and predominately White nonpublic high 
schools in the percent of students eligible 
for TOPS Opportunity scholarships or higher 
(see Figure 2). This gap is down from a 
40-percentage point gap in 2005.  It is also 
worth noting that almost all TOPS eligible 
students at White nonpublic schools earned 
TOPS Opportunity scholarships or higher. 
In comparing TOPS Opportunity eligibility 
or higher amongst public and nonpublic 
high schools, NOPS schools outperformed 
Black nonpublic schools by eight 
percentage points in 2014 (LOFSA, 2014). 
OPSB outperformed Black private schools 
by 14-percentage points, and RSD-NO fell 
just three percentage points below Black 
nonpublic schools in the percentage of 
TOPS Opportunity (or higher) eligibility 
(See Figure 4). So, among students who are 
TOPS eligible in New Orleans schools, there 
is a higher percentage of TOPS Opportunity 
or better in NOPS than in Black nonpublic 
schools (LOFSA, 2014). If college readiness 
is an important factor inuencing African 
American families school choices, could 
OPSB schools be a better investment 
for African American families than Black 
nonpublic schools in New Orleans?
Despite gains in TOPS scholarship eligibility 
in public and nonpublic, predominately 
Black schools in New Orleans, the 
achievement gap between predominately 
Black and predominately White schools 
remains signicantly wide.  To what can these 
disparities be attributed? Could it be that 
the environmental barriers to development 
young children face during early childhood 
continue to disadvantage children well into 
high school? How can schools help eliminate 
disparities in student achievement and 
college and career readiness without also 
examining and addressing root causes of 
these disparities? How are these disparities 
impacting African American students’ 
capacity to compete in postsecondary 
education and in the workforce? The 
next section examines African American 
students’ college enrollment trends to shed 
light on this issue.
College Enrollment
College enrollment appears to be on the 
uptick for New Orleans public high school 
graduates. Almost 60% of the class of 2014 
is reported to have enrolled in college in 
the fall of 2014 (LDOE, 2015).  This statistic 
represents both in-state and out-of-
state college enrollment. Prior to 2012, 
the Louisiana Department of Education 
only reported on students who went to 
college in-state, thus we present in-state 
college enrollment over the past decade to 
examine college enrollment trends. 
Using current college enrollment reports, 
we were able to determine that 48% of 
public high school graduates from the class 
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of 2014 enrolled in in-state colleges and 
universities in the fall of 2014 as compared 
to 37% in 2004 (LDOE, 2014b; LDOE, 2004). 
This represents an 11-percentage point 
increase in 10 years and a one-percentage 
point increase since 2010 (LDOE, 2010). 
Figure 5 highlights changes in in-state 
college enrollment for New Orleans public 
school graduates by district from 2004-2014. 
A closer look at the postsecondary 
education enrollment trends among 
NOPS graduates reveals a series of peaks, 
valleys and plains in student outcomes 
throughout the past ten years. NOPS 
experienced its greatest gains in college 
enrollment between 2004 and 2010, 
when RSD-NO district still directly ran 
most RSD-NO high schools. (LDOE, 2004; 
LDOE, 2010). The exceptions were Algiers 
Charter Schools Association high schools 
and the Capital One UNO Charter School 
(Thurgood Marshall Early College High 
School).  RSD-NO is currently experiencing 
the most growth in the city, having 
increased college enrollment by seven 
percentage points since 2010. RSD-NO 
continues to experience growth while 
OPSB growth has slowed at almost 60% 
(LDOE, 2014b). Although OPSB contains 
a few selective admissions schools all but 
one of their high schools had college-
going rates in 2010 above the state average 
of 52% (LDOE, 2010). That suggests that 
OPSB did a fairly good job of helping their 
students access postsecondary education 
opportunities. 
Although college-going rates in 
NOPS experienced a nine percentage 
point increase between 2004-2010, 
developmental education rates for both 
OPSB and RSD-NO schools indicate that 
many NOPS students entered school 
underprepared for college coursework 
(LDOE, 2004; LDOE, 2010). In 2010, 44% 
of first time freshman from OPSB schools 
required remediation at in-state colleges, 
and 60% of students at RSD-NO schools 
required remediation (LDOE, 2010). 
Approximately 51% of NOPS students 
entering in-state schools in the fall of 
2010 required remediation. Nearly one-
third (31%) of first time freshman from 
Louisiana required remediation in 2010. 
In 2004, 53% of first time freshman from 
NOPS required remediation, as compared 
to the 29% remediation rate for the state 
(LDOE, 2004).  So, between 2004 and 2010, 
NOPS remediation rates dropped two 
percentage points. Between 2010 and 2014, 
NOPS college-going rates increased by two 
percentage points. In 2010, the state adopted 
the Louisiana GRAD Act, which phased out 
remedial courses at four-year colleges and 
increased admissions requirements across 
the state’s public institutions (Oce of the 
Governor, 2010). Since remediation data is 
no longer reported, we use ACT scores of 
18+ to gauge college readiness. 
Figure 5:   NOPS college enrollment 2004-2014
Source:  Louisiana Department of Education [LDOE]. 
(2004). Louisiana rst time college freshman state ; 
Report: Fall 2004;Louisiana Department of Education 
[LDOE]. (2010). Louisiana rst time college freshman 
state: Report: Fall 2010; Louisiana Department of 
Education [LDOE]. (2014b). College enrollment data for 
2013- 2014 high school graduates
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Career Readiness
At the start of this section, we asked, “How 
are high schools in New Orleans preparing 
their students to succeed in career and 
college?” We know that more than half of 
RSD-NO graduates who enrolled in college 
in 2014 attended two-year colleges (LDOE, 
2014b). Although we cannot assume that 
all students in that number attended two-
year colleges because they were not college 
ready, the RSD-NO ACT composite score of 
16.4 suggests that many RSD-NO students 
were not prepared to pursue college 
coursework without remediation (LDOE, 
2014a). Regardless, 47% of RSD-NO students 
attended college in 2014 (both in and out-
of-state) (LDOE, 2014a). What happened to 
the 53% of students who did not pursue 
postsecondary education?  In OPSB, 72% of 
students enrolled in college in 2014, with 
28% attending two-year colleges (LDOE, 
2014a). For the 28% of graduating seniors 
from OPSB that did not attend college, were 
these students prepared to pursue careers 
in elds that would provide them with a 
livable wage? Could it be that schools’ focus 
on college enrollment may be preventing 
them from serving the needs of the students 
who do not transition into postsecondary 
education institutions after high school? 
And for those that do transition to college, 
do they have the basic skills required to 
excel in the workforce?
There are currently no available data that 
capture the level of career readiness of 
students graduating from public schools in 
Louisiana. In addition, very few students in 
NOPS have access to career and technical 
education coursework according to school 
proles. Of those that do oer career and 
technical education courses, are they 
preparing students for high-wage, high 
demand industries? These are important 
questions because career pathways for 
students leaving high school may currently 
be leading to employment without a 
livable wage. This means that the school 
systems are falling short of preparing 
students for postsecondary options that 
will actually improve the quality of life 
and career trajectory of African American 
students. Could schools be reinforcing 
social stratication by graduating students 
ill-prepared for career success?
The Louisiana Department of Education 
responded to this crisis by launching 
Jump Start, the state’s career and technical 
education initiative (LDOE, 2014d). This 
initiative is meant to provide Louisiana’s 
students with access to resources, facilities 
and opportunities to prepare them for 
careers in high growth sectors in Louisiana. 
This program includes opportunities 
for students to earn industry-based 
credentials in high growth sectors before 
they graduate, positioning them for 
immediate employment in these industries 
upon graduation (LDOE, 2014d). The state 
also oers career readiness and career 
exploration courses through its Course 
Choice program and will begin using the 
Work Keys exam to evaluate students’ 
workforce readiness and literacy (LDOE, 
2014e). These initiatives will help to ensure 
all students have a pathway to success 
in college and career and will hopefully 
address existing gaps in school curriculum 
in NOPS.    
 Opportunity Youth
As mentioned, the cost of not completing 
a college degree can be devastating to 
individual and family wellbeing. The high 
school diploma simply will not secure 
job opportunities that lead to a middle-
class lifestyle. Unfortunately, many young 
people have dropped out of school and/
or not working as a result. Opportunity 
youth, also referred to as disconnected 
youth, are young adults 16 to 24 years old 
who are neither in school nor working. 
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They are called opportunity youth because 
of the opportunity their reconnection to 
school or employment could bring to their 
communities. 
Nationally, 13.8% of all youth 16 to 24 years 
old are considered opportunity youth 
(Sims, 2015). Among the four regions of the 
US, the South reports the highest rate of 
opportunity youth at 15.2%. In Louisiana, 
nearly one in ve young adults (between 
16 and 24 years) are opportunity youth. 
With a rate of 19.8, Louisiana has the 
highest percentage of opportunity youth 
in the country. Of youth in the New Orleans 
area, 18.2% (approximately 26,000 young 
people) are disconnected from school and 
work. This rate places New Orleans third 
from the highest behind Memphis (21.6%) 
and Las Vegas (19.6%) (Sims, 2015).
Nationally, 28.5% of opportunity youth 
have dropped out of high school; 23.7% 
of opportunity youth, however, have 
some college (Sims, 2015). Opportunity 
youth in the New Orleans metro area have 
similar educational attainment trends. The 
relatively high rates of opportunity youth 
with some college highlight the limited 
economic prospects for young people in 
the region. In spite of some encouraging 
improvement in the K-12 sector, many young 
people still nd it dicult to nd work or 
continue their education. The New Orleans 
job market is particularly dicult for Black 
youth. In the US, 23% of opportunity youth 
are African American. In the New Orleans 
metro area, the majority of opportunity 
youth are African American (Sims, 2015).
The issues associated with opportunity youth 
place nancial burdens on US taxpayers 
resulting from increased government 
spending (on crime, healthcare, and welfare) 
(Sims, 2015). Each opportunity youth 
represents an annual cost of $13,000. These 
costs accumulate each year and represent 
a lifetime cost of $235,680 for every young 
person who remains disconnected. If the 
26,000 opportunity youth in the New 
Orleans metro area are not re-connected 
to school or work during their lifetimes, the 
costs to taxpayers in New Orleans is $360 
million. More sobering, individuals become 
more vulnerable to a criminal justice system, 
violence, impoverished living conditions 
and unsafe neighborhoods (Sims, 2015).
There are initiatives that reconnect 
opportunity youth to jobs and schools. For 
instance, the city of New Orleans’ Job1/
YouthWork targets youth ages 14 to 21 
years old and provides participants with 
employment, tutoring, skills training, and 
counseling. The Urban League of Greater 
New Orleans’ Suits for Hire mentoring 
program provides youth ages 17 to 24 years 
with professional attire, mentoring, skills 
training, and other supports, and its Urban 
Youth Empowerment Program provides 
case management, skills development, 
education attainment, and job placement 
services. Partnership for Youth Development 
and the Cowen Institute’s EMPLOY 
(Employment and Mobility Pathways Linked 
for Opportunity Youth) is a 20 member 
collective including government, nonprot, 
and workforce development organizations 
facilitating a continuum of services that 
link and support education, employment, 
health, and well-being. The Cowen Institute 
at Tulane University oers the Earn and Learn 
Career Pathways program. For one year, 
opportunity youth work at Tulane University 
and take courses toward a career credential 
through the Accelerating Career Education 
(ACE) program at Delgado Community 
College. Upon completion, the youth will 
receive an industry-based certicate and 
long-term employment. In addition, the 
Youth Empowerment Project’s The Village 
provides out of school youth ages 16 to 
24 years with GED/HiSET preparation and 
wrap-around case management services. 
And its NOPLAY (New Orleans Providing 
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Literacy to All Youth) program provides GED/
HiSET and basic literacy instruction to youth 
between the ages of 16 and 24 years. Liberty’s 
Kitchen, Café Reconcile, and Café Hope 
provides young adults between the ages 
of 16 and 22 with workforce development 
and life skills training within the culinary 
environment to become employed and self-
sucient. 
Still these programs meet a fraction of the 
need. Quality jobs must be available so an 
education can realize its value. Unfortunately, 
the large number of opportunity youth 
reect the real life context which many Black 
students face. Educational improvement in 
New Orleans’ schools does not easily predict 
a better quality of life in New Orleans.
College Success
As schools strive for and actualize growth 
in state level achievement test scores, 
national standardized tests data as well as 
high school graduation rates are crucial 
and encouraging. However, these are 
intermediate goals – means to a bigger 
end: college access and degree attainment. 
In an increasingly global and competitive 
environment, the consequences of 
not getting a college degree can be 
devastating to individuals, communities 
and the national economy. But a high 
school diploma is worth less than in the 
past. The Pew Research Center found that 
the value of a college degree is increasing 
with time while high school diplomas are 
depreciating. Today, 22% with only a high 
school diploma from the U.S. are living in 
poverty, compared to 7% of Baby Boomers 
who had only a high school diploma in 
1979 when they were in their late 20s and 
early 30s (Pew Research Center, 2014). At an 
absolute minimum, individuals need some 
post-secondary experiences if they are to 
have any reasonable opportunities to earn 
a living wage.  
Table 1:  Fall 2014 enrollment data for Louisiana colleges & universities by race. Source: Source: Source:  National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics, U.S. Department of Education 2013; Data Note:  This data reects undergraduate enrollment; Not all institutions are 
shown in this table  due to missing data, but the averages included institutions when applicable.
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As was mentioned, more Black students 
from New Orleans are qualifying and 
enrolling in college. However, data suggest 
that serious disparities exist in the higher 
education setting. The capability to track 
New Orleans high school graduates by 
race in the Louisiana institutions of higher 
learning is limited. But we can extrapolate 
from enrollment and graduation rates that 
the journey to a higher education degree is 
dicult for Blacks in the state. 
Data from the US Census Bureau suggest 
that as of 2013 the total population ve- 
year estimate for Louisiana is approximately 
4,567,968 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013a).  Of 
this population 32% (1,463,345) are Black 
and 62.9% (2,874,235) are reported as White. 
Approximately 7.6% of Louisiana’s population 
is in the age range of 20-24, which is in line 
with the traditional age of students entering 
and attending colleges and universities. 
Institution Name Asian Black Hispanic White 
Tulane University of Louisiana 78 65 70 78
*Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College 69 59 63 67
Centenary College of Louisiana 63 54 44 60
Loyola University New Orleans 57 49 45 60
Xavier University of Louisiana 69 47 33 0
Dillard University N/R 45 N/R 0
*Louisiana Tech University 46 42 38 51
Louisiana College 50 35 25 45
*Northwestern State University of Louisiana 33 35 38 40
*University of Louisiana at Monroe 35 34 20 43
*University of Louisiana at Lafayette 60 33 31 47
*Southern University and A & M College N/R 32 N/R 29
*Grambling State University 50 31 20 13
*Nicholls State University 38 31 12 45
*Louisiana State University-Shreveport 27 30 38 34
*McNeese State University 50 30 60 38
*University of New Orleans 32 26 25 33
*Southeastern Louisiana University 30 25 47 38
University of Phoenix-Baton Rouge Campus 50 17 N/R 17
University of Phoenix-Louisiana Campus 50 17 N/R 17
*Southern University at New Orleans N/R 10 N/R N/R
Our Lady of Holy Cross College 67 7 29 23
*Louisiana State University-Alexandria 0 5 0 25
Table 2:  Six-Year graduation rate for Louisiana public colleges & universities by race Rank order by Black (highest to lowest)
Source: Source:  National Center for Education Statistics – http://nces.ed.gov
U.S. Department of Education 2013 DataN/R – None Reported
*Public, Some institutions not shown because of missing data.
due to missing data, but the averages included institutions when applicable.
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Enrollment data were collected for each 
of these institutions by race as a way of 
highlighting the racial prole of Louisiana’s 
colleges and universities.  A closer 
examination of these results revealed that 
in aggregate - that is when the institutions 
in this sample are collapsed to a single 
variable (Louisiana Colleges & Universities) 
- Black student enrollment for Fall 2013 was 
25% compared to their White counterparts 
at 59% in Louisiana Colleges and 
Universities. It can easily be discerned from 
Table 1 which institutions are traditionally 
Black and White e.g. Louisiana State 
University and A&M College (75%) White, 
Southern University and A&M College 
(94%) Black.
In further describing the prole of Louisiana 
public colleges and universities and the 
dierences in Black and White students, 
six-year graduation rates were collected 
and compared using the institutional 
comparison tool in IPEDS (NCES, 2015). 
Graduation rates reveal more than 41% of 
Whites who enrolled in Louisiana colleges 
and universities in 2007 graduated in six 
years compared to 34% of Blacks.  Both 
numbers are wanting and a gap exists 
nonetheless (See Table 2). 
These data culminate into racial dierence 
among those who have college degrees in 
New Orleans and the metro area.  The White 
subgroup is twice as likely to have at least 
an associate degree than the Black cohort 
in the metropolitan area  (See Figure 6).
Figure 6:  Population with at least an associate’s degree by race/ethnicity for the population 25 years and older
Source: Louisiana Oce of Student Financial Aid [LOFSA]. (2014). 2014 High School Graduates 
(including alternate eligible) eligible for a TOPS award by school, school district and parish TOPS eligibility report.
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Closing
For the last 10 years, New Orleans has played 
the blame game in education. Reformers 
have shamed the past to argue for change. 
In return, reform has been charged with 
destroying traditional public education for 
future children. The aftermath of Katrina 
should incite passions. Everyone seemingly 
prots from the debate except for public 
school families – the people who need more 
than words. However, durable arguments 
have concretized into an immovable tableau 
that gets in the way of both justice and 
progress. Regardless of whose side you’re 
on, pointing ngers to say who did what to 
who doesn’t solve problems. Progress forces 
us to ask where do we go from here.
Based on this report, the authors recommend 
the following:
• Increase funding and slots for early 
childhood programming including CCAP 
and LA4 programs, while maintaining 
much-needed tax incentives.
• Increase support to early childhood care 
and education providers to improve 
quality.
• Use appropriate play-based learning 
approaches during early childhood 
education and abandon a focus on 
standardized testing of children during 
early childhood.
• Maintain a holistic focus on early childhood 
development rather than simply focusing 
on kindergarten readiness.
• Examine the impact of a Whiter 
educator workforce on academic and 
socioeconomic outcomes for African 
American children, as well as its impact 
on the African American middle class. 
• Align K-12 curriculum with college 
and career readiness standards to 
better support students in successfully 
accessing college and career 
opportunities.
• Expand career and technical education 
programs in NOPS.
• Continue to hold all schools 
accountable for exceptional outcomes 
(for all subgroups of youth), and require 
action for patterns of sub-performance. 
• Increase capacity (seats) at high-
performing and high-demand schools, 
while also strengthening all schools 
to provide high quality educational 
options in every neighborhood.
• Provide parents with meaningful and 
appropriate information that allows all 
families to select the schools that are 
the best t for their children.
• Mandate the inclusion of all NOPS in the 
centralized enrollment system. 
• Create a centralized Student Information 
System (SIS) that would hold data on all 
public school students, track mobility, 
support services, and monitor outcomes.
• Develop programs that infuse the local 
diversity into all levels of school sta, 
faculty, vendors, administration and 
governance.
• Implement restorative justice practices in 
schools to reduce the rates of suspension and 
expulsion. Produce uniform guidelines for 
school suspensions, considering appropriate 
behavior modification strategies for the 
varying age and grade levels. 
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• Expand and improve school accountability 
practices to provide schools in crisis with 
support to address areas of deciency, 
reserving complete school closure for 
emergency circumstances or as a means 
of last resort.
• Place more focus on undergraduate 
student success, with an expanded 
strategy to provide stackable 
credentials/certications to students 
while in high school and also promote 
the viability of two-year degrees for 
demand sector jobs in the region.
• Build partnerships between NOPS 
and the local business community to 
strengthen career readiness initiatives.
These and other reforms should not be 
done to communities. We should constantly 
build capacity of others so members can 
improve themselves. In the next 10 years, 
we have an opportunity to pass a test that 
has challenged our nation for decades—to 
create schools that authentically represent 
the public and compel us to learn together. 
But we will miss this opportunity if we 
reform in spite of community. It is harder, 
and it certainly takes longer, but the rewards 
and gains will be greater if we build upon 
our current reforms in an inclusive manner.
When we remove our eyes from the higher 
standard of community, we also remove our 
personal responsibilities for improving it. 
When we have faith in community, we will 
begin to understand fully that we can uplift 
communities while reforming - together.
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92Disaster Preparedness
DISASTER PLANNING  
AND EQ UITY:LESSONS LEARNED 
IN POST- KATRINA NEW ORLEANS
ROBERT A.  COLLINS
WHILE THE KATRINA 
DISASTER RESPONSE 
HAS BEEN EX TREMELY 
WELL DOCUMENTED AND 
ANALYZ ED MANY TIMES, 
MOST ANALYSES DO NOT 
LOOK SPECIFICALLY AT 
ISSUES OF EQ UITY.
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Hurricane Katrina did more than expose the 
weaknesses in the ood control structures 
around New Orleans. It also exposed the 
weaknesses in the social fabric of the city 
by demonstrating how the impacts of 
disasters are not shared equally among all 
social groups. This essay will examine this 
issue by rst describing the history of the 
challenge. It will then look at the Katrina 
disaster response through the lens of 
equity. After looking at the Katrina disaster 
response, it will examine improvements 
in disaster planning implemented since 
Katrina. Finally, the essay will conclude by 
making recommendations on how disaster 
planning can be improved in the future.
The History of the Challenge
The city of New Orleans is, by nature and by 
design, a vulnerable geographic location. 
It was already vulnerable to ooding at the 
time it was founded by the French in 1718, 
due to its location in the natural oodplain 
of the Mississippi River (Colten 2005). 
Generations of settlers and governments 
have attempted to make the city more 
livable by draining the soils and building 
levees and oodwalls higher with each 
passing generation. Paradoxically, while 
these structures make the city habitable to 
humans, they also increase human exposure 
to catastrophic ooding during a hurricane. 
The levees intended to protect the city 
also locked out the sediment and nutrients 
that built the land up over millions of years 
of natural Mississippi River ooding. The 
locking out of sediment and nutrients 
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began a process of subsidence, or sinking 
land. The vast majority of modern soil 
subsidence, however, was caused by the 
installation of drainage systems, originally 
designed to drain swamp water, and 
then designed to drain rainwater. These 
modern drainage structures built to pump 
rainwater out of the city have the eect 
of denying the land of natural hydration 
and lowering the water table, which soils 
need to maintain organic character and 
shape. The result of pumping out rainwater 
is constantly sinking land (Campanella, 
2015a). This process of constantly sinking 
land has turned areas of the city that were 
at or slightly below sea level a century ago, 
to currently being several feet below sea 
level in some parts of the city – enough to 
drown a human being.
No levee system is perfect, and levees are 
occasionally breached. Subsidence makes 
recovery from a catastrophic ood more 
dicult because when levees are breached 
a “bowl eect” is created, containing the 
standing water in the low-lying areas of the 
city and making draining oodwater from 
the city much more dicult. While much of 
the land mass of New Orleans is below sea 
level, there is a great deal of variation in the 
number of feet below sea level, and about 
one half of the city is actually at or above 
sea level due to natural geologic ridges. 
The beginning of inequity in disaster 
planning began with the earliest 
settlement of the city. The early wealthy 
settlers had access to the surveyors’ maps 
and knew the location of the geologic 
ridges that were above sea level. Once the 
early wealthy settlers bought up the land 
above sea level, the lower income residents 
had to settle on what was left. This began 
the process of the upper classes being 
settled on the higher land and the lower 
income residents settling in the lower 
elevations (Colten, 2005). This pattern was 
repeated over many generations and as a 
result there is a direct correlation between 
income level and ood level. This  is not 
simply caused by the upper income citizens 
buying up all the available land. There was, 
and is, land available for purchase at the 
higher elevations. However, because of the 
economic principle of scarcity, that land is 
also the most expensive, pricing it out of 
range for many working class families.
In general, the phenomenon of the highest 
elevation land being the most expensive 
in the city has continued until the present 
day. There are a few exceptions to this rule. 
The primary one being that land bordering 
Lake Pontchartrain is more valuable since 
land close to a lake tends to demand 
a higher price in any city. However, in 
general, the land aordable to poor and 
working class families will tend to be at 
the lower elevations, meaning poor and 
working class families will have the greatest 
exposure to ooding.
The issue of racial discrimination amplied 
the inequities in the land and housing 
market. After World War II, when the VA 
Housing Loans in the GI bill allowed many 
veterans to purchase their rst home, many 
Black veterans found their benets either 
delayed or denied. By the time many Black 
veterans received their housing benets, 
the safest neighborhoods in the city had 
already been lled up. Add to this the 
well-documented processes of “Redlining:” 
Banks rejecting mortgage applications 
to Black applicants in certain desirable 
neighborhoods; real estate agents steering 
Black homeowners into low elevation areas; 
blatant racial discrimination in the sale of 
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homes, and a historic pattern developed 
whereby Black homeowners ended up 
living, by and large, in the lowest and most 
ood prone areas of the city.  
Insurance is another area where inequities 
of income and race are exposed. While 
mortgage holders require ood insurance 
in lower elevation areas, acquiring ood 
insurance adequate enough to insure a 
home against a total ood loss is beyond 
the nancial means of most working class 
families, making them unable to replace a 
home lost to a catastrophic ood. 
All of the above factors formed a nexus of 
historical circumstances whereby poor and 
working class Black families were steered 
into the most vulnerable areas of the city 
with the highest probability of catastrophic 
ooding, then left without sucient 
resources to rebuild when that catastrophic 
ooding took place.     
The Katrina Disaster Response
While the Katrina disaster response has 
been extremely well documented and 
analyzed many times, most analyses do 
not look specically at issues of equity. All 
residents of New Orleans suered during 
Katrina, however some residents suered 
more because they were in more vulnerable 
conditions prior to the storm (Tierney, 
2006). The rst inequitable condition was 
the greater geographic vulnerability of 
Black and low-income residents, discussed 
above. Black and low-income residents 
were hit hardest by the ooding because 
they tended to live in the lowest elevations. 
Perhaps the most striking inequities from a 
disaster planning perspective are those of 
transportation and shelter. When the mayor 
calls for a mandatory evacuation of the city, 
middle and upper-income residents simply 
get in their cars and drive out of the city. 
Upon reaching their destination city, they 
rent a hotel room, or stay with relatives, 
and monitor the news media for word as 
to when they can return to the city. These 
options are simply not available to the poor 
and many working class families. 
The poverty rate in New Orleans is 27%, 
considerably higher than the national 
rate of 16%; and 19% of New Orleans 
households do not have access to a car, 
compared to 9% nationwide (Shrinath, 
Mack, & Plyer, 2014). If working class 
families do own a car, quite often the car 
is old and not in good enough condition 
to make a long evacuation trip. Even 
among those citizens who own reliable 
cars, evacuation is not an option for many 
because they simply have nowhere to go. 
They may not have relatives or friends 
outside of the city. And a hotel room for 
these families is out of the question due to 
high cost. Evacuating before a hurricane 
can cost hundreds or even thousands of 
dollars, resources that poor and working 
class families do not have. 
In some cases, the inequity of transportation 
and shelter access had a lethal eect, 
causing some residents to stay and drown in 
the oodwaters. Also, many of the residents 
who stayed found themselves trapped in 
a city with no access to fresh water, food, 
or sanitary living conditions. The plight of 
the citizens trapped in the Superdome and 
Convention Center is well documented, 
and those conditions were replicated all 
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over the city at many other locations. The 
fact that none of the government agencies 
charged with protecting the city had a 
comprehensive plan in place to evacuate 
and shelter the most vulnerable citizens 
was an egregious disaster planning failure. 
Basically, there was no truly comprehensive 
plan. The response was made up on site. 
This resulted in citizens being scattered all 
over the US after they nally were rescued 
and evacuated from New Orleans. The 
rental assistance funding oered by the 
federal government for evacuees to rent 
housing was slow in coming and dicult 
to access, unless, of course, one had a 
computer, internet access, and a bank 
account ready to receive an electronic 
direct deposit, all markers of the middle 
class and not available to the poor. 
Once citizens were able to return to the 
city, the disaster recovery process was also 
not equitable. The poor and working class 
areas were likely to have the most damage 
to housing stock from ooding, due to the 
fact that they were in lower elevations. 
Also, these houses were likely to be the 
oldest, and the weakest in terms of ability 
to withstand a ood (wood instead of brick 
construction.) 
In terms of insurance coverage, many of 
these homeowners did not even know 
that they were in a oodplain due to old, 
outdated maps being used by the mortgage 
banks and insurance industry. As a result, 
they had never been required to buy ood 
insurance. So, when the ooding occurred, 
many found themselves with no ood 
insurance to cover the loss. Those working 
class families who did have ood insurance 
tended to have very little, due to the high 
cost. Very few had insurance sucient to 
cover a total loss. 
The disaster recovery process was much 
quicker for middle class families who either 
had minimal ooding due to neighborhood 
location and ood elevation, or, even if 
they did experience catastrophic ooding, 
they were more likely to be fully insured 
and were able to recover most of the value 
of the house from the ood policy. Flood 
insurance rates are predicted to continue to 
go up, further straining the resources of the 
low-income residents (Campanella, 2015b).  
The federally-funded, state-administered 
“Road Home” program, intended to assist 
homeowners with nancial reconstruction 
assistance, was slow to deliver funds, and 
had a tedious and complicated application 
process. Once again, favoring the middle 
class with access to computers, lawyers, 
and accountants. 
Improvements to Disaster 
Planning since Katrina
Although New Orleans remains a vulnerable 
city, there have been key improvements 
since Katrina. First, the US Army Corps 
of Engineers made billions of dollars in 
improvements to the levee, oodwall, and 
drainage systems protecting the city. Most 
of the ooding in the city was caused by the 
breach of oodwalls connected to rainwater 
drainage canals. The oodwall breaches 
were caused by storm surge that came in 
from the Gulf of Mexico, passed through 
Lake Borgne, then into Lake Pontchartrain. 
Once in Lake Pontchartrain, the storm surge 
travelled into the drainage canals (their 
function is normally carrying rainwater 
out to Lake Pontchartrain). Due to awed 
engineering and shoddy construction, the 
canal oodwalls breached in several areas, 
ooding the city. 
The Army Corps of Engineers has installed 
“Lock and Dam” systems at the mouth of 
every drainage canal. These locks will be 
closed before a hurricane threatens the 
city, protecting the drainage canals from 
storm surge. Although levees can still be 
over-topped by a large storm surge, the 
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most vulnerable aspect of the ood control 
system has been repaired. The city is much 
better protected than pre-Katrina, and 
should be able to withstand a Category 
3 Hurricane (111-129 mph wind speed); 
however, a storm with higher wind speeds 
will still overtop the levees and ood large 
sections of the city, so there is more work 
to be done.
In the area of urban planning, the city 
recently completed a 10 process of 
post-Katrina city planning that included 
a master plan and comprehensive 
zoning ordinance. Although the current 
comprehensive zoning ordinance passed 
in May of 2015 does not include all of the 
recommendations written into the master 
plan passed in 2010, it is a work in progress. 
The post-Katrina master plan began the 
work of designing a more sustainable ood 
control plan for the city (Collins, 2011). 
Disaster planners contracted by the city 
have designed a comprehensive ood 
control system based on the globally 
respected “Dutch Model” of ood control, 
rst used by the Government of the 
Netherlands to protect that country from 
the North Sea. The Dutch Model does 
not simply rely on levees. Instead, it relies 
on a system of inundation canals, which 
essentially carry storm surge through a 
city and move it along within the canals, 
pushing it out the other end of the system. 
It would pass in, through, and out of the city 
without ooding. Also, the ood control 
plan included in the city’s master plan, 
called the “Urban Water Plan,” proposes to 
ght subsidence by absorbing as much 
rainwater runo as possible through 
porous surfaces, retention ponds, and 
open drainage canals built into the natural 
landscape. (In terms of city topography, 
think: A version of the Venice canal 
system). This plan to “live with water” is 
popular with city planners, but there is no 
implementation funding at the moment.   
In the area of assisted-evacuation, there 
is now a comprehensive plan in place 
to evacuate residents who do not have 
access to transportation: The City-Assisted 
Evacuation Plan or CAEP (City of New 
Orleans, 2015). It is assisted by a non-prot 
organization that provides volunteers to 
the city as part of a cooperative agreement 
(Evacuteer, 2015). Once the mayor calls an 
evacuation, residents in need of evacuation 
assistance will report to a large number of 
designated pick-up points around the city, 
called “evacuspots.” Buses provided by the 
city will pick citizens up and transport them 
to Union Passenger Terminal, at which time 
they will be transported out of town. This 
plan was eective during Hurricane Gustav 
in 2008, however that was only a short-term 
evacuation, as Gustav was not a direct hit. 
The most recent hurricane to threaten the 
city, Isaac in 2012, was not large enough to 
call a mass evacuation. 
The plan has not yet been tested with a 
large-scale, long-term evacuation event 
the size of Katrina. Also, it is unclear 
whether or not comprehensive long-
term shelter plans have been improved 
since Katrina, since the city evacuation 
plan simply states that residents will be 
transported to “State and Federal shelters” 
(City of New Orleans, 2015). 
Recommendations for future 
Disaster Planning
Based on lessons learned from Katrina, the 
following recommendations should be 
considered in making preparations for the 
next hurricane more equitable:
1.  Aordable housing at higher elevations: 
Although current market forces will 
conspire with a history of race and class 
discrimination to keep most poor and 
working class families in the most ood 
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prone neighborhoods, inclusionary 
zoning can be used to require that 
any new multi-family residential 
development on land above sea level 
include some aordable housing, 
thereby improving access to higher 
elevations for low-income residents.
2.  Funding to complete ood protection: 
Congress should approve the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ full funding request 
to complete the upgrade of the city’s 
ood control network, and provide 
funding to begin work on the Dutch 
Model of ood control in the “Urban 
Water Plan” by installing inundation 
canals to handle storm surge, and 
building drainage canals into the 
natural landscape to return rainwater 
to the ground, re-hydrating the soils, 
which is the only plan that will ght 
subsidence in the long run and stop 
the city from sinking even further 
below sea level.
3.  Assisted Evacuation: Although the 
city now has a robust city-assisted 
evacuation plan, it is unclear whether 
or not residents will avoid the problems 
with long-term evacuation shelter that 
occurred during Katrina once they are 
outside of the city and delivered to state 
shelters. The state government should 
publish a specic plan for long-term 
evacuation shelter so that each resident 
knows what to expect when evacuated. 
4.  City Planning: The city can mitigate 
ood risk by zoning for higher 
population density at higher elevations, 
with inclusion of aordable housing 
as mentioned in recommendation 
number one. Also, the City’s most recent 
master plan calls for “Comprehensive 
stormwater management systems that 
include natural drainage methods and 
potential use of Dutch-style canals 
as amenities” to allow residents to 
“live with water” (City of New Orleans, 
2010). A high priority should be 
given to eorts to directly ght soil 
subsidence by absorbing or retaining 
as much stormwater runo as possible 
through retention ponds and open 
drainage canals built directly into the 
natural landscape. The next round 
of amendments to the city’s new 
comprehensive zoning ordinance will 
need to begin specically implementing 
and enforcing designs to allow the 
city to live in harmony with the water, 
so that regardless of race, income, 
geographic location, or elevation, 
residents can avoid the damage of 
ood inundation.  Only then will the 
New Orleans landscape become a truly 
equitable environment.  
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ENV IRONM ENTAL INJ USTICE 
AND THE STATE OF BLACK 
NEW ORLEANS
BEV ERLY WRIG HT,  PH. D.  
HURRICANE KATRINA MADE CLEAR 
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN RACE, 
PLACE, AND VULNERABILITY. WHAT 
PEOPLE OFTEN TERM “ NATURAL”  
DISASTERS OR “ ACTS OF G OD”  
ARE OFTEN ACTS OF SOCIAL 
INJ USTICE PERPETUATED BY 
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS ON 
THE POOR, PEOPLE OF COLOR, 
THE MOST VULNERABLE OF OUR 
SOCIETY— GROUPS LEAST ABLE TO 
WITHSTAND SUCH DISASTERS.6
State of Black New Orleans103
A rising concern in recent years for societies 
across the globe is the impact of extreme 
weather on coastal areas, natural habitats 
and the species that inhabit them.  Extreme 
weather events have impacted agriculture 
and natural resources with devastating 
and long lasting eects. While managing 
weather impacts has always been dicult 
for societies, survival before, during and after 
these impacts has always been more dicult 
for some than others.  Disadvantaged 
populations around the world already bear 
inequitable environmental burdens, and 
that fact rings true, even in today’s society.
While United States citizens have not 
experienced the devastating impacts of 
climate change on the same scale as the 
citizens of Haiti after the earthquake in 
2010, or the people of Asia after the tsunami 
of 2004, the footprint for recovery is quite 
similar in content. In all of these examples 
the issue of equity in recovery is central, 
especially to marginalized communities.
Katrina Left Behind
In its wake, Katrina left behind toxic 
contamination and health threats as well 
as debris and hazardous waste. Six storm-
caused oil spills released 7.4 million gallons 
of oil, or 61% as much as the 11 million 
gallons that leaked into Alaska’s Prince 
William Sound from the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in 1989 (The New York Times, 
2010).  Waters from the storm surge hit 60 
underground storage tanks, ve Superfund 
sites and 466 industrial facilities that stored 
highly dangerous chemicals. More than 
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1,000 drinking-water systems were disabled, 
leaving the dreaded e. coli in oodwaters at 
levels far exceeding EPA’s safe standards. 
Twelve million of 21 million tons of debris 
from Hurricane Katrina was left in Orleans 
Parish. Sixty thousand boats, 300,000 
underground fuel tanks, and 42,000 tons of 
hazardous waste were left for collection and 
proper disposal at licensed facilities (Bullard 
& Wright, 2009).  Katrina left behind 350,000 
automobiles to be drained of oil and 
gasoline and then recycled, with 145,000 
left in New Orleans alone (Bullard & Wright, 
2009).  But that is not all Katrina left behind.
One of the remnants of Hurricane Katrina 
was the question of who would survive 
the storm, and who would be rescued and 
protected by society and government. The 
storm illustrated how pointed a political 
question that was. Katrina exposed the 
hard truth that groups within society are 
valued dierently as is evidenced by the 
consistent, dierential eects of natural 
disasters on low-income and minority 
communities.  Vulnerable populations by 
denition already suer from both higher 
socio-economic stress and greater exposure 
to environmental toxins, hazardous wastes 
and experience other environmental 
burdens (Boyce, 2000).
Such is the case for the city of New Orleans, 
Louisiana.  The incomes of the poor did 
not aord many citizens the luxury of 
evacuating, so they remained in peril of 
a killer storm.  Those left behind were 
people already living in low-lying areas 
with less than adequate levee protection, 
and in proximity to landlls and Toxic 
Release Inventory reporting facilities, thus 
compounding their exposure to toxins 
released in the air and oodwaters after the 
hurricane. It was largely African-American, 
Vietnamese and poor populations who 
lived in the areas most vulnerable to the 
collapse of the levees, who were unable to 
secure transportation for evacuation, and 
who scrambled in frightening conditions 
to secure scarce resources and aid for their 
families and themselves.
As the city began to recover, the question 
became, “How equitable was the plan 
and who would recover?”  Ten years after 
Katrina, New Orleans has become more 
separate and less equal than before the 
storm.  There are huge disparities emerging 
in income, housing, jobs and education. 
The city today is undeniably Whiter and 
richer in terms of individually-earned 
income than before the storm.
An examination of data shows that the 
impact of this recovery on the Black middle 
class has been devastating.  These data 
indicate that only 5% of African American 
compared to 29% of White households 
fall within the highest income categories 
(Plyer, Ortiz, Horowitz, & Hobor, 2013). 
The gap is widening.  African Americans 
of all income groups were hit hardest by 
Hurricane Katrina. These data seem to 
indicate that they have also beneted least 
from its recovery.
Ten years after Katrina laid waste to this 
historic and culturally diverse city, what 
we have learned is that race still matters. 
What we have yet to learn is how the city 
will be transformed and to what extent 
African Americans will benet from this 
transformation.  History does not paint 
a positive picture of how the African 
American community, particularly its poor, 
survive large-scale changes made towards 
“progress” in the city.  History records a 
culture of metropolitan progress resulting in 
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the displacement of African American New 
Orleanians (Long, 2007).
There is an adverse relationship between 
city progress, as dened by developers and 
city leaders, and the displacement of Black, 
urban neighborhoods in New Orleans. 
After Hurricane Katrina, many traditionally 
African American neighborhoods were 
decimated (Long, 2007). When this result 
is coupled with the tear down of public 
housing, we now nd that New Orleans 
is a city where gentrication is running 
rampant in traditionally African American 
neighborhoods. (Long, 2007)
Disaster Capitalism
Immediately after the ood, billions of no-
bid contracts were awarded to a handful of 
politically connected national contractors; 
the federal Davis-Bacon Act, which 
mandates workers be paid the prevailing 
wage, was suspended; and a host of 
environmental waivers were granted 
(Bullard & Wright, 2009).  Some policy 
analysts and elected ocials presented 
the plight of the city’s displaced citizens as 
a “silver lining” in dispersing New Orleans’ 
poor in Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, 
Memphis, and Jackson. They spin it as an 
unintended positive eect of the storm 
- breaking   up concentrated poverty—
something that government ocials 
had been trying to achieve for decades 
(Bullard & Wright, 2009). However, the best 
way to break up concentrated poverty 
is not displacement, but concentrated 
employment at a livable wage.
Disaster capitalism, or the embracing of 
Milton Friedman’s free market policy as a 
deliberate strategy for political leaders, is 
argued as being a prominent strategy in 
some developed countries (Klein, 2007). 
Disaster capitalism is the exploitation 
of crises by leaders to push through 
controversial exploitive policies while 
citizens are too emotionally and physically 
distracted by disasters or upheavals to 
mount an eective resistance (Klein, 2007).
The situation is described as synonymous 
with the process by which prisoners are 
softened up for interrogation by the shock 
of their captivity (Klein, 2007). Massive 
disasters could serve to soften up citizens 
for radical free market crusades.  Politicians 
are advised that they should immediately 
after a crisis push through all the painful 
policies at once before people could regain 
their footing.  Such practices are akin to an 
economic shock treatment.  The state of 
shock is, by denition, a temporary state; 
shock wears o.  The best way to stay 
oriented to resist shock is to know what is 
happening to you and why.  Klein calls it the 
“shock doctrine” (Klein, 2007).
Hurricane Katrina made clear the linkages 
between race, place, and vulnerability. What 
people often term “natural” disasters or “acts 
of God” are often acts of social injustice 
perpetuated by government and business 
on the poor, people of color, the most 
vulnerable of our society—groups least 
able to withstand such disasters (Squires & 
Hartman, 2006).  Decades of government 
neglect, denial, and old-fashioned greed 
created a nightmare in the aftermath of 
the storm, and Katrina allowed “disaster 
capitalism” to shift into high gear.
Perilous Consequences of Policy 
Decisions: A Plan for the Future of 
New Orleans
As the pumping stations in the city were 
restored, and the massive breaches in the 
levees were nally plugged with tons of sand 
bags, the gravity of the situation became 
real for New Orleans residents and for the 
rest of the world.  The sobering newscasts 
elicited quite dierent responses as a matter 
of perspective for those who remained in 
the city, those who left the city and people 
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watching the disaster play out around the 
globe.  While New Orleans natives grieved 
and were obsessed with the complicated 
nature of how to return home, or how to 
rebuild their lives living in a devastated city; 
urban planners around the world saw this 
tragedy as an opportunity to plan and build 
their version of the perfect city.  It was almost 
as if the hurricane waters that had washed 
away the lives of New Orleans citizens had 
also washed away the knowledge that 
this city, with a settlement history that is 
older than the United States, was home 
to thousands of people. Developers and 
planners approached the crippled city as an 
artist would a new canvas, ready to display 
his latest artistic strokes of genius for the 
world to admire.  Katrina presented them 
with an opportunity of a lifetime; the ability 
to start anew and build their dream city.
New plans for the city abounded and 
planners and developers from all over 
descended on the city wrangling for their 
piece of the rebuilding pie.  Ultimately, the 
plan selected, entitled “Plan for the Future,” 
was put forth by the Bring New Orleans Back 
Commission (Times-Picayune Sta, 2006). 
Despite the attempt to engage community 
representatives in the planning process, the 
completed plan was not well received by 
the community (Warner, 2006).
The Plan for the Future proposed to 
signicantly reduce the “footprint” or size 
of the city of New Orleans, reasoning that 
a signicantly resource-constrained city 
would not be able to eciently serve all 
neighborhoods when only a fraction of 
the pre-storm population and tax base had 
returned (Times-Picayune Sta, 2006). The 
citizens of New Orleans largely rejected 
this plan and spoke against it at numerous 
city council and town hall meetings 
following its introduction to the public 
(Randall, 2006; Krupa, 2010). The plan was 
rejected by citizens for many reasons, but 
the most signicant was the perception 
of inappropriate and heavy-handed 
government intrusion into the private 
lives of citizens eectively denying their 
individual right of self-determination and 
the right to return to the city in which they 
lived (Warner, 2006).
Ironically, most areas slated for immediate 
rebuilding and redevelopment were 
predominantly White and auent, while 
areas identied for conversion into green 
space and parks and areas required to 
prove their viability were predominantly 
African-American and less auent (Mohai 
& Lee, 2010). The plan also appeared to 
ignore the fact that New Orleans started 
losing population in the 1960s, resulting in 
signicant blight and an insucient tax base 
decades before Hurricane Katrina (Plyer, 
2011).  This only fueled the feeling among 
residents that the storm was being used as 
an excuse to prevent certain neighborhoods 
from returning (Warner, 2006).  The citizens 
of New Orleans were actively engaged in 
a process to determine the direction, size, 
and scope of the rebuilding, including the 
allocation of recovery funding. A preliminary 
equity analysis reveals a key feature of New 
Orleans’ recovery. Principles for ensuring 
equitable distribution of recovery funds 
were not in eect. To this day, parts of the city 
are “back” while others are still languishing.
It is dicult to identify any action taken by 
government as a response to the enormous 
devastation that befell New Orleans than 
the Bring New Orleans Back Commission 
(2006) unveiling its plan for rebuilding New 
Orleans.  Mayor Ray Nagin’s commission 
presented the city with a $17 billion plan 
that would signicantly change the city’s 
neighborhood and housing patterns. 
The plan presented specic directions on 
who could rebuild and where building 
was allowed (Bring New Orleans Back 
Commission, 2006).
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The hot button prescriptive, however, was 
that all renovation was to be stopped in 
the ooded areas.  Persons most aected 
by this moratorium on rebuilding were 
African Americans.  In New Orleans alone, 
61% of the population (484,674) lived in 
areas that were ooded (Campanella, 2007; 
Plyer, 2014).  African Americans resided in 
these areas with numbers far greater than 
Whites by nearly 4 to 1 (220,970 to 57,469) 
(Campanella, 2007).  African Americans also 
outnumbered Whites even before the storm 
by nearly 2.5 to 1 (323,868 to 134,120).  Asian 
and Hispanic residents citywide totaled 
10,751 and 14,663 respectively (Plyer, Ortiz, 
Horowitz, & Hobor, 2013).
The Bring New Orleans Back Commission 
plan  (2006) had four levels of specicity 
relative to rebuilding, They included  (1) 
areas where rebuilding was allowed,  (2) 
areas where a building moratorium would 
exist until neighborhoods proved viability, 
(3) approximate areas expected to become 
parks and green space; and (4) areas to 
be redeveloped, some with new housing 
for relocated home owners. The map, 
infamously known as the green dot map, 
became a bone of contention for African 
Americans and Vietnamese in particular, 
but clearly, the largest number of persons 
to be aected were African Americans 
(Krupa, 2010).
In response to the panic and fury of the 
community, by many neighborhoods that 
were overlaid with green dots, the plan 
was dismissed (Krupa, 2010).  And, while it 
was suggested that the city deny citizens 
permits to rebuild over a large area of the 
city, residents nalized their rebuilding 
plans, and the city granted permits to all 
who applied (Krupa, 2010). Today, most 
areas earmarked for green space, by the 
infamous green dots, have rebounded to 
at least 60% of their pre-Katrina population 
(Krupa, 2010).  There has even been 
improvement in two green zones in New 
Orleans East that were zoned commercial.
After nearly 10 years of recovery since 
Hurricane Katrina, the city of New Orleans 
is showing strong resilience in eorts to 
rebuild damaged and ooded housing. 
According to a University of New Orleans 
survey, 81% of both single and double 
family residents have begun or completed 
rebuilding or renovating their homes 
(University of New Orleans, 2015).  Fifteen 
percent of homes have been demolished 
and four percent are gutted or derelict 
(Louisiana Weekly Sta , 2015).
The dreaded green dots seem to have little 
consequence for community resettlement. 
But, in light of the slow recovery in some 
areas versus speedy progress in others, 
many wonder if the Plan for the Future is 
still the plan. A real test of this hypothesis 
could be to embrace the old adage “Follow 
the Money.”
The Unwritten Plan 
– Following the Money
In a preliminary study conducted by the 
Deep South Center for Environmental 
Justice, the planned distribution of 
hurricane recovery funds was analyzed for 
New Orleans’ thirteen planning districts 
(Mohai & Lee, 2010). The analysis was based 
on publicly-available information provided 
in the Unied New Orleans Plan (City of New 
Orleans, 2007), a planning document that 
oers only a snapshot of an ongoing process, 
yet served as one of several post-disaster 
recovery plans with widespread community 
involvement (City of New Orleans, 2007). 
The plan presented 95 recovery projects 
at a total cost of over $1.55 billion. Thirty-
three percent of this amount was planned 
for recovery projects located in Planning 
Districts 1, 2, and 3 (i.e., the French Quarter/
Central Business District, Garden District, 
and Uptown), which were among the least 
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storm-damaged neighborhoods in New 
Orleans. The remaining 67% of recovery 
expenditures were planned for Planning 
Districts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13; 
districts that include the greater proportion 
of the city’s population and the hardest 
hit neighborhoods of Lakeview, Lower 9th 
Ward, and New Orleans East (City of New 
Orleans, 2007). 
To put these facts into context, there are 13 
planning districts in New Orleans, four of 
which are predominantly White (Planning 
Districts 1, 5, 11, and 13) (Mohai & Lee, 2010). 
Eight planning districts are majority Black 
(Planning Districts 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 
12).  The four predominantly White planning 
districts were allocated a combined total 
of $208 million for redevelopment, which 
exceeds the $204 million allocated to a 
total of eight predominantly Black planning 
districts (Mohai & Lee, 2010). These ndings, 
while disturbing, are not surprising to 
researchers, activists, and scholars who 
routinely illuminate environmental 
injustices and who regularly monitor 
governmental disaster response actions. 
Hurricane Katrina placed a magnifying lens 
on the environmental injustices suered 
by the people of New Orleans immediately 
prior to, during and after the storm (Pastor, 
et al., 2006).
Place Matters
Place matters. In fact, where one lives is 
the best determinant of one’s health and 
how long one will live (Policy Link, 2007). 
A community’s physical, social, economic 
and service environment are important 
factors in the quality of life for its residents 
(Policy Link, 2007).  Poor communities and 
communities of color are often home to 
dangerously polluting facilities in addition 
to other maladies that accompany poverty. 
High crime rates, inadequate housing, 
poor transportation and under-funded 
schools are commonplace to many poor 
communities.  Citizens are locked into a 
life of poverty by segregation, which is 
often due to their race or skin color, and are 
excluded from the decision-making process.
Hurricane Katrina revealed to the nation 
(and developers in particular) that the area 
in New Orleans known as the “sliver by the 
river,” (i.e., an area of the city that did not 
ood after the levee failures that resulted in 
the ooding of most of the rest of the city). 
This area is replete with the quintessential 
architecture of New Orleans on display in 
neighborhoods lined with grand mansions 
and modest shotgun houses shaded by 
old-growth trees.  Real estate values have 
skyrocketed as the market of buyers and 
renters for these houses has swelled to 
include thousands of people relocating 
from other states (White, 2015).
Since Hurricane Katrina, African American 
residents have demanded that the New 
Orleans City Council, Mayor, and legislative 
representatives establish rent controls and 
high-rise development zoning restrictions; 
stop the closure of public housing; ensure 
adequate funding through an equitable 
process for repairing Katrina-damaged 
homes; make property taxes aordable; 
as well as other measures to prevent 
their displacement from homes and 
neighborhoods.  More recently, a growing 
number of White residents are now 
demanding high-rise developing zoning 
restrictions and property tax relief.  However, 
none of these demands have resulted in 
legislation, regulation, or even a policy.  As a 
result, developers are setting the standards 
in New Orleans and targeting the streets 
and neighborhoods for gentrication 
(Goodyear, 2014).
For example, the Walter L. Cohen High 
School building is located two blocks 
from mansion-lined St. Charles Avenue in 
New Orleans’ famed Garden District.  The 
value of properties that share the same 
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zip code (70115) with the school has on 
average increased by more than 40% since 
Hurricane Katrina (White, 2015). Before 
Katrina, properties were sold at $173/sq. ft. 
However, in 2013 those values rose to $233/
sq. ft. and by 2014, it had reached $240/sq. 
ft. (White, 2015).
The Recovery School District (“RSD”), a 
special school district in Louisiana that 
assumed control of the majority of New 
Orleans public schools in the weeks after 
Hurricane Katrina, as prescribed in the 
School Facilities Master Plan and ultimately 
ratied by the Orleans Parish School Board 
(OPSB) and the La. Board of Elementary 
and Secondary Education (BESE), decided 
to land bank or close this school building 
that was assessed to be in fair condition 
(Lawton, 2014).  The RSD has not convened 
a process for informing the public of its 
rationale for closing the school building 
and inviting public input on this rationale 
(Lawton, 2014).  The school is currently 
attended by nearly 500 African American 
students (Lawton, 2014).
The proposed plan for Cohen College Prep, 
currently operating out of the Walter L. Cohen 
High School site, is to build a school for those 
students on the site of the former Booker T. 
Washington school, which was constructed 
on the site of the former Silver City Dump. 
While the RSD has asserted that its plan met 
or exceeded the remediation requirements 
for environmental standards of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality (LaDEQ), ongoing tension ensues. 
Children are one of the most vulnerable 
segments of the population when it comes to 
being harmed by exposure to toxic chemicals. 
Because they spend so much of their time at 
schools, these environments must be as toxin 
free as possible. Not surprisingly, schools 
that serve low-income students of color 
are more frequently built on contaminated 
sites (Cohen, 2010).  School siting has thus 
become a serious problem not only in New 
Orleans, but across this nation as advocates 
for children’s environmental health and 
environmental justice galvanize around this 
issue.  It has also become abundantly clear 
that this ght is a continuing one in New 
Orleans as the practice of siting schools 
serving low-income children of color on toxic 
landlls is repeated.
The City of New Orleans operated the 
Agriculture Street Landll from 1909 
until the late 1950s and reopened it to 
burn debris from Hurricane Betsy in 1965 
(Webster, 2015). During the 1970s and 
1980s, residential neighborhoods and 
Moton Elementary School were built over 
more than 40 acres of the site.  In 1984, 
Robert Moton Elementary School opened 
for kindergarten through sixth grade. There 
were about 900 children enrolled in the 
school. The Orleans Parish School Board did 
not tell its employees or parents that the 
school had been built on a part of the City’s 
landll or that environmental testing had 
identied the presence of toxic chemicals on 
the school site. The EPA added the site to its 
national list of Superfund sites in 1994, after 
arsenic, lead and other hazardous materials 
were found on the property (Webster, 2015).
We are now more knowledgeable of the 
consequences of building schools on 
municipal landlls, and have a better 
scientic knowledge of what harm could 
occur to our children if schools are built on 
these sites.  What lessons have we actually 
learned from our past behaviors if we are 
willing to continue to build our schools on 
contaminated sites?
The RSD proposes to build a new school 
for the students on a former city waste 
dump, where the land remains highly 
contaminated with lead, arsenic, mercury, 
and cancer-causing chemicals (Jacobs 
CSRS Program Management, 2015; Dall, 
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2015).  According to the RSD’s plan, at least 
12 feet of the contaminated soil would 
remain on the school site with lead levels 
24 times above the standard for residential 
land use (Leaaf Environmental, 2012; Leaaf 
Environmental, 2013).  Several parents, 
school alumni, public education advocates, 
environmental justice organizations, and 
other New Orleanians have condemned the 
RSD’s plan (Dall, 2015). State legislation was 
introduced by Representative Joseph Bouie 
to prohibit the RSD from building the school 
on the waste dump.  The legislation passed 
unanimously by the Louisiana House of 
Representatives, but died in the Louisiana 
Senate after school ocials and building 
contractors testied in opposition to the bill 
(Campbell-Rock, 2015).  The RSD publicly 
announced that it will proceed with its plan 
to build the  school for students whose 
current school is now “hot” property in post-
Katrina New Orleans (White, 2015).
Disaster Increased Vulnerability
Research is replete with data supporting 
the disproportionate exposure of minority 
and poor communities to hazardous waste 
facilities and the disparities in clustering 
waste facilities within three kilometers 
of these communities (Bullard, Mohai, 
Saha, & Wright, 2007).  After Katrina, New 
Orleans East, a largely African American and 
Vietnamese community was chosen for the 
disposal of debris from the storm.  There 
were four landlls in the community with 
River Birch Landll taking on the lion’s share 
of the waste along with the Old Gentilly 
Landll being reopened for that purpose 
after Katrina (Russell, 2012).
Additionally, vulnerable communities have 
become increasingly more endangered by 
the threat of new and risky technologies 
for waste disposal. An Eastern New Orleans 
community was targeted for the location 
of a risky technology waste disposal 
facility in 2009.  Over the past ten years, 
plasma arc technology has emerged as a 
potential trend for renewable energy in 
waste management (Solena Group, n.d.). 
It is a waste disposal technology with 
critical environmental health implications 
in the waste management industry.  Such 
a gasication facility was proposed by the 
Sun Energy Group, LLC, for development 
at the site of the Regional Business Park on 
Jourdan Road (Elie, 2009; Buchanan, 2010). 
It would be the rst facility of its size to be 
built in the United States and the largest of 
any existing facility in the world.
“Sun Energy (Sun Energy Group, LLC), in 
partnership with Air Products, through 
a joint venture company, Louisiana 
Gasication Facility, LLC (LGF), proposed 
to build, own and operate what they 
call an ‘energy from waste . . . facility’ in 
New Orleans East (Deep South Center for 
Environmental Justice, 2011). The LGF would 
use ‘Plasma Arc Gasication” (Deep South 
Center for Environmental Justice, 2011). Sun 
Energy claims that the technology is not 
incineration, per se (Sun Energy Group, LLC., 
n.d.). However, though company websites, 
diagrams, and process descriptions claim 
the technology is a renewable energy 
facility, the proposed technology would in 
fact have the same polluting eect as a two-
stage incinerator (Deep South Center for 
Environmental Justice, 2011; Greenaction 
for Health and Environmental Justice, 2011). 
While there are dierences between 
traditional incineration technologies and 
plasma arc technology, the system proposed 
by Sun Energy involves incineration/
combustion as an essential component 
(Greenaction for Health & Environmental 
Justice, 2011). One dierence is that while 
traditional incinerators burn the waste 
directly, plasma arc heats the waste in the 
gasication stage, creating a synthetic 
gas (or “syngas”). Key to the technology 
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proposed by Sun Energy is the burning 
of the syngas in a turbine or boiler. This 
combustion process is the incineration 
that results in emissions of toxic and 
criteria air pollutants into a neighborhood 
already overloaded with air pollution. 
These emissions would include dioxins and 
furans, highly toxic chemicals linked to a 
wide range of profound illnesses including 
cancer, reproductive, developmental, and 
immunological diseases. Plasma arc facilities 
around the country have been plagued with 
failed equipment and no merit of energy 
production from the syngas technology 
has been shown (Greenaction for Health & 
Environmental Safety, 2011). This new and 
risky technology represents the latest threat 
to New Orleans’ vulnerable communities.
The selected site for the project is the 
neighborhood of New Orleans East, the 
largest African-American community in the 
city located in Planning District 9 (Bennett, et 
al., 2011).  New Orleans East has an industrial 
park that is zoned as heavy industrial, and 
for a long time, the neighborhood has 
served as a garbage-dumping site for the 
city and surrounding parishes (Bennett, 
et al., 2011). The neighborhood currently 
has 23 illegal dumpsites and numerous 
inactive and active landlls (Bennett, et al., 
2011). The city of New Orleans does not 
have a comprehensive waste management 
plan to eectively manage this problem. 
African American and Vietnamese residents 
living near the site opposed the location 
of the facility there (Elie, 2009). To date, 
the community has been able to stop the 
development of the project.
Collateral Damage in the Melia 
Community
Policies and projects implemented to mitigate 
the damages of climate change impacts 
sometimes  come with consequences as was 
the case with a New Orleans community, 
Melia, that was negatively impacted by the 
Southeast Louisiana (SELA) Dwyer Road 
Drainage Project (Deep South Center for 
Environmental Justice, 2012). The purpose 
of the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood 
Damage Reduction Project (SELA) is to 
reduce the risk of ood damage due to 
rainfall ooding in Orleans, Jeerson and 
St. Tammany Parishes.  The Army Corps of 
Engineers led the implementation of the 
project with the Sewerage and Water Board 
of New Orleans as the local sponsor.  Homes, 
some newly constructed and renovated 
after Katrina, were severely damaged in this 
predominantly African American community 
of mostly elderly and retired residents.   The 
damage was extensive, including structural 
property damage, cracked slabs, shifted 
windows and doors, sewer ies, and broken 
plumbing pipes. Since May 2011, residents 
of the Melia community have complained 
of structural damage to their property. In an 
eort to resolve their problems, residents 
solicited assistance from Dillard University’s 
Deep South Center for Environmental Justice 
(Deep South Center for Environmental 
Justice, 2012).
For nearly four years, the DSCEJ assisted 
the Melia community in navigating the 
complicated terrain required for redress of 
damages caused by the drainage project. 
A class action lawsuit was led to further 
progress in the resolution of their claims 
(Rainey, 2015). On  May 15, 2015,  10 Melia 
residents along with assistance from the 
DSCEJ and Advocates for Environmental 
Human Rights sta attended a meeting with 
the Federal District Court judge assigned 
to this case to address issues blocking the 
SWBNO processing of damage claims.  After 
four years of living in substandard conditions 
due to property damage caused by the SELA 
project, SWBNO was given the green light to 
continue their claims process with the Melia 
residents. It is important to note that while 
it took four years for the Melia community 
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to get redress, the Uptown community 
complaining of similar damages to their 
property due to another SELA project in the 
mostly White auent community, received 
front page coverage in the Times-Picayune 
of their plight (Rainey, 2015).
Conclusions
There are perilous consequences that stem 
from policy decisions that do not have 
equity as a foundational principle.   All of the 
policy decisions in response to Hurricane 
Katrina discussed herein to some degree 
are stimulating changes and movement 
towards the total transformation of the city 
of New Orleans.  Sadly, this transformation 
has largely lacked inclusion and equity for 
the poor and middle class African American 
citizens of this city.
While New Orleans is being applauded for a 
remarkable comeback, a close look reveals 
some deeply troubling facts. While showing 
improvements in many quality of life index 
areas (New Orleans Recovery Index), its 
lowest scores come in the areas of equity 
and inclusion (Plyer, Ortiz, Horowitz, & 
Hobor, 2013; Rainey, 2013). This inequitable 
legacy of Katrina must be addressed.
Asking dierent questions will generate 
dierent answers. Comparing the city of 
New Orleans to other cities suering from 
the same structural and systemic problems 
due to race and income does not get us 
on the road to equitable recovery.   New 
Orleans has been touted as a model for city 
recovery after a major disaster. The question 
is whether this model should be replicated 
in other communities suering post-
disaster recovery challenges.  Is the New 
Orleans model inclusive and equitable for all 
citizens?  Or is it a model of dispossession and 
forewarning for indigenous communities 
whose very survival is threatened not only 
by the disaster, but by post-disaster policies 
favoring exclusion and gentrication?
The city of New Orleans’ progress towards 
prosperity should have at its foundation 
an examination of the lack of inclusion of 
African Americans in this new prosperity.  We 
would then have a truer picture of where we 
should be and plan to prioritize eorts in 
needed areas. The city has made progress 
in some areas, but it is those areas where 
we have not made progress that need the 
most attention in order to better plan for the 
future. If issues of equity in recovery as well 
as emergency preparedness and response 
are not adequately addressed, there will be 
an ongoing disaster that will result in the 
permanent, systematic depopulation of 
New Orleans’ African American communities 
and neighborhoods (Wright, 2006).
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DOUBLING  DOWN: 
G ETTING  TO RESILIENCE 
IN NEW ORLEANS
J OHN M .  BARRY AND M ARK S.  DAV IS,  J . D. ,  M . L. T.
WE REMAIN DEEPLY 
V ULNERABLE TO HURRICANES, 
RISING SEAS, SINKING SOILS, A 
VANISHING COAST, AND JUST 
PLAIN HEAVY RAINS.  THOSE ARE 
HARD THINGS TO DEAL WITH AND 
NEW ORLEANS IS BY NO MEANS 
ALONE IN FACING THEM. 
7
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There is something about anniversaries that 
focuses our thinking and makes us reect 
on, mourn, and celebrate those people and 
events that shape our lives.  It is tting that we 
do that.  And if ever there was an occasion 
worth marking it is the 10th anniversary of 
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall along the coasts 
of Louisiana and Mississippi.  But amid all 
the speeches, vigils, and memorials some 
space needs to be made to ask ourselves 
just what we learned from that largely 
induced tragedy—and whether we are 
applying those lessons.
Since we have all chosen to make our 
homes in New Orleans, we clearly have a 
stake in this being a smarter, safer place. 
We deeply hope it is and there is evidence 
that says it.  But being safer and smarter 
is not the same thing as being safe and 
smart enough.  By almost every measure 
we have a long way to go before our levels 
of protection and resilience are where they 
need to be.  Most of the vulnerabilities 
and the consequences thereof fall 
disproportionately on the disadvantaged. 
We remain deeply vulnerable to hurricanes, 
rising seas, sinking soils, a vanishing coast, 
and just plain heavy rains.  Those are hard 
things to deal with and New Orleans is by 
no means alone in facing them.  But there 
is a positive:  Plans and options exist that 
give New Orleans and coastal Louisiana a 
better chance at a decent future than many 
other places.  
But plans and technically feasible actions 
don’t implement themselves to create vibrant 
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resilient communities and ecosystems.   That 
takes community, a community able and 
willing to honestly invest in itself and to face 
the fact that, when you are working at this 
scale, a community’s prospects for survival 
and prosperity are measured not by how 
prepared and engaged its most auent and 
privileged members are, but how well its least 
are.  Katrina revealed that in spades.  Those 
most likely to die, lose their jobs or homes, 
and to miss out on the post storm recovery 
work were African Americans, the elderly, 
the poor and the civically estranged.   This is 
what makes Katrina an event of global and 
enduring importance.  It was not just a storm, 
it was an unraveling of society in a way that 
few have seen and fewer expected, especially 
in the richest nation on Earth.
So, how are things?  What lessons have 
been learned?  The truth is, it depends on 
who you ask.  The city has been hailed as a 
successful comeback story with a surging 
economy, housing market and a bold 
approach to reforming public education.  But 
there is still entrenched poverty, racism, and 
unemployment and a persistent trust-gap 
between those making it and those who are 
not (and who historically were not allowed 
to).   The region struggles to remain insurable 
and attractive to investors in the face of 
advancing seas and a pervasive disinvestment 
in the public sector.  In short, New Orleans 
remains a fascinating but troubled place and 
one that grapples daily with its own identity 
and sustainability.  Considering that the City 
and its surrounding coast were decidedly 
unsustainable 10 years ago, perhaps this is 
progress but without much more it will not 
be enough.
Whether New Orleans can make it or not 
is probably not a question most people 
outside of Louisiana ask.  After all, after 
Hurricane Sandy, western droughts, eastern 
blizzards, and urban unrest, there are 
other places to think about, not the least 
of which are those thousands of places 
where everybody else lives and that New 
Orleanians surely don’t spend much time 
thinking about. But New Orleanians should 
always keep these issues in mind, and 
others should keep their nger on the 
pulse of New Orleans.  Because if one thing 
is now clear it is this:  New Orleans is one of 
the handful of places on the planet that are 
bellwethers of our ability to manage our 
way out of the mess we are in. 
For all the talk of resilience, sustainability, 
inclusion, and no more “business as usual,” 
no place that we know of has marshaled 
the options, resources and civic and 
political will to squarely face the future. 
Maybe that is because you cannot face 
the future if you do not honestly own up 
to the past, for the keys to crafting a future 
lie in learning about and from the past. 
The disasters of Fukashima, Hurricanes 
Katrina and Sandy, the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill, and earthquakes in Haiti, Mexico 
City, Christ Church New Zealand, and 
most recently Nepal teach one relentless 
lesson.  And that is that too many people 
in too many places are living at profound 
and well-understood risk, and that it is 
policy to trust more to luck than any sense 
of real management to reduce or alleviate 
those risks.  
There is a brief window following a disaster 
when systemic change may be possible 
but it passes quickly, replaced by excuses, 
platitudes and plans that have little chance 
of being implemented.  That is particularly 
true where solutions depend more on 
social change than engineering.  It is easy 
to call for change but when change means 
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things really being dierent, or costing too 
much in terms of money or how we see and 
treat our neighbors, things get dicey.
The problem is not just people’s attitudes. 
In fact, people’s attitudes may be the most 
straightforward piece of the puzzle.   People 
are teachable and capable of caring and 
learning.   You can move them to thought, 
action or tears with a message or experience. 
Not so long ago, when our communities 
were smaller and more compact, this was 
where the action was.  This is no longer the 
case , at least not in some very important 
ways. The more intractable part of getting 
more sustainable societies lies in the fact 
that our communities are less and less the 
masters of their destinies.  There has been 
a pronounced shift from the personal and 
local sphere to the institutional and global 
realm.  The issue is not whether that is good 
or bad. This is simply a fact.  New Orleans 
oers a good example. 
When Hurricane Betsy hit New Orleans in 
1965 many neighborhoods ooded in ways 
that Katrina repeated in 2005.  At that time 
hurricane protection was a local, mostly 
personal, thing.  There were no federal 
hurricane defenses to protect the City, 
much less to fail.  The decision to return 
and rebuild was assisted from Washington 
DC, but mostly shaped by locals.  Most 
of the drug and grocery stores, retailers, 
banks were locally-owned.  The decision for 
them to reopen was inseparable from the 
recovery of the neighbors they served. 
By 2010, that had changed dramatically. 
Flood protection was heavily the province 
of the Army Corps of Engineers.  Federal 
government had a commitment to protect 
the region from the worst storm it was 
likely to see, a once in 200 to 300 year storm 
to use the current terminology.  That made 
people feel safe but it turns out to have been 
illusory.  The hurricane science the Army 
Corp of Engineers relied on in designing 
that system had evolved and by 1972 it 
was clear even to the Corps that the worst 
likely storm would be worse than the one 
they had planned for (St. Bernard Parish et 
al. v United States, 2015).  New information 
like that tends to make a sensible person 
reect, learn and adapt their plans.  That is 
not what the Corps, which is full of sensible 
people, did.  No, the Corps felt absolutely 
bound to build the system they pitched to 
Congress in 1965 and no new information 
about the real storm risk was going to 
change what they saw as their legal 
mission.  Unfortunately for the people 
in New Orleans that meant the Corps’ 
legal mission had become defending an 
outdated metric instead of a city.  That is 
hardly an aberration.   In addition, their 
engineering designs were in critical places 
so deeply flawed it could not perform 
even to the Corps’s old standards.
The truth of the matter is that for every law 
empowering someone or some agency 
to promote greater public safety and 
environmental resilience, there are passels 
of other laws and policies that run counter 
to it.  Not intentionally, of course, and not 
without some justification, but the result 
is the same.  Immunity laws intended to 
protect the public purse also can inoculate 
government against accountability, as 
can laws intended to encourage (and 
then shield) private investment.  Narrow 
agency and organization missions can 
be useful to focus expertise and limit 
overreaching, but they also can defy 
comprehensive planning and action.  And 
lending, housing and education policies 
that can elevate communities, can also be 
used to trap people in poverty and high-
risk locations.
By the time Katrina hit, many of the 
banks, grocers, and retailers had been 
bought out or replaced by national 
chains, organizations with no ties to the 
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community.  For them the decision to 
return, rebuild and reopen was a business 
decision driven by metrics and policies set 
in cities far away.  They needed customers 
first, customers who often could not return 
until they had a place to shop, bank and 
worship. Their duty was to their shareholders 
and business models, duties that did not 
reward compassion or local roots.  
One of the most compelling lessons from 
New Orleans and Katrina is that the very 
nature of our communities has changed. 
The notion that community is dened by 
who lives nearby must now be expanded 
to include persons and institutions at 
a distance whose decisions can control 
the fate of places and their residents. 
When those persons and institutions are 
unknown or faceless to locals, and when 
the locals are mere abstractions or metrics 
to those out-of-towners, the challenges 
of building any sense of real community 
should be obvious.  But nobody said this 
was going to be easy.
Which brings us to the second lesson from 
New Orleans.  The enemy is also us.  New 
Orleans has made tremendous strides and 
by almost every measure, is well ahead of 
any post-storm projections of where the 
region would be 10 years after the storm. 
People in every segment of the metro 
region have worked hard and accomplished 
far more than expected by almost anyone. 
Yet, to an unfortunate extent, our very 
success has made us complacent about the 
greatest threat:  The all too real risk that we 
can ood again.   
Too many people believe that so-called 
“100-year protection” is something with 
which we should be content. But that term 
just means is that we are protected against 
a storm with a 1% chance of striking any 
particular year. This is the lowest standard 
in the civilized world for densely populated 
areas. In fact, that standard was set by and 
for ood insurance. It may make perfect 
sense to insure a single building to that 
standard. Unfortunately, when oods hit 
entire cities not just a few buildings it’s 
comparable to designing medical care to 
handle a single person sick with inuenza, 
when the threat is actually an inuenza 
pandemic. In the rst case, a single doctor 
can handle it. In the second case, an entire 
society can be knocked out or even all but 
wiped out. 
The real chances over the next 100 years of 
escaping a hurricane that could overwhelm 
the 100-year standard are not good. Facts 
communicate more than probability 
statistics. The Mississippi River levees 
were built to protect against what was 
perceived to be the worst probable ood, 
and not to protect against some arbitrary 
mathematical projection.  And that is a 
good thing: in the last 88 years there have 
been at least four and possibly more oods 
that broke the standard for a 100-year ood 
on the river, most recently during the 2011 
Mississippi River Floods. 
Much better protection is closer than it 
might seem. The existing protection system 
can keep the city dry against the “still-
water” storm surge of a “500-year storm,” i.e., 
the surge if waves can be knocked o the 
top of it. How can that be accomplished? 
Greater protection can be accomplished 
by restoring areas outside the levees and 
by honestly partnering with the people 
and communities who live and work on the 
“wet” side of the levees.  This strategy can 
raise the standard of protection to “500-
year.” That standard is achievable, at least 
for much of the metro area.
But it cannot be accomplished unless we 
face a number of truths, some of them 
uncomfortable.   Our window of opportunity 
is shrinking and the temptation to delay or 
compromise to avoid making hard decisions 
will be immense.  But we must keep after it, 
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keep the faith and be honest with ourselves. 
We must make it our business to not let our 
community be divorced from those who 
have the power to make decisions that 
will determine its future.  We must make it 
our business to empower every resident in 
civic life.  And we must make sure that we 
do not ever assume that the institutions 
that now dominate our governments and 
economies have our best interests at heart. 
None of this will be easy or cheap. There will 
be friction. There has to be if you are doing 
anything worthwhile. But if it is friction that 
is fueled by a true sense of purpose and that 
produces traction and not just heat, then 
there is indeed hope. 
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HEALTH OUTCOM ES IN 
POST- KATRINA NEW ORLEANS: 
PLACE AND RACE M ATTER
PHARISSA ROBINSON,  J . D.  AND LILA ARNAUD,  M . P. H.  
IN NEW ORLEANS PLACE 
AND RACE ARE CLOSELY 
LINKED, BECAUSE STRUCTURAL 
BARRIERS SUCH AS HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION, HISTORICALLY 
HAVE RELEGATED AFRICAN 
AMERICANS TO NEIGHBORHOODS 
THAT ARE POORLY RESOURCED, 
WHILE RESIDENTS IN MAJORITY-
WHITE NEIG HBORHOODS ENJ OY 
BETTER RESOURCES AND HEALTH 
OUTCOM ES.  8
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The neighborhoods in which people live 
have a profound impact on their health 
behaviors and health outcomes (World 
Health Organization, n.d.). In New Orleans, 
the concept that place matters is literally 
life and death. People residing in high 
poverty, high crime communities where 
the educational attainment of residents 
is low and unemployment is high, have a 
much lower life expectancy rate than their 
counterparts in communities where the 
reverse is true (Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies, 2012). In New 
Orleans place and race are closely linked, 
because structural barriers such as housing 
discrimination, historically have relegated 
African Americans to neighborhoods that 
are poorly resourced, while residents in 
majority-White neighborhoods enjoy 
better resources and health outcomes.  For 
instance, individuals living in zip code 70112 
(predominately Black) have a life expectancy 
25 years lower than those in zip code 70124 
(predominately White) (Joint Center for 
Political and Economic Studies, 2012).
This chapter will examine the social and 
structural forces that impact health equity 
for African Americans in New Orleans. 
These social determinants of health, or 
the conditions in which people live, work 
and age and the systems in which they 
interact, are examined in this chapter using 
neighborhood comparisons of health 
outcomes. More specically, the health 
disparities between African American and 
White New Orleanians are highlighted with 
126Healthcare
neighborhood-level analysis of the rates of 
chronic illness. Included in this chapter are 
discussions on the natural and manmade 
forces that impacted the health care 
infrastructure in New Orleans and its eect 
on African Americans. Finally, an analysis of 
structural and social issues in health care is 
provided that includes recommendations 
to improve health and wellness for African 
Americans in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
Health Care Infrastructure
Hurricane Katrina severely damaged the 
health care infrastructure in New Orleans 
and exposed the vast vulnerabilities in 
the system at the expense of low-income, 
African Americans. Charity Hospital, a 
state-run hospital that primarily served the 
city’s indigent, lay vacant after the storm, 
leaving a major gap in health care access 
for low-income African Americans in the 
city (Gratz, 2011). The closure of Charity 
Hospital had severe consequences for 
African Americans in the city as 75% of the 
hospital’s patients were African American 
before the storm (Save Charity Hospital, 
n.d.). In the absence of Charity Hospital, 
African Americans’ access to health care in 
New Orleans diminished signicantly, and 
the city saw a 50% increase in its death rate 
following the hospital’s closure (Save Charity 
Hospital, n.d.). To highlight the importance 
of Charity Hospital in the New Orleans 
landscape, 51% of uninsured individuals in 
New Orleans reported their usual source 
of care was the emergency room (New 
Orleans Health Department, 2012). Without 
Charity Hospital, more than half of the city’s 
uninsured, lacked access to their usual 
source of care. 
In 2012, at a time when the city was 
still recovering from the devastation of 
Hurricane Katrina, Governor Jindal made $34 
million dollars in cuts to the public hospital 
system (Deslatte, 2012). LSU Public Hospital 
prisoner services and the city’s already 
crippled mental health infrastructure were 
hit hardest, representing half the nancial 
cuts. The hospital’s chemical detoxication 
unit and nine out of 38 psychiatric inpatient 
beds at the DePaul campus were also 
closed (Maldonado, 2012). The Jindal 
administration had already closed the New 
Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH) in 
2009, which had provided psychiatric care 
to indigent children (Barrow, 2009). These 
cuts dealt a serious blow to the already 
fractured health care infrastructure in the 
region and impacted some of the most 
vulnerable populations in the city, most of 
whom are African American. 
Despite these severe cuts to the hospital 
system in Louisiana, several post-Katrina 
recovery projects are expected to help 
improve access to medical care for residents 
of the city. These projects include the 
University Medical Center New Orleans 
(opened August 2015), the VA Hospital 
downtown medical complex (opening 
in 2016) and New Orleans East Hospital 
(opened July 2014). These projects cost 
over $2 billion dollars much of which came 
from hefty allocations from the federal 
government (Adelson, 2015; Buchanan, 
2012; Jacobson, 2013).  The federal 
government also awarded a $10 million 
grant to the City of New Orleans Health 
Department for its Healthy Start New 
Orleans Initiative to improve birth outcomes 
in communities with the high rates of low 
weight babies (City of New Orleans, 2014). 
Federal support has been essential to the 
recovery and rebuilding of the health care 
infrastructure in the city. 
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The rebuilding of these hospital projects 
are important steps in the recovery of the 
health care infrastructure of the city. Not 
only do they expand access to health care 
for New Orleans residents, but they also 
have a positive impact on the economic 
and workforce development in the city.  The 
completion of the New Orleans medical 
complex and Biodistrict are projected to 
create over 17,000 jobs and generate $630 
million in personal earnings by 2030 (Hollier, 
2011).  This underscores the importance of 
the health care system to the local economy 
in New Orleans. While these key projects 
are coming online, federal policies and local 
eorts are helping to address health care 
access issues that may help address health 
care disparities for African Americans. 
Access
Access to health care is an important factor 
inuencing health disparities across the 
nation. This is particularly true for African 
Americans who are more likely than Whites 
to be uninsured in New Orleans, are more 
likely than Whites to not see a doctor 
because of cost in Louisiana, and are less 
likely than Whites in Louisiana to have a 
primary care physician (The Kaiser Family 
Foundation State Health Facts, n.d.; New 
Orleans Health Department, 2013). It follows 
then that Blacks die from diseases at a higher 
rate than other racial groups, thus widening 
racial disparities (Culp-Ressler, 2013). 
Like many other southern states, Louisiana 
opted out of the Aordable Care Act’s 
Medicaid expansion provisions, denying 
coverage to otherwise ineligible residents 
who earn up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level (Schuler, 2015). Notwithstanding this, 
the Aordable Care Act has the potential 
to reduce racial disparities throughout New 
Orleans.  In particular, the city’s African 
American community is already signicantly 
benetting from some of its reforms 
through insurance coverage for more than 
60,000 in the New Orleans Metropolitan Area 
(Advocate Sta, 2015).  Many of the city’s 
African Americans who were ineligible for 
Medicaid now have coverage and access to 
treatment that was once only available to 
them in the city’s hospital emergency rooms. 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, 21% of New Orleans 
residents were uninsured, giving the city one 
of the highest uninsured rates in the country 
(Rudowitz, Rowland & Shartzer, 2006).  As 
previously mentioned African Americans 
have higher uninsured rates than Whites, 
with uninsured rates of 32.3% as compared to 
16.6% for nonelderly adults from 2009-2011 
African-American Unisured Rate in New Orleans from  2009 - 2011 and 2013-2014
0
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
20132009-2011
16.6%
32.3%
16%
25%
Whites 
Uninsured 
African Americans
Uninsured
African Americans
Uninsured
Whites 
Uninsured 
2014
11%
16%
African Americans
Uninsured
Whites 
Uninsured 
13%
Other
27% 
African American
60%
Whites
D E A T H S  P E R  1 0 0 , 0 0 0
Figure 1
128Healthcare
(New Orleans Health Department, 2013a). The 
Aordable Care Act has made a noticeable 
impact in reducing this disparity, by helping 
reduce the number of uninsured in the city. 
Between 2013 and 2014, the percent of 
uninsured African Americans dropped from 
25% to 16%, while the percent of uninsured 
Whites dropped from 14% to 11% (Number 
of uninsured, 2015). That’s a dierence of 
just ve percentage points between African 
Americans and Whites in the percent of 
uninsured in 2014, down from an almost 16 
percentage point dierence in 2009- 2011 
(See Figure 1) (Number of uninsured, 2015; 
New Orleans Health Department, 2013a). The 
impact of the Aordable Care Act is expected 
to play a continual role in decreasing the 
number of uninsured African Americans in 
New Orleans.   
While uninsured rates are dropping in New 
Orleans, the city faces the dicult challenge 
of addressing the shortages in mental 
health care providers.  Pre-Katrina, the 
mental health care provider shortage was an 
issue that was exacerbated by inadequate 
funding to address mental health and 
substance abuse needs (Reckdahl, 2012). 
Before the storm, the city’s shortage of 
psychiatric inpatient beds was at a rate of 
46.5 per 100,000 population or 364 total 
inpatient psychiatric beds for the entire city 
(City of New Orleans, 2010). Of those beds, 
100 were at Charity Hospital. The hospital 
that served the needs of the city’s low-
income African Americans, no longer served 
as a primary source of both inpatient and 
outpatient mental health care (The Kaiser 
Family Foundation State Health Facts, n.d.). 
African Americans in New Orleans were 
hardest hit because they are most likely to 
be misdiagnosed or not diagnosed at all, 
thus ending up in jail or avoiding treatment 
altogether (Simpson, 2015).  
By 2010, the number of available mental 
health and substance abuse hospital 
beds remained critically low at about 
17.5 adult beds per 100,000 (The Kaiser 
Family Foundation State Health Facts, 
n.d.). Although the number of available 
emergency room beds increased to 159 
in 2010, a shortage in psychiatric beds 
still remains a challenge in the city (City of 
New Orleans, 2010). While the outpatient 
infrastructure has beneted from the inux 
of federal funding, inpatient psychiatric 
facilities still face a shortage of inpatient 
beds. The new University Medical Center, 
provides 80 inpatient psychiatric beds 
today (Hays, 2015). One of the unfortunate 
results of this mental health care shortage 
crisis in the city is the criminalization of 
mental illness.  The combination of poverty, 
the unaordable housing and a edgling 
psychiatric healthcare system led to a 
disproportionate number of mentally ill 
African Americans falling through the cracks 
and ultimately showing up in city jails, 
morgues and emergency rooms (Simpson, 
2015). But the New Orleans East Behavioral 
Health Center opened their doors June 2015 
brining a much-needed mental health care 
service to the metropolitan area (Barbarin, 
2015). A continued increase of mental health 
care providers is crucial to increasing access 
to mental health care in New Orleans, but 
other options may also help to address the 
needs of residents in New Orleans.  Another 
strategy to address the mental health 
needs of New Orleanians is to follow the 
national trend of increasing the provision 
of home-based psychiatric care to stabilized 
patients as an alternative where psychiatric 
admissions are not feasible. 
An important improvement to health care 
access in New Orleans is the expansion of 
community health centers. Community 
health centers provide much needed 
primary care and mental health care to low-
income residents, including those that are 
uninsured (504HealthNet.org, 2015). Today, 
over 70 neighborhood-based, community 
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health centers serve 59,000 working class 
individuals throughout the Greater New 
Orleans area (City of New Orleans, n.d.). 
The Aordable Care Act has accelerated 
the growth of these centers encouraging 
the development of patient-centered 
medical homes that are well-coordinated 
systems in which clinicians and patients 
work together to provide patients with 
appropriate care (Freundlich, 2013). These 
Centers are designed to reduce emergency 
room visits and avoidable hospitalizations, 
reduce health disparities and improve 
health outcomes for its patients. In July of 
2014, two community health centers in New 
Orleans were awarded federal funds made 
available by the Aordable Care Act to 
expand or establish mental health services 
(Catalanello, 2014). In May 2015, the City 
of New Orleans was awarded a $175,000 
grant to help community health centers 
encourage residents to use the centers 
(McClendon, 2015). The Aordable Care 
Act and the health care delivery reforms in 
New Orleans are helping to rebuild a health 
care system that may help change health 
care decisions and behaviors of residents 
by increasing their access to primary care. 
Community health centers in New Orleans 
are serving many of the low-income African 
American residents who previously would 
be served by Charity Hospital, and providing 
much needed primary care and mental 
health care that can help turn the tide on 
health disparities for African Americans in 
New Orleans. 
In New Orleans East, the city also opened 
New Orleans East Hospital in July 2014, an 
80-bed facility that serves nearly 80,000 
residents (Catalanello & Myers, 2014). 
The facility is located on the former old 
Methodist Hospital site. Neighborhood 
clinic initiatives and the reopening of 
a hospital in New Orleans East may be 
contributing to improved health outcomes 
that have been experienced across the city 
for the past three consecutive years (City 
of New Orleans, 2015).  Today, the services 
the City oers through New Orleans East 
Hospital and its community health centers 
play a crucial role in increased health care 
access for African Americans and other New 
Orleans residents. 
Social Determinants of Health & 
Chronic Diseases
The conditions in which people live, work 
and age and the systems at play that 
shape their daily lives are referred to as 
the “social determinants of health” (World 
Health Organization, n.d.). Conditions like 
neighborhood income, crime rates, access to 
supermarkets and educational attainment 
are social determinants that can each create 
disparity in the health outcomes observed 
in a neighborhood.  Income, for example, 
directly aects health outcomes as families 
living below the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) 
become almost four times more likely to 
report poor health than families living at 
least two times above the FPL (Joint Center 
for Political and Economic Studies, 2014). 
The disparity in health outcomes is most 
dramatically observed across zip code 70112 
(a predominantly Black area) and 70124 (a 
Today, over 70 
neighborhood-based, 
Community  Health Centers 
serve 59,000 working class 
individuals throughout the 
Greater New Orleans area.
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predominantly White area) and leads to a 
drastic dierence in life expectancy (over 
25 years), with residents in 70112 living an 
average of 54 years and residents in 70124 
living an average of 85 years (Joint Center 
for Political and Economic Studies, 2014). 
Residents in zip code 70112, for example, 
are ve times more likely to die from heart 
disease than are those living in zip codes 
like 70124, with 1,945.2 people/100,000 in 
70112 dying from cardiovascular disease as 
compared to the 190/100000 people in zip 
code 70124 (Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies, 2014). Residents living 
within zip code 70112 also experience the 
highest rates of mortality due to stroke and 
diabetes. Between 2008 and 2010, African 
Americans were also three times more 
likely than white New Orleans residents 
to die of diabetes and twice as likely to 
die of kidney disease (New Orleans Health 
Department, 2013b). Risk factors like 
obesity, hypertension and diabetes all of 
which are driven by the cycle of poverty, also 
persist at the highest disparity levels in the 
neighborhoods represented under 70112 
(Joint Center for Political and Economic 
Studies, 2014). 
Obesity
Social determinants like the concentration 
of corner stores and fast food restaurants 
coupled with the lack of supermarkets 
and fresh food options, all can impact a 
person’s decision making around their food 
options and can lead to obesity. In spite of a 
growing number of supermarkets and fresh 
food venues in the city since the storm, 
access to these venues for African American 
residents has decreased. Pre-Katrina census 
tracts showed that African Americans were 
40% less likely to have access to more than 
one supermarket in their neighborhood 
as compared to residents of other 
neighborhoods. By 2009, lack of access 
increased to 71% (New Orleans Health 
Department, 2015). 
Crime and neighborhood safety are 
intrinsically linked to obesity. Unsafe 
neighborhood spaces deter people from 
becoming physically active. Exposure to 
stress also signals the body to release 
hormones like cortisol and adrenaline in 
the bloodstream, which have been linked 
with obesity and metabolic disease (Bose, 
Laferrere & Olivan, 2009). Obesity is a major 
risk factor of increased risk of diabetes, 
heart disease, stroke and certain kinds of 
cancer. A report by the New Orleans Health 
Department (2012) indicates that New 
Orleans has a 30% adult obesity rate. More 
recent numbers show that 42% of African 
Americans reported living with obesity as 
compared to 30% of Whites in Louisiana, 
giving Louisiana the sixth highest rates 
of adult obesity in the nation (Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2013; 
Levi, Segal, St. Lauren, & Rayburn, 2014). 
Diabetes
Disparities in health outcomes due to 
diabetes can be observed across race, 
income lines, and educational backgrounds 
(Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals [DHH], 2004b). The disease 
can be prevented and managed with 
healthful eating, regular physical activity 
and management of other risk factors 
such as high blood pressure, high levels 
of body fat and tobacco use (CDC, 2014). 
With decreased access to healthy food 
options, safe, walkable neighborhoods, 
and continuous health care access, African 
Americans are at a social disadvantage for 
preventing and managing diabetes. On a 
national level, 13.2% of Blacks live with the 
disease as compared to almost 8% of Whites 
(CDC, 2014). In New Orleans, Blacks are 
three times more likely to die from diabetes 
related complications than their White 
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counterparts (United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2012).
Due to limited local data, this section 
extrapolates state data to talk about trends 
in health disparity of diabetes across time. 
In 2004, the prevalence of diabetes in 
Louisiana had increased steadily from 5% of 
the adult population in 1994 to 80% (DHH, 
2004a). In pre-Katrina Louisiana, 10.9% 
of African Americans lived with diabetes 
as compared to 7% of White Americans 
(DHH, 2004a).  Residents who reported an 
annual household income less than $13,000 
were at higher risk of developing diabetes 
than residents who reported an annual 
household income of over $50,000 (14% 
versus 9%). Residents who had not attained 
a high school diploma were also twice as 
likely to develop diabetes than residents 
who had graduated from college (14% 
versus 7%) (DHH, 2004).
By 2010, the prevalence of diabetes had 
increased to 10% of the adult population in 
Louisiana as compared to almost 7% in 2000 
(CDC, 2010). African Americans still had the 
highest prevalence of diabetes with a 13% 
diagnosis rate compared to approximately 
9% diagnosis rate among White Americans. 
Residents who reported an annual income of 
less than $15,000 were still at higher risk than 
residents who reported an annual income 
of over $50,000 (a prevalence of 20% versus 
approximately 6%). Residents who had not 
attained a high school diploma experienced 
higher prevalence of diabetes than residents 
who attained a college degree at 16% and 
8% respectively (CDC, 2010).
Maternal Health Indicators  
Unfortunately not all pregnancies in the 
US today result in a live or healthy birth. 
Infant mortality rates (IMR) and rates of 
low birth weight (LBW) are maternal health 
indicators used to gauge the overall health 
of mothers and their babies. Some will 
argue that accessing prenatal care within 
the rst trimester of pregnancy is the 
greatest indicator of low infant mortality rate, 
premature births, neonatal mortality, infant 
mortality and maternal mortality (Funke, 
Tran, Mather & Kieltyka, 2006). 
Black communities throughout the US, 
including Orleans parish, report more adverse 
birth outcomes, than any other group (DHH, 
2006). This is due in part to much higher 
rates of low birth weight and higher rates of 
infant mortality before the rst year of life. 
Black communities also report less utilization 
of prenatal care early in pregnancy (rst 
trimester), which has been linked to healthy 
pregnancy (DHH, 2006).
From 2004-2006, the Department of Health 
and Hospitals (2006) estimated that in 
Orleans Parish, 16% of live Black births 
compared to 8% of live White births resulted 
in babies with low birth weight. The infant 
mortality rate in Black communities was 
11.5 deaths/1,000 live births compared 
to 4.8 deaths/1,000 live births in White 
communities. There was a wide disparity 
in utilization of prenatal care, with 72% 
of Black women reporting they received 
prenatal care in the rst trimester compared 
to 92% of White women (DHH, 2006).
Immediately after the storm, from 2005-
2007, the disparity in rates of low birth 
weight widened slightly from 16% of Black 
live births compared to 8% of live White 
births (DHH, 2007).  Infant mortality rate in 
Black communities was 11 deaths /1,000 
live births compared to 4.3 deaths/1,000 
live births in White communities; and 76.5% 
of Black women reported accessing rst 
trimester care, compared to 92.2% White 
women (DHH 2007).
 Most recent numbers show that the disparity 
in maternal health outcomes continues to 
widen across racial groups in New Orleans. 
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Fourteen percent of live Black births result 
in low birth weight and 7% of live White 
births result in low birth weight (DHH, 
2011). While infant mortality rates between 
both Black and White communities each 
decreased, the disparity observed across 
groups increased with 10.7 deaths/1,000 
Black births compared to 1.9 deaths/1,000 
White births (DHH, 2011).
HIV/AIDS
The dierences in rates of HIV transmission 
are the most extreme health disparity for 
African Americans in New Orleans given 
that African American residents are twice 
as likely to be diagnosed with HIV than 
their White counterparts (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2012). The 
Louisiana Public Health Institute identies 
high-risk heterosexual sexual activity and 
injection drug use as major modes of HIV 
transmission for women and same sex 
sexual activities followed by high-risk 
heterosexual activity as major modes of 
HIV transmission for men (Louisiana Public 
Health Institute, 2010). 
In 2004, 1,113 new HIV/AIDS cases were 
diagnosed in the state of Louisiana, 32% 
(353) of which were in New Orleans. Of the 
1,113 new HIV/AIDS cases diagnosed in the 
state, 872 were new AIDS cases, indicating 
late diagnosis (DHH, 2004b). New Orleans 
had the highest number of new HIV/AIDS 
cases diagnosed in 2004 and 76% of the new 
HIV/AIDS diagnoses were AIDS diagnoses. In 
2004, 5,148 people were living with AIDS 
in New Orleans (DHH, 2004b). Although 
African Americans made up 33% of the 
Louisiana population, they represented 76% 
of new HIV cases diagnosed and 79% of new 
AIDS cases diagnosed in the state. African 
Americans’ HIV rates were seven times 
higher than Whites in Louisiana in 2004 
(DHH, 2004b). 
In 2004, there were 15,068 people living with 
HIV/AIDS in Louisiana, 50% of whom were 
living with AIDS (DHH, 2004b). By December 
2014, there were a total of 20,013 people 
living with HIV/AIDS in Louisiana, 53% of 
whom were living with AIDS (DHH, 2014). 
In New Orleans, 4,901 people were living 
with HIV/AIDS in 2014. Of those living with 
HIV/AIDS, 2,596 had AIDS (53%). Across the 
Other
White
African-American
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Figure 2
of the People 
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state, disparities in HIV/AIDS rates were 
extreme in 2014. In Louisiana, 68% of 
people living with HIV/AIDS were African 
American as compared to Whites who 
made up 23% of people living with AIDS 
(DHH, 2014). In 2014, African Americans 
represented 32% of the population in 
Louisiana. Those disparities held up in 
the New Orleans Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, where 62% of people living with 
HIV/AIDS were African American and 
31% of those living with HIV/AIDS were 
White (See Figure 2) (DHH, 2014). The 
New Orleans metropolitan area includes 
Jefferson, Orleans, St. Tammany, St. John 
the Baptist, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. 
James and St. Charles parishes. 
Cancer
Louisiana’s rates of cancer are close to the 
national average or higher. From 2008-
2012, per 100,000 people, the incidence 
of breast cancer rates averaged 121.9 
compared to the national average of 123; 
lung cancer rates averaged 73 compared 
to the national average of 63.7; and rates 
of kidney cancer averaged 20.9 compared 
to national average of 16.0 (National 
Cancer Institute, 2012). Overall, cancer 
disproportionately affects people of color 
in Louisiana, with age-adjusted incidence 
rates for Whites at 486.7/100,000 
compared to 508.8/100,000 for people of 
color including Latinos living in the state 
(National Cancer Institute, 2012). With 
less access and utilization of health care, 
African Americans are at an increased 
risk of morbidity caused by cancer. Black 
women, for example, are less likely to 
survive cancer following a diagnosis, 
compared to White women (Susan G. 
Komen Breast Cancer Foundation, 2013). 
In New Orleans, African Americans are 
also disproportionately affected by 
cancer, with rates of death caused by 
cancer averaging 245/100,000 among 
African American communities compared 
to the death rate average of 150/100,000 
seen among White New Orleanians. 
African Americans are 1.55 times more 
likely to die from cancer than their White 
counterparts (See Figure 3) (New Orleans 
Department of Health, 2013). 
Social Determinants of Health and 
Smoking
One of the most egregious examples of 
structural and social forces that promote 
poor health outcomes for African Americans 
is the tobacco industries’ targeting of young 
people and low-income communities 
of color. An unpublished report by the 
Louisiana Public Health Institute (LPHI) 
found that the tobacco industry spends 
$215 million annually to market their 
products to these populations, resulting in 
tobacco-related disparities. LPHI conducted 
a study of the product, placement, pricing 
and promotion (4Ps) of tobacco, alcohol 
and food in New Orleans, surveying 
465 stores throughout the city. They 
found a significant relationship between 
socioeconomic status and access. 
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Specific findings of the unpublished LPHI 
study suggest that the 4Ps are major social 
determinants that impact health choices 
and influence health outcomes. Findings 
of the study indicate that tobacco and 
alcohol products were cheaper and 
health foods were more expensive 
in African American neighborhoods. 
The reverse was true in more affluent, 
White neighborhoods. Study findings 
also indicate that African American 
neighborhoods had 2.5 times more 
tobacco advertising than more affluent, 
White neighborhoods where they had 
almost no tobacco ads in stores. These 
findings highlight the disparate strategies 
implemented by the tobacco industry in 
African American neighborhoods and 
illuminate some of the structural forces 
that promote poor health outcomes and 
health disparities for African Americans. 
For added clarity, smoking is linked to 
20% to 30% of low birth rates in the 
United States and public smoking and 
lack of access to fresh foods are risk 
factors for obesity and chronic disease 
(New Orleans Health Department, 2013b). 
It is safe to say that product, placement, 
pricing and promotion of tobacco, 
alcohol and healthy foods in African 
American neighborhoods in New Orleans 
is contributing to higher rates of low 
birth rates, obesity and chronic diseases 
among African American New Orleanians. 
While the aforementioned structural and 
social forces continue to facilitate poor 
health outcomes for African Americans, 
the New Orleans City Council passed a 
smoke-free ordinance banning smoking 
in bars, restaurants and casinos in the 
city that appears to be yielding positive 
health results (Berenson, 2015; City of 
New Orleans, 2015). A new study found a 
96% decrease in fine particle air pollution 
in the 100 days since the ordinance 
passed (Travers &Vogl, 2015).
Disaster Preparedness 
How much mayhem and loss of life 
could the city have avoided during the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina had 
officials at all three levels of government 
executed an effective communication or 
disaster preparedness plan is unknown. 
Hindsight is 20/20. However, there are 
lessons learned regarding where the city 
stands today in its disaster preparedness 
and readiness plan should another storm 
or disaster strike. The government has 
infused billions of dollars into the city 
to shore up its levees, and has since 
made several repairs to address constant 
sinkage problems. However, some still 
worry the levees may not hold up if 
another storm makes a direct hit. Local 
providers and hospitals are still tasked 
with the challenge of caring for its sickest 
ventilator dependent patients during 
power outages. Lessons learned from 
Katrina include moving critical equipment 
like generators to higher floors and 
revamping hospital communication lists. 
No plan is ever exhaustive, which is why 
the greatest lesson learned from Hurricane 
Katrina is eradicating complacency such 
that residents heed evacuation warnings 
and alerts in a timely and orderly fashion 
and that disaster plans are regularly 
checked and updated for maximum 
preparedness. This is particularly critical 
for the city’s most ill and vulnerable 
populations who will more likely rely on 
public transportation and other mass 
transit for evacuation purposes. 
Conclusion
Like other major cities in America, 
where you live in New Orleans strongly 
correlates with the condition of your 
health and life expectancy. Thus, despite 
having a greater number of providers, 
residents in some of the most income and 
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resource poor areas of the city experience 
more persistent, frequent & severe health 
problems than those living in zip codes 
that are predominantly White and have 
higher income rates. Large disparities in 
diseases in only certain areas of the city 
are too disproportionate to ascribe it only 
to poor decision-making, particularly 
when considering how high the deck is 
stacked against residents living in some 
of the most violent areas of the city, like 
Treme and Central City. 
Neighborhoods with low crime rates, 
quality schools, libraries, nutritious food 
outlets, safe workout facilities, parks 
and community centers, as well as, 
trusted relationships, and equal access 
to resources, strongly influence healthier 
lives just as much as access to quality 
healthcare. In applying this to New 
Orleans as a solution for addressing health 
disparities, we should take a different 
approach by looking more closely at the 
city’s neighborhood infrastructure, land 
use and housing policies and not just the 
African Americans who live in them. The 
density of liquor stores and commercial 
to residential space, as well as the 
number of banks versus check-cashing 
places are as much drivers of health 
outcomes as is access to healthcare and 
neighborhood clinics. 
Although riddled and beleaguered by 
epidemic, systemic failures, the city 
has nonetheless undergone a major 
transformation since Hurricane Katrina. 
But too many struggling areas of the 
city still sit bruised and battered not just 
from the waters of Katrina, but also from 
an almost daily spray of bullets and gun 
violence that remind us of the plight of New 
Orleans. If ever there was an opportunity 
to rectify substandard neighborhood 
conditions known to perpetuate the 
cycle of violence, desperation and health 
disparity in New Orleans, the recovery 
period in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina was it. Yet, 10 years after one of 
the worst disasters ever unleashed onto 
the banks of the Mississippi, the health 
of many African American residents is no 
better off than it was before Hurricane 
Katrina, as compared to White residents. 
These disparities are sometimes seen 
as aggravating problems that are near 
impossible to fix. When the city honestly 
addresses its issues with neighborhood 
diversity and inclusion, and couples that 
with healthcare access interventions, it will 
have a more realistic and comprehensive 
picture on which to base decisions and 
an equitable strategy. Until New Orleans 
applies lessons learned from Katrina by 
addressing the relationship between zip 
code and morbidity, no amount of beds 
or providers alone will eliminate the 
health disparities between its African 
American and White residents. Closing 
the disparity gap between predominantly 
White communities like 70124 and 
predominately Black communities like 
70112 requires an equitable practice of 
prioritizing Black health and healing in 
the city, which includes neighborhood 
diversity. The strategies employed 
throughout Columbia Parc represent one 
such approach the city can adopt in truly 
desegregating its communities as a step 
towards closing the health outcomes 
disparity gap.  
Recommendations 
Adopt strategies that diversify resources and 
funding streams and make them available 
to historically marginalized New Orleans 
communities to improve health equity.
Review the city’s neighborhood infrastructure, 
and not just the African Americans who live in 
them, for land use and housing policies that 
promote a cycle of poverty, i.e., density of 
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liquor stores, commercial to residential space, 
number of banks versus check-cashing places, 
food deserts and limited service restaurants.   
Advocate for increased funding and access 
to primary care and mental health services, 
exploring alternatives such as the national 
trend of increasing the provision of home-
based psychiatric care to stabilized patients.
Regularly check disaster plans and update 
for maximum protection.
In hurricane preparedness plans, ensure 
critical equipment like generators are 
moved to higher oors.
Ensure hospital communication lists are 
periodically updated and alerts, educational 
outreach programs and warnings are 
regularly tested.
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THE CHALLENG ES OF G ETTING  
HOM E Q UICKLY AND FAIRLY: 
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
OF POST- KATRINA 
HOUSING  RECOV ERY EFFORTS
KELLY D. OWENS, PHD.
THE Q UESTION OFTEN ASKED 
BY THOSE OUTSIDE OF NEW 
ORLEANS IS, “ IS NEW ORLEANS 
BACK? ”  ALTHOUGH THIS INQ UIRY 
IS SEEMINGLY STRAIGHTFORWARD, A 
NUMBER OF COMPLEX ITIES PRECLUDE 
THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE A SIMPLE 
ANSWER. IN GENERAL, 7 8 %  OF 
THE PRE- KATRINA NEW ORLEANS 
POPULATION COUNT IS BACK WITH 
8 8 %  OF HOUSING  INV ENTORY 
RESTORED. 9I V E TORY 
State of Black New Orleans141
The question often asked by those 
outside of New Orleans is, “Is New Orleans 
back?”  Although this inquiry is seemingly 
straightforward, a number of complexities 
preclude the ability to provide a simple 
answer. In general, 78% of the pre-Katrina 
New Orleans population count is back 
with 88% of housing inventory restored 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). On the surface, 
the numbers suggest that the immediate 
post-Katrina concern around housing New 
Orleanians has been resolved. However, 
digging deeper unveils that while the 
quantity of housing units is not an issue, 
the aordability and quality of housing in 
New Orleans is a major concern, particularly 
to individuals and organizations vying 
for fairness, equality, and the provision 
of decent places to live for all citizens. 
Further, if “being back” is dened as the 
return of New Orleanians to their pre-Katrina 
neighborhoods, a thorough response has 
to be qualied with reference to race 
because of the disparate recovery of 
predominantly white versus predominantly 
Black neighborhoods. The fact that the 
answer to “Is New Orleans back?” elicits 
responses that have to be qualied based 
on aordability, housing quality, and race 
suggests that an analysis about equity and 
the fair distribution of disaster recovery 
resources for the rebuilding of New Orleans 
neighborhoods is warranted.
Bringing families back to New Orleans 
necessitated swift action to restore housing 
to pre-Katrina levels in order to stabilize 
neighborhoods. However, housing recovery 
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became an arduous task, complicated by 
the limitations of insurance companies, pre-
Katrina poverty rates at 28%, and challenges 
such as neighborhood blight associated 
with a steadily declining population. 
Moreover, the city/state had to equally 
prioritize several needs: housing its labor 
force; safeguarding tax-based revenue from 
higher income households; preserving its 
tourist economy; and forestalling increased 
homelessness. These considerations meant 
that a comprehensive housing recovery plan 
would have to be developed and executed 
quickly. Under a national spotlight, the city 
of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana 
with support from the federal government 
had the opportunity to demonstrate how 
disaster recovery should be conducted. 
However, many lessons can still be gleaned 
from the mistakes made during the housing 
recovery. However, once the dust settled, 
housing recovery in New Orleans would 
become a case-study complete with lessons 
on what could and should have been done 
dierently.
Housing and Race
Hurricane Katrina did not discriminate. 
Homes belonging to families of all 
racial backgrounds were aected by the 
devastating eects of the storm.  Thousands 
of families were displaced and given that 
New Orleans had a majority African American 
population, when looking at raw numbers, 
more African American households were 
aected than any other racial group. Yet, 
when analyzing devastation and housing 
recovery percentage-wise, while disaster 
did not discriminate, disaster did expose 
major inequities. Of New Orleans’ 14 
planning districts, ve areas experienced 
less than 13% severe housing damage 
as a result of Katrina while eight districts 
encountered severe damage to at least 40% 
of their homes. In the Uptown/Carrollton 
area, one of the larger districts, 27% of 
homes were severely damaged (see Table 
1). Of those eight, New Orleans East, the 
Lower Ninth Ward, Mid-City, Gentilly, and 
Village De l’est were the hardest hit, with 
64% to 69% of homes severely damaged. 
All of these areas were predominantly 
occupied by African American families (see 
Table 1). Related to this observation is the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) nding 
that Blacks were less likely to return than 
were individuals in other racial groups. 
According to BLS, only 54% of Black 
evacuees returned to their pre-Katrina 
communities, compared with 82% of White 
evacuees. BLS concluded that Black net 
out-migration was tied to geographical 
patterns of storm damage, income, and 
educational attainment rather than race 
(Groen & Polivka, 2008). While it is apparent 
that geography determined which 
communities were more damaged and 
socioeconomic status dictated the capacity 
for residents to return, BLS’s suggestion 
that race did not factor into which 
residents were able to return ignores the 
vestiges of racially discriminatory practices 
(e,g., redlining, steering, blockbusting, 
and exclusionary zoning)  that established 
racially segregated communities. The 
suggestion also ignores that life chances 
are tied to geography.
It is because of residential segregation 
that predominantly Black communities 
in New Orleans were more susceptible 
to destruction caused by Katrina, which 
can be correlated to the rate of return of 
African Americans to New Orleans. New 
Orleans’ population count dropped by 
197,792 people from the 2000 census 
count to 2006, the period immediately 
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following Katrina, and estimates are that 
64% of this population loss was African 
American (Shrinath, Mack, & Plyer, 2014; 
U.S. Census, 2000). As anticipated, the 
hardest hit neighborhoods suered the 
most population loss. In 2010, ve years 
after Katrina, the Lower Ninth Ward and the 
Little Woods neighborhood in New Orleans 
East were still experiencing population 
declines of more than 10,000 people (see 
Table 2). 
These ndings make it hard to circumvent 
race as a unit of analysis with respect 
to housing recovery. Since the onset 
of recovery eorts, policy analysts and 
academicians have been grappling 
with the nding that African American 
neighborhoods have been recovering at 
slower rates than white neighborhoods 
despite the inux of state and federal 
funding earmarked for recovery (Gotham, 
2014; Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2011; Rose, 
Clark, & Duval-Diop, 2008; Rivera & Miller, 
2007; Quigley, 2007a).
While these results may not have been 
intentional, it is important to bring such 
critiques and analyses forward if we are to 
inform and shape future practices that are 
equitable and fair for all groups.
Damage by Neighborhoods
New Orleans’ City Planning Commission 
divides New Orleans into 14 planning 
districts comprised of neighborhoods. 
 HOUSING UNITS
% UNITS 
SEVERELY 
DAMAGED
PERCENT OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN SPECIFIED NEIGHBORHOOD 
POPULATION COUNT PRE- AND POST-KATRINA
Neighborhood 2000 2010
French Quarter/CBD (1a) 2,896 0% French Quarter 4.3% 4.4%
Warehouse/CBD (1b) 1,552 2% Warehouse DNA DNA
Central City/Garden District 
(2)
19,737 12% Central City 87.1% 72.4%
Uptown/Carrollton (3) 28,213 27% Audubon 5.1% 4.8%
Mid-City (4) 24,247 64% Mid City 64.3% 55%
Lakeview (5) 12,666 57% Lakeview .7% 3.4%
Gentilly (6) 16,902 67% Gentilly Terrace 69.7% 77.8%
Bywater (7) 15,416 42% St. Roch 91.5% 86.8%
Lower Ninth Ward (8) 6,802 69% Lower Ninth Ward 98.3% 95.5%
Eastern New Orleans (9) 28,865 68% Little Woods 86.1% 92.6%
Village d L’est (10) 3,820 67% Village De l’est 55.4% 43.4%
Lake Catherine/Venetian 
Isles(11)
829 62% Venetian Isles 76.5% 61.4%
Algiers (12) 18,973 1% Old Aurora 30.9% 54.9%
English Turn (13) 1,712 12% New Aurora/English Turn 68.1% 63.4%
Table 1: Damage by Neighborhoods 
Source: The Data Center, Neighborhood Statistical Area Data Proles
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Table 1 indicates the amount of severe 
damage in each planning district and 
indicates the percentage of African 
Americans represented in the most 
populated neighborhoods of the planning 
districts. 
Pre and Post-Katrina Housing 
Landscape
At the time of the last census (2000) before 
Katrina, housing inventory accommodated 
New Orleans’ population of 484,674 
residents with a total of 215,091 units. 
Of these units, 188,251 were occupied 
and renters inhabited 53.5% of them. 
The median home value was $87,300 
and median gross rent was $488.  The 
U.S. Census found that 26.7% of Orleans 
Parish homeowners and 42.7% of renters 
were paying 30% or more of their 
income toward housing costs (housing 
cost burden). Racial demographics 
before Katrina showed a majority Black/
African American population of 66.6%. 
White residents represented 26.6% and 
the Asian population 2.3%. Hispanics of 
any race numbered 3.1% while American 
Indian and others were at 1.4% (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2000). 
By 2013, the population of New Orleans 
was estimated at 378,715-- indicating 
that New Orleans had lost 105,959 
residents since 2000. The 2013 American 
Community Survey counted 190,127 
housing units in the city of New Orleans, 
24,964 fewer units than in 2000.1
Additionally, by 2013, the median gross 
rent had increased by 89% and home 
 
Sample Neighborhoods
POPULATION
Change 
Number
Change 
Percent
2000 2010
French Quarter            4,176            3,813          (363) -8.69%
Central City          19,072          11,257      (7,815) -40.98%
Audubon          14,898          15,865            967 6.49%
Mid City          19,909          14,633      (5,276) -26.50%
Lakeview            9,875            6,394      (3,481) -35.25%
Gentilly Terrace          10,542            8,210      (2,332) -22.12%
St. Roch          11,975            6,632      (5,343) -44.62%
Lower Ninth Ward          14,008            2,842    (11,166) -79.71%
Little Woods (New Orleans 
East)
         44,311          31,698    (12,613) -28.46%
Village De l'est          12,912            8,008      (4,904) -37.98%
Venetian Isles            1,883                840      (1,043) -55.39%
Old Aurora          15,807          16,781            974 6.16%
New Aurora/English Turn            5,672            5,769               97 1.71%
Table 2: Population Count in Select Neighborhoods in 2000 and 2010
 Source: The Data Center, Neighborhood Statistical Area Data Proles
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median values increased by more than 
$95,000 compared to 2000 values. Median 
gross rent at $926 explains the significant 
increase—from 42.7% to 61.3%--in 
number of renters experiencing housing 
cost burden of 30% or more. Another 
notable difference is the African American 
population, which in 2000 measured at 
323,392, and was estimated at 213,632 
in 2013 – a significant boost after having 
experienced a low of 125,600 in 2005. 
2013 numbers show a decrease of 6.8% 
in Black residents since 2000 while White 
and Hispanic representation has increased 
by 7% and 2.2%, respectively (see Table 3). 
Housing Recovery: Slow but 
Steady
Ten years post-Katrina, 99.9% of the 46,922 
households that applied for nancial 
assistance through Road Home, the state’s 
housing disaster recovery program, have 
been granted funding (State of Louisiana, 
2015a). While this is an encouraging nding, 
the pace by which the program operated 
substantially slowed down the rate by 
which neighborhoods recovered. It was not 
until August 2006, one year after Hurricane 
Katrina, that the Road Home program was 
ocially launched. 
2000 2010 2013
POPULATION 484,674 343,829 378,715
Black/African American 66.6% 60% 59.8%
White 26.6% 30% 33.6%
Asian American 2.3% 3% 3%
Hispanics (any race) 3.1% 5% 5.3%
HOUSING
Housing Units 215,091 189,896 190,127
Occupied Units 87.5% 74.9% 78.1%
Renter-occupied Units 53.5% 52.2% 52.7%
Vacant Units 26,840 47,738 41,729
Median Home Value $87,300 $184,100 $183,700
Median gross rent $488 $899 $926
Homeowners paying ≥ 30% of income 
toward housing costs
26.7% 46.2% 43.9%
Renters paying ≥ 30% of income toward 
gross rent
42.7% 61.6% 61.3%
Table 3: Demographic and Housing Characteristics of New Orleans in 2000, 2010, and 2013
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census & American Community Survey 2013, 2006-2010 American 
Community Survey 5 Year Estimates, 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
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Road Home, the state’s response to damage 
caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita2, has 
been a major component of the disaster 
housing programs that garnered $11.5 
billion of the $13.3 billion in Community 
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery 
(CDBG-DR) funding from HUD3 (State of 
Louisiana, 2015b). According to Governor 
Blanco, Road Home was established to 
“help Louisiana residents get back into their 
homes or apartments as quickly and fairly 
as possible” (Louisiana Recovery Authority, 
2006). With grants of up to $150,000 to 
homeowners, New Orleanians would nally 
receive the assistance needed to rebuild 
their damaged homes. In partnership with 
the newly created Louisiana Recovery 
Authority, HUD signed o on the Road 
Home program as the mechanism to 
deliver much needed funding to distressed 
homeowners. The reliance on federal 
assistance was necessitated by the 
tremendous gaps created by the refusal 
of insurance companies to cover damage 
that was deemed to have been caused by 
ooding rather than wind. In other cases, 
homeowners were under- or uninsured 
(King, 2007; Buckley, Doroshow, Hamdan, & 
Hunter, 2006).
Unfortunately, Road Home was riddled with 
a number of challenges. Administrative 
execution of the program was slow and 
haphazard, eventually leading to the ring 
and replacement of the lead subcontractor 
of the program. Disbursement of funds was 
hindered by bureaucratic ineciencies 
creating nancial hardship for families 
waiting to rebuild (Finger, 2008). One 
troubling nding was that most Road 
Home grants were insucient. Even 
after receiving nancial assistance, many 
homeowners were still faced with major 
funding gaps making it impossible to 
complete work on their homes. By 2008, 
the average Road Home grant of $60,000 
meant a shortfall of nearly $50,000 for 
46.7% of applicants rebuilding in place 
(Rose, Clark, & Duval-Diop, 2008).
The shortfall of funding was a direct result 
of Road Home’s policy in determining 
how much funding homeowners could 
receive. The formula was based on the 
pre-Katrina assessed value of the home 
or the actual cost to repair the home – 
whichever amount was less. For example, 
a home valued at $70,000 with $90,000 
of home rebuilding costs would only 
receive $70,000 thus creating a $20,000 
shortage. This policy created an even more 
deleterious eect for African American 
communities dealing with the nationwide 
trend of depressed market value attributed 
Neighborhood Impact of the 
Road Home Program
New Orleans East, a 
predominantly African American, 
middle-class neighborhood 
is about eight miles east of 
Lakeview, a neighborhood with 
a majority of White households. 
In New Orleans East and 
Lakeview, pre-storm home values 
averaged $146,216 and $336,064, 
respectively. Average home 
damage estimates were $224,303 
in New Orleans East and $281,537 
in Lakeview. In 2008, the average 
Road Home grant for the 13,908 
applicants in New Orleans East 
was $69,196 while 4,735 Lakeview 
applicants received an average of 
$109,777. This created an average 
funding gap of $69,196 for New 
Orleans East applicants compared 
to a $44,405 gap for Lakeview 
applicants. (Rose, Clark, & Duval-
Diop, 2008).
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to homes located in predominantly Black 
neighborhoods. PolicyLink (2007) found that 
African American households had an almost 
35% higher shortfall than White households. 
A neighborhood-by-neighborhood analysis 
showed that in predominantly Black areas 
such as New Orleans East and the Lower 
9th ward, 60% of homeowners ended up 
with average gaps of $65,000 and $68,000 
respectively (Duval-Diop, 2009).
It could be argued that housing inequities 
were being further exacerbated by Road 
Home’s policies and racial preferences. 
In 2008, HUD and LRA were sued for the 
disparate outcomes of Road Home in a 
class action lawsuit led by several African 
American homeowners, the Greater 
New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, 
the  NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, and the National Fair Housing Alliance. 
The suit was settled six years after the 
storm in 2011 with remedies that included 
amending grant formulas to provide 
full relief to over 13,000 homeowners. 
Over 45,000 low and moderate-income 
homeowners across the state received 
supplemental grants based on damage 
costs rather than home values and one 
year extensions to occupy the homes were 
granted to homeowners whose original 
grants were based on pre-storm market 
value (NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 2011). 
To date, over $2 billion has been provided 
through Additional Compensation Grants 
(State of Louisiana, Oce of Community 
Development, 2015).
LRA’s failure to apply principles of equity 
and utilize actual renovation costs as a 
basis for funding from the start resulted in a 
delayed recovery process. In the meantime, 
lower- and middle-income families were 
indenitely displaced or were forced to 
sell rather than rebuild due to delayed 
and insucient funding. Slowly getting 
the program on par came at the expense 
of tax dollars being spent on building and 
maintaining temporary housing units 
(“FEMA trailers”) or completely losing 
families—mostly Black families—to other 
cities and states. In addition to African 
American neighborhoods being disparately 
impacted by the government’s policies 
and processes, government ineciencies 
led to millions of wasted federal tax dollars 
and lost tax revenue for the city. As recent 
as 2014, LRA was continuing to implement 
new measures to deal with issues related 
to applicant compliance and recovery of 
grant dollars from homeowners due to non-
compliance (Road Home, 2014).
Aordable Housing 
High poverty rates, low wages, a 
preponderance of single-parent households, 
and high unemployment in New Orleans 
created the need for substantial aordable 
housing units in the city prior to Katrina 
where 42% of tenant households and over 
25% of homeowners were excessively 
burdened (according to HUD standards) 
by paying 30% or more of their income 
towards gross rent and/or housing costs 
(U.S Census, 2000).  This amount of burden 
demonstrated that aordable housing was 
extremely insucient before Katrina. 
Hurricane Katrina worsened the aordable 
housing situation for the city of New Orleans 
with severe damage to over 51,000 units 
(PolicyLink, 2007). The shortage of rental 
housing—market-rate or aordable—
placed a premium on livable units resulting 
in median gross rents soaring from $488 right 
before Katrina to the current median gross 
rent of $926. Of the housing units damaged 
or lost due to the hurricane, 37,790 of these 
units fell in a price range ocially considered 
aordable for low-income residents (less 
than 30% of household income). 
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Expediency and strategy were required in 
order to bring residents, including lower-
income New Orleanians, back to the city. The 
primary aordable housing providers—the 
Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), 
the Louisiana Housing Corporation (which 
had been preceded by the Louisiana Housing 
Finance Authority), state and city-sponsored 
aordable homeownership programs, state 
and city-based tax incentives for private 
developers, and non-prot community 
development corporations—would have 
to thoughtfully address aordable housing 
gaps that were now deeper than before 
Katrina.
Rehabilitation Aid for Small 
Rental Properties  
One of the state’s responses to the aordable 
rental housing crisis was the Small Rental 
program launched in January 2007 and 
administered through the Louisiana 
Recovery Authority’s Road Home program. 
To date, LRA has allocated $649 million of 
the $11.5 billion Community Development 
Block Grant (for housing programs) towards 
rental housing for extremely low- and very-
low-income people (State of Louisiana, 
2015b). The intent of the program was to 
provide forgivable loans to landlords of 
one to four-unit properties in the hardest 
hit neighborhoods. Landlords had to agree 
that rents would be capped for the next 10 
years. In doing so, aordable rental units 
would be made available to residents. 
However, policy became a barrier for 
substantial progress being made during the 
initial phases. The program operated on a 
reimbursement basis with the expectation 
that landlords would front the money 
for repairs and then get compensated for 
expenditures up to $72,000 per unit. This 
policy initially delayed the replenishment 
of aordable units because many landlords 
did not have the resources to obtain 
upfront capital. Revisiting the policy, LRA 
decided to provide gap nancing to eligible 
landlords. As of 2015, incentives for 6,169 
small rental loans have been committed 
including 5,407 aordable rental units 
available in New Orleans. Just over $295 
million of Community Development Block 
Grant Disaster Recovery Funds have been 
committed specically in New Orleans 
(Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2015). 
Public Housing
Prior to August 2005, HANO reported 
5,146 households living in public housing 
apartments. Currently, the city has a total 
count of 1,976 public housing units (HANO 
Fact sheet, 2015). The reduction in available 
units may have been more related to the 
timing of the storm rather than the storm 
itself. Katrina hit New Orleans during an 
era of nationwide redevelopment via the 
HUD-sponsored HOPE VI program launched 
in 1992. By 2005, HOPE VI had already 
transformed over 200 major housing 
developments in cities across the nation, 
including Chicago and Washington, DC as 
well as the Desire, St. Thomas, and Fischer 
housing developments in New Orleans.4 
HOPE VI was the federal government’s 
solution to deconcentrate poverty whereby 
public-private partnerships leveraged 
funding to physically and socially alter 
public housing sites into mixed-income 
developments. Housing middle-class 
residents along with a substantially 
smaller subsidized tenant population in 
newly redeveloped sites was intended 
for new, higher-income individuals to 
model behavior that would encourage 
government-subsidized residents to adopt 
mainstream values such as self-suciency 
(Owens, 2012). However, HOPE VI bore with 
it some controversy, namely the failure to 
replace units on a one-on-one basis and 
allow all former residents to return upon 
completion of the new developments. This 
created the permanent displacement of 
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poor, Black residents with what appeared 
to be government-sanctioned gentrication 
(Lees, 2008; Hackworth & Smith, 2001). 
The four housing developments—C.J. Peete, 
St. Bernard, Latte and B.W. Cooper—that 
were slated for redevelopment (using the 
HOPE VI mixed-income model)5 survived 
the storm. This fueled protest against HUD 
and HANO’s plan to demolish the buildings.6 
Redevelopment opponents pointed to the 
increased demand for aordable housing 
sparked by Katrina as rationale to merely 
renovate the developments, which could 
have housed more low-income households 
more quickly and more aordably than if they 
were razed and redeveloped. Protesters also 
made accusations of racism as the buildings 
had been occupied by Black families who 
faced permanent displacement.7 The 
city cited unlivable conditions and an 
estimated $1 billion renovation cost as 
major impediments to renovate rather than 
redevelop (HANO, 2015). The New Orleans 
City Council unanimously voted in favor of 
demolition, resulting in 3,170 fewer public 
housing units in New Orleans. Mitigation 
for residents displaced by redevelopment 
included HANO’s issuance of 2,987 tenant-
protection vouchers.
Under President Obama’s Administration, 
HOPE VI was modied into the HUD Choice 
Neighborhood Initiative, which requires 
one-to-one replacement of public housing 
units along with comprehensive services for 
subsidized residents. HANO was awarded 
a HUD Choice grant and is currently 
transforming the Iberville public housing 
site into a mixed-income community, which 
upon completion will bring the city’s total 
to 2,748 public housing units. However, 
completion is not expected until 2017 and 
HANO’s leadership has raised questions 
about the agency’s capacity to deliver as 
originally planned. 8
Since Katrina, the displacement of poorer 
households by redevelopment eorts and 
Hurricane Katrina more than doubled the 
demand for the Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher Program, which provides housing 
assistance to enable low-income families 
to rent from private landlords. HANO 
has responded to demand via scattered 
site public housing and the inclusion of 
aordable units (in addition to public 
housing units) in a number of housing 
developments.9  As an indication of the 
compelling need for aordable housing, 
consider that 17,800 families receive Section 
8 vouchers and 20,000 families are currently 
on the waiting list (HANO, 2015).
Aordable Rentals Via Tax Credits
In addition to mixed-income developments 
resulting from the redevelopment of 
public housing, mixed-income housing is 
also made possible by private developers 
incentivized by public support in the form 
of tax credits. Investors have been building 
and rehabilitating multi-unit developments 
in areas such as the Tulane Avenue corridor, 
where aordable units funded by Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) funds 
comprise at least 30% of these newer 
developments. LIHTC is an indirect federal 
subsidy administered through the state-
run Louisiana Housing Corporation (LHC). 
Aordable units are delivered through 
partnerships with private developers, non-
prot organizations and public agencies. 
As enforced by the IRS, LIHTC units in these 
developments must remain aordable for 
15 years. This timeframe can extend to a 
total of 30 years dependent upon continued 
enforcement by the city and state. 
Despite a slow start, the production of 
aordable units made possible through 
LIHTC’s did increase in response to 
Katrina, resulting in a total of 10,187 
aordable tax credit units.10  LIHTC units 
could have been made available sooner, 
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but several issues delayed or disrupted 
development. A number of neighborhood 
coalitions, driven by NIMBY-ism,11 made 
it dicult for developers to come into 
their communities. Another barrier was 
the rising cost of insurance for apartment 
buildings, particularly right after Katrina. 
With higher insurance costs, opportunities 
to build equity and ensure profitability 
were diminished. Furthermore, the Great 
Recession12 further hampered progress 
as stricter underwriting laws came into 
effect. LIHTC production was eventually 
aided by an allocation of $595 million 
in CDBG/Piggyback funds, which saved 
a number of developments under 
construction facing additional loan 
restrictions and scrutiny. As of May 2015, 
all but $272,000 of the CDBG/Piggyback 
fund had been obligated to the LIHTC 
program (State of Louisiana, 2015; Rose, 
Clark, & Duval-Diop, 2008; Schrayer, 2007). 
The Impact of Mixed-Income 
Housing
To date, the combined eorts of public-
private partnerships have created a modest 
dent when considering the overall housing 
aordability needs of low-income residents. 
Even with eorts such as the Greater 
New Orleans Foundation’s Community 
Revitalization Fund that supported the 
development of 9,500 aordable housing 
units, aordable housing continues to be in 
great need.
While the aordable housing situation 
continues to be addressed, there is 
concern about where poorer families are 
being housed and for how long. Under 
certain conditions, developers are able 
to opt out of the LIHTC program in 15 
years. This means that aordable housing 
units put in service beginning in 2010 
could be drastically reduced by 2025 with 
subsequent conversions from aordable 
to market-rate units in the years thereafter, 
thus creating waves of aordable housing 
unit shortages. Moreover, the eects of 
NIMBYism and housing discrimination by 
Section 8 landlords are pushing lower-
income residents into certain pockets 
of neighborhoods, reinforcing racial 
segregation and creating new areas of 
concentrated poverty.13
Aordable Homeownership
As an indication of housing cost burden, 26% 
of homeowners were paying 30% or more 
of their income towards home ownership 
costs in 2000. In 2013, 43.9% were paying 
more than 30% towards owner costs (e.g., 
mortgage, insurance, taxes, utilities, etc.), 
however, in 2013, there were 17,414 fewer 
owner occupied units than in 2000. In 
raw numbers, the number of “burdened” 
households has increased by over 600 
families when compared to 2000 rates 
despite lower population numbers.  One 
explanation for the increase in burdened 
households is the rising cost to buy homes. 
The average purchase price in May 2015 
was $347,212 compared to $253,502 in 
May 2005 based on information from 
the Gulf South Real Estate Information 
Network. Other explanations are tied to 
institutionalized trends and market forces 
(discussed in next section).
While the rate of owner-occupied units has 
remained steady when comparing 2000 
to 2013 (46.5% vs 47.3%), there were over 
17,000 fewer owner occupied units by 2013. 
Still, the fact that owner occupancy is on par 
with previous rates despite the substantial 
displacement of previous homeowners is 
commendable and largely attributed to the 
collective eorts of government agencies, 
funders, volunteers, and organizations 
that have supported aordable housing 
programs and clean-up campaigns. Their 
eorts have helped neighborhoods recover 
and have made homeownership possible 
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for lower- and middle-income families. 
Eorts include the Crescent City Community 
Land Trust, which committed to providing 
1,000 aordable housing units by 2024; 
Make it Right has built 150 homes averaging 
$150,000; NORA’s administration of the HUD 
Neighborhood Stabilization program has 
delivered 236 aordable homes; the New 
Orleans Area Habitat for Humanity helped 
over 3,200 families since 2006 by building 
500 homes and gutting 2,400 buildings; 
HANO has placed 340 rst-time buyers into 
homes; and the City of New Orleans and 
the Louisiana Housing Corporation have 
administered funds for homeownership 
programs including rst time buyer and soft 
second programs, which received $120.9 
million of CDBG-DR funds (Greater New 
Orleans Foundation, 2015; HANO, 2015; Make 
it Right, 2015; New Orleans Area Habitat for 
Humanity, 2015; State of Louisiana, 2015; 
NORA, 2013).  Although these eorts are 
laudable, there is still much work to be done 
if New Orleans’ homeownership rates are to 
compete with those of Louisiana and the 
U.S.—which are 19.7 and 17.6 percentage 
points higher, respectively— and  with 
a majority African American population, 
increasing homeownership may prove to be 
a challenge.
Challenges to Homeownership
Current homeownership rates in New 
Orleans are consistent with Pre-Katrina 
rates at about 46%, which is 17% lower 
than national homeownership rates. 
African American homeownership in 
New Orleans is more consistent with the 
national African American homeownership 
rate of 43.2%, however, New Orleans 
falls short in comparison to other 
predominantly Black cities such as Mobile, 
AL; Memphis, TN; and Virginia Beach, VA 
where Black homeownership is at least 
48%. When examining predominantly 
Black neighborhoods in New Orleans prior 
to Katrina, higher than average African 
American homeownership rates were 
found in The Lower Ninth Ward (54%), 
New Orleans East (55%) and Gentilly 
(72% homeownership rate). Post-Katrina 
homeownership for African Americans 
have fallen in these neighborhoods mostly 
due to lack of ood and hazard insurance, 
compounded by delays, ineciencies, and 
inequitable distribution of Road Home 
funding (Washington, Smedley, Alvarez, & 
Reese, 2006). 
The African American homeownership rate 
is largely attributable to discriminatory 
practices that have always existed in the real 
estate and mortgage industries, and recent 
market forces have added complications. 
The Great Recession brought with it 
foreclosures and tighter loan restrictions 
that have thwarted homeownership rates 
for families of all racial backgrounds. Upon 
factoring in predatory lending and other 
discriminatory loan practices in minority 
communities, the disparate impact on 
families of color is signicant. Still today, 
the threat of foreclosure looms over many 
African American households in New 
Orleans and FHA foreclosed properties 
in Black neighborhoods are more likely 
to be neglected than those in white 
neighborhoods, consequently bringing 
down home values in African American 
neighborhoods. According to the Greater 
New Orleans Fair Housing Center, between 
2008 and 2010, African Americans held 
more high-yearly-percentage-rate home 
loans than whites, meaning that because 
they were paying o interest rather than 
principal, building equity was occurring at a 
much slower pace (Buchanan, 2015). 
Additional ndings that explain challenges 
to homeownership for African American 
households include the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition’s 2008 reporting 
that African Americans were 2.59 times 
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more likely to receive high cost home loans 
when compared to whites immediately 
following Katrina in 2006. Forty-one percent 
of all home loans received by African 
Americans were high cost, compared to 
just 16% of loans received by whites. Also, 
African Americans were nearly twice more 
likely to be denied loans than whites. In 
2010, the Louisiana Oce of Community 
Development conveyed that the home 
loan denial rate for Whites was 20.7%, for 
African Americans 37.9%, and for Hispanics 
26.8% (Buchanan, 2015; Louisiana Oce of 
Community Development, 2010).
Herein lies one of the major equity issues 
further compromised by the hurricane, levee 
failures, and government recovery eorts. 
Threats to homeownership, particularly 
for racial minorities, means delaying the 
building of equity and generational wealth. 
The associated implications are far-reaching 
when considering how home equity can be 
leveraged to handle nancial emergencies 
or nance education, small business 
development, and other investments with 
potentially positive returns. In 2011, the 
median white household had $111,146 
in wealth holdings, compared to just 
$7,113 for the median Black household. 
Homeownership is key to addressing the 
racial wealth gap (Sullivan et al., 2015).
Progress toward Eliminating 
Residual Eects of Katrina
Blight reduction. Another major issue 
confronting New Orleans recovery has 
been urban decay— also known as blight. 
Already a problem that precipitated Katrina 
due to population decline, blight became 
a barrier to neighborhood recovery in 
that many homeowners were reluctant to 
rebuild in neighborhoods experiencing 
higher percentages of blighted properties 
such as in the Lower 9th ward. While pre-
storm blight gures are not available, it 
has been estimated that in 2010, the rate 
of blighted homes in New Orleans was 
25%, with approximately 43,755 blighted 
homes and empty lots coupled with 9,356 
vacant but habitable housing units (one 
of the highest rates of abandonment in 
the country) (Plyer et al., 2011). In many 
instances, blight resulted from Road Home 
funding shortages, denied insurance claims, 
and contractor fraud. In essence, blight 
disparately impacted African American 
neighborhoods where there was the most 
damage and the widest funding gaps 
(Southern United Neighborhoods, 2013).
Peter Yaukey, geography professor at UNO, 
estimates blight reduction at a range of 
10,328 to 14,591 units between 2010 and 
2013 –an indication that Mayor Landrieu’s 
blight reduction goal of 10,000 units was 
met. The city credits blight reduction to 
code enforcement, aggressive demolition 
policies, and a soft second nance program 
that tacked both blight and the aordable 
housing issue. Another blight reduction 
strategy has been the Lot Next Door program 
(LND) administered by the New Orleans 
Redevelopment Authority (NORA). Through 
this program, homeowners were able to 
purchase adjacent vacant properties that 
were part of the 5,000 properties acquired 
by the state through the Road Home 
program 14. At least 1,300 homeowners have 
participated in LND and NORA is continuing 
to oer properties through this program 
(City of New Orleans, 2014a; NORA, 2014; 
Yaukey, Knaggs, & Wise, 2013).
Housing for homeless individuals and 
families. Homelessness in New Orleans was 
certainly worsened by Hurricane Katrina. 
Before Katrina, only 2,051 people lived in 
literal homelessness on any given night. In 
2007, the homeless population surged to 
11,619 homeless people. UNITY of Greater 
New Orleans—a nonprot organization that 
leads a collaborative eort of 60 agencies 
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helping individuals who are homeless or at 
risk of being homeless—determined the 
2014 homeless population to be at 1,981 
people, 3% less than pre-Katrina.15 This 
count is 15% less than the previous year and 
83% less than 2007 (City of New Orleans, 
2014b). Steady declines in the homeless 
population from 2007 to 2014 have been 
attributed to the combined eorts of 
the city’s Homelessness Prevention and 
Rapid Rehousing Program funded with 
federal dollars and the UNITY homeless 
collaborative. UNITY doubled the amount of 
clients initially served in 2004, leased private 
rentals, and reunited homeless individuals 
with their families. UNITY also surpassed 
HUD’s national requirement to permanently 
house at least 65% of transitional clients 
by nding permanent homes for 90% of 
clients in transitional housing programs. 
Even more recent developments include the 
abolishment of homelessness for veterans 
(National Alliance to End Homelessness, 
2015; Unity of Greater New Orleans, 2012; 
City of New Orleans, 2015).
Did Katrina Spur Gentrication?
Anxiety around the idea of New Orleans 
becoming more and more gentried has 
been expressed by long-time residents 
since the beginning of initial planning talks. 
Apprehension may have been well founded 
given commentary from city ocials and 
scholars. For example, Jimmy Reiss, the chair 
of the Regional Transit Authority for New 
Orleans, asserted that Katrina had changed 
New Orleans for the better if low income 
African Americans were not able to return; 
conclusions by over 200 social scientists 
indicated that the displacement of low-
income residents presented the opportunity 
to deconcentrate poverty (Ehrenfeucht & 
Nelson, 2011). 
While housing practitioners debate 
whether gentrication is an issue, an 
observation of redevelopment activity 
and soaring housing costs suggest that 
conditions for gentrication exist. Using 
the denition provided by Neil Smith, a 
preeminent geographer and scholar on 
the topic of gentrication, conditions for 
gentrication include the inux of private 
capital, homeowners, and renters as a 
means to refurbish poor neighborhoods 
(Smith, 1996). In the instance of post-
Katrina recovery, it can be argued that 
both private and public capital has been 
poured into the redevelopment of lower-
income neighborhoods, particularly in 
areas where public housing developments 
have been replaced with mixed-income 
developments, bringing in higher-
income individuals as new renters and 
homeowners (Owens, 2012). Private 
and public redevelopment dollars have 
also contributed to improvements in 
several corridors bringing about more 
restaurants, retail hubs, and mixed-use 
developments. CDBG-DR dollars have 
contributed to redevelopment efforts 
with funding coming from an economic 
development allocation of over $317 
million and/or from the nearly $1.4 billion 
dedicated to infrastructure programs 
(State of Louisiana, 2015b). 
What is obvious to long-time residents 
is the influx of White transplants 
(Campanella, 2013), particularly into 
neighborhoods that are becoming less 
black, such as Central City, Mid City, and 
St. Roch. Neighborhood change is also 
prevalent along the Mississippi River 
where Bywater, Marigny, the Lower 
Garden District, St. Thomas, the Irish 
Channel, and East Riverside have all 
statistically become Whiter (see Table 2). 
Displacement in favor of mixed income 
development, neighborhood composition 
changing from one race to another, and 
huge capital investment clearly point to 
neighborhoods in the process of being 
gentrified.
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Conclusion: Equity in the 
Rebuilding Process
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, African 
Americans comprised 67% of the 
population with one-third of those 
individuals living under the poverty line 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Blacks were 
overrepresented as residents of public 
housing and affordable housing units. The 
economic status and housing patterns 
of New Orleanian Blacks is what made 
them more vulnerable to Hurricane 
Katrina, thus making their post-disaster 
experience quite different from more 
affluent populations (Fothergill & Peek, 
2004; Bolin, 1998). Similar to policy-
backed housing patterns in other urban 
areas across the U.S., African American 
New Orleanians resided in multi-
family dwellings, in homes with weak 
infrastructures, in racially segregated 
sections of town, and in poor land-use 
areas (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004). 
These conditions made it possible for 
Katrina to uproot a disproportionate 
number of Black people, causing the 
involuntary displacement of mostlyBlack 
communities (Rivera & Miller, 2007). In 
essence, Katrina intensified the racial 
inequities that had predicated her arrival. 
A number of scholars (Biles, 2000; Hirsch, 
2000; Radford, 2000; Wilson, 1987) make it 
clear that residential segregation patterns 
are deliberate outcomes of housing policies 
and programs, including government 
subsidies for White ight to suburbs, 
redlining, and restrictive covenants. African 
Americans were further disadvantaged by 
sections of the Federal Housing Acts of 1949 
and 1954 that “cleared slums” to embark 
upon urban renewal projects that, more 
often than not, were private development 
projects that resulted in the displacement 
of Blacks and rehousing of Blacks into public 
housing developments and neighborhoods 
plagued with concentrated poverty (Biles, 
2000; Hirsch, 2000). In total, these policies 
helped to crystallize racially segregated 
ghettos (Hirsch, 1998), subjecting African 
Americans to substandard land such as the 
case in New Orleans.
With respect to post-Katrina recovery, the 
state employed a number of tactics that 
placed African American neighborhoods 
at a disadvantage to recover as quickly 
as other neighborhoods. The demolition 
of four public housing developments 
and displacement of poor residents, the 
establishment of uninformed policies to 
govern distribution of government recovery 
dollars, and slow decision-making were 
crucial deterrents to recovery for all New 
Orleanians and particularly for African 
Americans. While unintended, the policy 
implications of initial recovery eorts have 
been reminiscent of slum clearance, urban 
renewal, and institutionalized racism. 
Essentially, when new policies are created 
without regard to preexisting disparate 
conditions, they are ineective for intended 
minority groups, create more advantages 
for Whites, or create further harm to non-
Whites. In the case of post-Katrina New 
Orleans, leveling the playing eld for African 
American households may have been an 
unrealistic goal, however, the dire housing 
situation in New Orleans presented the 
city with the opportunity to design and 
build stronger communities, ensuring less 
exposure to future natural disaster. Ideally, 
housing recovery would also present an 
opportunity to ensure equity while restoring 
both Black and White neighborhoods. 
Future housing recovery plans are 
encouraging. A group of concerned citizens 
and housing advocates are currently 
positioning New Orleanians for long-term 
development including plans for recovery 
should the city face another catastrophic 
disaster. HousingNola was launched in 2014 
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as a result of the Foundation for Louisiana’s 
convening of a working group of 
community residents, housing advocates, 
for-profit and non-profit developers, and 
representatives of elected officials and 
city agencies. The Greater New Orleans 
Housing Alliance (GNOHA) serves as 
the lead agency of the coalition, which 
also includes the Urban League of 
Greater New Orleans and the Greater 
New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center. 
Collaborative efforts will produce a 
10-year comprehensive housing plan, 
funded by the Foundation for Louisiana 
and a number of partners including the 
City of New Orleans and the Greater New 
Orleans Foundation.  Of most importance 
is HousingNola’s commitment towards 
equitable results undergirded by goals 
that include preventing displacement, 
promoting fair housing, encouraging 
sustainable design, improving quality 
of life in neighborhoods, and increasing 
accessibility for all residents, including 
special needs residents (HousingNola, 
2015). The HousingNola plan intends to 
address permanent affordable housing, 
which is not fully addressed in the city’s 
current master plan. The impact of 
HousingNola is dependent upon city 
leadership and is sure to be an important 
resource as housing recovery continues 
to be evaluated.
Data-based evaluation will continue to 
play a critical role in Katrina recovery 
efforts. Policy analysts, academicians, 
think tanks such as PolicyLink and the 
Brookings Institution, in addition to The 
Data Center (formerly the Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center) have 
been instrumental in providing statistics, 
highlighting progress, exposing inequity, 
demonstrating the impact of policies 
and programs, and reporting important 
findings through data analyses. The level 
of transparency that these individuals 
and organizations have created ensures 
that agencies remain accountable and 
provide a clear picture of what still needs 
to be done. 
Consistent with the saying that “hindsight 
is 20-20,” it is recognized that Hurricane 
Katrina and its aftermath presented 
numerous unforeseen challenges, and 
many responses resulted from creating a 
recovery playbook in the process of trying 
to recover. The incapacity to administer 
recovery programs using fair and equitable 
practices may speak to a larger issue, not 
just in New Orleans but across the nation. 
Allowing policies and programs to be 
developed without considering historical 
and institutional biases has and will 
continue to place traditionally marginalized 
groups in vulnerable positions. Post-Katrina 
recovery eorts provide many lessons for 
cities and states that will have to respond 
to disaster-related neighborhood damage. 
In the same manner that environmental 
impact assessments are utilized to predict 
program and policy outcomes, cities and 
states will need to consider the social and 
racial implications of policy decisions and 
recovery processes. Taking the time to 
gauge overall equity and eectiveness 
prior to implementation not only ensures 
fairness but also saves long-term costs 
associated with lost wages, lost tax revenue, 
mismanagement, litigation, duplication of 
eorts, etc.
Having had this experience means that the 
city of New Orleans now has the playbook 
to ensure that in the event of future 
catastrophes, every eort will be made to 
make sure that the city fully and equitably 
recovers, and we will all be able to provide a 
resounding “Yes!” if ever asked the question, 
“Is New Orleans back?”
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Endnotes
1Count does not take into consideration the number 
of housing units that were still uninhabitable. Because 
the Census Bureau denes housing units as long 
as they are not open means that many boarded up 
houses are in the census count. Examining the number 
of vacant units is therefore important in determining 
available housing stock.
 2Hurricane Rita hit coastal Louisiana three weeks after 
Hurricane Katrina.
 3CDBG-DR funding also supported infrastructure 
programs, economic development initiatives, planning 
and technical assistance, and administrative costs.
 4HOPE VI awards to the Housing Authority of New 
Orleans occurred in 1994, 1996, and 2003
 5HANO received a $20 million HOPE VI grant for 
redevelopment of C.J. Peete.
 6HANO was under HUD receivership at the time due 
to operational challenges, mismanagement, and poor 
housing conditions.
 7See http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2007/12/
city_hall_girds_for_public_hou.html
 8See http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/
blog/2015/02/16/top-construction-projects-8-
iberville-redevelopment-2/ and http://nextcity.org/
features/view/10-years-after-katrina-new-orleans-
public-housing-still-in-limbo-iberville
 9These are aordable units in addition to public 
housing units. The LIHTC program, which provides 
tax-based incentives to developers, is one of the 
mechanisms used to create aordable rental housing.
 10Number includes units in service and units in 
development. Veried by LHC administrator via email, 
July 2015.
 11NIMBY is the acronym for Not In My Backyard 
and describes the rationale for protest of proposed 
development that existing residents believe will create 
undesired eects
 12 The economic downturn between the years 
2007-2009 precipitated by disproportionately high 
foreclosure rates
 13 See http://www.gnofairhousing.org/2009/09/16/
housing-choice-in-crisis/
 14 5,221 homeowners opted not to rebuild and sold 
their properties to the state via the Road Home 
program. 
  15According to UNITY’s point-in-time count 
conducted March 31, 2014 for Orleans and Jeerson 
parishes.
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We all thought New Orleans would never be 
the same after Hurricane Katrina ravaged it 
beyond one’s imagination.  Nor would the 
lives of thousands ever be the same. Homes 
were destroyed by wind and floodwaters. 
Jobs disappeared, medical services and 
schools were crippled and in some areas non-
existent.  Family and neighborhood networks 
and churches, the bedrock in many areas, 
were gone as people fled to safe ground, 
some to cities all over the United States.  The 
homes of three of my children and I were 
uninhabitable.  Ten years later, we have 
recovered.
My family’s losses were devastating to us, but 
they cannot be compared with the financial 
loss and emotional trauma that thousands 
of New Orleanians had to live through. 
Everyone who was affected by Katrina 
has their own story.  However at this 10 
anniversary of the disaster, I have chosen to 
recall the thousands of people who came to 
our aid, unsolicited, to help in so many ways 
that seemed miniscule in the whole scheme 
of the tragedy but meant a lot to the victims 
they helped.   Aid came from good people 
from around the globe, from individuals and 
diverse organizations, from church groups, 
and  college students in the months and 
years after Katrina to lend their time, their 
hands and talents and their treasure.
I cite just two examples of the help that 
came.  A group of college students from 
the northeast came during their Christmas 
vacation, secured free paint, and painted 
every room from ceiling to floor in a public 
school.  
Katrina victims who had no place to go 
nor the means to get away from their 
flooded homes and neighborhoods went 
to inadequate public shelters. They suffered 
pain and humiliation beyond description, 
and from which they were transported to 
cities all over the country.  Families in some 
of the cities opened their homes to the 
victims who were virtual strangers to them 
and allowed them to live there until they 
could figure out a plan of recovery.
Many opened their wallets over and over. 
Some made the journey over and over to 
help in ways that not only assisted in victim 
recovery, but lifted their spirits when their 
faith was at its lowest.  I am sure there are 
more stories that should be recorded about 
the generosity of others during this horrific 
disaster.  It is this generosity of care and 
giving that has sustained my faith in the 
goodness of human beings.
Sybil H. Morial
Educator and wife of the late 
New Orleans mayor, Dutch Morial
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I continue to see our beloved city like many 
other natives as we deem it the “Tale of Two 
or maybe Three Cities.” A recent local news 
article (Times Picayune) on August 2, 2015 
describes New Orleans economic expansion 
and job growth as strong, but wages and 
education funding lagging. New Orleans is a 
very different place  10  years post the storms. 
Because I was born, raised and educated 
here, I can really feel and see the difference. 
I believe we are even more segregated than 
before as a community in spite of all the 
great efforts to bring about a so-called “one 
voice.”  There are many Black churches still 
trying their best to be restored. Many Black 
pastors and leaders along with many Black 
citizens never returned and there is very 
little discussion or strategic efforts to aid in 
their return that I am aware of since August 
2005.  In my humble opinion, I believe the 
biggest crisis in the Black community (and 
maybe the White community) is one of 
effective, credible leadership at many tiers 
(religiously, politically, civically, socially etc). 
It’s one of the reasons I offered myself to run 
for the mayor’s seat in 2006. I thought and 
still believe that the profile of an effective 
city leader should be (but not limited to) a 
very spiritually grounded, governmentally 
experienced and militarily and culturally 
conscious individual considering the “times” 
in which we live.  
In the midst of all of the basic challenges 
to return to New Orleans after hurricane 
Katrina, our church doors reopened with 
worship services on the first Sunday in 
November 2005 with full participation from 
so many worshippers who had no place to 
have church services. This reopening was 
under the leadership of Rev. Pat Watson, 
who now serves as the Executive Pastor of 
Watson Memorial Teaching Ministries and 
CEO of the Family Center of Hope Social 
and Educational agency. I returned to our 
city on the first Sunday in January 2006 and 
we have been non stop since that time with 
rebuilding, restoring and making ongoing 
contributions to our beloved community. 
I hope and pray that our city will move 
forward over the next ten years with some 
since of “equity” so that we don’t leave so 
many others behind.  Our goal for the next 
10 years is to hold hands with partners 
throughout this region and beyond as 
we train and pave the way for the “next 
generation.” We want to ensure to the best 
of our ability that the next generation is a 
lot better off than this one. Last but certainly 
not least, I hope that the people of God 
in this city and nation would continue to 
seek His divine direction as we march on ‘til 
victory is won!
Pastor Tom Watson
Senior Pastor 
Watson Memorial Teaching Ministries
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2015 New Orleans is much more affluent, 
much more white, much more brown and far 
less black.   Traditional black neighborhoods 
such as Central City, the Lower Ninth Ward 
and many other parts of uptown are being 
gentrified at a rocket pace.  While the 
population numbers have risen to those 
similar to pre-Katrina, those numbers reflect 
new residents and the number of displaced 
natives who are unable to return home is 
alarming.  Housing prices and escalating 
rent are forcing native residents out of 
neighborhoods that their families have 
populated for generations.
The one glaring fact about New Orleans that 
has not changed is the economic disparity 
between Blacks and Whites.  Billions of 
dollars have been spent in rebuilding and 
reconstruction but very few Black New 
Orleanians have participated in capacities 
other than laborers.  Atlanta created a 
black middle class with the construction 
of its airport and we had a much bigger 
opportunity to create black wealth here. 
Unfortunately, to-date, we have failed 
miserably.  
The population will most certainly benefit 
from the construction of the new schools, 
drainage, infrastructure systems, hospitals 
and transportation systems, but those 
benefits would have still been realized 
if there had been significant minority 
participation in making some of the billions 
spent.
Our people, food, culture and way of life 
make New Orleans a wonderful place to 
live, but erasing the economic disparity 
would only make it better.  I would never 
want another Katrina, but I sure would like 
another chance to fix this and truly build 
back stronger and more equitably for all 
New Orleanians
Jay H. Banks
King-elect 2016 and Recording Secretary, 
Zulu Social Aid & Pleasure Club; and 
Director of the School of Commerce, 
Dryades YMCA
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Whenever I think about post Katrina 
New Orleans, I reect on how racism 
was woven into the very fabric of Road 
Home  - Homeowner Assistance  Program 
distributions and how that negatively 
impacted the ability of too many black 
homeowners to restore their lives and 
property. 
The inclusion of pre-Katrina property values 
into the calculations for claims rather than 
the more equitable cost to rebuild meant that 
the more Black and poor the neighborhood 
was, the less money Road Home provided for 
a home’s repair, whereas similar size homes 
in more White and auent neighborhoods 
received the maximum... because real estate 
values in New Orleans are heavily weighed 
by race. Even middle class, recently turned 
Black neighborhoods like New Orleans East 
felt the discrimination as their pre-Katrina 
property values were a fraction of the value 
before the collapse of the oil business and 
White ight from what was a primarily White 
homeowner community before 1986.
Now, 10 years later, in the name of blight 
removal, land is being taken from people 
as a result of their inability to recover, as 
many are disgustingly self-righteous about 
people who didn’t renovate their property... 
since many have to remain away with no 
resources to keep up land that has lost 
almost all its value.
So once again, those that have are those 
that got and can now grab land that is 
a bargain because those who didn’t get 
couldn’t aord to keep it.
What bothers me is there are no media 
stories, no acknowledgment, no reparation 
for this inclusion of an easily identiable 
racial and demographic factor into a disaster 
relief program. Why property values? There 
were no loans, no need for collateral, no 
federal requirement, just an assumption that 
some homes deserved to be rebuilt more 
than others and the inclusion of property 
values insured that race and demographics 
would determine which. But actually we 
are talking about rebuilding lives and in the 
Road Home program it seems rebuilding 
Black lives just didn’t matter as much.
Lloyd Dennis
Executive Director
The Silverback Society
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During this decade of rebirth following 
Hurricane Katrina, one of the more 
remarkable transformations has been New 
Orleans’ K-12 education landscape. Prior 
to Hurricane Katrina, public education in 
New Orleans was experiencing its own 
mini-disaster. We had a school board that 
was completely dysfunctional, the system’s 
finances were a mess and worst of all 
children were not learning.
While significant education reforms were 
enacted just prior to Hurricane Katrina, it 
took this tragedy that claimed the lives of 
more than 1,000 Louisianans to force us to 
make changes that we all knew needed to 
be made. The things that held us back for 
so many years – politics, turf wars, and the 
desire by many to maintain the status quo 
– were washed away by Katrina. The disaster 
thrust upon stakeholders – parents, school 
boards, lawmakers, unions, and reform 
advocates – the urgency to come together 
to create an educational environment that 
would put children and families at the 
forefront.
What’s ahead in the next 10 years for 
education in New Orleans? We must look 
to parents, who are now more informed, 
empowered and engaged in the education 
of their children. They are saying loudly 
and unequivocally, “Don’t go back!” This 
is a window of opportunity, opened by 
Hurricane Katrina, that cannot be closed. 
During the recent NOLA PARENTS 
PERSPECTIVE: A Conversation About New 
Orleans Public Education 10 Years Post-
Katrina, I listened as parents demanded that 
our schools continue to improve. They all 
agreed that the we won’t reach the finish 
line until all choices are good choices; where 
every school is an excellent school, in every 
New Orleans neighborhood.
Ann Duplessis is president of the Louisiana 
Federation for Children and former state 
senator.
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My look back at Hurricane Katrina is one of 
death and dying, grieving and goodbyes as 
exemplified by the funeral of my mentor 
and the former Urban League of Greater 
New Orleans CEO, Clarence Lyle Barney. It 
was Saturday, August 27, 2005-- just two 
days before Katrina made landfall and the 
levees broke--when the Black community 
gathered at Dillard University Chapel to lay 
Barney to rest.
Ten years after ”the” cataclysmic storm 
ripped our community asunder, forever 
changing the city, the defining event which, 
to me, symbolizes the mournful leave-
taking of a people and their  way of life is the 
funeral of our good friend and leader.
For 30 years, he had been the stalwart 
president of the local affiliate of the Urban 
League. He was determined and committed, 
a daring trailblazer. With his feet planted 
firmly on the ground, Barney understood 
the challenges of the everyday New 
Orleanian. He was at ease in every sector of 
our community. Whether conferring with 
the well-heeled uptown establishment or 
with the regular men and women whose 
culture, hard work and spirit are woven 
together to create the very fabric of the city, 
he was comfortable; he was unapologetic 
and authentic. 
At this time— the 10th anniversary of 
Hurricane Katrina and 10 years after Barney’s 
death, I find myself asking over and again, 
“What would Clarence Barney think; what 
would he say about the state of our city 
now?” Interestingly enough, I need only 
to turn pages in The New Orleans Tribune 
to find the answers. You see, Barney had 
been a frequent Tribune contributor—
writing one of his last commentaries in 
the August 2002 edition of the paper, an 
issue emblazoned with the headline “Yell 
Fire”—a headline that he had animatedly 
suggested for that issue.
Facing the daunting reality that there was 
an effort afoot to take New Orleans back, 
to wrestle influence and political muscle 
from the Black leadership that had steered 
its course during the previous 24 years, in 
that article he contemplated what he saw, 
an African American community in dire 
trouble.
And as usual, Barney was right. In fact, 
anxiety and angst envelope me as I reread 
his column. With uncanny prescience, he 
laid out the steps the establishment would 
employ to take New Orleans back.
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He warned of the consequences Black 
New Orleans would face if it waited or 
did nothing or even worse—aided the 
establishment in their mission that he 
forewarned would:
“Proclaim that a certain group of citizens is 
morally, socially, culturally and intellectually 
superior and deserves to control New 
Orleans.”
Is this not exactly what happened when the 
“shadow government” met in the days and 
weeks after Katrina with their plans for green 
space in New Orleans East and the Ninth Ward 
and their plans for redeveloping public housing 
into mixed income dwellings that provide fewer 
options for the city’s poorest residents? 
“Organize a network of private, quasi-public 
and volunteer institutions and supply them 
with a core ideology and message.”
How long after Katrina were our public 
education system and neighborhood schools 
seized and subsequently turned over to 
outside management organizations? How 
long after Katrina before talk of privatizing 
our public recreation system began? 
“Identify Blacks to carry that message and 
put them in positions of power.”
 To be sure, sadness washes over me when I 
consider the number of our leaders who have 
either co-signed these disastrous ideologies 
and messages or those who have sat silently 
saying and doing nothing as our communities, 
our schools, and our neighborhoods are placed 
on a modern-day auction block and sold to the 
highest bidders.
I know Clarence Barney would be troubled 
by this New Orleans. It may be new and 
different…revitalized. But it isn’t right. With 
too many poor, mostly Black people still left 
out, left behind, locked out and stranded—
just as they were in those haunting days after 
Katrina—it could never be right. 
In the 30 years that The New Orleans Tribune 
has been in existence and particularly 
since Katrina, we at McKenna Publishing 
have taken seriously our mission to be an 
unfettered voice for the community. We 
remain undeterred in that mission. In so 
doing, we will strive to honor the legacy of 
our friend Clarence Barney. And personally, 
I, who served a term as vice chairman of 
the local Urban League board during his 
tenure, will challenge those who celebrate 
now to genuinely reimagine New Orleans as 
a city that refuses to leave anyone behind. 
Ours should be a richer city—not because 
we priced out and locked out the poor, but 
because we did everything in our power to 
eliminate the conditions that create poverty. 
Our city cannot be made stronger—truly 
stronger—by turning its back on the weak.
Yes, certain areas of the city have made 
progress since those precarious weeks and 
months immediately following the storm. And 
as we commemorate the 10th anniversary of 
Hurricane Katrina, those strides should be 
observed. But let’s not confuse progress for 
certain areas with success. 
As I look back to the 10 years since Katrina 
and then look to the future, I want a better 
New Orleans for all of our citizens—not just 
a different one.
Beverly Stanton McKenna
Publisher, The New Orleans Tribune
